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Prospective Balance: Loss Aversion and Consistency in International Relations 
 
Robert M. Scott 
 
Prospective Balance in an interactionist systemic theory that utilizes the concepts 
of non-additivity and non-linearity to better explain the incidence of cooperation 
and conflict. The theory argues against neorealism in which the distribution of 
power in the international system purports to explain the phenomenon of 
interest. Balance theory is a manifestation of non-additivity, while attitudinal 
consistency is a manifestation of non-linearity. Balanced and imbalanced 
configurations comprise balance theory. Rational and irrational consistency 
comprise attitudinal consistency. In turn, cognitive (or unmotivated) biases and 
affective (or motivated) biases comprise irrational consistency. Both balance and 
attitudinal consistency serve as independent variables. The dynamics of prospect 
theory, in which states are risk acceptant for loss but risk averse for gain, and the 
dynamics of deterrence theory serve as intervening variables. Characteristic actor 
behaviors, identified as perceptual syndrome, intentional clarity, widespread 
loss aversion, and affective abandonment of rational consistency, comprise the 
outcomes to be explained. Because neorealism is predicated upon maximizing 
rationality, its predicate is expected utility theory, in which states take actions 
should they provide benefits in excess of costs with appropriate utilities and 
probabilities considered. Because of this orientation, neorealism is unable to 
explain instances in which states engage in conflict that has little rational basis 
 for success, on the one hand, and instances in which states cooperate with one 
another when aggression has a reasonable chance of success, on the other hand. 
By adopting prospect precepts, Prospective Balance provides a more powerful 
explanation of this puzzling behavior. Case studies selected from early to later 
19th-century Europe serve as the empirical basis for analyzing in detail two of the 
characteristic behaviors, that of widespread loss aversion, and that of affective 
abandonment. 
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Dedication 





In international relations, anarchy means that there is neither an overarching 
sovereign to enforce cooperative agreements among states nor to punish those 
states that aggress against another. Situations in which states find themselves can 
change and different leaders may come to power with different ideas as how to 
relate with others.1 Therefore, realism teaches that states must be self-regarding 
and existentially prepared to defend themselves. Because intentions can change, 
the capabilities that a state can bring to bear for military action are closely 
monitored by other states. Neorealist theory largely focuses on the distribution of 
power within the international system at any particular time in order to explain 
and predict the degree of stability and peacefulness.2 Intentions tend to be given 
short shrift. Yet, serious questions are raised by neorealism’s explanatory, and 
predictive, power, respectively. During the Cold War, the United States, as the 
overarching sovereign, welcomed an increase in the power of its allies in Europe 
and the Far East.3 After the Soviet Union disintegrated (something not 
contemplated by neorealism) and the communist threat disappeared there was 
little noticeable worry on the part of the United States regarding the power of its 
                                                            
1 Robert Jervis, “Cooperation Under the Security Dilemma,” World Politics, vol. 
30, no. 2 (January 1978), p. 168. 
2 Kenneth N. Waltz, Theory of International Politics (New York: Random House, 
1979). 
3 Jervis, “Perceiving and Coping with Threat,” in Jervis, Richard Ned Lebow, and 
Janice Gross Stein, eds., Psychology and Deterrence (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins 
University Press, 1985), p. 14. 
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former Cold War allies. Moreover, those allies have not fallen into conflict with 
one another as was predicted by a more extreme version of neorealism.4  
Interactionist theories of international relations provide a useful 
counterpoint to neorealism’s structuralism. Balance, which is a manifestation of 
consistency more generally, is one such theory with the potential to provide 
better explanations of interstate behavior regarding cooperation and conflict. 
Originally developed by cognitive psychologists for interpersonal relations, 
consistent relations provide a good form, or Gestalt, and so simplify the manner 
in which we come to understand our social environment.5 Following the Arab 
proverbs, friends tend to be friends of friends, friends of enemies tend to be 
enemies, and enemies of enemies tend to be friends. Many social and political 
patterns of relationships tend to be balanced; thus balance is a psychological 
shortcut to understanding our environment that brings informational benefits in 
                                                            
4 John J. Mearsheimer, “Back to the Future: Instability in Europe After the Cold 
War,” in Sean M. Lynn-Jones, ed., The Cold War and After: Prospects for Peace 
(Cambridge, MA: MIT Press, 1991), pp. 141-92. According to this scholar, China 
is next primary adversary of the United States. See, Mearsheimer, The Tragedy of 
Great Power (New York: W. W. Norton, 2001). For a critique of Mearsheimer’s 
position, see Matthew Rendall, “Defensive Realism and the Concert of Europe,” 
Review of International Studies, vol. 32 (2006), pp. 523-39. 
5 See, generally, Fritz Heider, The Psychology of Interpersonal Relations (New 
York: Wiley, 1958); Theodore M. Newcomb, Social Psychology (New York: 
Dryden, 1951); Robert P. Abelson, et. al., Theories of Cognitive Consistency: A 
Sourcebook (Chicago: Rand McNally and Co., 1968); Robert B. Zajonc, 
“Cognitive Theories in Social Psychology,” in Gardner Lindzey and Elliot 
Aronson, eds., The Handbook of Social Psychology, 2nd ed. (Reading, MA: 
Addison-Wesley, 1968), pp. 320-411. For an application to international relations, 
see, Jervis, Perception and Misperception in International Politics (Princeton: 
Princeton University Press, 1976), Chapter Four. 
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excess of costs.6 We are rationally consistent when reasoning in this manner.7 At 
first blush, Simon’s concept of bounded rationality has much in common with 
this approach.8 Yet, when the stimuli do not fit balanced patterns decision-
makers can make serious errors regarding the motives and intentions of others.  
Inadequate and inappropriate deterrent strategies can be crafted that bring about 
unintended and undesired conflict.  
A mediated stimulus response method of examination9 is useful in which 
the state attempts to determine the other’s intentions as demonstrated by the 
latter’s recent actions (or what Jones and Davis refer to as inferences from acts to 
dispositions).10 The state then determines whether and to what degree it needs to 
deter the other in order to protect its interests. The other, in turn, reacts to the 
state’s deterrent actions resulting in peaceful or conflictual outcomes. Peaceful 
outcomes are usually the result of more accurate mutual perceptions than of 
inaccurate perceptions. Conflict can be the result of accurate perceptions, but it is 
usually the result of misperceptions. Thus, it is important to distinguish balanced 
                                                            
6 Jervis, Perception and Misperception , ibid., p. 118. This is one strength of what 
Kelley refers to as commonsense inference. See, Harold Kelley, “The Processes of 
Causal Attribution,” American Psychologist, vol. 28, no. 2 (February 1973), pp. 
107-28. 
7 Jervis, Perception and Misperception, ibid., Chapter Four. 
8 Herbert A. Simon, Models of Bounded Rationality (Cambridge, MA: MIT Press, 
1982); Thierry Balzacq and Jervis, “Logic of mind and international system: a 
journey with Robert Jervis,” Review of International Studies, vol. 30, no. 4 (2004), 
p. 565. 
9 Jervis, “Introduction,” in Jervis, Lebow, and Stein, op. cit., p. 2. 
10 Edward E. Jones and Keith E. Davis, “From Acts to Dispositions: The 
Attribution Process in Person Perception,” in Leonard Berkowitz, ed., Advances 




and imbalanced configurations from rational and irrational attitudinal 
consistency. Misperceptions can result from two very different failures of 
rationality. First, errors in logical inference can occur even though those charged 
with directing a state’s foreign policy do their best to reason logically. These 
errors are known as cognitive, or unmotivated, biases. Second, habit or passion 
can short-circuit logical inference when individuals do not even attempt rational 
self-control.11 These dynamics result in affective, or motivated, biases.12 
Unmotivated and motivated errors can be very important in explaining the 
other’s seemingly irrational actions as well as those of the state. Cognitive biases 
result from shortcuts to processing information and would be corrected were the 
errors pointed out. In contrast, motivated biases tend to be manifested in 
rationalizations for policies that serve particular interests, usually resulting from 
domestic politics.13 It may be impossible to deter actors that are driven by such 
motivated biases; thus, a reconsideration of the costs and benefits of deterrence 
                                                            
11 Summarized by Jack Hirschleifer, “The Expanding Domain of Economics,” 
American Economic Review, vol. 75, no. 6., Centennial Essays and 1985 Survey of 
Members (December 1985), p. 59. 
12 According to McDermott, “affect refers to the way people represent the value 
of things as good or bad; it can include preferences as well as emotions and 
moods. Moods are amorphous states—like emotions, but without specific objects 
or referents. Finally, feelings are the actual experience of value” (Rose 
McDermott, “The Feeling of Rationality: The Meaning of Neuroscientific 
Advances for Political Science,” Perspectives on Politics, vol. 2, no. 4 (December 
2004), p. 692. 
13 Jervis, “Perceiving and Coping with Threat,” in Jervis, Lebow, and Stein, 
Psychology and Deterrence, op. cit., pp. 18-27. 
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versus conciliation may be in order14 although very difficult to achieve because 
of the cognitive biases of the deterring state. 
A primary problem with balance theory as it has been applied to 
international relations is that its explanatory power is underspecified. 
Inconsistent (or imbalanced) relations occur in a statistical sense and thus need to 
be explained.15 But the explanations tend to be relegated to an actor’s values, 
calculations, idiosyncracies, blunders, and leadership skills that do not reside at 
the systemic level.16 But, at bottom, balance theory is as psychological as it is 
systemic in nature. Thus, it is odd that scholarly treatments of the theory employ 
a version of bounded rationality known as expected utility theory to determine 
the intentions of actors. Costs and risks are balanced against the benefits with 
appropriate probabilities attached to such factors. The status quo is arbitrary and 
actions will generally be taken if benefits exceed costs with due consideration of 
the risks.  
A more powerful psychological theory known as prospect theory can 
buttress consistency theory in order to provide more determinate explanations 
and predictions of cooperation and conflict. According to prospect theory, the 
status quo is crucial in determining the calculations of actors. Actors will take 
                                                            
14 Jervis, “Deterrence and Perception,” International Security, vol. 7, no. 3 (Winter 
1982-83), p. 14. 
15 Jervis, Systems Effects: Complexity in Political and Social Life (Princeton: 
Princeton University Press, 1997), p. 210. 
16 Jervis, “Systems Theories and Diplomatic History,” in Paul Lauren, ed., 
Diplomacy: New Approaches in History, Theory, and Policy (New York: Free 
Press, 1979), pp. 226-27. 
  
6 
risky and aggressive actions to return themselves to the status quo but they will 
act quite conservatively when contemplating actions that could improve their 
positions. In identical situations, actors will take different actions depending on 
how the issue is framed.17 If loss aversion is widespread and a common 
understanding of the status quo prevails,18 imbalanced patterns will obtain to the 
extent that states only provisionally ally with one another to defend what they 
have and not to make opportunistic gains. Sustained interaction will generate 
cross-cutting interests as states work with others to defend what they have and 
to meliorate conflicts with others with whom they have other common interests. 
Deterrence, which is easier than compellence, should prevail.19  
Yet, when states believe that they are losing, they will take risky actions to 
return to the status quo. They may come to believe that a failure to fight for their 
values and interests will result in significant losses. Cognitive biases enter here as 
states fail to understand that their actions can inadvertently threaten others’ 
interests. Believing that they are defending the status quo, each side can 
overestimate the others’ hostility and come to believe that the latter are merely 
                                                            
17 Amos Tversky and Daniel Kahneman, “Rational choice and the framing of 
decisions,” Journal of Business, vol. 59, no. 4, Part 2: The Behavioral Foundations 
of Economic Theory (October 1986), pp. S251-S278; Jervis, “Political Implications 
of Loss Aversion,” Political Psychology, vol. 13, no. 2, Special Issue: Prospect 
Theory and Political Psychology (June 1992), pp. 187-204. 
18 Jervis, “Political Implications of Loss Aversion,” ibid., p. 192. 
19 Jervis, “Political Implications of Loss Aversion,” ibid., p. 192; Thomas 




striving to make opportunistic gains at their expense.20 Actions taken by another 
that a disinterested observer is likely to see as ambiguous in intent will be seen as 
related and confirming by a state disadvantaged by them.21 Conflict is most 
likely to occur here22 because deterrent actions will not dissuade aggression but 
will merely confirm in the other fearful state that the former intends it harm.23  
When states are desperate they can take aggressive actions that a 
disinterested observer believes have little chance of succeeding and thus will 
surprise others.24 Status quo states will not understand the circumstances that 
give rise to the desperate state’s actions because the drivers of domestic politics 
of a particular state tend to be opaque to others.25 Recent behavior by the 
desperate state will be perplexing to others because the actions will not seem to 
serve a useful purpose.26 In other cases, overestimation (rather than 
underestimation) of an adequate deterrent threat can take place leading to self-
deterrence of the target state.27 Opportunistic states will be eager to make gains, 
but even status quo states can improve their positions at little cost and risk when 
                                                            
20 Jervis, “Political Implications of Loss Aversion,” ibid., p. 192; Jervis, “War and 
Misperception,” Journal of Interdisciplinary History, vol. 18, no, 4 (Spring 1988), 
pp. 688-89. 
21 Jones and Davis, in Berkowitz, ed., op. cit., p. 239. 
22 Jervis, “Political Implications of Loss Aversion,” op. cit., p. 192. 
23 Richard K. Betts, “Conventional Deterrence: Predictive Uncertainty and Policy 
Confidence,” World Politics, vol. 37, no. 2 (January 1985), pp. 153-79; Jervis, 
“Political Implications of Loss Aversion,” op. cit., pp. 192-93.  
24 Jervis, “Political Implications of Loss Aversion,” op. cit., p. 192. 
25 Jervis, “Perceiving and Coping with Threat,” in Jervis, Lebow, and Stein, 
Psychology and Deterrence, op. cit., p. 27. 
26 Jones and Davis, op. cit., p. 229. 
27 Jervis, “Perceiving and Coping with Threat,” in Jervis, Lebow, and Stein, 
Psychology and Deterrence, op. cit., p. 26. 
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others fail to defend their interests. An advantage of employing prospect theory 
is that it provides a theoretical linkage between cognitive and affective biases 
and posits the circumstances under which one or the other will be 
predominant.28 When states mutually believe that they are losing regarding the 
status quo, cognitive biases can hold sway, but when a state feels desperate, 
affective biases may predominate.29 An objective determination between mere 
loss and desperation may be impossible to draw. This is why status quo states 
remain surprised at actions that a desperate state takes. 30 
Finally, balanced patterns have a real referent when the other is 
dispositionally motivated to hurt the deterring state. Gross deterrent threats may 
keep the peace if they leave no ambiguity in the other’s mind of the 
determination of the state to protect its interests and values. War may break out 
but it will not be the result of mutual misperceptions. But this occurrence should 
be rarer according to prospect theory than according to expected utility theory. 
As will be argued, a more common dynamic occurs when ideology and power 
combine to generate adversarial relations, but loss aversion inhibits the 
antagonists from attempting to disarm the other with a first-strike attack. 
 
 
                                                            
28 Jervis suggests this as an unsolved research problem in “Perceiving and 
Coping with Threat,” but his later analysis in “Political Implications of Loss 
Aversion,” suggests the following formulation. 
29 Jervis, “Political Implications of Loss Aversion,” op. cit., pp. 192-93. 
30 Jervis, “Political Implications of Loss Aversion,” op. cit., p. 195. 
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Plan of the dissertation. 
Chapter 1 will specify in detail the theory outlined above. Balance theory is 
somewhat agnostic as to whether balanced systems are more peaceful or warlike 
than imbalanced ones. By grafting prospect theory to consistency theory it is 
argued that more determinate predictions can be made. Configurations in which 
irrational consistency prevails, either through cognitive biases or motivated 
biases, or both, are most likely to end in war.31 In contrast, rational consistency 
prevails when loss aversion is widespread and mutually understood. The world 
ought to be more peaceful than balance theory in which actor calculations are 
posited on expected utility theory. Rational consistency also prevails when a 
coherent image of the adversary as being aggressive leads to strong deterrent 
strategies.32 Deterrence theory is not defeated if and when war breaks out in such 
an instance. Some adversaries simply are not deterrable. 
 The interactionist theory proposed will be tested against neorealist 
theories that attempt to predict cooperation and conflict on the basis of 
distinctive distributions of power in the international system. As will be argued 
in the next chapter, implicit in neorealism’s explanatory power is the assumption 
of maximizing rationality. Thus, expected utility theory is the proximate reason 
for action-oriented behavior and the primary competitor to prospect theory. Yet, 
                                                            
31 Jervis, Perception and Misperception, op. cit., Chapter Four. In the interview 
with Balzacq, Jervis allows that, at the time of the writing, the concept of 
motivated bias did not figure as an aspect of irrational consistency. See, Balzacq 
and Jervis, op. cit., pp. 564-65. 
32 Jervis, “Deterrence and Perception,” op. cit., p. 23, fn. 31; Jones and Davis, op. 
cit., p. 229-30. 
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additional explanatory theories to be tested in head to head tests is not a 
particularly fruitful manner in which to proceed. This is because psychological 
models by themselves cannot provide complete explanations of interstate 
cooperation and conflict. Rather, as Levy argues, “cognition and affect mediate 
between international and domestic structures and processes and the foreign 
policy decisions of political leaders, and we need to explain the nature of those 
reciprocal linkages by integrating psychological variables into more 
comprehensive theories of foreign policy and strategic interaction.”33   
Chapters 2 through 7 provide case studies to test the hypotheses. 
Boulding usefully categorizes interactions between putative adversaries as being 
characterized either by illusory incompatibility or real incompatibility.34 As will 
later be demonstrated, the analysis can be further extended to argue that 
interactions between states can also be characterized by both real compatibility 
and illusory compatibility. Chapter 2 identifies the Concert of Europe from 1815 
until the outbreak of the Crimean War in 1854 as a period in which real 
compatibility existed among the major European powers. Loss aversion was 
widespread and mutually understood.  
Chapters 3 through 7 examine wars precipitated by motivated biases on 
the parts of leading European statesmen, due to domestic considerations, to 
                                                            
33 Jack S. Levy, “Political Psychology and Foreign Policy,” in David O. Sears, 
Leonie Huddy, and Robert Jervis, eds., Oxford Handbook of Political Psychology 
(New York: Oxford University Press, 2003), pp. 274-75. 
34 Kenneth Boulding, “National Images and International Systems,” Journal of 
Conflict Resolution, vol. 3, no. 2 (1959), p. 130. For discussion and criticism of 
Boulding’s concepts, see Jervis, Perception and Misperception, op. cit., pp. 75-76. 
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revise the status quo. In all of these case studies evidence of illusory 
compatibility as being crucial to abetting the degree of conflict that eventuated is 
discovered. Illusory compatibility is manifested in the severely imbalanced 
patterns of alignment that obtained. Mutual over-, and under-, deterrence, 
respectively, as well as asymmetric deterrence, in which one actor is under-
deterred while his opponent is simultaneously over-deterred, exhaust the 
theoretical possibilities here. Thus, Chapter 3 examines the diplomacy leading up 
to and including the Crimean War in which Britain and Russia reluctantly went 
to war with each other because they repeatedly failed to make clear to each other 
their determination to protect their respective interests. Mutual over-deterrence 
eventually resulted in a war that neither side wanted. Chapter 4 examines the 
Franco-Austrian War of 1859 resulting in the unification of Italy. France, 
Sardinia, and Austria had motivated biases to precipitate this war but ended up 
fighting to a stalemate because risk aversion for gain on the parts of outside 
major powers largely subverted effective intervention. Thus, Italy won by 
default. Mutual under-deterrence led the combatants to believe that they could 
fight with impunity.  
In Chapters 5 through 7, Germany, under Bismarck, was able to construct 
an imbalanced system, in part due to the statesman’s genius, but also because 
both England and Russia were largely self-deterred, having absented themselves 
from European interstate politics. Again, motivated biases prevailed largely for 
domestic reasons. Prussia was repeatedly under-deterred while third party major 
  
12 
European powers were, at times, self-deterred, as well as over-deterred. Thus, 
Chapter 5 examines two conflicts that were crucial to dissolving Franco-British 
cooperation, cooperation that might at least have slowed down German 
unification or at least required that it legitimately occur under peaceful 
circumstances. These conflicts were the 1863 Second Polish Uprisng and the 1864 
Danish War over the Elbe Duchies. Chapters 6 and 7, examine the Austro-
Prussian War of 1866, and the Franco-Prussian War of 1870, respectively. (Pre-
World War I interstate diplomacy, largely the product of cognitive biases 
stemming from mutual fears of loss from the status quo, is the paradigm case of 
illusory incompatibility. Process-tracing those biases on the parts of the 
participant powers could well comprise a separate full volume and thus will not 
be attempted here.) Only two of the four systemic dynamics, real compatibility 
(later characterized as widespread loss aversion), and illusory compatibility 
(later characterized as affective abandonment), respectively, will be assessed in 
detail. Thus, Chapter 8 can only provide partial assessments of the validity of the 
theory of prospective balance.  
 13 
Chapter 1:  Prospective Balance: Loss Aversion and Consistency. 
The interrelated dynamics of non-additivity and non-linearity characterize 
complex systems.1 In contrast, simple systems, if they can be called systems, are 
characterized by additivity and linearity.2 Semi-complex systems can be 
conceived as hybrids between the two. Non-additivity might be analyzed in a 
linear vein as might additive systems in which non-linearity prevails. Dyadic 
arms races are examples of the latter hybrid system. Employing consistency 
theory with expected utility theory might be seen as an example of a non-
additive system in which linear thinking prevails. Yet examining relevant 
dynamics reveals predictive indeterminacy regarding outcomes of interest. It will 
be argued that synthesizing consistency theory with prospect theory is an 
example of a complex system that should provide an improved explanation of 
cooperation and conflict in international relations. 
                                                            
1 Robert Jervis, System Effects: Complexity in Political and Social Life (Princeton: 
Princeton University Press, 1997). Balzacq makes the extremely perceptive 
observation that these two characteristics are interrelated, something that has not 
been fully appreciated. See, Thierry Balzacq and Jervis, “Logic of mind and 
international system: a journey with Robert Jervis,” Review of International 
Studies, vol. 30 (2004), p. 574. Interestingly, in an early article on systems theory 
Jervis argued that systems were characterized both by interconnectedness and 
conditionality, the latter of which is the same as the concept of non-additivity. 
Later work has continued to emphasize non-additivity, but also to incorporate 
non-linearity. The early systems article is “Systems Theories and Diplomatic 
History,” in Paul Lauren, ed., Diplomacy: New Approaches in History, Theory, 
and Policy (New York: Free Press, 1979), pp. 212-44 and a later work that shifts is 
“Systems and Interaction Effects,” in Jack Snyder and Jervis, eds., Coping with 
Complexity in the International System (Boulder, CO: Westview Press, 1993), 
Chapter 2.  
2 We can largely dispense with the notion of a system when behavioral 
consequences are additive, linear, and straightforward. On this point see, Jervis, 
“Systems and Interaction Effects,” in Jack Snyder and Jervis, eds., ibid., pp. 25-26.  
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 In developing the theory it is useful to disaggregate balanced and 
imbalanced patterns, on the one hand, from rationally and irrationally consistent 
attitudes, on the other hand. Balance is an aspect of consistency theory that is the 
result of systemic non-additivity. Attitudinal consistency is an aspect of 
consistency theory that incorporates the concept of non-linearity. Regarding 
attitudes, we are specifically interested in the consistency that results when 
judging a policy and the advantages and disadvantages believed to go with that 
policy and the consequent response to that policy.3 Responses may be non-linear 
in scale due to the influence of affect in decision making.4 Disaggregation and 
then recombination of these two manifestations of consistency theory should 
allow for a more fine-grained analysis than previously thought.  
Collectively assessing analyses formerly seen in isolation serves to 
underscore this proposition. The famous comment by Churchill regarding his 
view of the Soviet Union with regard to Germany, “If Hitler invaded Hell, I 
would make at least a favorable reference to the Devil in the House of 
Commons,”5 is a good example. This comment is used both in Jervis’s analysis of 
balanced systems6 as well as in his analysis of rational consistency.7 Here we see 
                                                            
3 Edward Jones and Harold Gerard, Foundations of Social Psychology (New 
York: Wiley, 1967), pp. 180-81. 
4 Rose McDermott, “The Feeling of Rationality: The Meaning of Neuroscientific 
Advances for Political Science,” Perspectives on Politics, vol. 2, no. 4 (December 
2004), pp. 691-706. 
5 Winston Churchill, The Second World War, vol. 3: The Grand Alliance (Boston: 
Houghton Mifflin, 1950), p. 370. 
6 Jervis, “Systems Theories and Diplomatic History,” in Lauren, ed., op. cit., p. 
228. 
 15 
an identity of outcomes regarding two different manifestations of consistency 
theory, which suggests that there is more than just a familial relationship 
between the two. But, this finding is not dispositive in making the case for the 
utility of distinguishing the two aspects of consistency theory.  
An example in which balance and attitudinal consistency potentially point 
to different outcomes would be strong evidence in favor of the theory proposed. 
Regarding the dynamics leading to the outbreak of the First World War, balance 
theory argues that for Britain to side with France meant opposing Germany. 
Nevertheless, the hostile inferences that Germany drew were at least partially 
caused by Britain’s lack of empathy with Germany’s predicament and this lack of 
empathy was produced primarily because Britain failed to see (or refused to see) 
how its own policies harmed German interests.8 Although the connections were 
indirect, Britain should have seen that its efforts to ward Russia off from India by 
encouraging and abetting Russian expansion in Persia and the Balkans would 
raise life and death questions for Austria, Germany’s only reliable ally.9 Here we 
see another convergence of outcomes regarding the two different manifestations 
of consistency theory. But the possibility is held out that a more rationally 
                                                                                                                                                                                 
7 Jervis, Perception and Misperception in International Politics (Princeton: 
Princeton University Press, 1976), p. 122.  
8 Jervis, “Systems Theories and Diplomatic History,” in Lauren, ed., op. cit., p. 
238.  
9 Paul W. Schroeder, “Embedded Counterfactuals and World War I as an 
Unavoidable War,” in Schroeder, Robert Jervis, David Wetzel, and Jack S. Levy, 
eds., Systems, Stability, and Statecraft: Essays on the International History of 
Modern Europe (New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2004), pp. 168, 75, 90. Barbara 
Jelavich, Russia’s Balkan Entanglements, 1806-1914 (Cambridge: Cambridge 
University Press, 1991). 
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consistent attitude on the part of Britain with implications for consequent 
German behavior might have materially changed the outcome from one of 
general war to an object-lesson in crisis management that was ultimately 
resolved in favor of maintaining the peace.10      
Having made a preliminary case for the proposed theory, the independent 
variables of balance and consistency will be related through an analysis of risk 
aversion. Appropriately, the intervening variables are the utility of deterrence 
and the dynamics of prospect theory. Multidirectional causality is evident as the 
dynamics of balance can either reinforce or mitigate the dynamics of consistency, 
and vice versa, through the mediation of risk aversion.  The dependent variable 
is a characterization of interstate conflict or cooperation and can produce positive 
or negative feedback11 to the independent variables as follows: 
                                                            
10 In the article cited above Jervis is pessimistic regarding peaceful prospects, but 
others are less so, to a point. See, Schroeder, “Embedded Counterfactuals and 
World War I as an Unavoidable War,” in Schroeder, Jervis, Wetzel, and Levy, 
eds., Systems, Stability, and Statecraft, ibid., pp. 188-91.  
11 Positive feedback occurs when a change that moves a variable in a particular 
direction reinforces that directional change. Negative feedback reduces change in 
one direction by roughly that same amount in the opposite direction. Systems are 
unstable when positive feedback is present and homeostatically stable when 
negative feedback occurs. For discussion, see Norbert Wiener, Cybernetics, or 
Control and Communications in the Animal and Machine, 2nd ed. (Cambridge: 
MIT Press, 1961), pp. 6-7.    
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Figure 1: Prospective Balance Theory Schematic 
 
 
The discussion will begin with a detailed analysis of each independent 
variable. In so doing, the dynamics of balance and consistency will provisionally 
be treated as processes, or, alternatively, as intermediate outcomes variously at 
the levels of the individual decision-maker, dyad, and triad. In putting 
theoretical flesh on the bone, the implications for deterrence will be a common 
feature. After considering the independent variables, predictive problems will be 
noted when applying expected utility theory; further, the dynamics of prospect 





mediated by risk aversion will be considered in order to generate distinctive 
outcomes of cooperation or conflict at the systemic level.12 
Balance and imbalance. 
From a systems standpoint, non-additivity means that the relations between two 
states are often explained by the separate states’ relations with a third state. 
Thus, we cannot determine the degree of cooperation and conflict between two 
states solely or even primarily by examining their bilateral relations. Two states 
might be adversaries, not because they have direct conflicts with one another, but 
because one is allied to a third state that is the enemy of the other. Two states 
might be allies because they share a common ally; they also might be allies 
because they share a common enemy despite the fact that they otherwise have 
little affinity for one another.13 Realism counsels that the state pay close attention 
to the degree that its security interests are furthered or hindered by the actions of 
other states. Thus, states recognize that allies might possess undesirable 
characteristics from a domestic politics standpoint. Democracies find the internal 
                                                            
12 Phenomena of interest can be treated as processes or as outcomes. But, they 
can also be treated as both for different purposes within the same theory. On this 
distinction, see Jack S. Levy, “Political Psychology and Foreign Policy,” in David 
O. Sears, Leonie Huddy, and Robert Jervis, eds., Oxford Handbook of Political 
Psychology (New York: Oxford University Press, 2003), p. 262.   
13 James A. Davis, “Structural Balance, Mechanical Solidarity, and Interpersonal 
Relations,” American Journal of Sociology, vol. 68, no. 4 (January 1963), p. 445; 
George Caspar Homans, The Human Group (New York: Harcourt, Brace & Co., 
1950), pp. 248-61.  
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politics of authoritarian states to be odious, but will ally with them when the 
external threat is great enough.14 
Balance codifies the interconnections described above. Drawn from the 
Arab proverbs, the following relations obtain: the friend of my friend is my 
friend; the enemy of my friend is my enemy; and the enemy of my enemy is my 
friend. As a first cut, these dynamics generate rather gross predictions as to the 
likelihood of cooperation and conflict in a particular instance of interstate 
relations. The act of siding with one actor against another will likely bring the 
enmity of the isolated actor even if that is not one’s intention. For a friend to 
become friendly with an enemy is likely to bring strain in the relationships all 
around. This inconsistent relationship will eventually tend toward balance as 
either the former enemy will become a friend or the former friend will become an 
enemy, thus designating the moving actor as the isolate in the latter case.15 Of 
course, a state might prefer the strain of an imbalanced relation when compared 
with being the isolated minority facing a hostile pair of states,16 but balance 
argues that this is likely to be a temporary situation as the other actors consult 
their own interests and react accordingly.17      
                                                            
14 Jervis, Perception and Misperception in International Politics, op. cit., p. 122. 
15 Frank Harary, “A Structural Analysis of the Situation in the Middle East in 
1956,” Journal of Conflict Resolution, vol. 5, no. 2 (1961), pp. 167-78.  
16 Philip Brickman and Charles Horn, “Balance Theory and Interpersonal Coping 
in Triads,” Journal of Personality and Social Psychology, vol. 26, no. 3 (1973), pp. 
347-55. 
17 Brian Healy and Arthur Stein, “The Balance of Power in International History: 
Theory and Reality,” Journal of Conflict Resolution, vol. 17, no. 1 (March 1973), 
p. 57. 
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Systems are most likely to be balanced either when one issue is both 
predominant and divisive or when all of the relevant issues coalesce such that all 
states are separated into two different camps. In such cases there are no cross 
alignments. All of the states in one camp oppose all of the states in the other 
camp.18 One consequence is that states with little in common other than the 
divisive issue at hand can be arrayed against states with which they have 
common interests.19 
 Systems have a tendency toward balance as states strive to further their 
interests, but reality and experience should allow us to make some judgments as 
to when the forces do not predominate. Balance is least likely when security 
threats are diffuse or when the degree of conflict within the system is not too 
acute.20 If a reversal of alignments takes place, the rules of balance indicated 
above dictate that the losing state become hostile to both the other states. But this 
stand is costly to the state, particularly if the reversal is not permanent.21 In fact, 
the actions of the state might generate unnecessary hostility and thus make the 
                                                            
18 Jervis, “Systems Theories and Diplomatic History,” in Lauren, ed., op. cit., p. 
228. 
19 Jervis, “Systems Theories and Diplomatic History,” in Lauren, ed., op. cit., p. 
231. 
20 Employing directed graph theory, the degree of balance in a system has been 
developed by Harary et. al., but the results have been disappointing. According 
to Healy and Stein, “the ratio becomes especially significant when the two-way 
relationship between points is involved. In that case the graphs become quite 
complex and the degree of balance is far from obvious” (Healy and Stein, “The 
Balance of Power in International History,” op. cit., p. 51); Harary, R. Z. Norman, 
and Dorwin Cartwright, Structural Models: An Introduction to the Theory of 
Directed Graphs (New York: John Wiley, 1956), p. 346.  
21 Jervis, “Systems Theories and Diplomatic History,” in Lauren, ed., op. cit., p. 
230. 
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reversal permanent when a more solicitous understanding of the other might 
bring benefits.22  
 Imbalance can also occur because of propitious circumstances for one 
state. Due to the dynamics of anarchy in international relations outlined in the 
introduction, even status quo states can be tempted to make easy gains when 
others fail to defend their vital interests. Additionally, threats may be 
particularly acute throughout the system yet imbalance can result. Because of 
ideological antipathy states may fail to align with one another in a timely manner 
thus allowing an aggressive state to make outsized gains before it is stopped. 
Because systems have a tendency toward balance, this is not an expected 
configuration. Conversely, a decision-maker might decide that he can continue to 
be hostile toward two states and thus maintain an imbalanced system without 
the both adversaries coming together to oppose him. Domestic politics may be 
the proximate reason but irrational consistency is ultimately the causus causans 
when statesmen fail to take proper notice of the severity of the external threat 
and allow domestic interest groups to make policy that undermines the security 
of the state.23 Moreover, as detailed below, irrational consistency can be analyzed 
                                                            
22 Jervis, Perception and Misperception in International Politics, op. cit., pp. 37-
38. 
23 Schweller’s theory of underbalancing follows Coser in arguing that the pre-
crisis degree of group cohesion is the key to explaining whether a state will 
balance or fail to adequately balance against an external threat. Elite cohesion, 
elite consensus, government/regime vulnerability, and social cohesion comprise 
his explanatory variables. See, Randall L. Schweller, Unanswered Threats: 
Political Constraints on the Balance of Power (Princeton: Princeton University 
Press, 2006), Chapter 2; Lewis A. Coser, The Functions of Social Conflict (New 
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systemically. This is an advantage over previous theorizing regarding the 
conditions that give rise to imbalanced configurations. Unusual circumstances 
and idiosyncratic factors, such as personality to include proficiency and 
deficiency in statesmanship, heretofore have been relegated to residual 
explanations that are non-systemic in nature. 
Rational consistency. 
The belief that relationships have a tendency toward consistency provides a 
baseline of expectation against which to test reality. We essentially engage in 
‘reality-testing’ in order to make better decisions.24 Reason and experience 
provide us with informational benefits in excess of search costs when the 
consistency that we perceive reflects the consistency actually existing in the 
environment. On the one hand, sociologists have noted a preference for 
positivity in triadic relationships.25 Experience and reason lead us to believe that 
our friends tend to like our other friends. This is particularly the case when we 
hold similar opinions on significant values that provide informational content 
regarding opinions on other important values.26 On the other hand, we are also 
said to be rationally consistent when we become suspicious of the peaceful 
                                                                                                                                                                                 
York: Free Press, 1956), p. 98.  However, crisis decision-making should diminish 
the impact of these factors in states able to engage in ratioanal consistency. See 
Ole R. Holsti’s comments at fn. 52. 
24 Kenneth E. Boulding, “The Learning and Reality-Testing Process in the 
International System,” in John C. Farrell and Asa P. Smith, eds., Image and 
Reality in World Politics (New York: Columbia University Press, 1967), pp. 1-15. 
25 Brickman and Horn, “Balance Theory and Interpersonal Coping in Triads,” op. 
cit., pp. 347-55. 
26 Jervis, Perception and Misperception in International Politics, op. cit., pp. 126-
27. 
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overtures by an adversary because we do not expect the latter to wish us well. 
Experience with previous deceptions and the intrinsic meaning of the idea of an 
enemy go a long way toward allowing us to read our environment correctly. The 
probability matching fallacy says that an event that occurs five out of six times 
should not lead us to bet against the occurrence of the event on the sixth try even 
if the event occurs as predicted in the first five instances. Thus, repeated attempts 
by an adversary that contravene our interests should not lead us to fall prey to a 
conciliatory move.27 The adage that a tiger can’t change his stripes largely applies 
here. In other instances, if we have to align with a less threatening actor in order 
to defeat a more immediate threat we do so with an understanding that this 
balanced configuration is likely to be temporary. In international relations, allies 
may harbor as many negative qualities as may the adversary of the moment, but 
we rationally understand that we need the former’s assistance. When the 
external threat abates we can rationally be more selective with whom we choose 
to associate. 
 The concept of bounded rationality28 has much in common with the 
concept of rational consistency. According to Keohane,  
“actors subject to bounded rationality cannot maximize their utilities, 
since they find it difficult to use available information to calculate the 
costs and benefits of every course of action. They therefore use shortcuts 
                                                            
27 Nathan Kogan and Renato Tagiuri, “Interpersonal Preference and Cognitive 
Organization,” Journal of Abnormal and Social Psychology, no. 56, no. 1 (January 
1958), pp. 113-16; Jervis, Perception and Misperception in International Politics, 
op. cit., p. 125. 
28 Herbert A. Simon, Models of Thought (New Haven: Yale University Press, 
1979); Models of Bounded Rationality (Cambridge: MIT Press, 1982). 
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such as rules of thumb in order to ‘satisfice’—achieving a satisfactory level 
of performance rather than an optimal one. In the terms of Akerlof and 
Yellen,29 they may be ‘near rational.’ That is, their deviations from 
rationality may not be so costly as to lead them to change their 
behavior.”30 
 
 The rules of thumb that Keohane alludes to somewhat parallel the 
rationally consistent dynamics analyzed above, but not universally. Satisficing 
tends to work well enough in situations where repeated interactions provide 
informational feedback, the situation is relatively unchanging, and the stakes are 
not so high that an optimal decision is required. Limited value integration occurs 
because the values are frequently incommensurable and the aspirational level for 
each value is not particularly high.31 Thus, satisficing tends to be appropriate for 
firms and large organizations engaged in typical bureaucratic decisions.32  
The satisficing model breaks down when the information needed to make 
an important foreign policy decision that is unique is either absent or ambiguous. 
Keohane is correct to argue that near rational behavior at the unit level can 
produce significantly different outcomes at the systemic level than theories, such 
                                                            
29 George A. Ackerlof and Janet Yellen, “Can small deviations from rationality 
make significant differences in economic equilibria?” American Economic 
Review, vol. 75, no. 4 (September 1985), pp. 708-20. 
30 Robert O. Keohane, “Realism, Neorealism, and the Study of World Politics,” in 
Keohane, ed., Neorealism and its Critics (New York: Columbia University Press, 
1986), p. 12. 
31 John D. Steinbruner, The Cybernetic Theory of Decision (Princeton: Princeton 
University Press, 1974), p. 62. 
32 Richard Cyert and James G. March, A Behavioral Theory of the Firm 
(Englewood Cliffs, NJ: Prentice-Hall, 1963); Richard R. Nelson and Sydney G. 
Winter, An Evolutionary Theory of Economic Change (Cambridge: Harvard 
University Press, 1982). 
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as Waltz’s,33 that employ maximizing rationality. He has correctly identified a 
major drawback of neorealist theories that analogize from classical 
microeconomics. Bounded rationality is a better approximation of reality that 
also does not sacrifice the possibility of systemic theory.34 But Keohane contrasts 
bounded rationality with Morgenthau’s thought experiment in which perfect 
rationality is used as a baseline against which misperceptions, perverse 
bargaining dynamics, and sheer irrationality are compared.35 Perceptual 
satisficing bridges this conceptual divide without sacrificing the possibility of 
systemic theory. The deviations that produce significantly different outcomes at 
the systemic level can likely be a result of perceptual satisficing by decision-
makers when the requisite information does not exist or is ambiguous. As 
discussed below, perceptual satisficing occurs when statesmen engage in 
shortcuts to cognition that will lead them astray when such shortcuts do not 
correctly analyze the stimuli in the environment.36 By perceptually satisficing 
decision-makers fail to revisit their policies when it becomes obvious that they 
are failing to achieve their objectives. Examples abound in foreign policy in 
which failed policies are continued well after a ‘near rational’ analysis would 
                                                            
33 Kenneth N. Waltz, Theory of International Politics (New York: Random House, 
1979). 
34 Keohane, “Realism, Neorealism, and the Study of World Politics,” in Keohane, 
ed., op. cit., pp. 12-13. 
35 Keohane, “Realism, Neorealism, and the Study of World Politics,” in Keohane, 
ed., op. cit., p. 12; Hans J. Morgenthau, Politics Among Nations, (New York: 
Knopf, [1948], 1978), p. 5. 
36 Jervis, “Political Decision Making: Recent Contributions,” Political Psychology, 
vol. 2, no. 2 (Summer 1980), p. 99. 
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dictate a change in course of action and at least one reason is that cognitive biases 
can be controlling. 
Irrational consistency. 
Irrational consistency can occur when cognitive, or unmotivated, biases 
predominate. These cognitive errors would be corrected were they pointed out to 
the decision-maker by a disinterested observer. Irrational consistency can also 
occur when affective, or motivated, biases are present. In such cases, the settled 
on policy calls up the values served rather than the other way around. Under 
irrational consistency, multiple sufficient causality is manifested for a chosen 
policy that would pass muster for any individual value adduced. This 
consistency is suspicious because there is little reason to believe that the values 
served by the policy are in any way positively related to each other. Interestingly, 
those who disfavor a policy tend to adduce values opposite to those that make 
up the suspicious consistency regarding the favored policy.37 Thus, they display 
irrational consistency as well. This should not be surprising as March argued in 
his theory of bounded rationality that all decisions involve some prediction as to 
how their outcomes will make us feel. It is precisely this ‘feeling of rationality’ 
                                                            
37 Early theorizing argues that this dynamic is cognitive in nature. More recent 
theorizing argues that affect plays a significant role. For a cognitive argument, 
see Jervis, Perception and Misperception in International Politics, op. cit., pp. 
128-42. For an affective argument, see Paul Slovic, “Trust, emotion, sex, politics, 
and science: Surveying the risk-assessment battlefield,” Risk Analysis, vol. 19, 
no. 4 (1999), pp. 689-701. 
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that then can become the predicate for our preferences in the first instance.38 
Many examples of irrational consistency reflect a mixture of cognitive, and 
motivated, bias, respectively, but for theoretical clarity, they are disentangled. A 
number of preliminary comments regarding cognition and affect and their 
relationship are offered before specifically addressing the individual biases. 
 It might be argued that cognitive biases are not a manifestation of 
irrational consistency, but closer inspection reveals the utility of inclusion 
because one of the factors, the failure to perceive value trade-offs, can be a 
manifestation. Moreover, the factors producing cognitive bias tend to reinforce 
each other in an irrationally consistent manner. Cognitive biases are shortcuts 
that we use to make sense of our environment. As demonstrated above, the 
tendency to perceive balance serves us well when reality reflects our perceptions; 
thus, one could hardly call this cognitive bias debilitating for accurate decision-
making. But cognitive biases reveal irrational consistency when the consistency 
that we perceive does not match the stimuli existing in the environment. The 
relevant biases for examination are: assimilating information to pre-existing 
images of the other without consciously understanding that this is taking place, 
which leads to overestimating the complexity of our thought processes, which 
leads to overconfidence in drawing conclusions regarding the intentions of 
others. This unwarranted confidence relieves us of engaging in hard thinking 
                                                            
38 James G. March, “Bounded rationality, ambiguity, and the engineering of 
choice,” Bell Journal of Economics, vol. 9, no. 2 (1978), pp. 587-608; McDermott, 
“The Feeling of Rationality,” op. cit., p. 698.  
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and, instead, allows us to engage in perceptual satisficing with the result that 
value integration in the form of trade-offs is neither perceived nor made. One 
effect of failing to make value trade-offs is to make too many enemies because we 
are unable to see how others perceive our own actions as they affect their 
interests.  
Of these factors, the reluctance to perceive value trade-offs and the 
related, but not logical, belief that all good things go together, as detailed above, 
can also be the result of motivated bias. But, the difference between these two 
types of bias turns on the motivations for the reluctance to perceive trade-offs. At 
one extreme, cognitive bias is the root cause when the trade-offs are easy to avoid 
or the long-term consequences of the failure to engage in value integration are 
difficult to predict.39 Moreover, cognitive biases are pervasive and generate 
perceptions based on what we expect to see as the consequence of prior beliefs.40 
Although complicated and contentiously debated, the dynamics of the run-up to 
the First World War reflect a syndrome of irrational biases that are largely 
cognitive in nature, in particular, the beliefs held by most of the major actors that 
the adversary would back down as in recent crises of the previous years and that, 
if war came, it would be over by Christmas even though the highest values were 
at stake.41 
                                                            
39 Jervis, Perception and Misperception in International Politics, op. cit., p. 142.   
40 Levy, “Political Psychology and Foreign Policy,” in Sears, Huddy, and Jervis, 
eds., op. cit., p. 268.  
41 On the first point, see, Schroeder, “Embedded Counterfactuals and World War 
I as an Unavoidable War,” in Schroeder, Jervis, Wetzel, and Levy, eds., Systems, 
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 In the case of ease of avoidance of making trade-offs, proper incentives 
can prolong deliberation in order to correct errors that arise from insufficient 
attention. But even so, incentives are no guarantee of success because effective 
learning requires accurate and immediate feedback regarding the relationship 
between the situation and the appropriate response. This necessary feedback is 
often missing because outcomes are often delayed and not necessarily 
attributable to a particular action; there is variability in the environment that 
degrades the reliability of the feedback, in particular when outcomes of low 
probability occur; there is often no information about what the outcome might 
have been had a different decision been made; and most important decisions are 
unique and thus provide little opportunity for learning.42  
At the other extreme, motivated bias is the root cause when the trade-offs 
are particularly painful because the values are deeply held. Motivated biases 
generate perceptions due to felt needs, desires, and, most critically, interests. 
They are most likely to arise when highly consequential decisions are being 
made.43 Moreover, as will be discussed later, anticipated feelings of regret at the 
                                                                                                                                                                                 
Stability, and Statecraft, op. cit., pp. 157-91. On the second and third points, see, 
Paul M. Kennedy, “The First World War and the International Power System,” 
International Security, vol. 9, no. 1 (Summer 1984), pp. 7-40. 
42 Hillel J. Einhorn and Robin M. Hogarth, “Confidence in judgment: Persistence 
of the illusion of validity,” Psychological Review, vol. 85, no. 5 (1978), pp. 395-
416. Cited in Amos Tversky and Daniel Kahneman, “Rational Choice and the 
Framing of Decisions,” Journal of Business, vol. 59, no. 4, part 2: The Behavioral 
Foundations of Economic Theory (October 1986), p. S274. 
43 Irving L. Janis and Leon Mann, Decision Making: A Psychological Analysis of 
Conflict, Choice, and Commitment (New York: Free Press, 1977); Richard Ned 
Lebow, Between Peace and War: The Nature of International Crises (Baltimore: 
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prospect of negative outcomes can systematically bias the decision-making 
calculus.44 For example, the decision by the Bush administration to invade Iraq, 
likely, in some manner, to avenge the obscenity of the 9/11 attacks on the U.S. 
homeland, is an example of motivated bias. National Security Advisor Rice 
warned of the imminent threat of nuclear and chemical weapons emanating from 
Saddam Hussein’s regime if the U.S. failed to take military action.45 Yet it seems 
quite plausible that her comment, “…we don’t want the smoking gun to be a 
mushroom cloud”46 was used as an excuse to cut short the United Nations 
Monitoring, Verification, and Inspection Commission’s search in Iraq for nuclear 
and chemical weapons. Had the UNMVIC been allowed to complete an 
investigation that would have revealed the falsity of the weapons claims, 
international diplomacy would have obviated the policy option of militarily 
invading Iraq, which is precisely what the Bush administration wanted to avoid. 
  Motivated bias in the Iraq case is evidence of irrational consistency only 
when examining the specific illogic used in the failure to engage in value trade-
offs in this instance. Had we seen administration officials make the case for a 
direct relation between the purported enormity of the stakes and the imagined 
difficulty of the task, the failure to engage in value trade-offs could still be a 
                                                                                                                                                                                 
Johns Hopkins University Press, 1981); Levy, “Political Psychology and Foreign 
Policy,” in Sears, Huddy, and Jervis, eds., op. cit., p. 268. 
44 Keith Markman, Igor Gavanski, Stephen Sherman and Matthew McMullen, 
“The impact of perceived control on the imagination of better and worse possible 
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function of motivated bias, but without further implication. Or it might have 
been a rational response because invasion was considered the best option from a 
cost-benefit standpoint and the American people would then be called upon to 
engage in shared sacrifice in order to prevail. But instead, suspicious bolstering 
occurred. An advisor to the Bush Administration asserted that prevailing 
militarily in Iraq would be a “cakewalk.”47 Vice President Cheney asserted that 
the Iraqi people would welcome the American military as liberators.48 Finally, 
President Bush prematurely declared ‘mission accomplished’ after the initial 
invasion and asked little of the American people other than to continue to go 
shopping in order to support the economy.49  
Irrational consistency tends to manifest itself through cognitive bias when 
a decision-maker fails to search for alternatives after the chosen policy is seen to 
be failing. In the case of motivated bias, irrational consistency can reveal itself 
earlier through arguments used to justify a policy that contradict logical 
expectations. (Motivated bias need not necessarily lead to irrational consistency. 
Other inconsistencies mentioned earlier, such as the belief that imbalanced 
relationships can be maintained in the presence of two adversaries, can also be a 
function of motivated bias.) Between the polar opposites of cognitive bias and 
motivated bias lies the realm in which the actor perceives the need to integrate 
                                                            
47 Kenneth L. Adelman, “Liberating Iraq would be a cakewalk,” Washington 
Post, February 13, 2002. 
48 Cheney interview with Tim Russert, Meet the Press, March 16, 2003. 
49 Andrew J. Bacevich, “He told us to go shopping: Now the bill is due,” 
Washington Post.com, October 5, 2006. 
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values and make trade-offs. All goals cannot be achieved; thus, in order to 
achieve certain highly valued goals, others need to be sacrificed or scaled back. 
In such instances, actors behave in a rationally consistent manner when the 
environment that they perceive requires such action in order to secure achievable 
valued goals.  
These propositions parallel research into the non-linear dynamics of 
political crisis decision-making. Non-linearity means that all sorts of returns to 
scale can be found regarding actions.50 The stress associated with making 
consequential political decisions is functional for the quality of the decision being 
made. According to Holsti, “some degree of stress is an integral and necessary 
precondition for individual or organizational problem solving, since in its 
absence there is no motivation to act. Even very low levels of stress may not be 
sufficient to alert one to the existence of a situation requiring attention, 
increasing vigilance, and stimulating preparations to cope with it.”51 Moderate 
stress levels structure the situation that the decision-maker is facing in order to 
mitigate the consideration of irrelevant values and to facilitate the integration of 
values deemed to be important. Moreover, the number of parties involved in the 
decision tend to narrow as the highest stakes in security affairs are considered 
and the organizational “politics of bargaining for resources, roles, missions, and 
                                                            
50 Thierry Balzacq and Jervis, op. cit., p. 574. 
51 Ole R. Holsti, “Crisis Decision Making,” in Philip E. Tetlock, Jo L. Husbands, 
Jervis, Paul C. Stern, and Charles Tilly, eds., Behavior, Society and Nuclear War, 
vol. 1 (New York: Oxford University Press, 1989), p. 28. 
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compromise” give way to rationally consistent analysis.52 Too high a level of 
stress challenges the optimistic aspects of decision under pressure and 
accentuates the negative aspects of reduced attention spans, cognitive rigidity, 
and compressed time horizons.53 According to Levy, the high stakes decisions 
facing political decision-makers gives them “greater incentives to expend mental 
energy to make rational decisions and to learn from their mistakes, but those 
stakes also create higher levels of stress and (after a certain point) suboptimal 
performance.”54 
A neuroscience perspective supports these lines of argument, but also 
reveals that the relation between cognition and affect is more complex because it 
is governed by multiple emotion systems in the individual. Such systems have 
access to, and produce appraisals of, the sensory stream of incoming data even 
before an attempt is made to apply cognition. It is precisely these appraisals that 
initiate, and thus stimulate, emotional, cognitive, and behavioral activity.55 The 
upshot is that cognition and emotion mutually support, and are necessary to, 
each other, respectively. According to Marcus, “emotion enhances our capacity 
to reason and indeed that to reason requires emotion not just to recruit its 
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abilities but also to execute its conclusions.”56 Emotional information usually 
adds both accuracy and efficiency in making judgments. But there are limits. 
Both extreme anger and fear can overwhelm more cognitively based responses 
and thus inhibit the decision-maker from making an objective analysis.57 This 
dynamic between cognition and affect will later help us characterize ideal types 
regarding cooperation and conflict as the consequence of the interaction between 
consistency and loss aversion.  
Cognitive (unmotivated) biases. 
The streams of evidence presented to us are being assimilated to pre-existing 
images of the other and recent history quite unconsciously.58 A formerly 
aggressive adversary will have a very difficult time in convincing us its overtures 
are peaceful and not a ruse. Conversely, democracies have a difficult time in 
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believing that its allies would go to war for anything other than defensive 
reasons. Recent cataclysmic war generates pre-existing images of the situation 
that may or may not be appropriate to the instance at hand. The conclusion of the 
Napoleonic Wars generated a fairly common understanding on both sides as to 
the fault and liability of France. Because France accepted responsibility, it was 
largely spared dismemberment even if it was not particularly trusted.59 States 
generally feared that revolution led to war and the malleable and contrasting 
doctrines of intervention and non-intervention in the affairs of other states 
reflected this concern. Even if the methods to achieving security were contested 
by states differently affected by domestic unrest in neighboring states, the pre-
existing beliefs of the causes of war and revolution largely stabilized mutual 
expectations of interstate behavior and led to uncommon cooperation during the 
Concert of Europe. In contrast, the somewhat widespread revised belief that 
Germany was not entirely responsible for causing the First World War and that 
the conflict was both unwanted and generated by systemic dynamics 
(particularly those of military technology and alliances)60 led the British to 
underestimate the forces driving the Nazis to violently overturn the status quo. 
Finally, the Nazi experience may have predisposed the United States to see the 
Soviet Union as being cut from the same aggressive mold, thus generating much 
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unforeseen and unnecessary hostility that produced the Cold War.61 
Unfortunately, the ruthless and paranoid Stalin abetted this pre-existing image. 
Gaddis speculates that the Cold War might have been avoided had Stalin not 
come to power.62 
Unconsciously assimilating bits of new information to pre-existing images 
ultimately results in unwarranted confidence in our opinions because we 
overestimate the complexity of our thought processes at the same time that we 
fail to realize that we are simplifying. Streams of new information are not 
evaluated in isolation, but are either incorporated or reformulated to conform to 
what we expect to see. This ‘selective attention’ to information largely accounts 
for the persistence of our beliefs.63 The political commentator David Brooks 
captures this conceit quite nicely: “Humans are overconfident creatures. Ninety-
four percent of college professors believe they are above average and 90 percent 
of drivers believe they are above average behind the wheel. Researchers J.H. 
Shoemaker and J. Edward Russo gave computer executives quizzes on their 
industry. Afterward, the executives estimated that they had gotten 5 percent of 
the answers wrong. In fact, they had gotten 80 percent of the answers wrong.”64 
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The upshot of this misplaced confidence is that we might not know what 
the other is thinking, but we likely know what we are thinking. We impose our 
understanding of the situation and presume that the other is thinking in this 
manner. For instance, presumption of the manner in which an adversary 
employs new military technology is likely to reflect the manner in which we 
would employ it. This is not necessarily irrational; physical limitations on the 
capabilities of the technology are a brute fact. A short-range missile cannot be 
launched inter-continentally. But the manner in which the technology is 
employed by the adversary in its tactical and operational doctrine may be quite 
unanticipated, surprising, and beyond our ken because we are confident that we 
know how it will be employed by a comparison with our own military 
doctrine.65 Two examples readily come to mind. The German blitzkrieg during 
the Second World War was a doctrinal innovation rather than one of technology. 
According to Jack Snyder, French military commanders failed to adequately 
deploy their forces in a period of mobile armored warfare.66 In another important 
case, Stein argues that the Arab use of densely deployed anti-aircraft missiles to 
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defeat the Israeli Air Force during the 1973 October War instead of improving its 
air force is another example of such innovation.67 
Perceptual satisficing occurs when a policy that seems satisfactory is 
settled upon. Little effort is made to search for alternative policies that would 
produce more optimal results and incoming streams of disconfirming 
information are either disregarded or reformulated as evidence that the settled 
on policy is working. Premature cognitive closure can occur. British Foreign 
Secretary Grey did not make clear that his country would stand by France and 
not remain neutral if it was involved in a war with Germany, but the German 
leadership convinced itself of British neutrality and made little effort to confirm 
whether this was true or not.68 Thus, at the outbreak of fighting, Chancellor 
Bethmann-Hollweg’s lament that, “the war turns into an unlimited world 
catastrophe only through England’s participation,”69 may have reflected sincere 
surprise that was the result of severe cognitive bias. From the standpoint of the 
Entente powers, Schroeder argues that intermittent signals of moderation in 
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bellicose behavior by Germany served only to reinforce the notion that the 
alignments were working and thus needed to be maintained which only served 
to increase German frustration with its geopolitical predicament.70 
Perceptual satisficing also results in a failure to engage in value trade-offs. 
The primary value is seized upon and other values are brought into line with 
that value. Two heuristic principles are usually invoked to reduce the 
complexity of assessing probabilities and therefore to settle on the primary value 
of interest. First, states tend to overestimate, on the basis of psychological 
salience, the probability that a vivid event, likely experienced first-hand, will 
recur. Second, there is a tendency to attach excessive representativeness to small 
samples of behavior that may be quite rare.71 Without realizing it, states usually 
fail to integrate values when they decide on the basis of a single value 
dimension.72 Thus, if war avoidance is the primary value, the costs of concessions 
to the other state might be mitigated. Conversely, if deterrence of aggression is 
the primary value, the costs of generating unnecessary hostility might be 
minimized. Either resulting policy might be acceptable if the appropriate risk is 
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being defended against. Concessions to an insecure state may relieve its anxiety 
while threats to an aggressive state might disabuse the latter of the state’s 
determination to protect its interests. But the policy will suffer if the  
circumstances change and the state fails to adapt.73 In certain cases, when a 
tentative decision is being reached, overconfidence can bias a decision-maker to 
dismiss out of hand opposing views of the situation, in particular, those of 
foreign diplomats who might hold a keener appreciation of the situation.74 
 In the worst case the lesser risk may be seized upon. The state might either 
overestimate or underestimate a deterrent posture that the other state believes is 
sufficient to make clear its determination to defend its interests. When 
overestimation occurs, the state is essentially self-deterred and may concede a 
bargaining advantage quite out of proportion to the other state’s 
representations.75 If the other state is aggressive, the state’s self-deterrence will 
dovetail nicely and even encourage the other state’s aggressive behavior. Prior to 
a war council meeting with the Kaiser in 1912, Bethmann-Hollweg viewed the 
emerging, but limited, détente with Britain as a means to avoiding war. 
Afterward, he became convinced that war was likely and pinned his hopes on 
Britain staying neutral in a continental war involving Germany because of the 
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détente.76  Unfortunately, Grey continued to see the détente as evidence that 
Germany would continue to restrain itself and its junior ally, Austria.77 The 
British Foreign Secretary seemed oblivious to evidence that the situation had 
changed regarding German intentions and that the wrong risk was being 
defended against.   
Underestimation occurs when the state convinces itself that it is safe to 
trifle with the other state’s interests that a disinterested observer believes are 
most certain to be defended. Underestimation is a particularly acute problem 
when the hostility of the other is overestimated, but the other’s deterrent posture 
is seen as vulnerable to preemption. In such cases, crisis instability results when  
deterrent forces become targets of attack.78 Crisis dynamics are driven even 
harder when the state believes that war is likely and it is better to strike first than 
to receive the first blow.79  
A consequence of the failure to make value trade-offs can be to make too 
many enemies because no values and interests are sacrificed. Termed the 
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fundamental attribution error, there is a tendency for a state to believe that its 
actions are justified because it is reacting to situational factors, but to assume the 
actions of the other as being dispositionally motivated.80 (The other side of the 
coin is that concessions by the state are seen to be dispositional. That is, the 
concessions by the state are freely given. In contrast, concessions by the other 
state are seen to be situationally driven. That is, the other state has no choice but 
to comply with the state’s demand.)81 The state fails to see that the realization of 
its interests might just threaten the interests of others. This can occur when the 
long-term effects of a policy are hard to predict. But it can also occur when the 
state is relieved from making difficult choices.82 For instance, states blessed with 
free security through geographic providence (e.g., Britain regarding the English 
Channel, the United States regarding its protective oceans on both sides) believe 
that they are strong enough to avoid these value trade-offs.83 Preponderantly 
large states such as Wilhelmine Germany can believe that bullying will not lead 
others to coalesce against them. (In contrast, smaller states may be forced to 
make value trade-offs because they recognize that they cannot afford to make too 
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many enemies.)84 Risk is manipulated to force others to get out of one’s way if 
mutual ruin is not to be the result. Schelling refers to this dynamic as forcing 
upon the other the last clear chance to avoid disaster.85 
Motivated (affective) biases.     
Opinions that an actor holds are not always the consequence of reality-testing 
clouded by the cognitive biases discussed above.86 Affective biases may be at 
work when the actions that another takes serve important interests usually 
resulting from domestic politics.87 According to Levy, “motivated biases are most 
likely to manifest themselves in decisions involving high stakes and 
consequential actions that might affect important values or tradeoffs having 
important values, and the resulting stress from threats to basic values often leads 
decision-makers to deny those threats or the need to make tradeoffs between 
values.”88 If cognitive biases generate perceptions of what we expect to see, 
affective biases can be related to reactions toward what we do not expect to see. 
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This latter dynamic predisposes actors to factor anticipated regret into the 
decision making calculus. Unanticipated outcomes can produce reactions that do 
not scale in effect. Surprises can feel more pleasant (if they are positive) or more 
painful (if they are more negative) than expected outcomes.89 Experimental 
evidence suggests that decision-makers are more likely to regret bad outcomes if 
they are in control of the situation.90 Decision-makers additionally regret bad 
outcomes if they are the result of action rather than inaction.91 But surprisingly, 
decision-makers experience greater regret if the bad outcomes are the result of 
inaction rather than action.92 Thus, a bias is in favor of action rather than inaction 
even though we cannot predict the content.     
Because the dynamics that operate in another state are frequently opaque 
to us, we can be faced with a situation in which the necessary evidence is missing 
rather than ambiguous, the latter of which is the case when cognitive biases 
predominate. If we presume that the other was ignorant regarding the effects of 
its actions on others, we might try to educate it by signaling a stronger deterrent 
stand to protect our interests. But this stronger deterrent stand may well backfire 
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and promote aggression because the other has motivated biases to act in the 
proscribed manner. 
 Underestimation and overestimation of a deterrent threat can be the result 
of affective biases rather than the consequence of cognitive biases. In such cases, 
perceptions are the result of policies rather than being the cause of policies.93 
Again, irrational consistency results but the taproot is different. A good example 
of underestimation is a case in which a state decides that it wants to develop a 
relationship with another state by becoming hostile to the latter state’s adversary. 
The adversary will be understandably mystified because it believes that it has 
done nothing to provoke the state. Moreover, the state’s challenge of the 
adversary’s deterrent stance that is believed to be credible will further compound 
the misperception if it is not understood that third party dynamics are the crux of 
the issue. From the standpoint of the state, cognitive dissonance occurs when it 
rationalizes its actions by developing an intrinsic reason for opposing the 
newfound adversary when it becomes obvious that little external evidence exists 
for the stance.94 
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Overestimation of a deterrent threat can occur for affective reasons when a 
state threatens to leave an alliance by charging that the alliance is failing to 
defend its interests, which can then be better served by allying with the enemy. 
Affective biases will not be needed here provided that the state correctly focuses 
on the greater threat to its security, but such biases can be causal when the state 
wants to renege on its fair share of the alliance burden. There is a rational basis to 
free-riding, but only if the collective good is actually provided.95 Stalin’s 
neutrality pact with Hitler is perhaps a good example of affective biases at work, 
but the explanation is more complicated than the thumb-nail sketch presented 
for expository purposes.96 Stalin rationally did not want Britain and France to 
maneuver him into fighting Hitler alone. Britain and France had similar concerns 
about being left alone on the battlefield against Germany.97 These concerns are to 
be expected of status quo states. But Aspaturion argues that, while Britain and 
                                                            
95 Both the Prisoner’s Dilemma and work on collective goods theory demonstrate 
that what is individually optimal can be collectively suboptimal, but learning 
should eventually take place after persisting in a failing policy. Glenn Snyder 
addresses this learning point at fn. 217. 
96 Posen’s characterization combines every possible motive as a reason for 
Stalin’s action, thus making it near impossible to analyze in a single theoretical 
framework: “Moscow may have been aiming at an alliance; or at appeasement, 
as were France and Britain, or at keeping its options open against the possibility 
of French and British accommodation with Hitler; or at scaring the Western allies 
into making a greater effort to tighten their connection with the Soviet Union” 
(Barry R. Posen, “Review Article: Competing Images of the Soviet Union,” World 
Politics, vol. 39, no. 4 (July, 1987), p. 596). 
97 Wolfers shows that the relations between France and Britain regarding the 
German threat were as contentious as were their separate relations with the 
Soviet Union. See, Wolfers, Britain and France Between Two Wars: Conflicting 
Strategies of Peace Since Versailles (New York: Harcourt Brace, 1940). Thus, it 
can be argued that all three states suffered from affective biases to greater or 
lesser degrees. 
 47 
France were genuinely status quo states, the Soviet Union always tended to be 
provisionally status quo: “The Soviet Union was revisionist when Germany was 
weak, a defender of the status quo after Hitler came to power, and revisionist 
again in 1939 when it seized the opportunity to gain territory and remain neutral 
in a war between its foes.”98  
Opportunism in this instance served the state very poorly as Germany 
consequently attacked the Soviet Union.99 While Britain and France were 
understandably uncertain about Nazi intentions during the early days of 1934 
and the evidence pointed as much in favor of conciliation as in favor of 
deterrence, statesmen steeped in a realist tradition had no intentions of going 
over to Hitler’s side. Of Hitler, Lord Halifax wrote, “One had a feeling all the 
time that we had a totally different sense of values and were speaking in a 
different language.” 100 In contrast, significant affective bias prevented Stalin 
from understanding that Hitler was not a man with who one might associate in 
order to make gains.     
When a state acts out of desperation defensive avoidance intensifies the 
failure to avoid value trade-offs and largely occurs when deeply held values 
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cannot be sacrificed.101 A state that fights a war in which it has little chance of 
winning is not necessarily problematic from a perceptual standpoint. If fighting 
and losing a war can stem a state’s further decline, the aggression can be quite 
rational.102 But defensive avoidance occurs when a state underestimates and 
distorts the costs of challenging the status quo. Such a state is not able to see that 
it will be defeated by its adversaries if it persists in challenging the status quo 
because it is preoccupied with the costs it will pay if it does not challenge the 
status quo.103 Wishful thinking occurs as decision-makers see their desired 
policies as more likely to succeed at the same time that they convince themselves 
that failure is improbable. This is more likely the case when such decision-
makers seduce themselves with an illusion that they are in control of the 
unfolding events.104  
Technological and organizational dynamics as they relate to affective biases. 
Scholarly understanding of the security dilemma and refinement of the 
implications of military technology and organizational dynamics can reveal why 
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a desperate state engages in motivated biases to fight a war that it will ultimately 
lose. Due to anarchy, the security dilemma operates when the actions that a state 
takes to protect itself threaten the security of others even though the former may 
have no intention to do others harm. Measures can be taken to ameliorate, but 
not to eradicate, the situation short of world government; thus the dilemma is 
very real in international relations. Military technology can abate or exacerbate 
the security dilemma. Specifically, when the defense is both stronger than the 
offense and the defense can be distinguished from the offense, the security 
dilemma should not be acute. The reverse occurs when the offense is both 
stronger than the defense and the offense and the defense cannot be 
distinguished from one another. In such a case, even status quo states are 
required to act like aggressors in order to protect themselves.105 More recent 
considerations of the offense/defense balance conclude that the defense is almost 
always stronger than the offense from technical and geographical standpoints.106 
Yet, organizational dynamics have been given short shrift with respect to 
surprise attack in this argument. A priori, the defense is more powerful than the 
offense. The problem is that, a posteriori, history demonstrates that states and 
their military organizations rarely take the timely action needed to make the 
stronger defense work as theorized. The initial phases of a surprise attack often 
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favor the offender even if the defense eventually prevails.107 Status quo states 
believe that they have successfully made clear to aggressors that they will defend 
their interests. Thus, they are genuinely surprised when attacked by a desperate 
state.  
Desperate states engage in aggression, in part, because of motivated 
biases. But they also do so, in part, because, historically, surprise attack works. 
Thus, they rely on either self-deterrence by the attacked state (it will allow the 
aggression to stand), or an unwillingness by the attacked state to fight a total war 
to regain its lost possessions.108 A refined understanding of the dynamics of 
military technology and organizational dynamics as they relate to the security 
dilemma gives a desperate state a rational sliver of incentive to believe that its 
enterprise will work. 
The best example of defensive avoidance is Japan’s attack on Pearl Harbor 
in 1941, which was the result of desperation. But even here, the case is not so 
clear-cut. According to Betts, “the status quo, or what seemed to flow from it, 
appeared intolerable (or less tolerable than a gamble on war); war at some point 
in the future, with declining prospects for victory, seemed inevitable (or almost 
inevitable); and there appeared to be no satisfactory diplomatic or other 
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alternative to change the situation (or none more palatable than war).”109 Japan 
was loath to give up its colonial possessions in the Far East as they threatened 
British interests there. American leaders were obtuse to the Japanese economic 
predicament.110 At the same time that they were arguing to their Japanese 
counterparts that defensive support for Britain did not imply prejudice towards 
Japanese interests,111 the Americans refused to allow Britain to concilliate 
Japan.112 The American oil embargo left Japan with the unenviable choice 
between retrenching and launching a preventive war on British interests in the 
Dutch East Indies and on American interests in Hawaii.113 The surprise attack on 
Pearl Harbor succeeded in the short run, but failed in its long run purposes. 
American leaders were taken by surprise precisely because they knew that Japan 
could not survive a long total war. Therefore, they discounted the possibility of 
the surprise attack.114  In turn, Japanese leaders hoped that the United States 
would be self-deterred by such a brazen act or that they would only fight a 
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limited war in which the Japanese might be able to prevail.115 Strong American 
public opinion that it would oppose Japanese imperialism failed to disabuse the 
Japanese leadership of its contemplated aggression because the latter had 
motivated biases to believe that the impossible could somehow succeed. Because 
the Japanese preferred war to retrenchment, they could not be deterred. Because 
the Japanese could not be deterred, making cooperation more attractive to them 
by the United States was the only way to solve the predicament,116 but the 
Americans made no attempt to do so because they believed that dispositional, 
rather than situational, dynamics, respectively, were at play.  
This account of the opening of the war in the Pacific is accurate as far as it 
goes. Nevertheless, as detailed above, the U.S. and Britain were not of the same 
mind. Although the Americans carried the day, the potential for imbalance 
inhered in the differential attitudes toward Japan. Even more importantly, Japan 
could perhaps be forgiven for believing that American policy was not of one 
mind. Three decades earlier, Teddy Roosevelt secretly championed the Japanese 
position in the settlement of the Russo-Japanese War of 1905. Although the 
American congress was not predisposed to allowing Japanese expansion in 
Southeast Asia, President Roosevelt enthusiastically viewed Japanese 
paramountcy on the Korean peninsula much as he did American predominance 
in Latin America by means of the Monroe Doctrine. Moreover, he secretly cabled 
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Tokyo that the U.S. and Britain approved of the annexation of Korea, an 
unconstitutional act. Finally, Admiral Yamamoto had vivid cognitive images of 
the successful surprise attack by the Japanese on the Russian fleet at Port Arthur 
in Manchuria and used this as the basis for planning the attack on Pearl 
Harbor.117               
Defensive avoidance is a severe form of affective bias. Both the dynamics 
of underestimation and overestimation, respectively, of deterrent threats can 
have affective components as well. Under both defensive avoidance and 
underestimation, states come to believe that their aggressive actions will not be 
contested. Overestimation results in self-deterrence and leads the state to believe 
that concessions to the other state will not lead the latter to press its advantage. 
Overestimation of the threat results in failing to take an adequate deterrent stand 
and hoping to get off scot-free.118 
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 One caveat needs to be made here. As indicated previously, all of these 
affective biases tend to result from domestic level politics. One reason why the 
British did not do a better job of deterring Germany prior to the First World War 
is that Grey feared that the government would fall over this stand. When states 
are deeply conflicted they may end up with policy paralysis. Deficient 
statesmanship can be at work. Moreover, the sense of threat necessary for a 
polity to focus on the predominant threat may not be realized until disaster is at 
the doorstep. But it is not unreasonable for a state to appease another state that it 
knows it is in no position to presently oppose. Appeasement, in the older, more 
diplomatic, sense of the term, can be appropriate if it buys the state time. Allies 
can be found, domestic support generated, and perhaps circumstances can 
change that will allow the state to eventually prevail against an aggressive 
adversary. The problem defines the imperative to take appropriate action and, 
when such action is not taken, irrational consistency manifests itself. The British 
were faced with this problem prior to the Second World War. But neither the 
British, nor the French for that matter, did little to rectify the military imbalance 
with Nazi Germany and were no more ready to prosecute war in 1939 than they 
were in 1934 when the Nazi threat began to manifest itself.119 
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 Unintended consequences can occur when states underestimate another 
state’s deterrent profile. In turn, the deterring state may not be able to predict its 
own response.120 The basis of the response is likely to be affective driven as 
anticipated regret biases the response in favor of action rather than inaction. For 
instance, neither the Soviets nor the Americans expected that a three-fold 
increase in American defense spending would result from a Korean ‘war of 
liberation’ in an area which the Americans previously abjured an interest in 
defending.121 But decision-affect theory sheds light on why an active outcome of 
this sort should not have been unexpected.   
Relating balance and consistency through risk assessment and its relationship to 
deterrence.  
 
So far, the dynamics of balance and consistency have largely been analyzed in 
isolation of one another. But a mediated stimulus response method of analysis is 
appropriate and this is where both dynamics either reinforce or mitigate each 
other to generate non-obvious outcomes of cooperation or conflict. When another 
state takes an action that affects our interests, it usually behooves us to ask what 
is intended by the action. Then, a response is taken, which, in turn, is reacted to 
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by the originally moving state.122 In effect, we act as ‘naïve scientists’. Following 
the work of Nisbett and Ross, Larson argues that, “the naïve scientist must 
describe accurately an individual datum (an object or event), characterize a 
sample of data, generalize to the population of objects or events, assess the 
magnitude of covariation between events, formulate causal explanations, predict 
future events, and test theories.”123 Because we are enmeshed in a system, we are 
potentially able to realize that both situational and dispositional factors must be 
separated from each other and recombined to make a considered judgment 
concerning another’s actions.124 But reasoning systemically is another area in 
which non-linearity makes itself evident and is surprising because most actors 
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tend to think in linear fashion.125 Using a rough version of expected utility theory 
we judge another’s action based on the benefits that we presume it intended to 
achieve for itself and balance those expected benefits against the costs and risks 
of the actions with appropriate probabilities attached.126 What is key here under 
rational choice is that the carriers of value are states of wealth or assets, rather 
than just discrete changes in wealth or assets, the latter of which severely limits 
the effect of the diminishing marginal utility of any acquired asset.127 
Actions (also conceptualized as policies) are believed to generate 
advantages as well as disadvantages. It is natural to presume that an actor takes 
an action in which the advantages outweigh the disadvantages. Else, why take 
the action unless the actor is a deviant? Indeed, we presume that the more the 
perceived disadvantages result from the policy, the presumable advantage will 
take on greater importance to the actor.128 In the case in which only 
disadvantages result from the policy, as judged by a disinterested observer, we 
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might consider that the actor was either unaware or ignorant of the effects of his 
actions.129 Such an actor does not necessarily deserve censure, but it might need 
to be educated as to the consequences of its actions on others as well as to 
itself.130   
 When we judge that the actor likely knew of and approved of the 
advantages and recognized the disadvantages associated with his actions, 
proportionality seems to guide our judgment, which is a fairly linear manner of 
thinking. Large projected gains ought to be proportional to the risks and costs 
involved even if we attempt to thwart them when they go against our interests. 
But when the gains are not commensurate with the risks we become alarmed at 
the other’s future intentions. A state that risks a lot in order to achieve a small 
gain is generally perceived likely to be nastier and less deterrable when it 
becomes stronger.131 Thus, it is best to strongly oppose the state in the infancy of 
its aggressive career in order to demonstrate that the rights and interests of 
others need a measure of respect rather than to indulge it. States that probe 
another state’s deterrent strategy in order to make gains ought to desist when 
significant resistance is met. Furthermore, expected utility theory, as discussed 
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below, counsels that losing ventures ought to be scrapped regardless of the sunk 
costs that are involved.132 
Predictive indeterminacy regarding the intentions of others when employing 
expected utility due to linear thinking. 
 
This line of thinking is not necessarily wrong; a particular model of deterrence 
theory is largely predicated upon it.133 The appetite is expected to grow with the 
eating and satiation may not take place unless the aggressive action is thwarted. 
But, as alluded to in a previous section, the assessment of the other here is largely 
dispositional and neglects the degree to which systemic dynamics are 
contributory. The spiral model of conflict incorporates situational dynamics and 
balances the benefits, costs, and risks of deterrence with those of conciliation in a 
particular instance. The motives and intentions of others are distinguished and at 
least considered. A state may fully intend its aggressive action, but it does so 
because it was compelled by the situation at hand. That is, the motive was fear 
for its safety even if its intention was aggressive.134 In fact, if we can discern that 
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all like actors would take the same action in the same situation, it is difficult to 
impute malice on the part of the moving state.135 As indicated above, an 
understanding of the security dilemma is relevant here although states tend to 
underestimate it, rather than overestimate it, with regard to others.136 That is, 
they fail to see that the measures that they take to secure themselves just might 
threaten the security of others.  
We learn little about the state’s intentions when it acts in the expected 
manner even if the situation is not compelling.137 While there are likely no a 
priori rules for conduct in international relations, one should not be surprised 
that great powers will vigorously defend their vital interests.138 A policy may 
serve a number of distinctive values, any of which would be sufficient to justify 
the action. But when the policy is recognized by disinterested observers to serve 
a desired value, however they define it, the reason behind a state’s action and its 
future intent with regard to others will be ambiguous from an informational 
standpoint.139 For example, if a state claims a strategically important geographic 
choke-point, it gains a measure of security for itself against attack. But it should 
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also be obvious to others that such an advantage might be profitably used for 
aggression against others.    
 If the appetite does not necessarily grow with the eating, a state that 
achieves sufficient resources or values to increasingly provide for its own 
security may become more reasonable with others. Different returns to scale may 
be found as a state becomes increasingly able to provide for its security.140 The 
Soviet doctrine of peaceful coexistence with the West under Krushchev came 
about as the Soviets claimed to achieve a substantial nuclear arsenal. In contrast, 
the communist Chinese contemporaneously argued that the Western nuclear 
threat was a paper tiger, a point taken largely because it lacked the means to 
defend itself without Soviet protection.141 Furthermore, at some point that is hard 
to specify, the secure state may actually become more unreasonable and thus 
more aggressive because it is strong enough to bully others rather than to work 
with them in order to achieve mutual ends.142 The peaceful end of the Cold War, 
in which the United States pocketed all of the gains with respect to the Soviet 
Union, may have led certain American decision-makers to believe that American 
military power could achieve almost any goal.143 It certainly looks that way to 
much of the world regarding the decision of the former Bush Administration to 
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wage war in Iraq, although the subsequent difficulty of the task has led to 
sobering reassessments as to what military power can and cannot accomplish. 
 These dynamics can work in reverse. A state might deter another state 
believed to be secure and expect that continued deterrence will generate the 
same result only to find that it fails in the next instance. In fact, the latter may 
look for an opportunity to demonstrate that it will not tolerate a string of losses 
in succession.144 To use Morgan’s formulation, the success of immediate 
deterrence can prejudice general deterrence.145 Redoubling one’s effort may 
appear puzzling to observers since the failure to make a gain is generally not 
seen as a loss, but reputational costs may enter here.146 Domestic audiences or 
allies might punish a state that appears unable to secure what it deems to be in 
its interest after a demand has been made. The fact of the demand puts the 
reputation at risk while the absence of a demand perhaps generates no such 
inference. But the situation is not so clear as non-linearity makes itself felt here. A 
state’s electorate might punish a decision-maker in the next election were he to 
concede a small loss internationally, but rally to him were he to lose big after a 
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demand has been made.147 Internationally, states can fear domino dynamics: the 
failure to prevail in one instance might lead allies to doubt the state’s resolve to 
defend its other interests and consequently desert to the adversary. But here, 
other inferences are possible. The fact that a state quits a losing enterprise might 
encourage allies to place more stock in the rest of the state’s defensive 
commitments.148      
Determining dispositions from recent actions according to prospect theory. 
Much of the indeterminacy regarding the dynamics elaborated above result 
because an analysis of the actor’s values and calculations must be made. This 
may be unavoidable when the situation is not so compelling. From a levels-of-
analysis standpoint, behavior at both the domestic and individual decision-
making levels, respectively, may be required rather than just relying on 
dynamics at the international level. Nevertheless, the indeterminacy also exists 
because of the manner in which an actor attempts to calculate another’s 
intentions. Moreover, the method of calculation can be analyzed systemically. 
Expected utility theory sees the status quo as being arbitrary. Whether a state 
will take a conciliatory or conflictual approach toward others can turn on 
whether the action brings benefits in excess of costs with due considerations of 
the risks. One problem with expected utility comparison is that different actors 
may put different valuations on the same course of action in a particular 
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instance. Another problem is that different risk profiles can generate different 
behavior even if agreement exists as to the value of the course of action. Thus, 
different values and different means-ends beliefs complicate the explanatory 
power and predictability of expected utility theory.149   
In contrast to rational choice models, under prospect theory the carriers of 
value are gains and losses of wealth or assets, rather than overall positions of the 
latter. The typical S-shaped value function for prospect theory is defined for 
deviations from the reference point (usually the status quo) rather than on 
overall asset positions; is generally concave for gains and convex for losses; and 
is steeper for losses than for gains, experimentally derived as much as by a ratio 
of 2:1.150 This means that the status quo anchors expectations and that states will 
take risky measures in order to maintain the status quo or to return themselves to 
the status quo after a loss. They will be reluctant to take risky measures to make 
similar gains. The latter dynamic is somewhat expected, but the former is quite 
surprising.151 (Anecdotally, we feel less happy about fortuitously finding a 
twenty-dollar bill than we feel more pained upon finding that we lost twenty 
dollars that was formerly in our possession.) An actor’s choice can be driven by 
how the issue is framed. In otherwise identical situations, an actor might take a 
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risky action that is seen as averting a loss when the same actor will refrain from 
the same action if the issue is framed as one in which gains are possible.152  
Three dynamics peculiar to prospect theory are important drivers of actor 
behavior. They are the endowment effect, the certainty principle, and the 
insurance premium/lottery ticket. The first two dynamics can work in 
conjunction; the third dynamic can work at cross-purposes to the first two.  
States tend to endow their holdings with more value than a disinterested 
observer believes is appropriate.153 This may be irrational, but it may also 
stabilize the situation when envy and covet are suppressed. Nevertheless, trades 
that a third party believes to be in the mutual interest of two parties might not be 
made when the latter two place an inordinately high value on what they 
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individually possess.154 Cognitive dissonance can also occur when states 
exaggerate the value of their possessions in order to justify the expenditures of 
effort being made to retain them in a contest with others.155   
The certainty principle (or the non-linear response to probabilities) argues 
that actors will place an unusually high valuation on outcomes that have a 
probability of either 1 or 0. What is peculiar about this principle is that this 
preference is not sensitive to the value of the contemplated action.156 For 
example, a certain outcome ought to provide great benefits, such as the 
disbanding of one’s army because peace is certain. Moreover, people should pay 
more for actions that significantly reduce, but do not eliminate, a particular risk, 
but they do not do so because of an attachment to the certainty principle.157  
In contrast, expected utility calculations tend to hedge, even if 
suboptimally, concerning the intentions of a potential adversary. This problem is 
evident due to the recent discovery in security studies of the existence of an 
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adversary that is simultaneously aggressive and fearful. For example, the Soviets 
brutally suppressed independence movements in Eastern Europe. To those states 
the Soviets’ actions were indeed aggressive, but to the Soviets the actions were 
necessary to prevent the crumbling of their protective cordon against feared 
NATO aggression.158 An expected utility calculation will add together the 
various motivations of the Soviets with their associated probabilities. This linear 
combination of utilities and probabilities is not likely to produce high confidence 
in their intentions. Moreover, actions taken to prevent a fearful state from 
attacking can leave the state at a disadvantage if war breaks out because 
aggression is the primary motive.  
Because of the certainty principle, prospect theory will not hedge, but will 
explicitly choose whether the Soviets are aggressive or whether they are 
insecure. Actions taken will either succeed very well because the correct risk has 
been defended against or they will fail spectacularly because the wrong risk has 
been addressed. One can only speculate as to the disastrous consequences had 
military airstrikes on Cuban positions taken place during the Cuban Missile 
Crisis, rather than assertive diplomacy in concert with the blockade by Kennedy 
towards Krushchev.  
Under prospect theory, “choices involving gains are usually risk averse, 
and choices involving losses are often risk seeking except when the probability 
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Confidence,” op. cit., pp. 174-75. 
 68 
of winning or losing is small.”159 The value function combines with a probability-
weighting function to produce the following dynamics: Indeterminacy of 
behavior occurs for extremely small probabilities (the possibility of rare 
catastrophes is either neglected or overweighted); small probabilities are 
overweighted while larger probabilities are underweighted; and extremely high 
probability events are treated as if they were certain.160 Thus, the underweighting 
of probabilities serves to reinforce risk aversion for gain and risk acceptance for 
loss. But in the realm of small probabilities overweighting encourages risking 
acceptance for gain and risk aversion for loss. It is in this realm that both lottery 
tickets and insurance policies are attractive.161 Thus, sure losses will be tolerated 
if they can be seen as a required payment for an activity, or the cost of doing 
business as in an insurance premium.162 In certain situations, the sure insurance 
premium will be tolerated to hedge against the possibility of a rare but 
catastrophic loss. Such action is consistent with the certainty principle but 
inconsistent with the endowment effect. In other cases, the lottery ticket (or 
gamble) will tolerate taking risky behavior in order to avoid any loss at all. Such 
action violates the certainty principle, but is consistent with the endowment 
effect (that is, no loss). 
                                                            
159 Tversky and Kahneman, “Rational choice and the framing of decisions,” op. 
cit., p. S255. 
160 Kahneman and Tversky, “Prospect Theory: An Analysis of Decision under 
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Prospect theory suffers from certain conceptual problems. The issue is 
rarely framed for the actors by a disinterested observer, but rather, the actors 
develop their own frames of reference.163 Moreover, most international relations 
treatments of prospect theory derive attitudes toward risk solely on the basis of 
the value function and neglect the impact of the probability-weighting function 
which, as noted, can reverse dynamics such that risk seeking for gains (a lottery) 
and risk aversion for losses (an insurance premium) occurs.164 This is problematic 
for the explanatory power of prospect theory because the weighting function is 
derived from experimental evidence165 as if to explain findings which contravene 
the core thesis of the theory.166 Moreover, as Kahneman and Tversky 
acknowledge, empirically, the purchase of insurance extends to the medium 
range of possibilities and small probabilities of disaster are sometimes entirely 
ignored.167 Expected utility theory does little better on this score because either 
gambling for a gain or insuring against a loss can easily be explained but not 
                                                            
163 For case studies see, Barbara Farnham, “Roosevelt and the Munich Crisis,” 
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within the same individual within the same theory.168 Although not developed, 
Kahneman and Tversky later argue that “the framing of an action sometimes 
affects the actual experience of the outcome.”169 Farnham develops at length this 
proposition and also argues that the role of affect can be causal in both framing 
and frame changes as well. Thus the causality can be multidirectional.170 This line 
of inquiry seems to be progressive for the research program in that it leads to the 
discovery of new facts in addition to explaining the anomalous findings.171 
A simple application of the insurance premium/lottery ticket to 
international relations does not capture the complexities of deterrence unless 
modified. As a first cut, one can easily imagine the employment of the insurance 
premium in conservative fashion (thus making sure concessions) in order to 
hedge against the possibility of catastrophic loss. But successful deterrence can 
also require the use of the insurance premium in risky fashion (perhaps by 
raising the cost that an adversary will pay should it not desist in its provocation) 
in order to maintain the status quo. As noted above, in more extreme instances, a 
state might fight a war that it knows it will lose if such loss can stem further 
decline. But to call such actions employment of a lottery ticket is misleading 
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because in both instances one is remaining risk acceptant for loss whereas use of 
the lottery ticket implies risk acceptance for gain. The concept of the lottery ticket 
retains its utility because states can be tempted either, to take long-shot chances 
in order to make gains, or to persist in losing ventures long after the strategic 
situation counsels cutting losses, respectively. However, it strains the 
imagination to believe that a state might use the lottery ticket in conservative 
fashion.  
Finally, economists formally employ the preference reversal phenomenon 
when referring to lotteries.172 Yet, psychologists and political scientists use the 
concept of preference reversal to refer to a broader category of framing effects.173 
For my purposes, one implication of Farnham’s argument is that reframing an 
outcome as a loss rather than a gain (or vice versa) can cause decision-makers to 
reverse their order of preference among otherwise equivalent prospects.174 
Moreover, decisions regarding the attractiveness of insurance are quite sensitive 
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to relatively minor changes in the manner in which the problem is framed.175 
Thus, it is argued that, on balance, the noted conceptual problems associated 
with prospect theory do not disable it from generating stronger and more 
determinant explanations of actor behavior than expected utility theory. This is 
due to the role that affect appears to play both in the employment of the 
insurance premium/lottery ticket and in the framing and reframing of choices. 
Additionally, broadening the considerations under which the insurance 
premium will be used in conservative, and risky, fashion, respectively, can better 
capture the complexities of deterrence in international relations.  
Both expected utility theory and prospect theory are purely intellectual 
constructs and therefore need to be leavened by the reality and experience that 
allows us to operate in the world. For our purposes here, in international 
relations, whether the insurance payment/lottery ticket in prospect theory will 
be used in a conservative or risky fashion is likely to turn on whether war is 
deemed to be inevitable or not.176 This determination is not a deus ex machina, 
but the result of reality and experience made more difficult by concern with the 
magnitude of loss aversion. Thus, the following table characterizes the degree 
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and type of cooperation and conflict as a consequence of consistency mediated 
by loss aversion: 
 






·Risky use of insurance 
premium up to 









· Risky use of insurance 
premium up to 
transformation into a 
lottery ticket  
·Obfuscating affect 
 
Cases: 1854 Crimean 
War, 1859 Austro-Italian 
War, 1863 2nd Polish 
Uprising, 1864 Danish 
War over Elbe Duchies, 
1866 Austro-Prussian 
War, 1870 Franco-
Prussian War  
 
Rational consistency Intentional clarity 
 
·Deterrence effective 
·Largely conservative use 
of insurance premium 
·Stimulating affect 
 




·Largely conservative use 
of insurance premium 
·Discriminating affect 
 
Cases: 1821, 1826 Greek 
Revolts; 1830 Belgian 
Revolt; 1831, 1839 
Turkish Revolts; 1848 
Italian Revolt  
 
 




Referring to the upper left cell, when both the state and others are engaged in 
loss aversion because each believes that it is losing and mutually unaware of the 
others’ actions, all sides may believe that others are merely trying to make gains 
at its expense and will desist when brought up short.177 Even if all sides are 
aware that others are engaged in loss aversion and defending the status quo, 
they may have different interpretations of the status quo.178 A state that loses 
territory by losing a war may not become reconciled to the loss even as the 
gaining state believes that a new status quo has been achieved that both sides 
will respect.179 In lesser situations, a state may restrain its anxious ally and feel 
that it cannot continue to restrain it in the next instance because the aggrieved 
ally will doubt the fealty of the state in supporting its interests. This problem 
manifests itself in differing interpretations of the status quo because the 
restraining state will wrongly expect its adversary to take turns by conceding the 
next time if for no other reason than to allow the state to repair its relations with 
the ally that it restrained in the first instance. But the other side does not see it 
that way; it merely sees others as trying to make gains at its expense. 
Irrespective of the sequence of concessions, the actions of another state 
that adversely impinge on our values and interests are likely to be 
                                                            
177 Jervis, “Political Implications of Loss Aversion,” op. cit., p. 192; Jervis, 
“Deterrence and Perception,” op. cit., p. 13. 
178 Levy, “Political Psychology and Foreign Policy,” in Sears, Huddy, and Jervis, 
eds., op. cit., p. 271. 
179 Jervis, “Political Implications of Loss Aversion,” op. cit., pp. 199-200. 
 75 
misinterpreted. Again, we return to the dynamic of affect. Does the action that 
another takes gratify or displease us? Streams of evidence that can be viewed as 
being ambiguous to a disinterested observer can be viewed as being functionally 
equivalent regarding the other’s intentions when the action disadvantages the 
perceiving actor.180 Identical factual information can cause us to interpret and 
value the actions of others quite differently depending on whether we are 
benefited or harmed by those actions. Creativity is accorded to others when their 
risky actions benefit us while recklessness is accorded to others when their risky 
actions harm us despite the fact that identical risks are taken by the two other 
actors.  
While this double standard is an expression of Heider’s general balance 
principle in which bad actions come from bad actors while good actions come 
from good actors,181 it is nevertheless irrationally consistent. As noted earlier, 
cognition requires affect in order to stimulate it and to put into action its 
conclusions. The affective biases discussed in an earlier section anchor an 
endpoint along a continuum in which affect and cognition mutually interact. The 
reality principle, for example, allows us to see that an action by another that 
contravenes our interests nevertheless can serve a useful function for that actor. 
In this instance, we are not so bereft of reason as to allow irrational passions to 
cloud our understanding of the environment. Of course, we may be angry. But, 
                                                            
180 Jones and Davis, in Berkowitz, ed., op. cit., p. 239. 
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at a higher level of cognition, we understand both the anger and its source; 
however, this understanding comes from a reflection on our feelings and not 
from the feelings themselves.182  
Affect stimulates the cognitive biases manifested by the individual 
decision-maker outlined previously and can be quite functional for purposive 
behavior when the shortcuts to thinking accurately reflect the reality that we are 
experiencing in the environment. Recall that these biases were the assimilation of 
new information to pre-existing images, the overestimation of complexity of our 
thought processes, the overconfidence in drawing inferences regarding the 
intentions of others, and perceptual satisficing. The degree (or intensity) of affect 
determines the degree to which these cognitive biases are positively associated 
with each other and the severity with which the biases affect a state’s perceptions 
regarding the actions of others because of the reluctance to perceive trade-offs 
and consequently to make too many enemies.183  
From the standpoint of the system, recall that balanced configurations 
result either when one issue is divisive or when all issues coalesce with each 
other such that states are divided into two opposing camps. As will be addressed 
later, a singular divisive issue that puts the system at risk tends to concentrate 
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 77 
the mind and forces rational consistency on all of the major actors with a stake in 
maintaining the status quo. But the probability greater than chance that the 
scenario of multiple issue coalescence could spread system-wide only makes 
sense if shared cognitive biases are controlling. Remember that cognitive biases 
are prevalent and widespread whereas motivated biases tend to be specific to an 
individual actor and somewhat idiosyncratic. Moreover, recall that multiple 
sufficient causation occurs when a state adopts a favored policy that would be 
adopted for any single value or reason. Those who oppose the policy do so in an 
opposite but equally irrationally consistent manner. This can happen in a dyadic 
conflict, but for all of the major actors to be affected in this manner and to choose 
up sides seems quite implausible unless the same cognitive biases regarding the 
issues of importance contaminate their perspectives. The cognitive biases would 
be corrected were they pointed out by a disinterested observer. Unfortunately, 
when all of the major actors suffer from these biases there exists no credible 
disinterested actor. It strains credulity to believe that motivated biases could 
produce such a systemic result if for no other reason than that states with 
incommensurable values that cannot be sacrificed will find it hard to coordinate 
with each other on a plan of action. The result would be a Hobbesian ‘war of all 
against all’,184 instead of two neatly divided and opposing camps. This is not to 
                                                            
184 Although somewhat unclear on the subject, Heider considers three-way 
animosity to be an imbalanced situation (Heider, The Psychology of 
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argue that motivated biases cannot be present, just that they are not likely to be 
the root cause of conflict here.  
When systems are tightly interconnected such that the actions of one actor 
affect the interests of others, those others are likely to implausibly infer that a 
singular action serves a number of different interests that contravene their own. 
If the world is not so neatly organized as to allow a decision-maker to rationally 
believe that a single policy can adequately serve a number of disparate values, 
why should others believe this to be the case? This is the mirror image of the 
actor’s irrational belief that all good things go together; it is an equally irrational 
belief that the adversary is more centralized in its intentions than is actually the 
case.185 
The result of this coalescence of values and attitudes, coupled with 
overconfidence in knowledge of the situation, is to generate a system-wide 
perceptual syndrome upon which state action is based. A useful dictionary 
definition of syndrome is “a group of signs and symptoms that collectively 
indicate or characterize a disease, psychological disorder, or other abnormal 
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condition.”186 Alternatively, a syndrome is a collective mentality.187 One reason 
why this syndrome is generated in international relations is that issues are 
perpetually left unresolved and allowed to pile up on each other. Subjective 
confusion as to who was responsible for such disorder prior to July 1914 is 
manifested in Kennedy’s observation that “some Russians disliked the Anglo-
Saxon powers more than they did Germany; some Austrians feared their German 
partner’s ambitions almost as much as they did Russia’s; some Britons feared 
Russia more than they did Germany; some Germans Britain more than 
Russia.”188 The fly in the ointment occurs when a reckless state is repeatedly 
rebuffed, but comes to believe that it has restrained itself too often and comes to 
see its risk-taking probes as a legitimate aspect of statecraft.189 The disintegration 
of a major actor can promote such probes; even status quo states believe that they 
can improve their positions at little cost by actions that chip away at the security 
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of a failing state.190 The repetition of issues raised and half resolutions to them 
seduce states into believing that the actions taken in the past will work in future 
confrontations without realizing that not all states have a common 
understanding of the status quo because the status quo has been shifting. Joll’s 
fin-de-siècle characterization of European thinking as being permeated with 
foreboding on the one hand, and wishful hoping based on Social Darwinist 
principles of social purification on the other hand,191 captures the Janus-faced 
notion of a syndrome in which all actors are irrationally certain of what needs to 
be done in order to survive.  
In asking whether the First World War was unavoidable, an analogy 
nicely captures this notion of a system-wide syndrome that imperfectly 
facilitated cooperation in spite of itself in the past but resulted in catastrophe 
when the various actors decided not to play by the rules. According to 
Schroeder,  
“compare World War I to a train collision involving five trains, all in a 
race to reach the station first or at least to avoid coming in last. The strict 
determinist view…holds that they collided because all five were on 
intersecting tracks, the only way to avoid an accident was for at least one 
or two of them to give way to the others, thereby losing the race, and none 
considered this outcome acceptable. An indeterminist view would hold 
that the trains, though they were running on unsafe tracks at dangerously 
high speeds with obsolete equipment operated in certain instances by 
reckless engineers, were not running on intersecting tracks but parallel 
ones set dangerously close together. Hence a collision was not inevitable 
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but could only arise by accident (say, if one of the trains left the tracks or 
swayed into another one) or by deliberate recklessness. The latter caused 
the actual collision. My version holds that while all five trains were 
involved in the race and running together closely enough that all would 
be involved in any accident, only three of the five were on a collision 
course. These three, however, had been in similar races over this same 
terrain a number of times before, and knew how an accident could be 
avoided!when to slow down, what signals to give, what switches or 
side-tracks to take, etc.!actions that involved some active coordination 
between themselves and at least passive cooperation by the other two 
trains in the race. What caused the collision in this instance was a refusal 
by the engineers on all five trains at critical moments to take the steps 
known from experience to be needed to avoid an accident. This failure to 
act derived from a shared conviction that such actions were no longer part 
of the game, had become futile and counterproductive, would cause them 
to lose the race, and were in any case not their particular responsibility. 
This collective mentality and fixed attitude made the collision 
unavoidable.”192 
 
Of particular interest here is the characterization more of tragedy than of 
willful malice despite the recklessness exhibited by the major actors. This 
syndrome-like quality to the actors’ calculations is manifested in a collective 
underestimation, rather than overestimation, of deterrent threats discussed 
previously. Again, underestimation occurs when a state takes actions that 
prejudice the interests of others that are most certain to be defended. Thus, 
framing of the situation is not likely to be one in which measures are taken to 
increase the probability that war can be avoided rather than on reducing 
casualties if war breaks out. Decision-makers will focus on measures that will 
certainly save some lives even though lives will certainly be lost as a response to 
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their aggression. In contrast, a standard expected utility calculation would 
counsel restraint in order to increase the probability that the peace can be 
maintained and that no lives will be lost.193  
Thus, states will retain their attachment to endowments and cooperative 
schemes that do not promise to reduce the chance of war with near certainty will 
be dismissed out of hand. The insurance premium is likely to be employed in a 
risky fashion, implausibly so as to inoculate oneself against any loss. Extreme 
instances can lead states to transform the insurance premium into a lottery ticket. 
Deterrence will likely provoke, rather than stem, conflict.  When all states 
operate in this manner, systemic conflict becomes likely. Again, with regard to 
the First World War, Schroeder argues that,  
“anyone who tried to suspend the rules of power politics, of ‘every man 
and every alliance for himself, and the devil take the hindmost,’ was a fool 
and would earn the fool’s reward. Hence, to ask any British, French, 
Russian, Italian, or even German leader to sacrifice or subordinate 
particular interests and opportunities of theirs for the sake of some sort of 
collective action to stabilize the international position of Austria-Hungary 
so as to lessen the chances of a general war was to ask the impossible and 
absurd to ask them to commit political suicide at home and to be laughed 
at and swindled abroad.”194 
 
On the one hand, we can see from this analysis that the degree of affect is 
sufficient to activate the cognitive biases which result in a failure to make value 
tradeoffs because a state believes that a failure to defend its interests will result 
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in individual loss. On the other hand, the degree of affect afflicting the major 
actors is insufficient to stimulate hard thinking into how one’s actions are 
detrimental to the interests of others and how they might react. Too many 
enemies are made because no values or interests are sacrificed. The cognitive 
biases conspire to ensure that none are likely to give significant thought to how a 
credible commitment that it will respect the interests of others might be 
constructed and how to convey that it believes that others, in turn, will respect its 
interests through reciprocated commitments.  
Superficially, this deficient result seems analogous to Boulding’s 
distinction between illusory incompatibility and real incompatibility among 
states. Nevertheless, there are differences and the problems associated with loss 
aversion are more intractable. Illusory incompatibility exists when the images 
that states hold of one another generate conflict out of proportion to the objective 
situation because of situational dynamics.195 Actor illusions, combined with the 
dynamics of the situation, reminiscent of ‘Richardson processes,’ create perverse 
dynamics when both sides merely react to each other’s actions without 
thinking.196 Real incompatibility exists when the realization of an actor’s interests 
result in direct losses for others. But loss aversion that is not mutually 
understood can result in states overestimating the hostility of the other without 
realizing how their actions harm the interests of others. A better understanding 
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of the situation can mitigate illusory incompatibility but it can’t mitigate the felt 
need to avoid losses. The remedy to real incompatibility is straight-forward: 
deter the aggressor through denial or punishment. But when all states are in the 
domain of losses, not only do concessions need to be made (hence, conceding 
sure losses), but all have to sacrifice, know that others have sacrificed, and know 
that others know that others have sacrificed.  
The dynamic of loss aversion that is not widely understood is a driver that 
reinforces the conflictual aspects of balance and irrational consistency, which, in 
turn, reinforce each other. More systemic conflict should result than would be 
the case were actors to base their conduct on expected utility calculations. When 
states believe that they can avoid making value tradeoffs by aligning with like-
minded others, they fail to realize that others will align with one another to 
thwart the original states’ efforts because similar calculations are being made. 
Alignments will tighten as the hostility of others is overestimated. The degree of 
affect increases, thus increasing the severity of the positively associated cognitive 
biases that promote confidence that the state can prevail without realizing that 
adversaries believe that they are gaining similar confidence. 
Affective abandonment. 
Referring to the upper right cell, affective abandonment is shorthand for 
mutually affective abandonment of rational consistency. Realism argues that 
states tend, or ought to tend, to their interests as they are affected by other states. 
But the intersection of irrational consistency and structural imbalance offers the 
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opportunity for mutual reinforcement of both dynamics, and thus the 
debilitation of realism’s rationally consistent dictum here. It has been shown that 
affect is necessary to cognition (and vice versa), can promote efficient decision-
making, but also can debilitate it either through insufficiency or surplus. Affect 
during decision-making can parallel and thus reinforce the prospect theory 
tendency to respond more to changes in values than to changes in absolute 
values when assessing the consequences of decisions.197 Moreover, affect is a 
contributing cause of perception of risk.198 Thus, a decision-maker’s estimate of 
the risk of an action can also be a function of her estimate of its possible 
benefit.199 Risk assessment is also a function of how a decision-maker feels about 
a particular target of contemplated action.200 Strong domestic or physiological 
needs201 can lead a decision-maker to underestimate the risks of a contemplated 
political action at the same time that she overestimates its potential benefit.202 
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Consequently, motivated biases can result in states leaving the international 
stage and turning inward when retrenching seems attractive as a short-term 
solution to problems that are largely domestic in nature. As analyzed above, 
perceptual syndromes result in states overattending to the interests of others, 
whereas mutual affective abandonment results in states underattending to 
others’ interests. The consequence of the latter is to leave the field relatively open 
for states to make easy gains through aggression. Prospect theory does not argue 
that states will never be opportunistic for gain, only that aggression is more 
likely to be the result of loss aversion than of the quest to add to one’s portfolio 
of values and interests. The isolationist states, in turn, look to stanch losses by 
turning inward, thus abdicating their interest (dare I say responsibility?) in 
ensuring that unprovoked aggression be punished. 
 Lebow’s analysis of crises that were the result of defensive avoidance 
indicate that the states that suffered from such bias either were aware or should 
have been aware that their adversaries would oppose and defeat their efforts.203 
Debilitating affect precludes an understanding of the situation. This is an 
important finding, but his analysis may suffer from a representative bias; the 
cases in which defensive avoidance occur have significant implications for 
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international conflict, but they seem to be somewhat rare.204 Perhaps more 
consequential for long-run geopolitical trends because they are more frequent are 
cases in which states differentially engage themselves in domestic and 
international affairs and the implications that this has for opportunism on the 
part of others. The degree of affect experienced by both sides will tend to 
obfuscate, rather than clarify, the situation. Instability can result as clear 
commitments to defend the status quo will not have been made. For example, the 
splendid isolation practiced by Britain in the 1850s occurred because new social 
welfare demands precluded both defending the Empire as well as the balance of 
power on the Continent. Britain was caught in a Catch-22; its prosperity at home 
depended on benefits derived from the Empire, but the latter was increasingly 
difficult to defend against the encroachments of others. Cutting costs by failing to 
engage in active diplomacy on the Continent allowed Germany a free hand to 
unify, thus making it more aggressive in the imperial sphere and putting greater 
pressure on Britain. Although there were dissenters, British decision-makers 
were slow to acknowledge the magnitude of the threat because Prusso-British 
dynastic ties repeatedly tamped down its estimation. 
States may be desperate to stem losses and they may take shortcuts to 
regain their positions that mutually surprise others. The concept of 
renormalization of the status quo is relevant here. States that lose values or 
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resources may not reconcile themselves to such loss and may take risky actions 
in order to regain those values. In contrast, states that make gains renormalize 
much faster and defend those gains as the newfound status quo reference. This is 
because they appear to achieve an “instant endowment effect.”205 Both sides will 
surprise each other as they ultimately defend what they rightfully believe to be 
theirs.  
How is the renormalization of the status quo dynamic different from that 
analyzed in the previous section regarding misinterpretations of the status quo 
and why is the spread between the perceived and actual status quo wider than it 
would be in the earlier case? In the first instance, a state that loses territory or 
resources in a war to another state may not be reconciled to that loss, but the 
gaining state should not be surprised that the other harbors irredentist claims. In 
the present circumstance under discussion, the gains are made because one side 
has essentially left the field of play in order to retrench and then unexpectedly 
reappears to reclaim any losses made internationally during its absence. 
Moreover, the gains may be made at the expense of third parties so it is not 
obvious that the retrenching state has concretely lost anything of value. But the 
retrenching state may be tempted to take shortcuts in order to regain what it 
believes to be the status quo by aligning with other aggrieved states. They 
essentially ‘hold the ring’ for the other by promising to support its claims with 
the proviso that their claims are not interfered with. The retrenching state will 
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have motivated biases to overestimate the others’ deterrent postures and concede 
bargaining advantages because it wishes to concentrate on internal affairs. To the 
state that has made easy gains because of little interference, motivated biases will 
lead it to underestimate the retrenching state’s deterrent posture. These 
dynamics will reinforce each other, thus leading to the belief that compatibility 
exists regarding the intentions of both sides. But each side will surprise the other 
when it eventually takes actions to defend what it perceives to be the status quo 
that are riskier than those recommended by a simple misinterpretation of the 
status quo and certainly riskier than those recommended by expected utility 
calculations. For an example of the shortcut, after its humiliation at the 
conclusion of the Crimean War, Russia turned inward in order to develop its 
economy and military. But it also aligned with revisionist France under 
Napoleon III to support its Black Sea claims in return for supporting French 
claims in Egypt. 
Because the spread in perceptions of the status quo is so wide, the 
insurance premium can be used in an extremely risky fashion by both sides in 
order to regain losses or to avoid losses. In extreme cases, particularly when 
defensive avoidance is evident, the insurance premium can be transformed into a 
risky long-shot lottery ticket. Motivated biases that are the result of domestic 
politics can lead states to take non-obvious measures to regain their influence. 
But in so doing, they create temporary imbalance throughout the system, 
imbalance due to apparent inattention on the part of retrenching states that allow 
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others to engage in fait accomplis that may or may not be immediately 
contested.206 For instance, Germany’s wars of unification with Austria in 1866, 
and France in 1870, respectively, were neither contested nor officially recognized 
by others, thus, giving subsequent German leaders the mistaken belief that 
future aggression would continue to go uncontested.207 
The foregoing discussion suggests three systemic possibilities that are 
exhaustive regarding affective abandonment. Mutual conciliatory affective 
abandonment occurs when states are overly solicitous of the other’s interests and 
thus fail to make clear in timely fashion to each other their determination to 
protect their respective interests from encroachment. Mutual deterrence, which 
should be effective in delineating the limits to which states will go to 
accommodate the other, then becomes counterproductive. This is because, 
without timely resistance, statesmen will then overestimate their room for 
maneuver and then infuse their actions with affect (notably amour-propre)     
when others finally put up resistance. The attachment to the endowments will 
not be adequately advertised to the other. Relaxation of the certainty principle 
will merely serve to confuse. The insurance premium will appear to be used in 
conservative fashion, but then can be employed in risky fashion due to the 
renormalization problem. 
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Because prospect theory does not disallow the possibility of opportunistic 
gain, mutual aggressive affective abandonment occurs when states exploit 
imbalance within the system to collude with one another to commit aggression 
against third parties for perceived easy gain. Because noninvolved states tend to 
be risk acceptant for loss, they will largely be indifferent to unprovoked 
aggression as long as it does not obviously affect their own portfolio of interests. 
Thus, the attachment to endowments will seemingly be irrelevant to them even 
as it operates strongly in states that fear losses. Aggressive states will mistake 
easy gains to be made and thus the belief that the certainty principle operates to 
their advantage. But due to unexpected resistance, noninvolved states will have 
to be recompensed handsomely in order to break stalemates. Unprovoked 
aggression will thus resemble the risky use of the insurance premium that easily 
can transform itself into a long-shot play of a lottery ticket.  
Asymmetric affective abandonment occurs when states are overdeterred 
while an expansive state is simultaneously underdeterred and thus makes 
piecemeal gains through unprovoked aggression. Timely deterrent threats will 
not have been made. Decision-makers may engage in preference reversals and 
make common cause with the aggressor by offering to ‘hold the ring’ in order to 
make gains themselves while other major powers turn isolationist. Both abetting 
and isolationist decision-makers will engage in irrational consistency to 
rationalize actions that derive from motivated bias. Attachment to endowments 
will be confused. The certainty principle will either reward aggressors because of 
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untimely or non-existent resistance or it will punish aggressors as states that fail 
to renormalize contest the losses that they have sustained.  
Widespread Loss Aversion. 
Referring to the lower right cell, when loss aversion is both widespread and 
widely understood, states should be rationally consistent when analyzing their 
environments. Reality and experience should lead to a generally correct 
understanding of the motives and intentions of others. Cross-cutting issues 
among states and the non-obvious axes of threat induce a measure of caution, 
but this caution must both be validated and rewarded. The hard edges associated 
with different values adduced regarding extant issues should be softened when 
adopting moderate solutions acceptable to all. Additionally, mutual cooperation 
can reduce the backlog of important issues that can pile up, fester, and join in 
unpredictable ways to produce conflict all out of proportion to reality. The 
international system should be relatively peaceful. Because deterrence is easier 
than compellence, states will take strong actions to protect the status quo. Thus, 
deterrence, which only requires that the targeted state refrain from proscribed 
behavior, should prevail. In contrast, compellence requires that a targeted actor 
take demonstrable action, for instance ceding a piece of territory to the 
demanding state.208 Because states are risk averse for gain under prospect theory, 
not only will there be a lower likelihood of states engaged in compellence, but 
such states will not likely prevail when they make such demands.  
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As noted previously, a state that takes an action generally expected by 
others that also potentially serves a number of disparate values provides only 
trivially ambiguous information of intentionality. But, widespread loss aversion 
and an understanding that this is taking place should provide better information 
about the state’s intentions. The moderate degree of stress induced by 
uncertainty produces a more discriminating level of affect, thus motivating states 
to engage in reality-testing.209 Because the system is not static, states will engage 
in sustained interaction with each other to determine whether the images that 
they have of the other’s deterrent profile are correspondent or not. By probing 
their environments, states could attempt to determine whether the signals that 
they send to each other are too subtle to yield accurate information and thus 
adjust accordingly.210 Instead of presuming that the other rejected the state’s 
signals (which occurs when cognitive biases predominate) rather than that it did 
not receive them,211 the state could redouble its efforts to ensure that the other 
state understands its intentions to defend its interests and that the other state’s 
interests will be respected in turn. Complex bargaining strategies can be 
developed that should provide mutual benefits.212  
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As states take account of the interests of others, they will relax their 
attachment to endowments, accept cooperative measures that promote peace but 
without certainty, and use the insurance premium in conservative fashion by 
tolerating small but sure losses so as to hedge against the possibility of mutual 
ruin. Threats to revert to more risk acceptant actions will only be taken to bring 
recalcitrant states back into the cooperative fold.  Thus when loss aversion is 
widespread and widely understood, deterrence should be effective in stemming 
conflict. Such actions promote imbalance within the system that helps to 
reinforce the rational consistency that makes widespread loss aversion possible. 
 To a point that is hard to specify, widespread loss aversion can sustain 
itself when the systemic dynamics are driven even harder. Even when states 
believe that they have sustained significant losses, they will nevertheless 
understand that others have lost significantly as well. The temptation to recover 
losses by engaging in high risk policies at the expense of others is muted by the 
understanding that others will react with high risk policies of their own, thus, 
bringing mutual ruin for all. Multidirectional causality should reinforce both the 
dynamics of imbalance and rational consistency. A rationally consistent 
understanding of the situation will have the effect of narrowing, rather than 
spreading, values deemed by states to be important. This supports mutual 
agreement and thus reinforces the diffusion of security threats that are 
simultaneously seen as being manageable. This new, improved, reality of the 
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environment in the form of greater imbalance, in turn, reinforces the rational 
consistency that makes a proper understanding of the environment possible.  
By mimicking essentially cooperative overtures, in which tit-for-tat 
responses to cooperation and defection occur, states can ameliorate the Prisoner’s 
Dilemma that states are confronted with.213 As more states buy into cooperation 
they will surprise themselves because their insurance premiums will be less than 
expected.214 This dynamic should somewhat mitigate the problems that states 
have in bargaining over the division of losses.215 The result is a somewhat benign 
self-fulfilling prophecy of cooperation that can sustain itself.    
We can expand Boulding’s distinction between illusory and real 
incompatibility, respectively, to argue that the interests of states operating under 
widespread loss aversion reflect real compatibility. A clearer understanding of 
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Intentional clarity. 
Finally, referring to the lower left cell, intentional clarity need not lead to an 
extreme evaluation of the other in the absence of debilitating affect. Again, reality 
and experience should lead to an understanding of when balanced 
configurations have a real referent. Betts usefully distinguishes between 
situations in which ideology and power generate adversarial relations, on the 
one hand, and situations in which visceral hatred is the basis for the relationship, 
on the other hand.216 Only in cases in which visceral hatred is controlling will 
intentional clarity lead to an extremely negative evaluation of the other. Such 
situations exist when the intentions of a state indicate that it is irremediably 
aggressive. States with hegemonic designs in violently overturning the world 
order and supplanting it with one of their own making fit this category. Real 
incompatibility exists in the sense that the success of the aggressive hegemonic 
aspirant would doom the independence and perhaps the existence of the other 
states. The system is likely to be balanced in this situation because of rational 
consistency. Reality and experience will point towards the wisdom of opposing 
this state.217 This is because, sating the aggressor’s appetite in the short term, 
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merely whets the aggressor’s long term ambitions. Thus, an evaluation of the 
need to stand firm, on the one hand, and an evaluation of the costs of not doing 
so, on the other hand, which can be mutually exclusive, are related because the 
analysis is produced by a coherent image of the adversary.218 Still, situations in 
which states attempt to destroy each other due to visceral hatred ought to be rare 
because “the moderate probability of territorial loss is a more potent disincentive 
than the higher probability of failure to gain territory, if there is no 
countervailing probability of loss from failure to attack.”219 
 The implications for conflict predicated on ideology and power relations 
are not so clear-cut. It is in the nature of ideology to miscalculate the strategic 
implications of a situation in which a state believes that it is losing.220 The 
problem is compounded when adversaries mutually believe that they are losing. 
But, when loss aversion is not occurring even as both sides vigorously defend 
their interests, adversaries can take the ideological posturing of the other for 
what it is: a low cost means of solidifying cohesion within each camp. Reflecting 
on the biases discussed, there is a difference between the degree of affect 
stimulating motivation to draw inferences regarding actions that serve useful 
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purposes for others, on the one hand, and the degree of affect that circumvents 
the inference process, on the other hand. The difference between these two 
instances turns on whether or not debilitating affect is at play, which, in turn, is a 
function of whether the perceiving state believes that it is losing, regardless of 
whether the other state is responsible for the perception of loss or whether the 
perceiving state is objectively losing at all. In the more extreme case, the losing 
state deems the outbreak of war to be inevitable. 
For example, although it waxed and waned, the ideological rhetoric 
between the United States and the Soviet Union during the Cold War, although 
hostile in content, reflects a case in which distinctive values or interests being 
served were assimilated to a presumed common value. As a consequence, Soviet 
rhetoric regarding capitalism, although deeply offensive to the American way of 
life, could be taken with a grain of salt. Claims of Yankee imperialism, dollar 
diplomacy, and exploitation of the worker can be seen as assimilating non-
common values served into a coherent hostile image of American capitalism. But 
this is to be expected from those who hold an antithetical ideology.221 Similarly, 
China today is variously accused of (ironically) dollar diplomacy, imperialism in 
Africa regarding the drive to secure access to needed natural resources, failure to 
help in censuring such resource-rich states that engage in human rights abuses 
against their people, and cornering the market for such resources, specifically to 
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the exclusion of Taiwan.222 It is difficult to know whether such actions 
demonstrate intentional clarity of hostile intentions on the part of the Chinese or 
whether they are merely part and parcel of great power relations, that is, 
“finding ways to preserve or gain an advantageous position in the correlation of 
forces—without provoking a dangerous response.”223  
In the more extreme variation, German suspicion and fear regarding 
encirclement by members of the Triple Entente prior to the outbreak of the First 
World War is a good example of cognitive bias in which different values served 
by the actions of other states were viewed as comprising a coordinated effort to 
ruin Germany. The antidote was predominance on the Continent because it was 
feared that the failure to achieve such status would doom Germany to a 
subservient status in which it would increasingly be less able to defend its 
rightful interests as a great power. There was likely no design to encircle 
Germany, but German bellicosity increasingly provoked other states to take 
actions both individually and in concert that had the effect of fueling German 
suspicions.224 Security interests by definition are incompatible when a state 
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comes to believe that its own security requires the insecurity of others.225 When 
such a situation occurs, affect works in conjunction with intentional clarity to 
produce an extremely negative evaluation of others that may not be objectively 
true when relations deteriorate but will become objectively true as attitudes 
harden.        
When intentional clarity without extreme negative affect is the case, 
prospect theory argues that a state should be reluctant to take risks that would 
bring significant gains if it is also possible that those same risks might lose the 
state what it values. Satisfaction with the status quo may not be high, but the 
status quo will not be risked unless it cannot be maintained.226 The attachment to 
endowments will be well advertised while the certainty principle will be relaxed. 
In such a situation, détente can prevail between adversaries even if an entente 
cannot form through a reversal of alliances. Mutually refraining from actions that 
might precipitate a collapse of the status quo is not the same as coordinated 
actions either to ward off a common threat from another state or to make gains at 
the expense of that other state.227 This argument parallels the prospect theory 
hypothesis that states are more likely to avoid taking from the commons (thus, 
failing to secure a gain) than they are to provide for a collective good (thus, 
ensuring an immediate loss)228 if it can be argued that the United States and the 
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Soviet Union, by virtue of their preponderant positions, had common concerns 
and interests that were not necessarily shared by their respective allies.229   
To exemplify, Gaddis argues that the Cold War was prolonged, in part, 
because of the disposition of Germany.230 The Soviets offered reunification to 
Chancellor Adenauer, but only if Germany adopted neutrality. The prospect that 
West Germany might reconstitute its army within NATO or a proposed 
European Defense Community forced Stalin’s hand.231 From Adenauer’s 
perspective, reunification had great emotional and symbolic appeal, but the cost 
was to cede a significant economic and political lifeline to the West in exchange 
for obtaining a politically corrupt East Germany. Adenauer rightly saw that a 
prosperous West Germany tied to the West would eventually attract its eastern 
brethren with no loss of present benefits.232 To the Americans, Adenauer was 
more pro-Western than the West had any right to expect233 and they might have 
allowed a reunified Germany, but not if it adopted neutrality. The Americans 
remembered too well the history of both the Rapallo agreement of 1922 and the 
Molotov-Ribbentrop pact of 1939 in which Germany and the Soviet Union 
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colluded with each other to disastrous results. 234 A reunified, independent, 
Germany was seen by the United States and the Soviet Union as a loss even if 
both sides might have mutually benefited from ceasing to have to provide for its 
security and well-being. This was certainly the case regarding East Germany, 
which was an economic deadweight on the resources of the Soviet Union.235   
In contrast, risky actions will be taken to shore up an ally that is losing, 
but such actions will not be taken to achieve a similar gain for that ally.236 Again, 
because deterrence is easier than compellence, the defending side should have a 
bargaining advantage.237 Were domino dynamics to predominate, success for one 
camp would spell the demise of the other. In this sense, real incompatibility 
exists between the adversaries, but the insurance premium will only be used by 
the state to retain or to regain the perceived status quo, not to vanquish the other 
state by depriving it of its allies. Quite a different inference process occurs under 
expected utility theory. Deutsch and Kaplan argue that a state might actually 
gain an advantage by relinquishing claims on a disputed territory if its adversary 
becomes bogged down in an area that is neither governable nor economically 
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viable,238 but this viewpoint is unlikely to gain much currency when states are 
risk acceptant for loss. 
Testing hypotheses and case study selection. 
The interactionist theory constructed above synthesizes situational and 
dispositional dynamics with a consideration as to whether war is deemed to be 
inevitable or not in order to better explain the incidence of cooperation and 
conflict between states. The hypothetico-deductive approach, in which the 
independent variables of balance and attitudinal consistency are mediated by 
risk aversion, generates distinctive patterns of actor behavior. This interactionist 
approach provides better explanatory power than does the neorealist approach, 
which relies on an analysis of the distribution of capabilities in order to 
determine actor intentionality. The Waltzian notion that wars occur because 
there is nothing to stop them239 must be qualified. The interactionist approach 
presented here argues that wars will more likely spring from fear than from 
aggression whereas the neorealist view is agnostic on this point. The hypotheses 
developed above are sufficiently specific to permit testing without becoming 
caricatures of reality. The context in which the hypotheses are evaluated is 
important. Thus, while a case study will rarely substantiate the deductive logic of 
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the theory in all its aspects, the general thrust of the hypotheses should be 
validated. 
 Controlled comparisons can be made because the case studies selected are 
drawn from the pre-nuclear age. Pre-nuclear states have changed over the last 
two hundred years but not so much that they no longer admit of comparison 
with each other. Nuclear weapons have significantly changed the calculations 
that states make whether to commit aggression because, while intense conflicts of 
interest generate differing estimates of cost and value, the risks of devastation are 
equalized for all much more so than in the pre-nuclear age.240 Controlled 
comparisons employ Mill’s method-of-difference,241 in which distinctive actor 
patterns of behavior (perceptual syndrome, affective abandonment, widespread 
loss aversion, and intentional clarity) differ from each other on the combined 
differences in values of the independent and intervening variables. Process-
tracing, in which detailed history attempts to determine whether the causal 
process implied by theory generates the expected outcome, also provides a check 
that omitted variables that would invalidate the results are not relevant.242 
Finally, a loose version of structured-focused comparison is employed. The study 
is structured to inquire into the situational and dispositional dynamics under 
which both interstate cooperation and conflict in national security are most likely 
                                                            
240 Betts, “Surprise Attack and Preemption,” in Allison, Carnesale, and Nye, op. 
cit., p. 62. 
241 John Stuart Mill, A System of Logic: Ratrocination and Inductive (New York 
and London: Longmans, [1843] 1965). 
242 Alexander L. George and Andrew Bennett, Case Studies and Theory 
Development in the Social Sciences (Cambridge: MIT Press, 2005), pp. 6-7, 50-51. 
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to occur. Hypotheses concern the intersection of balance and attitudinal 
consistency as mediated by concern with loss aversion. Nevertheless, the degree 
of concern for loss aversion has different taproots depending on whether 
cognitive or motivated biases predominate. Incorporating both biases in a single 
theory may somewhat violate the injunction that a single focus should guide the 
study.243 But the interactionist theory developed here has policy implications. 
Such theories are likely to be multi-causal and somewhat less parsimonious than 
structural theories in which there is little room for leverage on the part of policy-
makers.           
 This method of comparison casts the explanatory net sufficiently wide 
while at the same time delimits its domain. On the one hand, Waltz is certainly 
correct to argue that a theory that purports to explain everything ends up 
explaining nothing because it is as cumbersome as reality itself.244 Sartori argues 
that conceptual stretching occurs when minimal realism incorporates 
assumptions and causal mechanisms from alternative paradigms without 
attempting to reconcile contradictions that result.245 On the other hand, the call 
by Legro and Moravcsik to restrict the application of neorealist theory to only 
those instances in which high conflict is probable246 is theoretically faulty because 
severe selection bias results. It is true that not all theories are beneficial in the 
                                                            
243 George and Bennett, ibid., Chapter 3. 
244 Waltz, op. cit., Chapter 1. 
245 Giovanni Sartori, “Concept Misinformation in Comparative Politics,” 
American Political Science Review, vol. 64, no. 4 (December 1970), pp. 1033-53.  
246 Jeffrey W. Legro and Andrew Moravcsik, “Is Anybody Still a Realist?” 
International Security, vol. 24, no. 2 (Autumn 1999), pp. 5-55. 
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same manner; some are good for prediction, but not explanation, and vice versa. 
Some theories are good for both explanation and prediction.247 But the linkage 
between explanation and prediction has to turn, in part, on the frequency with 
which a particular phenomenon occurs. How much explanatory benefit do we 
get from a carefully constructed theory that is likely to be applicable under only 
the rarest of circumstances?248 To take the rare for the usual is likely to bias our 
prescriptions. False analogies will be drawn if an event is merely an instance of 
what it resembles rather than a compelling correspondence.249  If war occurs 
more often because of fear than from aggression, prescriptions to prevent war 
ought to be biased less towards deterrence models of aggression reduction than 
towards spiral models of anxiety reduction. 
 We can learn as much from analyzing cases in which peace rather than 
conflict predominates. Peaceful cases may be more difficult to analyze because 
they frequently involve instances that leave little in the way of observable 
evidence. Deterrence successes are difficult to prove because peace may occur, 
not because an actor has been deterred, but because it is satisfied with the status 
                                                            
247 Stephen Toulmin, Foresight and Understanding (New York: Harper 
Torchbooks, 1963), pp. 55-56, 108-11. Cited in Betts, “Conventional Deterrence,” 
op. cit., p. 178. 
248 Slantchev concedes that this is a problem with his otherwise excellent self-
enforcing equilibrium theory. See, Branislav L. Slantchev, “Territory and 
Commitment: The Concert of Europe as Self-Enforcing Equilibrium,” Security 
Studies, vol. 14, no. 4 (2005), pp. 565-606. 
249 Jervis, “Perceiving and Coping with Threat,” in Jervis, Lebow, and Stein, eds., 
Psychology and Deterrence, op. cit., pp. 22-24. 
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quo and the expected value of a peaceful future.250 Even when states contest with 
each other, peacetime diplomacy retains its necessary fluidity when states are 
able to re-align with each other during the opening stages of hostility in a timely 
manner in order to either gain or fend against a state with a bargaining 
advantage.251 Demonstrating this is the task of the next chapter, which examines 
the 19th-century Concert of Europe in which widespread loss aversion that was 
mutually understood allowed peacetime diplomacy the necessary breathing 
room in which to operate.  
 
 
                                                            
250 Jervis, “Review: Deterrence: Theory Revisited,” World Politics, vol. 31, no. 2 
(January 1979), p. 296. 
251 Jervis, “Cooperation Under the Security Dilemma,” op. cit., p. 189.  
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Chapter 2: Widespread Loss Aversion: The Attenuated Concert of Europe 1821-
1853. 
 
Because this dissertation argues that loss aversion is the common state of affairs 
in international relations, this chapter will examine a period that is not easily 
explained by realist (and neorealist) accounts. In its reduced cooperative state, 
the Concert of Europe from 1821-1853 should have become unstable and war-
prone largely due to shocks in the form of small power revolts that might have 
led to system-wide war, but it was largely able to restore the 1815 settlement 
concluded after Napoleon’s defeat. No war between the major powers occurred 
until the outbreak of the Crimean War in 1854, although serious threats of war 
erupted.  
Initially, self-conscious and close cooperation among the major powers 
was largely responsible for the Concert’s peace and stability. Yet by 1822, Britain 
refused to take part in the diplomatic conferences that were crucial to sustaining 
the cooperation.1 Foreign Secretary Canning famously regarded the breakdown 
                                                            
1 The Treaty of the Aix-la-Chapelle added France to the Quadruple Alliance 
partners, the latter alliance of which was a holdover from the Napoleonic Wars. 
The Quadruple Alliance was secretly retained in order to balance against 
potential French revisionism. Britain left the forum of regularized conferences 
generally over the Treaty of the Holy Alliance in which Austria, Prussia, and 
Russia formalized their commitment to intervene in the affairs of others to stem 
revolts. The specific event for British withdrawal was the French restoration of 
the conservative Bourbon regime in Spain in 1822, which Canning was unable to 
prevent. See, René Albrect-Carrié, A Diplomatic History of Europe since the 
Congress of Vienna, rev. ed. (New York: Harper & Row, 1973); Charles K. 
Webster, The Congress of Vienna, 1814-1815 (New York: Barnes and Noble, 
1969); Mack Walker, ed., Metternich’s Europe (New York: Walker and Company, 
1968), p. 136.  
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of the Concert as “a wholesome state: every nation for itself and God for all!”2 
The Concert should easily have destroyed itself given the Greek revolt of a year 
earlier; the 1830 revolt in the United Netherlands and the subsequent creation of 
an independent Belgian state; the disposition of the Eastern Question regarding 
Turkey and the Ottoman Empire in 1831, and then in 1839; and the national 
revolutions of 1848 (the Italian revolt from Austrian dominance being the most 
likely to cause system-wide war).  
These incidents can be characterized as short-term causes of war; that is, 
crises in the form of shocks which erupt with little forewarning. The Greek revolt 
and the larger Eastern Question did not fall under the purview of the 1815 
settlement, thus their resolutions under most inauspicious circumstances provide 
least likely tests for the theory proposed here. Situated in the middle of the 
continent, the Belgian case naturally attracts the strategic interests of the major 
European powers, and thus is an important case in its own right. Italy is another 
hard case for widespread loss aversion due to the revolutionary ferment of the 
moment coupled with France’s proximity to an increasingly poorly defended 
Austrian Empire. In several instances the status quo was changed (i.e., the 
creation of the independent states of Greece and Belgium), but only in order to 
retain the rest of the larger status quo. In other cases, the status quo was 
provisionally changed (i.e., the Ottoman Empire and Italy), but then largely 
restored after much hard bargaining by the major powers with threats of war.         
                                                            
2 Irby Nichols, The European Pentarchy and the Congress of Vienna 1822 (The 
Hague: Nijhoff, 1971), p. 315. 
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To begin discussion, widespread loss aversion is situated along a 
continuum of interstate cooperation to include realism, its strongest theoretical 
competitor. Then, necessary conditions for the emergence of widespread loss 
aversion are examined, as are the specific dynamics to be tested. Each of the four 
important and representative case studies identified above are divided into two 
phases. This allows for an efficient comparison both of whether and how 
statesmen frame the situation in order to determine whether actors really do 
engage in loss aversion rather that expected utility maximization.3 
Locating widespread loss aversion.  
Along a continuum of the degree of interstate cooperation, widespread loss 
aversion situates itself between realism (and its offshoot neorealism) and liberal 
institutionalism, the latter two of which take state interests as given. In both 
latter cases, the interests largely remain the same (for realists states are relative 
gain maximizers and for liberal institutionalists states are absolute gain 
                                                            
3 Specifically, we want to compare cases that differ on the degree of loss aversion. 
It is not simply that states are risk acceptant for loss, rather a correct comparison 
is that they are risk acceptant for loss to the same degree that they refrain from 
making gains similar in magnitude to the loss that they find unacceptable and 
instead prefer the status quo. By using within-case comparisons instead of 
across-case comparisons we are able to control for many relevant differences that 
can plague attempts that assume a high degree of correspondence between the 
cases other than differences in the independent variable to be tested. 
Nevertheless, it is important that differences in the degree of loss aversion reflect 
that variable and not differences in risk-taking because the utilities are different. 
See, Robert Jervis, “Political Implications of Loss Aversion,” Political Psychology, 
vol. 13, no. 2, Special Issue: Prospect Theory and Political Psychology (June 1992), 
p. 203.    
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maximizers),4 but observable state behavior changes as incentives generated by 
changes in the environment change.5 At the extreme pole of cooperative behavior 
lies constructivism in which ideas have independent status in determining an 
actor’s material interests.6 Although Schroeder argues that a transformation of 
European politics took place during the 19th century, I am in agreement with 
both Kraehe and Kagan that Schroeder’s empirical account belies his thesis.7 
Thus, this chapter will not attempt a comparison with constructivist arguments. 
Rather, theoretical variants of interest-driven cooperation and conflict will be 
compared with each other.  
Loss aversion by itself (absent a wide understanding that this is 
prevailing) is less cooperative than liberal institutionalism. Liberal 
                                                            
4 For theoretical analyses see the following articles in David A. Baldwin, ed., 
Neorealism and Neoliberalism: The Contemporary Debate (New York: Columbia 
University Press, 1993): Joseph M. Grieco, “Anarchy and the Limits of 
Cooperation: A Realist Critique of the Newest Liberal Institutionalism;” Duncan 
Snidal, “Relative Gains and the Pattern of International Cooperation;” and 
Robert Powell, “Absolute and Relative Gains in International Relations Theory.”  
5 Kenneth N. Waltz, “The Origins of War in Neorealist Theory,” in Robert I. 
Rotberg and Theodore K. Rabb, eds., The Origin and Prevention of Major Wars 
(New York: Cambridge University Press, 1988). 
6 There is the presumption in constructivism that increased cooperation produces 
more peaceful relations, but Finnemore offers the interesting possibility that bad 
ideas can just as easily socialize actors to engage in conflictual behavior. See, 
Martha Finnemore, National Interests in International Society (Ithaca: Cornell 
University Press, 1996), pp. 130-31. 
7 Paul W. Schroeder, The Transformation of European Politics: 1763-1848 
(Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1994); Schroeder, “Did the Vienna Settlement Rest on 
a Balance of Power?” American Historical Review, vol. 97, no. 3 (January 1992), 
pp. 683-708; Enno E. Kraehe, “A Bipolar Balance of Power,” AHR, ibid., pp. 707-
715; Korina Kagan, “The Myth of the European Concert: The Realist-
Institutionalist Debate and Great Power Behavior in the Eastern Question, 1821-
41,” Security Studies, vol. 7, no. 2 (Winter 1997/98), pp. 1-57.   
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institutionalism, of which regime theory is prominent, argues that actors would 
more readily cooperate with each other were mechanisms devised that could 
provide reduced transaction costs to agreements, greater transparency of 
information, and detection of cheating on agreements.8 But equally important as 
an impediment to cooperation is that states tend to overvalue what they have 
and are risk averse to making trades (such as territory or a reduction of arms) 
with others that disinterested third parties judge might benefit both sides.9 This 
is particularly the case in security affairs more than in economic ones because 
trades that a state makes in the former realm that it later comes to regret can have 
serious implications for its survival if it is insufficiently defended against attack10 
or if it emboldens the gaining state to believe that the other can easily be coerced.  
In its strongest form from 1815-1821 the Concert of Europe was at best a 
nascent security regime insofar as the incentives to cooperate were effected by 
changes in the environment even if the narrow interests of states were left little 
unchanged.11 Nevertheless, even a small change in which state interests were 
somewhat broadened to include those of other states, as well as to have a longer 
run conception of cooperation other than an immediate exchange of benefits, 
                                                            
8 Ronald H. Coase, “The Nature of the Firm,” Econometrica N.S., vol. 4, issue 16 
(November 1937), pp. 386-405; Oliver E. Williamson, The Economic Institutions 
of Captalism (New York: The Free Press, 1985). 
9 Jervis, “Political Implications of Loss Aversion,” op. cit., p. 193. 
10 Charles Lipson. “International Cooperation in Economic and Security Affairs,” 
World Politics, vol. 37, no. 1 (October 1984), pp. 1-23.  
11 Jervis, “From Balance to Concert: A Study of International Security 
Cooperation,” in Kenneth A. Oye, ed., Cooperation Under Anarchy (Princeton: 
Princeton University Press, 1986), pp. 58, 78. 
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paid large dividends for the peace and stability that ensued.12 Concerts in their 
strongest form are anomalous events in international relations given the 
implications of anarchy and the security dilemma discussed in the previous 
chapter. But, the system did not break down after interstate relations reverted to 
a more normal state of affairs and we must look for reasons as to why the status 
quo was largely maintained for some thirty more years.   
Recent realist accounts provide an explanation by variously arguing that 
the Concert of Europe was a fiction;13 that, as an institution, it was largely 
irrelevant to the cooperation that did emerge;14 or that it provided sufficient 
transparency to allow straight-forward realpolitik diplomacy to make the 
deterrence of aggression largely successful, thus standing the liberal 
institutionalist argument on its head.15 A common thread to these arguments is 
that rationality, read as utility maximization, has to prevail.16 But if expected 
utility maximization is indifferent between gains and losses, on balance, we 
should see more aggressive behavior on the part of states if such aggression 
                                                            
12 Jervis, “Security Regimes,” in Stephen D. Krasner, ed., International Regimes 
(Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1983), pp. 180-81. 
13 Kagan, “The Myth of the European Concert,”op. cit., pp. 1-57.   
14 Branislav L. Slantchev, “Territory and Commitment: The Concert of Europe as 
Self-Enforcing Equilibrium,” Security Studies, vol. 14, no. 4 (2005), pp. 565-606; 
Christopher Layne, “Lord Palmerston and the Triumph of Realism: Anglo-
French Relations, 1830-48,” in Miriam Fendius Elman, ed., Paths to Peace: Is 
Democracy the Answer? (Cambridge: MIT Press, 1997), pp. 61-100. 
15 Dan Lindley, Promoting Peace with Information: Transparency as a Tool of 
Security Regimes (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2007). 
16 Slantchev, “Territory and Commitment,” op. cit., p. 566; Andrew Schotter, The 
Economic Theory of Social Institutions (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 
1981); Randall L. Calvert, “Rational Actors, Equilibrium, and Social Institutions,” 
(mimeo, University of Rochester, 1998).  
 114 
brings benefits in excess of costs.17 That a number of cases that will be examined 
demonstrate restraint on the part of satisfied states when further gains might 
have been profitable is perplexing. So are instances in which aggression or 
threats of aggression occur that do not seem to be profitable from a cost-benefit 
standpoint. These various realist explanations for such perplexing behavior 
resort to the idiosyncratic character of major foreign policy statesmen18 or 
domestic-level arguments for a realist foreign policy.19 But it is argued here that 
widespread loss aversion that was recognized and respected by the major 
European powers provided more restraint against opportunism than realist 
accounts that are predicated on expected utility maximization can explain and 
predict. This relative self-restraint can be parsimoniously explained by rationally 
consistent interstate relations that are also risk-acceptant for loss but risk averse 
for gain. We should not see the level of cooperation predicted by liberal 
                                                            
17 Jervis, “Political Implications of Loss Aversion,” op. cit., p. 196. 
18 Matthew Rendall, “Russia, the Concert of Europe, and Greece, 1821-29,” 
Security Studies, vol. 9, no. 4 (Summer 2000), pp. 52-60. 
19 Incorporating domestic-level arguments in realist theory has recently been 
coined ‘neoclassical realism,’ in which status-quo, and revisionist, intentions, 
respectively, are crucial to an explanation of a state’s foreign policy in addition to 
system-level effects of anarchy and the security dilemma. For examples see, 
Stephen M. Walt, The Origins of Alliances (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 
1987); Benjamin Miller, When Opponents Cooperate: Great Power Conflict and 
Collaboration in World Politics (Ann Arbor: University of Michigan Press, 1995); 
Layne, “Lord Palmerston and the Triumph of Realism,” in Fendius Elman, ed., 
op. cit., pp. 61-100; Randall L. Schweller, Deadly Imbalances: Tripolarity and 
Hitler’s Strategy of World Conquest (New York: Columbia University Press, 
1998); Gideon Rose, “Neoclassical Realism and Theories of Foreign Policy,” 
(paper presented at the 1997 annual meeting of the American Political Science 
Association, Washington, D.C.). 
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institutionalism, on the one hand, but we should also not see the more predatory 
degree of conflict that has to be allowed by realism, on the other hand.   
Further specification of the dynamics of widespread loss aversion situates 
it, on the one hand, between a variant of balance theory, in which the security 
threats throughout the system are diffuse, and, on the other hand, the automatic 
version of balance-of-power theory, in which states that cooperate to defeat a 
third party threat realign with the defeated state in order that a former ally not 
steal a march on the other if it gains inordinately.20 In the balance theory version, 
adversaries on one issue are allies on another issue; thus states reconcile their 
differences with each other through moderate solutions that are amenable to all. 
In the most optimistic form, states compete with each other to get in the good 
graces of the recently defeated adversary in order to prevail on other issues in 
which they will need support.21 Such dynamics are possible, but there can be no 
significant alignment handicaps due to antithetical ideologies or visceral hatred. 
Reality is seldom that pristine. In the case of the Concert of Europe, Britain, at 
different times variously allied with, restrained, let it be known to others that it 
would fail to restrain, and balanced against, the recently defeated France. 
                                                            
20 For the assumptions and implications of balance-of-power theory see Jervis, 
“From Balance to Concert,” in Oye, ed., op. cit., pp. 58-79. 
21 Jervis, “Systems Theories and Diplomatic History,” in Paul Lauren, ed., 
Diplomacy: New Approaches in History, Theory, and Policy (New York: Free 
Press, 1979), p. 224. 
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Schroeder’s insight that alliances can be tools of control is important here.22 
Because Russia feared that France continued to be the seedbed of revolutionary 
activity, it was loath to ally with the latter and consistently advocated a 
permanent hostile alliance (against which Britain under Foreign Secretary 
Palmerston wisely demurred) until the Concert broke down.23 Thus, at times 
when it was at odds with Britain and Russia, France had to try to line up support 
for its individualistic policies with Austria and Prussia, two states which also 
largely distrusted French intentions and motives. The automatic balance-of-
power version fails for the same reason because France, while useful at times to 
Britain and Austria for tactical diplomatic reasons, was largely perpetually 
balanced against, both tacitly and overtly during the Concert period.    
What general dynamics should we then expect of widespread loss 
aversion? On the one hand, there has to be an incentive for the major powers to 
try to refrain from individualistic policies in order to achieve security and to 
engage each other multilaterally in order to attempt to achieve a degree of 
mutual security. On the other hand, cooperation has to be conditional on the 
continued respect by others for the state’s interests. Thus, while the state will not 
take advantage of another state’s temporary weakness by exploiting it, it will 
also not allow the fact of distress to become a cover for the other state to make 
                                                            
22 Schroeder, “Alliances, 1815-1914: Weapons of Power and Tools of 
Management,” in Klaus Knorr, ed., Historical Dimensions of National Security 
Problems (Lawrence: University Press of Kansas, 1976), pp. 227-62. 
23 Kenneth Bourne, Foreign Policy of Victorian England 1830-1902 (Oxford: 
Clarendon Press, 1970), pp. 39-40. 
 117 
aggrandizing gains in its effort to restore order. Furthermore, although it may 
not wish to add to the misery of the temporarily weak major power, the state will 
not go out of its way to rectify the latter’s problems. For instance, Britain and 
France could dissuade Russia from intervening on behalf of the United 
Netherlands to prevent the secession of Belgium, but they could not compel 
Russia to aid in coercive measures to ensure that Belgium become an 
independent state. In addition, major powers should not actively incite 
revolution or unrest in another major state or in that other state’s recognized 
sphere of influence. But, respect and a measure of defense for the interests of 
small powers precludes the system from devolving into a two-tier cooperative 
balance-of-power24 if it is believed that revolts and system-wide war can cause 
each other. In an interesting case to be discussed later, Britain let Austria know 
that it could not restrain France from coming to the aid of Italy were Italy to be 
humiliated completely after its revolts, thus guaranteeing that system-wide war 
would ensue should Austria not exercise a measure of self-restraint.  
Necessary conditions for the emergence of widespread loss aversion. 
A number of necessary conditions must be present for the general dynamics of 
widespread loss aversion to be attractive as an interactionist strategy. First, the 
major states must largely be satisfied with the status quo and they must know 
                                                            
24 Betts briefly suggests this as an assessment of the Concert of Europe. See, 
Richard K. Betts, “Collective Security and Arms Control in the New Europe,” in 
Betts, ed., Conflict After the Cold War: Arguments on Causes of War and Peace 
(New York: Macmillan Publishing Co., 1994), pp. 462-63. 
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that all feel similarly and that others know that they feel this way and so on.25 In 
criticizing this theoretical argument made by Jervis on behalf of a Concert, 
Slantchev argues that this is an inordinately demanding coordination task.26 But, 
the second necessary condition relates to the status of military technology and 
can at least provide states with incentives to engage in sustained communication 
with each other in order to determine whether they feel similarly and how they 
might go about maintaining the status quo.27 Specifically, the defense cannot be 
so dominant (or believed to be so dominant) and distinguishable from the 
offense that states prefer to go their own way. This was the case during the inter-
                                                            
25 Jervis, “A Political Science Perspective on the Balance of Power and the 
Concert,” AHR, vol. 97, no. 3 (June 1992), pp. 716-724, 719; Jervis, “Security 
Regimes,” in Krasner, ed., op. cit., pp. 176-77. 
26 Slantchev, “Territory and Commitment,” op. cit., pp. 575-76. 
27 Because of anarchy and the security dilemma, states that are satisfied with the 
status quo are not necessarily able to maintain it without coming to some 
agreement as to how to imperfectly achieve it. Cooperative solutions may not 
obtain, not because states are revisionist, but rather because some status quo 
states are incorrectly perceived by other status quo states as being aggressive 
when, in fact, they are acting out of insecurity. This is the major problem with 
Slantchev’s self-enforcing equilibrium argument to explain peace and stability 
during the Concert period in which he argues that the rules and incentives for 
enforcement must be endogenous. As a consequence, there seems to be no 
difference between short-run, and long-run, state interests, respectively. But, as 
Jervis shows, this is precisely the problem that systemic theories grapple with. In 
dynamics that reflect the Prisoner’s Dilemma, the first choice of the state is to 
defect while others cooperate, the second choice is for all to cooperate, the third 
choice is for mutual defection, and the last choice is to cooperate while others 
defect. Without explicit communication and techniques to iterate plays of the 
game, the suboptimal choice of mutual defection obtains with disaster for all. 
Thus, short-run, and long-run, state interests, respectively, are not identical and 
must somehow be harmonized, if only imperfectly, which will not occur if the 
rules of the game can only be endogenous. See, Slantchev, “Territory and 
Commitment,” op. cit., pp. 567-72; Jervis, “Security Regimes,” in Krasner, ed., op. 
cit., pp. 185-87; Jervis, “From Balance to Concert,” in Oye, ed., op. cit., pp. 64-73.   
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war period when buck-passing took place because states believed that they did 
not need to assist other defensively minded states.28 The result was that weaker 
states were initially picked off seriatim by the Nazis until a defensive stand was 
belatedly taken. At the other extreme, the offense cannot be so dominant (or 
believed to be so dominant) and indistinguishable from the defense that there is 
little possibility of distinguishing the military policies of status quo states from 
the military policies of revisionist states. In such cases, states engage in chain-
ganging behavior, which is largely individualistic because there is no attempt to 
determine whether states are status quo or revisionist, but rather to 
unconditionally join one’s allies in order to be on the winning side because war is 
deemed to be inevitable.29 The run-up to the First World War is held to be the 
paradigmatic example of chain-ganging. The choice does not become whether to 
go to war to make gains or to refrain from attack in the hope that peace can be 
preserved, but rather to become the sure victim of attack in the near future if one 
does not move first.  
Van Evera argues that defense dominance allows security dynamics that 
were formerly thought to be independent, but are actually related, to be 
naturally realized. Specifically, he argues that defense dominance reduces the 
incentive for states to engage in opportunistic expansionism; reduces the 
incentive for status quo states to engage in defensive expansionism; reduces the 
                                                            
28 Thomas J. Christensen and Jack Snyder, “Chain Gangs and Passed Bucks: 
Alliance Patterns in Multipolarity,” International Organization, vol. 44, no. 2 
(Spring 1990), pp. 137-68. 
29 Christensen and Snyder, “Chain Gangs and Passed Bucks,” ibid., pp. 137-68. 
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incentive for states to fiercely resist expansion; reduces the incentive for states to 
be first movers in order to be secure; reduces the incentive for states to take 
advantage of closing windows of opportunity through preventive, and 
preemptive, war, respectively; reduces the incentive for states to engage in fait 
accomplis; and reduces the incentive for states to fail to negotiate and to reach 
agreements the terms of which can only be positively verified.30 But these 
dynamics are not naturally realized as the dynamics of buck-passing detailed 
above show.  
There must be enough uncertainty (although not debilitating as the chain-
ganging dynamic shows) regarding the dispositional and situational mix that 
gives rise to particular state behavior to generate the proper incentives for the 
major powers to eschew individualistic policies in order to take a chance that 
multilateral policies can keep the peace. Mutual cooperation is possible, but not 
easy, when offensive and defensive weapons and policies are distinguishable but 
the former have an advantage, or when offensive and defensive weapons and 
policies are indistinguishable although the defense has an advantage.31 Under 
these two possible configurations, individualistic polices are likely to be costly, 
but following mutual policies will not be disastrous should one become the 
victim of attack because there is a strong expectation of support from others to 
                                                            
30 Stephen Van Evera, “Offense, Defense, and the Causes of War,” International 
Security, vol. 22, no. 4 (Spring, 1998), pp. 5-43. 
31 Jervis, “Security Regimes,” in Krasner, ed., op. cit., p. 178. 
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punish the aggression. Security is possible, but only if mutual security obtains.32 
Thus, states expand their narrow conception of self-interest to invest somewhat 
in the security of others.33 
The last two necessary conditions are that states cannot believe that   
individualistic policies can only provide for their security and that war must be 
seen as being very costly.34 These two conditions are taken in turn. If the 
dynamics of prospect theory are correct, states should adopt individualistic 
policies largely because they fear that they will sustain significant losses if they 
do not, not in order to make opportunistic gains. Understanding that this is the 
case should give states an incentive to make sure that others are not excessively 
humiliated in defeat or left insecure. Sustained interaction should do a better job 
of determining a state’s motives than merely presuming that aggression for gain 
is the cause of its behavior. Moreover, by giving the state an alternative to 
individualistic aggression in order to achieve security by offering it an 
expectation of support should it find itself in a situation of temporary distress, 
the motives of a potentially fearful state can be ameliorated.  
A state’s self-interest can be made longer run than is usually the case 
when the exchange of concessions between states is not so fine-grained. Van 
Evera argues that defense dominance achieves this because material 
disadvantages do not translate into strategic security disadvantages if resources 
                                                            
32 Jervis, “From Balance to Concert,” in Oye, ed., op. cit., pp. 69-73. 
33 Jervis, “Security Regimes,” in Krasner, ed., op. cit., p. 180. 
34 Jervis, “Security Regimes,” in Krasner, ed., op. cit., pp. 177-78. 
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are less usable for offense. In contrast, “resources are more cumulative when 
conquest is easy. The ability to conquer others and to defend oneself is more 
elastic to one’s control over strategic areas and resources. As a result, gains are 
more additive—states can parlay small conquests into larger ones—and losses 
are less reversible.”35 This is true, but what may be more important is the 
inference that others draw when a concession is given. At the extreme, a state 
that is believed to have no choice in making concessions is also not believed to be 
able to stand up for its vital interests and therefore is likely to be easily 
coercible.36 Such inferences will not be drawn if it is known that those who take 
unfair advantage of another state’s concession will be punished by third, and 
fourth, parties, respectively. The expectation that such punishment will 
materialize diminishes the incentive that states have to take advantage of 
others.37    
Finally, system-wide war and revolution must be seen as costly for all and 
mutually causal. Major powers differently situated, largely due to geography 
and regime type, will have different estimates of the likelihood of such 
contagion. Britain, and to a degree, France, championed non-intervention in the 
affairs of states and were generally supportive of liberal revolutions whereas the 
autocratic states of Russia, Prussia, and Austria, the last in particular, felt the 
need to intervene in the affairs of its neighbors to crush revolts in their infancy. 
                                                            
35 Van Evera, “Offense, Defense, and the Causes of War,” op. cit., p. 8. 
36 Jervis, “Security Regimes,” in Krasner, ed., op. cit., pp. 182-83. 
37 Jervis, “From Balance to Concert,” in Oye, ed., op. cit., pp. 70-73. 
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But, the attitudes of the major powers were more consistent with each other than 
is normally the case because Britain did fear radicalism. 38 Moreover, Palmerston 
was circumspect enough to realize when a revolution had gone too far to be 
contained without system-wide war (and the revolt thus needed to be both 
recognized and legitimized with independence) and when intervention in a 
revolt was necessary to preclude the eruption of system-wide war. To different 
degrees the major powers did not fear retaliation from another state if it engaged 
in aggression; rather they feared that a neighboring state might suffer a revolt 
with the attendant contagion effects.39 Even a victorious state might suffer a 
revolution due to unrest as a consequence of victory. 
The nature of military weaponry and policy were somewhat ambiguous at 
the conclusion of the Napoleonic Wars. Thus the major powers had the necessary 
incentives detailed above to engage in widespread loss aversion. Of particular 
importance was the demobilization of large standing national armies because 
such demobilization contributed to defense dominance.40 Liberal states feared 
despotism while autocratic states feared unrest and revolution because large 
                                                            
38 Jervis, “From Balance to Concert,” in Oye, ed., op. cit., p. 65; Jervis, 
“Cooperation Under the Security Dilemma,” World Politics, vol. 30, no. 2 
(January 1978), p. 169; Alan Sked, “Metternich’s Enemies or the Threat from 
Below, “ in Sked., ed., Europe’s Balance of Power 1815-1848 (London: Macmillan, 
1979), pp. 164-89. 
39 Jervis, “From Balance to Concert,” in Oye, ed., op. cit., p. 65. 
40 George Quester, Offense and Defense in the International System (New York: 
John Wiley & Sons, 1977), pp. 73-74; Michael Howard, War in European History 
(London: Oxford University Press, 1976), pp. 95-95. 
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standing armies required and fostered popular rule.41 Nevertheless, Van Evera 
argues that the ability to interfere in the affairs of a neighboring state can be seen 
as an offensive policy tool,42 while Jervis argues that the liberal states 
increasingly fell out with the autocratic states over the period of the Concert 
because intervention by the latter was increasingly viewed by the former as 
being a cover for aggrandizement.43 Because major war was seen as being too 
costly and this was recognized by all, such cheating at the margin should not be 
unexpected as states can believe that others have no choice but to cooperate even 
as they occasionally defect. But threats of war in order to restore the cooperative 
equilibrium largely had the effect of ensuring that all understood that fragile 
peace rested on conditionally good state behavior. Thus, the possibility of 
system-wide war limited the lengths that states were willing to go to make 
individualistic gains.44  
                                                            
41 Van Evera, “Offense, Defense, and the Causes of War,” op. cit., p. 17.  
42 Van Evera, “Offense, Defense, and the Causes of War,” op. cit., pp. 7-9. 
43 Jervis, “Security Regimes,” in Krasner, ed., op. cit., p. 184. The theoretical 
thrust of the argument is correct, but the diplomatic record demonstrates an 
increasing preference on the part of Palmerston to deal with revolts in a more 
interventionist and less liberal fashion. For instance, during the 1848 revolts the 
liberal Kossuth government appealed for British intervention in Hungary’s effort 
to secede from Austria, but Palmerston stated that he had no knowledge of 
Hungary other than as part of the Austrian Empire. Moreover, Palmerston 
instructed the Russians to put down the revolt as quickly as possible. See, 
Charles Sproxton, Palmerston and the Hungarian Revolution (Cambridge: 
Cambridge University Press, 1919), p. 46; E. Ann Pottinger Saab, The Origins of 
the Crimean Alliance (Charlottsville: University of Virginia Press, 1977), p. 8.  
44 This dynamic inverts Glenn Snyder’s stability-instability paradox. Presumed 
stability at the highest level of deterrence gives states some expectation that risky 
behaviors can be taken at lower levels of conflict. But if the cooperative 
equilibrium is tenuous, defecting individualistic behavior risks destroying the 
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Specific dynamics of widespread loss aversion. 
Because all of the major powers are satisfied with the status quo even if they are 
differentially secure, states recognize that their interests are positively  
interdependent. Because war is deemed not likely, but only because all take care 
not to provoke it, there should be an overriding interest in framing incidents 
which arise as the consequence of shocks to the system with a view to keeping 
the peace rather than mitigating losses because war is deemed possible. 
Therefore, states recognize that concessions need to be made in order to keep the 
peace. As argued in the previous chapter, in this case the insurance premium is 
accepted as a sure but small loss instead of being viewed as the cost of 
conducting a risky foreign policy in order to ensure that no loss occurs. The 
conservative view of the insurance premium largely takes place when one 
concedes the advantage of the unilateral initiative and instead solicits 
multilateral action even when dealing with a revolt within one’s recognized 
sphere of influence. Unilateral action is then only taken in order to stem certain 
losses should multilateral action not materialize. (These dynamics should operate 
even more strongly in areas where particular state influence is contested.) 
Restoration of the status quo is the objective and any additional gains that are 
                                                                                                                                                                                 
whole edifice. The knowledge that such consequences are possible induces actors 
to be restrained in their individualistic behavior. At the domestic level of 
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keeping multiethnic states from breaking apart. See, Glenn Snyder, “The Balance 
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made as the consequence of unilateral action should not be sought, even less so 
in contested areas. Even if gains are made almost by accident they should not be 
retained if others subsequently object that they are being taken advantage of.45  
By adhering to the belief that states will mutually support each other 
when temporary weakness is experienced (there will be no runs on the bank), 
states are not so wedded to a strict interpretation of the endowment effect. They 
will make concessions in the reasonable certainty that the peace will hold (or that 
system-wide war will not eventuate). Because states believe that their security 
critically depends on the security of others, the endowment effect can be 
broadened to include the necessary bundles of goods (territory, strategic 
resources, and prestige) in the possession of other states that give the latter the 
belief that they are secure. Taken to the extreme, my cession of goods to others 
that benefits them more than their loss harms me raises the general level of 
endowment to be enjoyed by all. 
 Because it is recognized that not all states are equally secure, the less 
secure ones will tend to frame incidents with a view to using the insurance 
premium in risky fashion in order to take unilateral action to achieve their 
                                                            
45 We should expect this sequence of actions to take place because free-riding on 
collective action problems can occur when multilateral action is requested. 
Moreover, prospect theory argues that states will be reluctant to escalate the level 
of violence in limited conflict situations in order to make gains but will only do 
so when failing to do so will bring a significant deterioration in the status quo. 
By such time, a significant amount of violence may be needed to restore the 
status quo which third parties will mistake as an effort to unilaterally change the 
status quo in order to make gains. These arguments are adaptations of the 
dynamics in Jervis, “Political Implications of Loss Aversion,” op. cit., p. 194.    
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security. But by guaranteeing their security, the more secure states can 
ameliorate the need for the less secure to take risky actions. The variety of 
alliance tools alluded to above can point the way for the less secure to return to 
the cooperative fold without the fear that they are taking significant risks that 
they will be taken advantage of. By providing a safety net, states can mutually 
invest in security arrangements that, while not promising certainty, significantly 
reduce the probability that a state will be left without allies in case it suffers 
aggression.46 This is not all sweetness and light. Brute threats of war may be 
needed to make an intransigent state realize that its policy position is untenable. 
Moreover, all of the major powers must be vigilant in defending their interests at 
the international level even as they take account of the legitimate interests of 
others. Resort to isolationism by an important state that collapses a security 
guarantee for others has the effect of destabilizing the system because the less 
secure then can only ensure their security if others that they have long-standing 
conflicts with are made insecure.47 Instead of the positive interdependence that 
                                                            
46 More formally, the certainty principle (or the non-linear response to 
probabilities) characteristic of prospect theory becomes less certain and more 
linear when states have an expectation of aid should they find themselves 
threatened by an aggressor state. Refer to Chapter 1 of this dissertation for 
discussion of the insurance premium, endowment effect, and certainty principle. 
47 One variant toward increasing isolationism is delegating the responsibility for 
managing conflicts to other major powers and failing to be actively involved in 
the mediating diplomacy. Jack Snyder has a complex view of Palmerston whom 
he believes was preparing Britain for a liberal imperialist policy (that of 
deflecting class hatreds domestically by venting them abroad) by the time of the 
Crimean War. This policy dovetailed with Britain’s move toward ‘splendid 
isolation’ and lack of interest in participating in mediating diplomacy. 
Nevertheless, during the Greek and Belgian crises, Palmerston’s view was 
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contributes to mutual security, mutual insecurity results when states view their 
relations as being negatively interdependent. Individualistic solutions must then 
be found in order to attain security. 
Four case studies beginning with the Greek revolt of 1821. 
 
The Danubian (Romanian) principalities of Wallachia and Moldavia found 
themselves in revolt as Greek Christians took up against their Muslim Turkish 
rulers. Thousands of Turks in southern Greece were killed and reprisals against 
Christians took place to include the sacrilegious murder of the Greek Orthodox 
Patriarch of Constantinople on Easter Sunday on church property. In addition, 
the Turks violated Russian shipping rights and continued to be in violation of an 
1812 Russo-Turkish treaty.    
In the first phase of the crisis from 1821-25, Russia, under Tsar Alexander 
I, was keenly interested in protecting its fellow Christians in an area that was 
largely respected by the major powers as being within Russia’s sphere of 
influence.48 Russia was the only state initially willing to intercede. Austria, 
Britain, and France allowed that Russia had a right to enforce its bilateral treaties 
with Turkey, although the Greek question required their consultation and 
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assent.49 Nevertheless, it has recently been argued that Britain and Russia were 
dual hegemonies in Europe. Thus, from a distribution of capabilities standpoint, 
Russia might have done what it pleased regarding this crisis and there was not 
much the other powers (except Britain) could do save plead for Russian self-
restraint.50 Britain and Russia were neither allies nor open enemies; they enjoyed 
fairly good but not intimate relations.51 Perhaps Britain might have vigorously 
opposed Russia but it did little more than threaten neutrality while Austria 
withheld moral support for the Russian position.52 In explaining why Britain did 
not simply make Greece a bulwark against Russian expansion, Canning stated, 
“that would be a proper argument for English policy, but what language could 
we hold to Russia to obtain her consent, knowing as we do that she can conquer 
Greece and Turkey when she pleases?”53  
Alexander was interested in multilateral diplomacy to quell the violence 
and he lobbied for five years to bring the other major powers on board. This 
poses a problem for realism in that Alexander might easily have made unilateral 
gains by promoting and securing Greek independence as the benefits appeared 
                                                            
49 Evidence summarized in Rendall, “Russia, the Concert of Europe, and Greece, 
1821-29,” op. cit., p. 62. 
50 Schroeder, The Transformation of European Politics, op. cit., pp. 614-21; 
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to outweigh the costs. At the time it was not believed that Turkey could 
successfully oppose Russia militarily54 and the other major powers were dilatory 
in intervening to resolve the crisis. The Russian foreign minister Capodistrias 
told Alexander, “Your majesty, once on the Danube, will resolve without effort 
the fate of the Levant.”55  
Britain and Austria had an interest in seeing the Greek revolt die out 
because they wished to see Turkey preserved as a bulwark against potential 
Russian expansion. Moreover, Metternich, the Austrian foreign minister, feared 
contagion from revolution in the Balkans.56 Yet, the two states could not 
coordinate their opinions. Canning and the earlier British foreign minister 
Castlereagh both severely mistrusted Metternich’s motives as the latter 
repeatedly attempted to make Vienna the diplomatic capital of the Concert.57 
France was looking to make gains in the Levant and vacillated between 
supporting British/Austrian opinions and offering a bilateral deal with Russia to 
make gains should Greece successfully secede from Turkish rule.58 
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56 Kagan, “The Myth of the European Concert,” op. cit., p. 26. 
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frequently engaged in self-serving diplomacy. Although status quo, Austria was 
an insecure state and was prone to taking risky actions in the form of fait 
accomplis in order to maintain its security. On these views see, Schroeder, 
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That Alexander had a brief interest but ultimately refused to make a 
Russo-French bargain in favor of multilateral diplomacy gives good evidence 
that Russia framed the crisis as one of peacefully attempting to maintain the 
status quo rather than attempting to make gains equal in value to the losses it 
might have sustained had Turkish atrocities against the co-religionist Greeks 
been permitted to continue with the risks of civil unrest elsewhere.59 
Nevertheless, Alexander became increasingly frustrated with Britain and 
Austria. Two ambassadorial conferences were sponsored in St. Petersburg, but 
they produced no allied action regarding the disposition of Greece.60 A 1924 
Russian offer to create three autonomous Greek principalities was perceived by 
Britain and Austria to give Russia predominant influence in the Balkans. It was 
feared that the three areas would become Russian satellites.61 There is evidence 
that Alexander was reaching the limits of his patience with the other major 
powers and decided on war with Turkey in spring of 1826.62 Thus, Russian 
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Lindley argues that Castlereagh, and Metternich, separately, exaggerated the 
threat of revolution in meetings with Alexander in order to serve their interests 
in propping up Turkey by quashing the Greek revolt. See, Lindley, Promoting 
Peace with Information, op. cit., pp. 72-75. But, instead of arguing that Alexander 
was inordinately gullible, this dynamic is to be expected by prospect theory as 
the tsar increasingly found his multilateral strategy to be failing without a more 
determined unilateral initiative on his part.   
60 Kagan, “The Myth of the European Concert,” op. cit., pp. 28-29. 
61 Jelavich, Russia’s Balkan Entanglement, op. cit., pp. 61, 66-67; Kagan, “The 
Myth of the European Concert,” op. cit., p. 29. 
62 Robert W. Seton-Watson, Britain in Europe, 1789-1914: A Survey of Foreign 
Policy (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1955), p. 108; Loyal Cowles, 
“The Failure to Restrain Russia: Canning, Nesselrode, and the Greek Question, 
1825-1827,” International History Review, vol. 12, no. 4 (November 1990), p. 703.  
 132 
framing of the situation, British/Austrian obstruction, and largely unwarranted 
suspicions are expected by the dynamics of widespread loss aversion. 
Nicholas I, who succeeded Alexander after the latter’s unexpected death 
in 1825, was less willing to sacrifice Russian interests for the sake of the Concert 
than was his predecessor. In the second phase of the crisis from 1826-29, Nicholas 
intervened to aid the Greeks. Over British objections Russia took some gains 
under the Treaty of Akkerman, which gave Russia preferred positions in the 
Caucasus and the Danubian Principalities.63 In essence, Russia had done little 
more than restore the status quo, but its unilateral action to achieve this outcome 
forced the other major powers to become active in resolving the Greek question, 
which is expected by our theory. The 1826 St. Petersburg Protocol between 
Russia and Britain, which added France as a signatory to the Treaty of London 
the following year, promoted Greek autonomy. An autonomous vassal Greece 
was created and an armistice was imposed should Wallachia and Moldavia fail 
to comply. Because of confusion, the armistice was enforced with the unfortunate 
sinking of the Turko-Egyptian navy at Navarino, the effect of which hardened 
Turkey toward any accommodation with Greece. The Turkish Sultan Mahmud 
declared war on Russia and although the Russian military performed poorly it 
was ultimately able to secure a victory in which the Sultan acceded to the Treaty 
of Adrianople.64 Before this conclusion was reached, a dangerous situation 
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occurred, which had the potential of escalating the war to a system-wide one. In 
1829, Russia was poised to take Constantinople, but the British and the French 
navies operating in the Mediterranean were dispatched to the Dardanelles, and 
they asked Turkey for permission to enter, in order to protect the city. Yet, Russia 
did not press its advantage and stopped short of securing its victory, thus 
averting a military clash between the three major powers.65   
The Treaty of Adrianople affirmed provisions of the Treaty of London and 
an independent Greek state came into being headed by a ruler independent of 
the three signatories. Russia limited its war effort in deference to British and 
French interests. Moreover, the Russian peace terms were moderate; they took 
small territorial gains and kept Turkey intact in continued control of 
Constantinople and the Straits. Finally, Russia did not incite Balkan Christians to 
revolt against Turkey, an act that would have threatened Austria as well.66 
Although Russia, Britain, and France formally agreed to refrain from taking 
unilateral advantage in the newly formed Greece, Kagan argues that it became 
an arena of acute major power rivalry. As evidence, the three states balanced 
each other: Britain allowed France the authority to supervise the withdrawal of 
Turkish troops in order to deny Russia exclusive territorial gains.67 Moreover, 
Britain and Russia cooperated with each other to the exclusion of Austria, thus 
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excluding Metternich, whom Kagan strangely regards as the keeper of Concert 
norms.68 This position is hardly tenable given the previously noted predilection 
of Metternich to force fait accomplis in disregard of the other major powers’ 
interests.69 Moreover, the details of competition between the signatories miss the 
more important point that the major powers were able to manage, relatively 
peaceably, a shock to the system that might have destroyed the Concert in a 
territory not contemplated by, nor within the purview of, the 1815 settlement.70 
The second phase of the crisis is largely in accord with the expected 
dynamics of widespread loss aversion. Alexander finally decided to intervene in 
the spring of 1826 to protect the Greek Christians as he feared that continued 
Turkish repression was exacerbating revolutionary sentiment elsewhere.71 
Although he was not in favor of the revolt, Alexander also did not wish to see the 
Greeks extirpated by the Turks. It is perhaps unfortunate that Nicholas later took 
small gains as part of compensation for intervening on behalf of the Greeks 
(prospect theory does not deny that this is possible), but his actions had the 
salutary effect of forcing the French and British to work multilaterally with 
Russia to resolve the crisis. Moreover, Russia might have made much more in the 
way of opportunistic gains, but was restrained in its actions because the rest of 
the status quo was restored by carving out independence for Greece. As 
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evidence, Russia’s strategic interest in the Ottoman Empire made it tempting to 
use the Greek revolt as a pretext for settling its other objections to Turkish 
violations of the 1812 Russo-Turkish treaty. Although Nesselrode, the Russian 
foreign minister, conveyed to the Russian representative in Constantinople that 
these demands might be attached should Turkey become intransigent on the 
Greek issue,72 Russia had little interest in materially changing its relationship 
with the Ottoman Empire. Russia found the Ottoman Empire to be more useful 
as a dysfunctional divided-against-itself frontier than as a partitioned area in 
which Britain and France might make greater gains and achieve greater influence 
at Russia’s expense.73    
The Belgian revolt of 1830. 
The 1815 settlement added Belgium to Holland, thus creating the United 
Netherlands, which served as a buffer against potential French revisionism. 
Nevertheless, the Belgians long resented the heavy-handed treatment of Dutch 
rule and the revolt was a contagion from the July Revolution in France that 
deposed Charles X and brought Louis-Phillipe, the citizen king, to the throne. 
Moreover, because of ideological similarity and culture, the Belgians and the 
French were natural allies. In consequence, the Dutch asked all of the major 
powers except France for aid in putting down the insurrection. Palmerston 
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believed that the revolt had gone too far to be contained and he did not wish to 
see the major powers intervening militarily in the Low Countries, an area of 
historic strategic importance to British security.74 He recognized the 
stubbornness that major powers evince in leaving a contested area after a crisis 
has been resolved.75 At the conclusion of the Napoleonic Wars, both Castlereagh 
and Metternich became the architects of the United Netherlands when they 
feared that France and Russia might conclude a separate alliance.76 Thus, the 
presence of a strong United Netherlands as a bulwark against France continued 
to be British policy and Palmerston privately regretted the Belgian revolt despite 
his general support for constitutional regimes.77  
In the first phase of the crisis, Palmerston framed the situation as one in 
which he wished to maintain the status quo peaceably, but could do so if the 
insurance premium was used in conservative fashion to accept the small, but 
sure, loss of a United Netherlands.78 As detailed below, the Belgian revolt could 
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 137 
easily spread to system-wide war without his firm diplomatic hand. Palmerston 
needed to align with France in order to dissuade Russia and Prussia from 
intervening to restore Belgium to the Dutch King William. But, the British were 
both suspicious of the French if the Belgians gravitated toward them, as well as 
of a westward expansion of Prussia.79 Moreover, in allying with France to 
prevent Prussian aggrandizement, Palmerston had to reassure the other major 
powers that diminution of the Dutch cordon against French revanchism could be 
compensated for by Britain giving France a security guarantee, which, in effect, 
was a security guarantee for all of Europe. As he would later do during the 1848 
revolutions, Palmerston offered to restrain Europe from attacking France were 
France to refrain from attacking Europe.80 This offer was credible as Britain (and 
possibly Russia) was the only state that might achieve its security without help 
from others.81 Because the other major powers relied on others to gain their 
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security, Palmerston could credibly use his trademark belligerent diplomacy 
through threats of general war to keep French revisionism in check.82 
A bit of luck was needed during the crisis and Palmerston found it in the 
contemporaneous revolts in the Polish provinces to which Russia and Austria 
had to attend. Because they were preoccupied with their own problems, 
Palmerston was able to secure the assent of the eastern powers at a London 
conference for Belgium’s independence. Lindley correctly argues that all of the 
major powers were more fearful of intervention leading to system-wide war than 
they were of revolution and thus they largely framed the crisis much in the way 
as Britain had. Remembering French aggression, the whole of Europe feared 
French intervention. In turn, France feared British or Prussian intervention; 
Russia mobilized forces for intervention but would not do so without Prussian 
assent for territorial access which France indicated that it would militarily 
oppose.83 
The logistics of demarcating Belgium’s borders, installing a ruler, 
demolishing border forts along the French-Belgian border, and forcing the Dutch 
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to accept the conference’s decisions preoccupied Palmerston. Not surprisingly, 
for its restrained behavior and improved resolution of the Polish insurrections, 
the result of the latter which was to re-awaken Russian and Austrian interests in 
intervention on behalf of the Dutch,84 the French foreign minister Talleyrand 
found an opportunity to make conditional his state’s support for British policy. 
The French foreign minister proposed that a Belgian ruler subservient to French 
interests be installed. Palmerston quickly turned on his ally and made common 
cause with the eastern powers in order to rebuff the French. A second 
duplicitous plot to install Louis-Phillipe’s son, the Duke of Nemours, on the 
Belgian throne forced Palmerston to threaten general war in an alliance with the 
eastern powers against France. In a private letter, Palmerston stated that the 
British occupied the position of “impartial mediators between France on the one 
hand, and the three other Powers on the other…as long as both parties remain 
quiet, we shall be friends with both; but…whichever side breaks the peace, that 
side will find us against them.”85             
Despite success in the Belgian issue, Luxemburg, which served as a buffer 
region between Holland and Belgium, was still occupied by Belgian troops. 
Holland attacked Belgium in summer 1831 and the latter turned to France for 
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help. The London conference authorized Anglo-French intervention to expel the 
Dutch. Yet, after defeating the Dutch, France remained in Belgium refusing to go 
out until a full resolution of the Dutch-Belgian issue had been effected. 
Moreover, the French attempted to dictate the forts that were to be destroyed on 
the French-Belgian border.86 According to Layne, by allowing the French to 
cherry-pick the forts to be destroyed, Belgium would be militarily exposed to 
France and subject to political pressure.87 Again, Palmerston resorted to threats 
saying that “one thing is certain, the French must go out of Belgium, or we have 
a general war, and war in a few days.”88 The threat had its desired effect. A more 
moderate Casimir Périer government came to power in France and Anglo-French 
coordination on Belgian policy re-ensued with the French receiving none of their 
opportunistic demands. 
Against the risk acceptant view that Britain saw the independence of 
Belgium as an opportunity to make economic gains at the expense of Holland is 
the risk averse view that the status quo was to be maintained by using the 
insurance premium in conservative fashion. Unfortunately, both viewpoints 
converge on the same policy of securing Belgian independence. Thus, it is 
difficult to definitively argue that risk aversion wins out over expected utility 
maximization in this phase of the crisis other than siding with the majority 
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scholarly viewpoint of the period. The fact that France wanted to be rewarded 
for its virtuous behavior by trying to make opportunistic gains is not 
incompatible with prospect theory, but neither is France’s rebuff by Britain.    
In the second phase of the crisis, Holland continued to occupy Antwerp 
while Belgium continued to occupy Luxemburg. Moreover, Holland blocked 
shipping on the Scheldt River. Both Britain and France found that economic 
sanctions proposed by the eastern powers were insufficient to force the Dutch to 
adhere to the conference’s Articles mandating an independent Belgium. France 
was eager to force the Dutch out of Antwerp militarily. The stakes were very 
high should France engage the Dutch unilaterally. According to Omond, the 
Belgians were out of patience and might attack the Dutch. Prussia would aid 
Holland and then take Alsace-Lorraine from the French should they be 
victorious. Should France be victorious it was believed that it would take 
provinces on the Rhine as well as Luxemburg while becoming the patron of 
Belgium. Austria and Russia would intervene to prevent the French from making 
such gains.89  
In this second phase, Britain framed the crisis as one in which the 
insurance premium was to be used in a more risky fashion, but in order to 
prevent system-wide war. It was known that a strong Anglo-French deterrent 
stance in favor of Belgium would stay the hand of Prussia absent Russian 
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support.90 Although Nicholas objected to a fellow monarch being deprived of his 
territory and thus threatened intervention in Belgium, the tsar mainly objected to 
the character of the July Revolution. In turn, Louis-Phillipe was anxious to 
declare his fealty to the status quo and when such bona fides were given, 
Nicholas had little interest in supporting Prussian aggression in support of the 
Dutch king.91 Knowledge of Russia’s position can only have made the Prussians 
more careful in their conduct.92 Mutual knowledge of these viewpoints was the 
result of sustained communication on the part of the major powers. Because they 
were fearful of the consequences of intervention, dissembling as to the real 
interests of the major powers did not benefit anyone.  
As noted above, for Britain to desert France would have ensured system-
wide war. Thus, in October 1822 the French army reentered Belgium while the 
British navy blockaded the Scheldt. Russia left the conference while Austria and 
Prussia protested. According to Schroeder, this action “caused suspension of the 
conference and created a war scare more serious than any earlier one.”93 Such 
risky action also resolved the crisis as the Dutch withdrew from Antwerp and 
France withdrew its troops. It took five years for King William to reconcile 
himself to the loss of Belgium. But he was on his own as the major powers were 
now in full agreement as to the course of action even if they differed as how to 
                                                            
90 Webster, The Foreign Policy of Palmerston 1830-1841, vol. 1, op. cit., pp. 67-72. 
91 Church, op. cit., pp. 40-56; H.A.C. Collingham, The July Monarchy: A Political 
History of France 1830-1848 (London: Longman, 1988), pp. 189-90. 
92 Slantchev, “Territory and Commitment,” op. cit., p. 594, fn. 86. 
93 Schroeder, The Transformation of European Politics, op. cit., p. 690. Cited in 
Lindley, Promoting Peace with Information, op. cit., pp. 75-76.  
 143 
achieve the goal of an independent Belgium. The eastern powers refused to 
engage in military coercion against the Dutch, thus delaying resolution of the 
crisis. For this reason, King William never accepted the fact of the changed status 
quo and sought to overturn it for as long as he could. Nevertheless, in 1839 an 
independent and neutral Belgium came into being which served as a buffer 
against France much in the same manner as did the United Netherlands. 
The greater threat to the status quo was the possibility of major power 
intervention in central Europe, not the revolt of Belgium which all of the major 
powers realized had to be managed. Thus, all of the major powers were risk 
acceptant for loss but such widespread loss aversion resulted in a somewhat 
harmonized common policy of avoiding war and tolerating a small loss, that of 
the loss of a unified buffer region against possible French revisionism. Only 
France, and possibly Prussia, had an interest in taking risks in order to make 
gains, but both states were dissuaded from action because Britain restrained 
France and Russia lost its interest in aiding Prussia when France promised to 
respect its treaty obligations and to refrain from starting war with anyone.94 
Britain only took the risky action of forcing the Dutch out of Antwerp when it 
became clear that France and Prussia would take control of the situation in order 
to further their own narrow ends. Finally, despite incautious remarks made by 
the French in support of the uprisings in Poland, and then in Italy to which 
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Metternich had to attend, the restraint on the part of the liberal states not to take 
advantage of the eastern powers’ temporary weaknesses allowed for agreements 
that were not so fine-grained.95 This had the effect of giving the major powers 
longer-run conceptions of others’ interests than is normally the case in 
international relations. The liberal states largely got what they wanted in the 
Belgian crisis because they were also solicitous of the eastern powers’ interests in 
their own spheres of interest. These expectations are largely in accord with the 
dynamics of widespread loss aversion.     
Turkey and the Eastern Question: 1831 and 1839. 
In 1831 Mehemet Ali, the pasha of Egypt and vassal of the Turkish Sultan 
Mahmud II, attacked Syria and Palestine with his son Ibrahim. Mehemet 
demanded full independence from Turkey after routing the Sultan’s military 
forces. Mehemet was extremely ambitious and his long-term goals may have 
been to take Constantinople and the rest of the Ottoman Empire.96 In turn, the 
Sultan asked for multilateral help from the major European powers in putting 
down Mehemet, whom Mahmud regarded as an outlaw. Much as in the Greek 
crisis, there was no one willing to intercede save for Russia, Turkey’s least 
favored protector and traditional enemy in the region. “A drowning man will 
clutch at a serpent,” was the retort given by a Turkish diplomat to his British and 
French opposite numbers after they implored the Porte to avoid allying with the 
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Russians.97 France began cultivating Mehemet as a client in its attempt to make 
inroads into North Africa and to contest British naval supremacy in the 
Mediterranean98 and was predisposed toward mediation rather than war. For his 
part, Louis-Phillipe did not encourage Mehemet’s aggression.99 Metternich 
declared Mehemet a rebel to be defeated but, once again, Metternich attempted 
to make Vienna the center of Concert diplomacy regarding this crisis to which 
Palmerston objected. Moreover, the British were absorbed in the Reform struggle 
at home as well as overextended militarily in their empire and could not provide 
resources.100 Thus, for a variety of reasons, the British and the Austrians could 
not coordinate their opinions in the matter.  
Without informing the other major powers, Russia dispatched 15,000 
troops to the shores of the Bosphorus and a naval squadron anchored at 
Constantinople. Both the British and the French protested these Russian actions 
as violations of an 1809 Anglo-Turkish neutrality of the Straits agreement.101 
French naval forces threatened to clash with the Russians despite Turkey’s 
refusal to allow the French to enter the Dardanelles. The Russian fleet stood 
ready on the shores of the Bosphorus to fire on French naval forces and a clash 
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was averted due to diplomatic mediation on the part of Austria.102 Russian 
mediation forced a settlement between Turkey and Egypt in 1833 after which 
Nicholas demonstrated moderation by withdrawing his troops from the region. 
Mehemet was able to keep his gains of Syria, Adana, and Tarsus while the Sultan 
was able to retain the rest of his holdings. 
 Nevertheless, for its unilateral efforts, Russia took from Turkey what the 
other major powers viewed as opportunistic gains. The Treaty of Unkiar Skelessi 
appeared to give Russia a preferential position in the region, but in essence it 
merely confirmed that existing bilateral treaties between Russia and Turkey 
would remain intact. The only material change was that Turkey was not 
obligated to support Russia in case of external aggression provided that the 
Dardanelles be closed to all armed vessels.103 Palmerston was angry with 
Metternich, accusing him of misleading diplomacy as to Nicholas’s intentions 
regarding Turkey. Metternich, for his part, felt that he had been taken advantage 
of by Nicholas.104  
 Because the Ottoman Empire lay astride Russia, the latter was adamant 
that it was part of its sphere of influence. Whereas Russia was willing to give 
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way regarding Greek independence, it did not believe that the Ottoman Empire 
was a contested area. Thus, it was much less willing to negotiate multilaterally 
with the other major European powers regarding Turkey.105 During the 18th 
century, Russia was engaged in creeping imperialism within the Ottoman 
Empire, but Russia was now content with its holdings and was looking only to 
consolidate them.106 As noted before, consolidation meant to Nicholas a weak, 
divided Turkish state, not a strong one that might oppose Russian interests.  
It has been argued that Britain considered the Ottoman Empire to be as 
important a strategic area for its security as was the European Low Countries 
during this period,107 but this argument is difficult to sustain. It is true that 
Britain had more than a passing interest in the Ottoman Empire, but Britain was 
overextended in the rest of its empire and consequently had to make difficult 
decisions as where to deploy its military resources effectively. Moreover, the 
advent of steam technology and its application to overland travel as a short route 
to India was not yet appreciated in the first phase of this crisis. Had the short 
routes been available, much less contemplated, rather than the long sea route 
around the Cape of Good Hope, Palmerston would likely not have dithered in 
asserting British interests in the area. He could only register displeasure with 
                                                            
105 Jelavich, Russia’s Balkan Entanglement, op. cit., pp. 75, 82; Anderson, “Russia 
and the Eastern Question,” in Sked, ed., Europe’s Balance of Power 1815-1848, 
op. cit., p. 64. 
106 Kagan, “The Myth of the European Concert,” op. cit., p. 37. 
107 John Marlowe, Perfidious Albion: The Origins of the Anglo-French Rivalry in 
the Levant (London: Elek Books, 1971), p. 8. For a more balanced view, see, 
Seton-Watson, Britain in Europe, 1789-1914, op. cit., pp. 173-78, 192-95.   
 148 
Russian actions, but little more than that. Even so, the Duke of Wellington 
overestimated British influence in the region, believing that a plain veto by the 
British would have stayed the hand of Mehemet without the intervention of 
Russian troops. And, as if to salve his ego, Palmerston argued unconvincingly 
before Parliament that British representations to Mehemet materially contributed 
to the resulting peace settlement.108 Yet, despite its protestations, Britain could 
take a somewhat relaxed view of the situation as the Russian preference for a 
weak Turkey was in Britain’s interest as well.109 Thus, Palmerston could state 
that, “with Russia we are just as we were, snarling at each other, but neither 
wishing for war…”110 During this period, France was an interloper looking to 
make gains in the region, but was at a disadvantage to Russia’s strong deterrent 
stand, which is expected by prospect theory. Prussia was not materially involved 
in this crisis. Perhaps Austria could make some trouble for Russia in this region, 
but it could not project its power. Recognizing that this was the case, Russia and 
Austria closed ranks with meetings in Münchengrätz at which both monarchs 
coordinated continued repression of Poles and German liberals within their 
respective spheres of influence, reaffirmed the right to intervene in the affairs of 
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other states to prevent revolution, but also resolved not to partition Turkey.111 
Seton-Watson argues that it was this moderation on the part of Nicholas 
regarding the Ottoman Empire that contributed to the relative détente that 
obtained between the liberal western and conservative eastern powers from 
1831-39.112 
 During this first phase of the crisis, Russia framed the situation as one of 
maintaining the status quo by using the insurance premium in conservative 
fashion. Nicholas had little trouble in suppressing the ambitions of Mehemet Ali 
and propping up the Sultan, but only if the other major powers did not intercede. 
He did take some chances by acting unilaterally, but a power vacuum existed 
which the tsar happily filled as the other major powers declined to aid the Sultan 
other than to offer weak diplomatic support. Nicholas was willing to risk a small 
war in order to avert dissolution of the Ottoman Empire, possibly a sure, but 
small, loss, as Russia would then proceed to carve up parts of the Empire for 
itself. Again, because the crisis largely concerned Russia in its declared sphere of 
influence, the other major powers save for France found it in their interest to 
register diplomatic objections rather than to send military forces. A military 
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engagement between France and Russia on the Bosphorus was potentially 
dangerous, but likely would not have resulted in a system-wide war. France was 
trying to make gains by supporting its renegade client. Russia was able to deter 
the French from military action and the face-saving offices of Austrian mediation 
kept the two powers from deserting the Concert. Britain’s military forces were 
preoccupied in other parts of its empire. Thus, they were in no position to 
oppose Russia. Additionally, Britain and Russian interests in maintaining the 
Ottoman Empire were essentially the same. Suspicions were inflamed because 
the other major powers incorrectly believed that Russia made opportunistic gains 
through the Treaty of Unkiar Skelessi, but the agreement merely confirmed 
existing bilateral treaty obligations between Russia and Turkey. Although 
communication was deficient during this phase of the crisis, suspicions were 
partly allayed because Nicholas was moderate in his behavior by refraining from 
splitting the Ottoman Empire. Because Nicholas largely had the field to himself, 
his restraint in not demanding more in concessions from Turkey is not easily 
squared with realist cost-benefit calculations that might have demanded more for 
his help. 
 In the second phase of the crisis, Mehemet regarded the earlier settlement 
as a mere truce to be broken when he found it advantageous. In 1838 he declared 
his independence from the Sultan. In turn, the Sultan unwisely attacked 
Mehemet in order to recover his territorial losses from the first phase of the crisis, 
but was soundly defeated and his entire navy defected to the enemy. Mahmud II 
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died unexpectedly leaving a leadership vacuum in Turkey. It looked as though 
Mehemet might conquer the Ottoman Empire.  
Palmerston acted with considerable dispatch in contrast to his earlier 
dithering. He wanted to overturn the Treaty of Unkiar Skelessi and replace it 
with a multilateral convention on the status of the Ottoman Empire. The foreign 
secretary wanted this change because the strategic situation was materially 
different from the earlier phase of the crisis. Trade was steadily increasing in the 
Levant and the new steam technology gave Britain hope that short overland 
routes to India might be feasible, either through Suez (were a canal to be built) 
and the Red Sea, or across the Syrian Desert to the Euphrates and the Persian 
Gulf.113 Additionally, Palmerston increasingly came to believe that Mehemet was 
a client of France and he did not wish to see the Ottoman Empire partitioned 
between Russia and France, thus shutting Britain out.  
For his part, Nicholas found the bilateral treaty to be burdensome; he 
knew that the Turks would repudiate it if they could and that Britain could 
entice the Turks to do so with little effort. Moreover, the same advantages 
obtained by Unkiar Skelessi could be had with any arrangement that provided 
for closure of the Straits. Finally, Nicholas wanted to detach France from Britain 
as he believed that the former was the prime fomenter of revolution throughout 
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Europe.114 Russia and Britain jointly drafted the settlement; Turkey was returned 
much of what it lost in 1833 while Mehemet kept Egypt and Syria. Additionally, 
the Bosphorus and the Dardanelles were to be closed to all warships. 
The French were intransigent and wanted to secure better terms for their 
client than the other major powers were willing to allow. Moreover, the 
anglophobic Thiers government wished to restore French influence throughout 
Europe. Thiers did not want war with Britain, but he overestimated Mehemet’s 
bargaining power and mistakenly thought that Palmerston would back down as 
the British cabinet was divided in the matter. Instead, Palmerston threatened to 
resign and thus bring down the Whig government if his views not accepted115 
and he drew together the other major powers to sign a Quadruple Agreement 
settling the Eastern Question, all the while isolating France. In turn, the Thiers 
government threatened war with Britain and, bizarrely, Prussia. Palmerston 
called Thiers’ bluff telling his ambassador to Paris, “if France throws down the 
gauntlet, we shall not refuse to pick it up; and that, if she begins a war, she will 
certainly lose her ships, colonies and commerce before she sees the end of it; that 
her army in Algeria will cease to give anxiety and that [Mehemet] Ali will just be 
chucked into the Nile.”116 Palmerston’s deterrent threat hit its mark as Louis-
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Phillipe swallowed a diplomatic defeat by forcing out Thiers and replacing him 
with the more moderate Soult government.  
For its part, Austria sought to make gains but its mediation was not 
without merit. Metternich was able to force the dismissal of the Sultan’s more 
intransigent advisors, thus paving the way for a settlement with Mehemet.117 But 
again, by attempting to make Vienna the center of Concert diplomacy, Nicholas 
detected an anti-Russian cast to the settlement. Although he agreed in principle 
with the settlement, Nicholas made common cause with Britain in enforcing it.118 
Although Austria, in turn, tilted towards France, it was also able to bring France 
back into the Concert fold and all five major powers were signatories to the 1841 
Straits Convention, thus successfully concluding the series of crises regarding the 
Eastern Question.119 
The second phase of the crisis does not fully vindicate the dynamics of 
widespread loss aversion. While one should not make too much of Britain’s 
dilatory response to the crisis in the first phase (after all a state with a world-
wide empire is necessarily preoccupied with many problems), it is difficult to 
argue that its response in the second phase was a risk acceptant response to a 
sure loss of the status quo. Rather, the difference in utilities across the two phases 
likely explains Britain’s significant interest in rolling back what it perceived as 
opportunistic gains by Russia in the first phase. All of a sudden the advent of the 
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short routes to India through the Levant in the second phase made Britain much 
more interested in asserting its strategic interests there.  
Russia’s response is more in keeping with the dynamics of widespread 
loss aversion. It was quite willing to give up a preferential position that it 
received almost by accident in the first phase, closure of the Straits to warships, 
which had the effect of closing in Russia while closing out Britain, if a similar 
satisfactory solution could be found. Moreover, Nicholas found the treaty not to 
be much of an endowment if Turkey would repudiate it when it pleased. Had 
Nicholas really believed the advantages derived from Unkiar Skelessi to be 
worth keeping, he likely would have opposed Britain on the grounds that he 
believed the latter was trying to make gains at Russia’s expense. Kagan argues 
that Britain perceived the significance of the treaty to give Russia predominant 
influence in the region and a virtual protectorate over Turkey.120 But the reality 
was quite different. Consequently, Nicholas recognized the misapprehensions 
and suspicions of Russia that the treaty caused in the other major states largely 
because of the sustained communication that took place with Britain. Thus, there 
was a happy harmony of interests in Nicholas dispensing with this presumed 
privilege.121 This is clear evidence that Russia was willing to cede accidentally 
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gotten gains similar in magnitude to a loss that they would find unacceptable 
and preferred instead to restore the status quo.     
France and Austria were less secure states; thus, by varying methods they 
attempted to make gains at the expense of others. Mehemet was successful in 
repeatedly routing the Sultan, but his military success did not make his 
conquests legitimate. Neither did France make them legitimate by grafting its 
ambitions in North Africa to Mehemet’s successes. Austria conducted itself as an 
insecure state does in making itself indispensable to the other major powers by 
attempting to gain for itself the center of diplomatic activity.  
As noted earlier, because they were successful in working together to put 
a satisfactory resolution to the crisis, Nicholas asked Palmerston for a permanent 
alliance against France. Palmerston courteously responded by “emphasizing 
Britain’s intention of continuing ‘to watch attentively and to guard with care the 
maintenance of the Balance of Power’, and ‘that an attempt of one nation to 
appropriate to itself territory which belongs to another nation’ would ‘constitute 
a derangement of the existing balance’. In addition, he explained the 
constitutional difficulties which prevented the British government from entering 
                                                                                                                                                                                 
found closure of the Straits by any measure to be in Russia’s interests (Philip E. 
Mosely, Russian Diplomacy and the Opening of the Eastern Question in 1839 
and 1839 (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1934), pp. 67-92). Taking both 
Palmerston’s and Nesselrode’s opinions into account, a fair assessment of this 
agreement is that both Britain and Russia believed they profited, thus, it was a 
win-win situation.   
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into ‘engagements with reference to cases which have not actually arisen.’”122 
Palmerston’s response is a classic instance of keeping one’s options open. Kagan 
sees in sentiments such as this an attempt by Britain to use the Concert for its 
narrow self-interests: “Palmerston used a four-power coalition as a tool to isolate 
France, and once this important goal had been achieved, had no further use for 
multilateral cooperation.”123 But Britain always preferred a looser arrangement 
than did the continental powers given its world-wide interests and more tenuous 
connection to Europe.124 Moreover, by allowing France to return to the Concert 
when it became obvious to Louis-Phillipe that Thiers’ position regarding 
Mehemet was untenable, Palmerston took account of France’s longer-run 
security interests. Webster argues that although the French government disliked 
Palmerston, it recognized that his policy was justified by the circumstances, and 
thus were anxious to renew the entente cordiale that existed between the two 
states since resolution of the Belgian crisis.125 
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Palmerston refused to make face-saving gestures because he wanted to 
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The 1848 revolutions (the Italian revolts from Austrian dominance).     
Social revolutions began in France and swept through Italy, Germany, Hungary, 
Poland, and Schleswig-Holstein. Britain and Russia resolved together to 
maintain the status quo, but interceded individually and used the different 
methods of intervention and non-intervention to achieve their common aims.126 
Palmerston publicly declared, “we will engage to prevent the rest of Europe from 
settling with France" and he accepted the new French Foreign Minister 
Lamartine’s public promises to maintain the peace with Europe.127 A German 
plan to prosecute a war with Poland against Russia was predicated on French 
military support and British benevolence. Palmerston asserted in no uncertain 
terms to the Prussians that Britain would not let the plan proceed, thus putting 
an end to it. This is a good example of Britain’s indispensibility to the security of 
the other major powers.  Later, Hungarian pleas for help from Britain in seceding 
from Austria fell on deaf ears and Palmerston instructed the Russian ambassador 
in London to intervene to put down the revolt. Despite the liberal proclivities of 
                                                                                                                                                                                 
show France that good relations with Britain could be maintained only on 
British terms. In short, Palmerston’s notion of a stable Concert was not one 
featuring internalized norms of reciprocal restraint, but one in which the 
other powers accepted British primacy”(Snyder, Myths of Empire, op. cit., 
pp. 175-76).  
126 Craig, “The System of Alliances and the Balance of Power,” in Bury, ed., The 
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 158 
the revolutionaries, Palmerston would not allow the Prussians to aid a 
Schleswig-Holstein revolt from Danish rule.128  
The most dangerous crisis to the peace was precipitated by the Italian 
provinces against Austria.129 According to Taylor, “hard geographical reality 
stood between France and Poland; nothing seemed to stand between France and 
Italy except a French reluctance to launch a great war. And, on the other side, 
control of Italy was fundamental to the existence of Austria as a Great Power, or 
so Austrian statesmen argued; this was a very different question from the future 
of [Schleswig] or even from the independence of Denmark. Hence it was in Italy 
that British policy was most active and displayed most initiative.”130  
In the first phase of the crisis, Charles Albert, the king of Sardinia-
Piedmont, exhorted the peoples of Lombardy and Venetia to revolt against 
Austrian rule after the collapse of Metternich’s government. Palmerston believed 
that a strong Austria played a crucial role in maintaining the peace, but, again, he 
had to decide whether the revolts could be contained and he did not think that 
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the Austrians were capable of doing so.131 The decline of Austrian leadership 
went hand-in-hand with the rise of the Risorgimento, a broad movement toward 
Italian unity.132 Austria’s problems in Italy were political rather than economic or 
cultural. Because of deficient statesmanship, particularly the accession of Francis 
I’s dim-witted son Ferdinand to the throne, Austria would neither promote 
useful change nor allow others to do so.133 Thus, Palmerston framed the situation 
as one of attempting to maintain the status quo by accepting a small, but sure, 
loss in allowing a measure of independence in the Italian provinces. Again, the 
insurance premium was to be used in conservative fashion. 
As noted above, after Metternich’s departure, Austria’s provisional 
government did not have strong leadership and was unusually susceptible to 
British diplomatic opinion. The Austrian diplomat Hummelauer stressed to 
Palmerston the possibility of French intervention and the impossibility of Austria 
fighting France as well as Piedmont at the same time.134 Thus, the Austrians were 
willing to consider making Lombardy-Piedmont an autonomous kingdom under 
an Austrian archduke as viceroy, but with its own parliament, government, and 
army.135 But Palmerston was of the opinion that Austria would be a stronger 
bulwark against Russia in the Near East if it were to rid itself of its ungovernable 
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Italian provinces.136 He also conceived of a new strong northern Italian state as a 
buffer between France and the rest of Europe.137 Thus, Palmerston proposed that 
Austria be rid outright of Lombardy, as well as portions of Venetia to which both 
sides might mutually agree. The Austrian hand was weak and Palmerston was 
later able to say, quite disingenuously, that this proposal “gave away nothing to 
Austria, because the Italians would agree to nothing less than the whole, but it 
saves the Austrian honour.”138  
The British foreign secretary’s sentiment was prescient. The provisional 
government in Milan overreached by demanding that any offer of independence 
had to include the whole of Austrian Italy (to include the South Tirol).139 The 
situation changed radically when the Italians were subsequently crushed by the 
Austrian military at Custoza in the first Italian war. In consequence, the 
Austrians became less amenable to independence for Lombardy because they 
were convinced of the bad faith of the Italians. Thus, the Austrians became more 
risk acceptant for loss.  
The Italians appealed for help from the French. Should France intervene 
militarily, a system-wide war would result. In part, the problem was French 
political opinion. Louis-Phillipe did not want to go to war, but as Cavaignac, 
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who headed the provisional government, put it, “if …there came a popular 
appeal for assistance from the Italian people…no government established here 
would long be able to resist the demand.”140 Moreover, Savoy and Nice, led by 
the king of Sardinia, were the spoils of war given to Italy for opposing Napoleon 
and represented “the most flagrant symbols of France’s humiliation in 1815.”141 
According to Taylor, “the greatest problem in French policy towards Italy turned 
on this trivial point: it was impossible for the French to aid Italy without 
demanding Savoy and Nice for themselves. In 1848 the French rulers already 
knew this; the Italians, or at least the Piedmontese, knew it; and the king of 
Sardinia knew it most of all.”142  
Louis-Phillipe framed the situation as taking risky action in aid of the 
Italians in order to save his own position. Nevertheless, Palmerston understood 
the French ruler’s predicament and was able to reframe the situation by 
suggesting that mediation based on the original idea of joining Lombardy to 
Piedmont be pursued. Such a solution, which Louis-Phillipe quickly grasped and 
accepted, mollified French political opinion in the streets while at the same time 
allowed the French king to maintain his bona fides to keep the general peace 
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with the other great powers. Realist accounts such as Lindley’s that only accord 
hard-boiled realpolitik diplomacy as being effective143 miss events such as this in 
which empathy for another statesman’s predicament leads to a creative solution. 
British and Austrian framing of the situation is in accord with our theory. 
A measure of independence in the Italian provinces might deflate calls for Italian 
unity in a region that the Austrians found was rapidly becoming ungovernable. 
A strong Austria was in the interests of all of the major powers to maintaining 
the peace. The Austrians were in a temporarily weakened position, but 
suspicions and rivalries among the various Italian governments were even more 
debilitating and Charles Albert’s overreaching put himself in the unenviable 
position of trying to expel the Austrians with the help of the French only to have 
the latter refuse to leave. Luckily, Palmerston was able to give France the only 
reason for not intervening by reframing the situation based on the original 
proposal to give independence to a few Italian provinces. Although not 
discounted by our theory, such empathetic reframing is an unexpected finding. 
Realist cost-benefit calculations would expect that France make opportunistic 
gains by intervening on behalf of the Italian provinces; that it did not do so 
provides evidence for our theory.      
 In the second phase of the crisis, Prince Schwarzenberg, who replaced 
Metternich and put Austrian foreign policy on a firm course, refused to make 
any concessions and engaged in brutal repression of the Italians saying, “we 
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shall take our stand on the treaties, we shall not cede an inch of ground.”144 
Radetzky, the Austrian commander-in-chief, urged Schwarzenberg to military 
action: “Give me the opportunity and you will soon see me lay the whole of Italy, 
up to the frontier of the noble King of Naples, at the feet of His Majesty the 
Emperor…”145 Thus, the Austrians reframed the situation as using the insurance 
premium in order to take risky action to maintain the status quo. Unfortunately, 
Charles Albert reopened his demands by prosecuting the second Italian war with 
Austria and he was no more successful than in the first phase of the crisis. An 
incompetent Italian army was crushed by the Austrians at the battle of Novara.  
Palmerston saw his risk averse policy failing and became more risk 
acceptant. According to Taylor, “for the sake of peace and the status quo, Great 
Britain had to accept attacks on the status quo or even to go to war; not 
surprisingly the British tried to escape from this contradiction by claiming 
idealistic motives for their foreign policy. In reality British policy would never 
have bestirred itself for Italian nationalism, had it not been for fear of an 
explosion from France.”146  
De Tocqueville, the new French foreign minister, asked Palmerston to join 
in defending Piedmont were it to be attacked again. Britain did not have the 
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military means to affect the outcome.147 Moreover, Palmerston recognized that 
French forces, once engaged, would never leave Italy.148 As always, Palmerston’s 
aim was to keep the French out of Italy and thus prevent a system-wide war, not 
to promote Italian unification. He demurred by telling the French foreign 
minister that the interest of the British in Italian unification was not equal to that 
of the French. Britain was willing to offer its diplomatic assistance and moral 
support, but not much more.149 
Schwarzenberg convinced himself that Britain was promoting the Italian 
cause while France had abandoned it.150 In a fit of pique the prince opined,  
“Lord Palmerston regards himself too much as the arbiter of Europe. For 
our part we are not disposed to accord him the role of Providence. We 
never impose our advice on him in relation to Ireland: let him spare 
himself the trouble of advising us on the subject of Lombardy…We are 
tired of his eternal insinuations, of his tone now protective and pedantic, 
now insulting, but always unbecoming. We are resolved to tolerate it no 
longer. Lord Palmerston said one day to Koller, that if we wanted war, we 
would have it: I say, if he wants war, he shall have it.”151  
 
Schwarzenberg’s opinion was not the result of dispassionate analysis. It fact, 
British and French opinions were quite the reverse. Palmerston was no longer 
advocating that Austria relinquish territory because he feared that he could no 
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longer control French policy.152 But neither would Palmerston publicly guarantee 
this position to Schwarzenberg because doing so would lose the faith of the 
Italians as well as the liberals in Britain, the latter of whom the foreign secretary 
relied upon to support his policy of maintaining the general peace in Europe.153 
For its part, France could not tolerate an Austrian army in Piedmont so close to 
the French border and news came to Palmerston that the French were attempting 
to secure Parma and Modena for Sardinia and taking Savoy as recompense for 
their assistance.154  
The news of the disaster at Novara threw the French government into 
action. The Committee of Foreign Affairs resolved to occupy Savoy and a 
proposal in the Assembly to intervene militarily almost carried. Finally, Louis 
Napoleon, the new French president, wanted to dispatch an army across the 
Alps.155   
By strongly intimating that he would not be able to control French policy, 
Palmerston, through his French ambassador to the confidential Austrian agent, 
Hübner, was able to concentrate Schwarzenberg’s mind.156 In correspondence to 
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Schwarzenberg, Hübner stated, “above all the marshal must avoid reopening the 
hostilities. That would bring France and England on us at once. Be sure that five 
days after the first cannon-shot on the Sesia, the French would land in Nice and 
Genoa…”157 Due to increasing activity on the part of the French in Italy 
combined with Palmerston’s warnings and Hübner’s entreaty, the Austrian 
minister refrained from continued humiliation of the Piedmontese. Thus, in 1849 
a peace treaty was signed in which the 1815 settlement was restored. In this 
instance, after changes of position and hard bargaining on the part of the major 
powers, the status quo was provisionally changed, but ultimately restored to the 
major powers’ satisfaction. Moreover, as Schroeder a bit optimistically observes, 
“the striking thing is that by 1846-8 Austria was no longer trying to keep France 
out of Italy or France trying to throw Austria out.”158 
The dynamics of the second phase of the crisis largely comports with 
widespread loss aversion. Both Britain and Austria framed the situation as one of 
taking risks in order to maintain the status quo. Because of bad faith on the part 
of the Italians, the Austrians were determined to snuff out the flame of 
revolution because there seemed to be no end to Italian demands. In turn, Britain 
knew that France would not be able to refrain from intervening if for no other 
reason than it could not tolerate the Austrians on its border in Piedmont. By 
taking the chance that events would get out of control, Palmerston was able to 
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convince Schwarzenberg to proceed carefully. Hübner was able to convey to 
Schwarzenberg the views of the British foreign office: “The Queen’s government 
wants Italy pacified as soon as possible. All our efforts are towards that end: 
Lord Palmerston desires it as much as you.”159 In effect, Palmerston instructed 
Schwarzenberg to put down the Italian insurrection, but not to attempt to 
vanquish the enemy or system-wide war would result. It did not take Palmerston 
to make Schwarzenberg see that the interests of both states were similar in this 
regard. In contrast, realist cost-benefit calculations would argue that Austria 
should have escalated its military objectives when Italians forces were being 
routed, but restraint obtained, which is expected by widespread loss aversion.    
Conclusions. 
Widespread loss aversion requires more connective tissue than does realism, but 
less than liberal institutionalism. Realist accounts of this period cannot explain 
why there ought to be vested interests on the part of the major powers that no 
state be inordinately insecure. Loss aversion by itself does little better in this 
regard. If states are risk acceptant for loss (even if they are risk averse for gain), 
why should they care if others lose even as they are able to maintain their 
holdings? Unless loss aversion is widespread and is understood by all, and that 
all understand this to be the case, individualistic measures will still seem 
attractive in order to maintain one’s security. In contrast, liberal institutionalism 
posits a more harmonious world than the diplomatic relations of the period 
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reveal. In this regard, Kagan’s attempt to distinguish realism from liberal 
institutionalism by comparing the cooperation to competition ratio between the 
two approaches and applying it to this period of history,160 while theoretically 
fruitful, misses certain subtleties of international diplomacy. First, looking only 
at discrete case studies misses the important point that what comes before is 
likely to be of consequence to present and future events. Moreover, sometimes it 
takes hard bargaining and a willingness to threaten isolation in order to bring a 
state around to the fact that its policy is untenable. As Stein shows, conflict can 
occur in order to enforce cooperation.161 In such cases, the cooperative to 
competitive ratio would be quite misleading as an indicator of the degree of 
conflict between states and the purposes for such conflict. Finally, realists argue 
that competitive actions are taken as evidence that liberal institutionalism is 
irrelevant, but they are unable to explain surprising instances in which states do 
not press for maximum advantage and actually take the interests of other states 
into account. Moreover, related to the first point, they do not attempt to connect 
instances in which a statesman is hostile towards a foreign statesman, but then 
later demonstrates empathy for the latter’s situation.  
 More generally, the period of the attenuated Concert should have seen 
much more conflict than that which actually occurred. In Schroeder’s words, 
“…when everything was over, not one war between Great Powers had broken 
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out, not one international boundary had been altered, and not one treaty had 
been torn up. In short, though all the factors that were said to have produced 
peace and stability after 1815 had been suspended or destroyed, peace had been 
maintained, and the international crises had been managed.” 162  
Two cases examined in this chapter are most unpromising for cooperative 
solutions. The Greek crises of 1821 and 1826, and the Eastern Question crises of 
1831 and 1839 involving Turkey and Egypt, respectively, are least-likely cases for 
widespread loss aversion theory. Both cases generated significant interest on the 
part of the major European powers because strategic interests in projecting 
power and maintaining security were at stake. Moreover, the geographic areas in 
which they took place were not covered by the 1815 settlement; thus, they were 
contested areas. We should have seen much more evidence of states taking 
opportunistic gains should others not be able to compete as effectively. 
Specifically, Russia might have done what it wished regarding Greece and the 
Ottoman Empire as it could project its military power in this area much more 
effectively than could the other major powers. But Russia preferred to maintain 
its holdings and not aggrandize itself when it might have done so with impunity. 
Regarding the Eastern crisis, Britain became much more interested in the Levant 
during the second phase when the possibility of short routes to India dictated an 
increased interest in the area. Loss aversion works less well in this instance than 
does realist cost-benefit calculations in which differences in risk-taking on the 
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part of the British between the two phases of the crisis reflect differences in 
utilities. But widespread loss aversion is still operative because Russia should 
have vigorously opposed British demands, seeing the latter as only attempting to 
make opportunistic gains, but was instead willing to concede the advantages that 
it obtained as a consequence of the Treaty of Unkiar Skelessi in the first phase of 
the crisis. Such concessions should not be expected by realist expected utility 
maximization. 
In the Belgian case, the insurance premium was used in conservative 
fashion in order to retain the rest of the status quo. Loss aversion points to the 
wisdom of giving Belgium independence in order to prevent system-wide war, 
but so does utility maximization if the goal of Britain was to diminish the 
economic might of the United Netherlands. Loss aversion wins out only because 
the predominant scholarly view supports the former rather than the latter thesis. 
In the second phase of the crisis, France was tempted by various measures to 
make gains with regard to Belgium, which is consistent with both utility 
maximization and prospect theory. Nevertheless, France backed down quickly 
when it saw that these gains would be vigorously opposed and that it preferred 
maintenance of the status quo to a dangerous revision, which is better explained 
by loss aversion than expected utility maximization. Moreover, expected utility 
maximization would not predict that Britain would ally with France in order to 
contain it. But, widespread loss aversion can explain why this occurred because 
Britain saw that France was insecure, not irremediably aggressive. Moreover, the 
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conservative states could trust Britain not to make gains at their expense because 
the liberal states refrained from interfering in the problems of the eastern states. 
Narrow self-interest to include the interests of others was thus expanded as well 
as made more long-run than is usually the case in international relations.  
The arc of the Italian crisis is much the same as the Belgian case. The 
insurance premium is initially used in conservative fashion in order to maintain 
what can be retained of the status quo, but is then used in risky fashion as the 
initial policy is seen to be failing. Again, France might have made gains from an 
expected utility maximization standpoint but was ultimately restrained in its 
behavior. What is interesting here is the perceptiveness of Palmerston to reframe 
the situation for the benefit of Louis-Phillipe. Prospect theory argues that leaders 
are prone to take risky actions if failing to do so means electoral punishment by 
domestic interests. But finding a creative solution that satisfies the demands of 
both domestic and international audiences while maintaining the peace is not 
inconsistent with widespread loss aversion, although it is an unexpected salutary 
finding. Such a finding is beyond the conception of expected utility 
maximization. Finally, the Belgian and Italian cases were related as France and 
Britain worked together to oppose material changes in the status quo even as 
they had different interests. Remembrance that Britain had worked with France 
in the Belgian case generated the expectation that they could similarly do so 
when the Italian revolts broke out. Expected utility maximization relates 
differences in risk-taking to differences in utilities, thus cases are examined in 
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isolation of one another, which does not comport with the reality of international 
diplomacy.  
On balance, widespread loss aversion is supported over realist expected 
utility maximization, its strongest theoretical competitor, by the four important 
case studies examined here. 
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Chapter 3: Mutual conciliatory affective abandonment: The Crimean War. 
 
The ‘tradition of appeasement’ in British foreign policy is traced by Kennedy 
from the death of Palmerston in 1865 until its breakdown in 1939. The historian is 
even-handed in his exposition of the tradition, which largely occurred as a 
rational response to internal and external impulses that coalesced, namely early 
industrialization, free-trade, enlargement of the voting franchise at home, and 
world-wide empire acquired and sustained on the cheap.1 In fact, the rational 
give-and-take in international politics so as not to overextend oneself dates back 
to the provisionally non-interventionist policies of Castlereagh and Canning, 
respectively, who expected reciprocal considerations from other powers in the 
non-interference of British interests abroad, and asserted themselves when 
clashes of interest occurred and low-cost remedies were available. Otherwise, 
with a few egregious exceptions, the British largely conceded when appropriate.2 
Off and on again British intervention in Continental politics largely contributed 
to the imbalanced structural conditions of the 19th century and if the dynamics of 
affective abandonment partially resonate with the tradition of appeasement, as 
analyzed by Kennedy, evidence can be found that Palmerston’s death did not 
mark the appearance of the tradition. Rather, an aptly titled chapter by Bourne, 
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(London: George Allen & Unwin, 1983), pp. 15-39. 
2 The appeasement of Hitler and the failure to appease during India’s drive for 
independence were colossal foreign policy mistakes. 
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“Appeasement, Revolution, and War, 1841-1856”3 suggests a good place to locate 
an earlier example of the systemic dynamic.   
Five representative case studies are examined regarding the dynamics of 
structural imbalance and irrational consistency, the latter of which is largely the 
result of motivated bias. The first case study, which comprises the present 
chapter, examines the quixotic diplomacy leading to the outbreak of the Crimean 
War in 1853. This is the only system-wide war involving all of the major 
European powers prior to the outbreak of the First World War and can largely be 
traced to the mutual abandonment of Russian and British state interests 
regarding the Ottoman Empire. Swift preference reversals on both sides 
reasserted authority as the consequence of a crisis generated by opportunistic 
third parties, namely France and Turkey.  
The usual trend from cooperation to conflict occurs when states 
individually come to believe that they are making all of the concessions while 
others are increasingly taking advantage of their unilateral restraint.4 But the 
Crimean War case illuminates a more subtle and opposite dynamic in which 
states committed to upholding the status quo are overly solicitous of the other’s 
interests and thus fail to make clear their determination to defend their own 
interests in a territorial area of mutual concern. They may do so because of the 
                                                            
3 Kenneth Bourne, Foreign Policy of Victorian England 1830-1902 (Oxford: 
Clarendon Press, 1970), Chapter 3. The time frame encompasses the Peel 
government (1841-46) until Aberdeen’s coalition government (1852-55). 
4 Robert Jervis, “Security Regimes,” in Stephen D. Krasner, ed., International 
Regimes (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1983), p. 184. 
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anticipated effects of their actions or non-actions on the perceptions of relevant 
third parties. The uncertainty associated with structurally imbalanced conditions 
regarding alignment patterns5 can be exacerbated when states develop motivated 
biases to overlook obvious incompatibilities of interest among erstwhile allies. 
Instead of fine and timely adjustments of alignment in order to maintain a status 
quo that is, itself, shifting, realignments are delayed until manageable conflicts of 
interest become intractable because statesmen have taken overextended positions 
and invested them with affect (in most cases, what in diplomatic history has been 
referred to as amour-propre).   
The outcome of the Crimean War was unrewarding for both Britain and 
Russia, both of whom largely turned isolationist and abrogated their 
responsibilities in upholding the status quo on the Continent. The second case 
study, which comprises the next chapter, examines affective abandonment from 
the opposite perspective than that of the Crimean War diplomacy. For different 
reasons, the Conservative Alliance powers of Russia, Austria, and Prussia were 
humiliated by the conditions imposed by the 1856 Treaty of Paris. Russia turned 
                                                            
5 As the mathematician Strogatz notes, the two most stable states in social 
networks are both when a nirvana of goodwill exists, and when networks are 
split into two hostile factions with no cross alignments, respectively. The latter 
polarized state is the only one as stable as nirvana. See, Stephen Strogatz, “The 
Enemy of My Enemy,” nytimes.com, February 14, 2010. For his purposes, 
Strogatz is entitled to refer to this characteristic as one of stability, although some 
systems theorists can find stability in the continuous change of cast of actors such 
as occur in perfectly competitive economic markets as long as those going out of 
business are replaced by those entering the market. See, for example, Kenneth N. 
Waltz, Theory of International Politics (New York: Random House, 1979), p. 162. 
Nevertheless, while Strogatz equates imbalance with instability, certainty (and 
uncertainty) seems to be his dynamic of interest. 
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isolationist and took short-cuts by aligning with France in a secret 1859 treaty to 
reclaim its losses on the Black Sea in exchange for supporting France’s revisionist 
claims in Italy. Austria feared that its treacherous conduct in maintaining 
neutrality during the Crimean War, while attempting to insist on opportunistic 
gains by occupying the Principalities (Moldavia and Wallachia), would lead 
Russia to later take retribution. In consequence, Austria attempted to bolster its 
insecure position by undermining the federal system upon which Germany was 
based since 1815. Finally, Prussia adopted neutrality during the Crimean War by 
hiding behind its federal status. This action caused the other major powers to 
doubt its continued status as a major power and prejudiced its right to 
participate at the peace conference. The resulting insecurity prompted Prussia to 
seek revisionist policies under Chancellor Bismarck.  
If Britain and Russia provided each other with vague and confusing 
reassurances of common interest prior to the Crimean War, Russia and France 
later worked together to attain their respective interests by disregarding those of 
others. So did Austria, and Prussia, separately. For opposite reasons, these first 
two case studies violate the strictures of widespread loss aversion that require 
the communicated defense of one’s interests at the same time that the interests of 
others are reciprocally to be respected and communicated as such. 
The last three chapters regarding affective abandonment largely examine 
the British abetment of Prussian aggression that resulted in wars against Poland 
in 1863, Denmark in 1864, Austria in 1866, and France in 1870, respectively. 
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Poland and Denmark are considered together in the first of these chapters. It is 
impossible to understand the ease with which Prussia prosecuted wars against 
Austria and France without examining how Poland and Denmark set the stage 
for lasting Franco-British estrangement. All of the German case study chapters 
are straight-forward examples in which Britain is over-deterred by Prussian 
aggression. Britain had motivated biases to remain neutral due to domestic 
considerations and the unwarranted belief that a unified Germany would be a 
liberal bulwark against autocratic Russia.6 France, and Austria, for their parts, 
failed to come to each other’s assistance, expecting, instead, compensation from 
Prussia as their individual rewards for maintaining benevolent neutrality. 
Consequently, Prussia developed motivated reasons to believe that its aggression 
would go unopposed.7 In short, Prussia was under-deterred. Both Kennedy and 
Schroeder recognize the long-term importance of the manner in which German 
unification was conducted. Neither was the aggression opposed, nor sanctioned 
                                                            
6 Paul W. Schroeder argues this in Schroeder, Austria, Great Britain, and the 
Crimean War: The Destruction of the European Concert (Ithaca: Cornell 
University Press, 1972), p. 420. Also see, Bourne, Foreign Policy of Victorian 
England 1830-1902, ibid., p. 65. 
7 Bismarck noted that Britain’s agreement to abide by the tribunal findings in the 
Alabama case regarding the U.S. was a sign of weakness and decadence. See, 
Karl Hildenbrand, “’British interests’ als Staatsräson,” 19 Jahrhundert, 
Mitteilungen der Gessellschaft der Freunde der Universitat Mannheim, vol. 22, 
no. 2 (1973). Cited in Kennedy, Strategy and Diplomacy 1870-1945, op. cit., p. 21.   
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after the fact, thus giving German leaders the continued belief that aggression 
would continue to pay dividends until the outbreak of the First World War.8 
Specific dynamics of affective abandonment. 
One dynamic associated with widespread loss aversion that was largely 
validated in the previous chapter is that framing of the situation (in particular the 
use of the insurance premium) is likely to be initially conservative and then more 
risky when the status quo cannot be maintained.9 When widespread loss 
aversion predominates, we see a preference reversal but the reversal is largely 
telegraphed by the moving state and thus should not necessarily take others by 
surprise. Moreover, the preference reversal is usually enacted in the form of a 
                                                            
8 See, Kennedy, Strategy and Diplomacy 1870-1945, op. cit., p. 21; Schroeder, 
“The 19th-Century International System: Changes in the Structure,” World 
Politics, vol. 39, no. 1 (October 1986), p. 9. 
9 As Levy notes, different decision-makers sometimes see an action differently; 
that is, one may see the action in a conservative light while the other sees it as 
being risky. See, Jack S. Levy, “Prospect Theory and International Relations: 
Theoretical Applications and Analytical Problems,” in Barbara Farnham, ed., 
Avoiding Losses/Taking Risks: Prospect Theory and International Conflict (Ann 
Arbor: University of Michigan Press, 1994), pp. 135-38. Disinterested party 
analysis, many times the later judgment of scholarship, can serve as a useful 
check on such disagreements. Moreover, there is more widespread agreement on 
the inherent riskiness of a particular political action than is generally supposed 
when one takes into account the context in which the action is taken. As 
evidence, even Hitler’s generals were appalled at some of his contemplated 
actions, not because of the large uncertainty concerning success or failure, but 
because they saw incredible risk where the dictator simply did not. See, Jervis, 
Perception and Misperception in International Politics (Princeton: Princeton 
University Press, 1976), p. 52. Luckily, the Hitler mind-set is an aberration, not a 
commonality, in international relations despite frequent overdrawn Munich 
analogies. Recall George H.W. Bush invoking the Munich analogy to argue that 
Saddam Hussein was another Hitler prior to American intervention in the 1991 
Gulf War. See, Ann Reilly, “How Bush decided he sees Saddam Hussein as 
another Hitler,” money.cnn/magazine/com/fortune, February 11, 1991.     
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conditional in order to bring others back into the cooperative fold. In contrast, 
when affective abandonment is operative, what is of interest is whether a moving 
state reverses its preference for action regarding the insurance premium based on 
affect when the status quo has not materially changed but the decision-maker 
has perceived a detriment in its position.  
As noted in Chapter 1, cognitive biases lead decision-makers to draw 
conclusions regarding action based on what they expect to see. Preferences are 
merely reinforced and thus should not be subject to abrupt reversal. This may 
occur either because decision-makers believe that all good things go together, or 
because systemic dynamics impose like-minded action on all of the major 
decision-makers, or both.10  
In contrast, abrupt preference reversals regarding the use of the insurance 
premium take place when decision-makers are under significant stress not to 
                                                            
10 As analyzed in Chapter 1, decision-makers regret negative outcomes most 
when they fail to take action when they are in control or believe that they are in 
control of the situation. When systemic dynamics predominate, decision-makers 
can recognize or come to believe that they are not in control and, therefore, can 
disclaim responsibility for their actions. Social scientists have analyzed actor 
behavior when, for example, they are in the presence of natural disasters, or 
when participants commit mass suicide, such as occurred during the 1978 
Jonestown Massacre by a religious sect in South America. For theory and 
evidence, see, Frank A. Heller, Decision-making and Leadership (Cambridge: 
Cambridge University Press, 1992); Robert L. Hamblin, “Group integration 
during a crisis,” Human Relations, vol. 11, no. 1 (February 1958), pp. 67-76; 
Alexander Mintz, “Non-adaptive group behavior,” Journal of Abnormal and 
Social Psychology, vol. 46, no. 2 (April 1951), pp. 150-59; R.E. Foreman, 
“Resignation as a collective behavior response,” American Journal of Sociology, 
vol. 69, no. 3 (November 1963), pp. 385-90; Carl A. Hammerschlag and Boris M. 
Astrachan, “The Kennedy Airport snow-in: an inquiry into intergroup 
phenomena,” Psychiatry, vol. 34, no. 3 (August 1971), pp. 301-08.  
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sacrifice deeply held values when value loss is quite likely. The insurance 
premium is thus employed in risky fashion. In extreme cases, the insurance 
premium can be transformed into a risky long-shot gamble of a lottery ticket.  
Their decision matrix is based, not on what they expect to see, but rather on what 
they do not and cannot expect to see. Because this is the case, anticipated 
negative regret is factored into their decision-making such that significant 
incidents that do not necessarily change the larger status quo take on 
unwarranted import and bias preference reversals for action-oriented, rather 
than inaction-oriented, behavior. Farnham demonstrates that affect is a 
significant driver of preference reversal.11 This is not to argue that preference 
reversals cannot be the result of cognitive biases, but the theoretical argument 
seems to point towards motivated biases as the root cause. 
Changes in framing effects can be the result of gradual changes in the 
status quo or perceptions of changes in the status quo that are not commonly 
shared among the major actors. We take for granted that there is a common 
understanding of the status quo. In reality, this understanding may be 
deliberately vague in order not to antagonize, but unexpected actions by third 
parties can force the major actors to more fully clarify their understandings of the 
status quo, thus revealing intrinsic incompatibilities of interest. One possibility is 
that interests may still remain quite compatible in the short-term, but that long-
term trends will require an exchange of endowments. This is a particularly 
                                                            
11 Farnham, “Roosevelt and the Munich Crisis: Insights from Prospect Theory,” 
in Farnham, ed., Avoiding Losses/Taking Risks, op. cit., pp. 41-71. 
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thorny problem in meliorating conflict because, while possession of a good has 
more basis than the future possession of a good or even more basis than the 
future chance of a possession of a good,12 the shadow of the future may be quite 
unkind to the losing state and the potentially gaining state(s) know this. 
Related to gradual changes in the status quo is the concept of 
renormalization. States do not adjust easily to loss, but domestic changes in 
government can keep revanchism in check or reawaken it in ways that are quite 
surprising to other states. Moreover, the dynamics of renormalization do not 
necessarily scale linearly in their international effect. A state that attempts to take 
back what it lost from another state may induce otherwise status quo third party 
states to go along with it because the balance of endowments enjoyed by the 
respective parties has been disturbed because it is being contested.  
An interesting possibility is that a mixed lottery obtains in this instance. 
The experimental literature on prospect theory focuses on choices in the domain 
of either losses or gains, but not on a combination of the two. Mixed lotteries 
occur when a particular action produces gains as well as losses. Thus, an 
otherwise status quo state that engages in revisionist action experiences both 
positive and negative outcomes.13 
 
  
                                                            
12 Levy, “Prospect Theory and International Relations,” in Farnham, ed., 
Avoiding Losses/Taking Risks, op. cit., p. 125. 
13 Levy, “Prospect Theory and International Relations,” in Farnham, ed., 
Avoiding Losses/Taking Risks, op. cit., p. 131.  
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Diplomacy leading to the outbreak of the Crimean War. 
One can scarcely understand the causes of the Crimean War without taking into 
account the triadic context in which Britain, France, and Russia operated for the 
twenty five years prior to the conflict over the Holy Places.14 The following 
extended inquiry into the motivated biases by the major powers is intended to 
dispel the received notion that the Crimean War occurred by accident,15 or, as 
Morier opined, “[was] the only perfectly useless modern war that has ever been 
waged.”16 It is true that none of the detailed alignments between the major 
powers would have necessarily precipitated the outbreak of general conflict, but, 
as Conacher observes, “[the war] seemed to come about with the inevitability of 
a Greek tragedy.”17 Moreover, Seton-Watson cogently observes that, “the dispute 
of the Holy Places was what the Defenestration, the Ems Telegram, or the 
murder of the Archduke have been to other great wars!in a word, the spark and 
not the powder magazine.”18    
  The 1848 revolutions discussed in the previous chapter were as well 
managed as could be expected by Britain and Russia, the two steadfastly status 
                                                            
14 J.B. Conacher, The Aberdeen Coalition 1852-1855 (Cambridge: Cambridge 
University Press, 1968), p. 138. Conacher argues that one needs to go back forty 
years, but I will only trace back twenty five years here. 
15 Matthew S. Anderson, The eastern question 1774-1923: a study in international 
relations (New York: St. Martin’s Press, 1966), p. 132. 
16 Robert Morier quoted in J.A.R. Marriott, The Eastern Question, 4th ed. (Oxford: 
Oxford University Press, 1947), p. 249. 
17 Conacher, The Aberdeen Coalition , op. cit., p. 137. 
18 Robert W. Seton-Watson, Britain in Europe, 1789-1914: A Survey of Foreign 
Policy (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1955), p. 304. 
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quo powers in Europe.19 In particular, Palmerston’s instruction to Nicholas to 
aggressively aid Austria in putting down the liberal Kossuth’s Hungarian 
insurrection20 gave the tsar reason to believe that Britain cared more for order 
than for liberal change in Europe.21 As will be shown, these expectations of 
continued cooperation of an authoritarian sort to manage deterioration of the 
Ottoman Empire led Nicholas to develop motivated biases of commonality of 
interest with Britain that were not easily disabused by events leading up to the 
Crimean War that proved otherwise.  
As early as 1844, Nicholas made a state visit to Britain and sounded out 
the Tories, the prime minister Peel, and the foreign secretary Aberdeen, on 
various ideas as to how disintegration of the Ottoman Empire should be 
managed among the major European powers. Turkish decadence regarding 
unequal treatment of Christians, including sporadic, but frequent enough, 
massacres; general misrule; corruption; and the unwillingness to engage in 
administrative reforms despite frequent assurances to do so through written 
                                                            
19 Bourne, Foreign Policy of Victorian England 1830-1902, op. cit., p. 64. 
20 Wellington told Brunnow, the Russian ambassador in London, that the force 
used should be strong enough to crush the revolt with one blow. See, Fedor F. 
Martens, Recueil d’actes internationaux de l’Empire Ottoman, vol. 2 (Paris, 1897), 
pp. 254-55. Cited in Seton-Watson, Britain in Europe, op. cit., p. 266; Ann 
Pottinger Saab, The Origins of the Crimean Alliance (Charlottsville: University of 
Virginia Press, 1977), p. 8.  
21 Palmerston knew that he was abetting this motivated bias of the tsar’s. To 
Drouyn de Lhuys, the French ambassador in London, Palmerston stated, “the 
moderation of the tsar…reassures me poorly. From moderation to moderation he 
might finish, if one let him have his way, by invading the entire world” (quoted 
in Drouyn de Lhuys to de Tocqueville, August 22, 1949, Archives des Affaires 
Etrangères (Paris: Ministèr des Affaires Estrangères)). Cited in Saab, The Origins 
of the Crimean Alliance, ibid., pp. 8-9. 
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decrees, or firmans, was well understood by most of the major European 
powers.22 Nicholas’s various schemes for partition indicated that he had no 
interest in shutting Britain and Austria out; he preferred an orderly sharing out 
that respected the various major powers’ territorial interests to a deadly scramble 
by them for pieces of the Ottoman Empire. Moreover, the tsar was at great pains 
to make sure that neither the French nor the British controlled Constantinople 
and that Russian informal predominance in that area remained. French or British 
control of the warm-water Straits at Constantinople and consequent access to the 
Black Sea and Russia’s southern coast would ensure that Russia would not be 
able to project its naval power worldwide. As long as non-interference of Russian 
interests in this regard was respected, Nicholas was amenable to almost any 
scheme of partition that the other major powers might desire.23  
Nicholas was also determined to ensure that revolutionary France made 
no inroads and this motivated bias clouded his better judgment and forced him 
to take overextended positions that were not easy to draw back from because of 
his amour-propre.24 Initially, the tsar welcomed the ascension of Louis Napoleon, 
but he later drew back when the latter decided to declare himself Emperor of 
France. Nicholas deliberately insulted the French leader by referring to him as 
mon cher ami rather than mon frère, the latter salutation which he could only 
                                                            
22 Conacher, The Aberdeen Coalition , op. cit., pp. 140-41; Seton-Watson, Britain 
in Europe, op. cit., p. 307. 
23 David Gillard, The Struggle for Asia 1828-1914: A Study in British and Russian 
Imperialism (London: Methuen & Co., Ltd., 1977), pp. 69-70. 
24 Seton-Watson, Britain in Europe, op. cit., pp. 300-27; Bourne, Foreign Policy of 
Victorian England 1830-1902, op. cit., p. 75. 
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confer were Louis to have attained his status by divine right rather than by the 
will of the people. Nicholas was growing ever more autocratic; he failed to 
understand the dynamics of burgeoning democracy in liberal Britain and France 
and their effects on public opinion and the degree to which statesmen at least 
had to pay attention to it, and he continued to believe that gentlemanly 
agreements between heads of state would continue to suffice to keep the peace.25  
Louis Napoleon desired to restore the glory of the French Empire; 
liberalism would submerge itself in nationalism, the new dynamic force in 
European affairs.26 Because Russia was the most autocratic state in the 
Conservative Alliance, France was bound to come into conflict with it. The Holy 
Places in the Ottoman Empire was one area in which Catholic France might drive 
a wedge between Catholic Austria and Orthodox Christian Russia in order to 
stem the growing influence of the tsar throughout Europe.27 Having repressed 
the 1848 revolutions, and with Metternich gone, Nicholas could claim to be the 
arbiter of order in Europe.28 Curtiss nicely captures the nervous sentiment of the 
rest of the major European powers by observing that the Gendarme of Europe 
was cordially hated by all.29   
                                                            
25 Seton-Watson, Britain in Europe, op. cit., p. 307. 
26David Wetzel, The Crimean War: A Diplomatic History (Boulder, CO: East 
European Monographs, distributed by Columbia University Press, NY, 1985), p. 
23.  
27 Saab, The Origins of the Crimean Alliance, op. cit., p. 10. 
28 Bourne, Foreign Policy of Victorian England 1830-1902, op. cit., p. 72. 
29 John Shelton Curtiss, Russia’s Crimean War (Durham, N.C.: Duke University 
Press, 1979), p. 39. 
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Significant friction also made war likely between Britain and both the 
Americans and the French. Thus, Aberdeen was willing to be reassured by 
Nicholas’s entreaties even though Russian penetration of Persia threatened 
Britain’s routes to India as never before and British conquests in Asia 
increasingly threatened Russian interests (more of this later). Motivated bias 
exerted an influence in the British foreign secretary’s framing of the fluid 
situation that Britain was faced with. When cognitive biases dominate thinking, 
we tend to extrapolate hostility from one actor to another, but just the opposite 
can occur when we need to believe that the array of friends and foes is 
manageable in order to maintain cherished values. In so doing, it is easy to 
overlook intrinsic incompatibilities of interest or to submerge those differences 
with deliberately vague understandings of the status quo. As evidence, 
negotiations with the Americans were frustrating; rebels were aided by the 
Americans against Canadian British rule, but Aberdeen resolved to settle old 
boundary disputes that hung over from the War of 1812-14 in order to gain 
leverage.30 In so doing, Aberdeen deigned to take less over the disposition of 
Maine and the Oregon Question and he did a good job of framing such 
concessions with the British public as necessary to maintain the rest of the 
Empire.31 Although Britain attempted to discreetly manage American expansion, 
                                                            
30 Bourne, Foreign Policy of Victorian England 1830-1902, op. cit., p. 71.  
31 Bourne, Foreign Policy of Victorian England 1830-1902, op. cit., p. 56. 
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the foreign secretary resolved that American predominance in the Caribbean and 
Latin America was a foregone conclusion.32  
Both Louis Napoleon’s coup against the Republic and the advent of steam 
propulsion reawakened the old 18th century fears of French naval invasion of the 
British homeland.33 Moreover, the British and the French were at loggerheads 
over Tahiti, Morocco, Algeria and took opposite sides in the Lebanese civil war 
of 1841-45. Palmerston’s machinations in attempting to secure British interests in 
the Spanish marriages of Queen Isabella and her sister, the Infanta, raised a 
dustup with the French that the foreign minister was only too happy to provoke 
and the French were only too happy to oblige.34 Moreover, Palmerston’s earlier 
blunt diplomacy in dealing with attempts to install a ruler in Belgium 
sympathetic to French interests and French aid given to Mehemet Ali during the 
1839 Eastern crisis left a lingering estrangement between the British and French 
which it was Aberdeen’s job to try to mend.35 The new foreign secretary 
condemned the high price in enmity that the British had to pay for their foreign 
policy successes: “…Palmerston’s assertiveness had not only upset the entente 
with France, it had also left [Aberdeen] a war with China, the chance of another 
                                                            
32 Gillard, The Struggle for Asia 1828-1914, op. cit., p. 69. 
33 Bourne, Foreign Policy of Victorian England 1830-1902, op. cit., p. 71; Wetzel, 
The Crimean War, op. cit., p. 18. 
34 Bourne, Foreign Policy of Victorian England 1830-1902, op. cit., pp. 58-59. 
35 Without the Queen’s concurrence, Palmerston congratulated Louis Napoleon 
on his coup in 1851, thus costing him his job at the Foreign Office. Of this, see, 
Charles Greville, Henry Reeve, ed., Memoirs, 3rd ed., vol. 6 (London: Longmans, 
Green & Co., 1875-77), p. 435; Bourne, Foreign Policy of Victorian England 1830-
1902, op. cit., p. 70. Of course, Palmerston would later return to office as prime 
minister after the fall of Aberdeen’s cabinet in 1855.  
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war with the United States, and, though no one knew it yet, an imminent disaster 
and a new campaign in Afghanistan.”36 According to Clayton, “the Anglo-French 
relationship had a special quality of ambiguity in the Louis Philippe and Louis 
Napoleon era. British governments regarded France with a curious mixture of 
condescension and fear, seeing her now as a subservient partner, now as a 
dangerous rival.”37  
It was this ambiguous relationship between Britain and France that 
Nicholas played upon in order to attempt a deal with the former over the demise 
of the Ottoman Empire. First, the tsar was emboldened by the belief codified at 
Münchengrätz (later shown to be incorrect), that Austria would act as one with 
Russian interests. He then clearly engaged in a bit of wishful thinking in 
believing that Britain could be separated from France by the prospect of 
territorial gains.  Yet, Nicholas never made clear, nor did he likely know himself, 
whether the projected demise of the Ottoman Empire was a foregone conclusion 
and therefore needed to be managed, or whether it might be in Russia’s interest 
to precipitate that demise.38 Nicholas fundamentally could not understand 
                                                            
36 Bourne, Foreign Policy of Victorian England 1830-1902, op. cit., p. 47. 
37 G.D. Clayton, Britain and the Eastern Question: Missolonghi to Gallipoli 
(London: University of London Press, 1971), p. 94. 
38 For an example of Nicholas’s belief that the Ottoman Empire needed to be 
liquidated, see, Nicholas V. Riasonovsky, Nicholas I and Official Nationality in 
Russia (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1959), p. 264. For too simple a  
gloss that the tsar never intended to proceed on his own and was always 
respectful of the other major powers’ interests in the Ottoman Empire, see, 
Gordon Craig, “The System of Alliances and the Balance of Power,” in C.P.T. 
Bury, ed., The New Cambridge Modern History, vol. 10: The Zenith of European 
Power 1830-70 (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1960), pp. 266-67. 
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Britain’s complex of interests: first, that Britain had an interest in the 
continuation of the Ottoman Empire; second, that it agreed that an orderly 
partition should take place should the Empire disintegrate; but, finally, that it 
would oppose any Russian effort to promote that disintegration.39 Thus, while 
Aberdeen was relieved to be reassured by Russian overtures for peaceful 
accommodation and he did make clear that Britain would not enter into an 
alliance or even a ‘clear understanding’ regarding a mere contingency, Nicholas 
came away with the notion that Britain would not oppose a Russian defense of 
its interests as it saw fit regarding the Eastern Question.40 Both Peel and 
Aberdeen deluded themselves into believing that their collective viewpoint 
would impress upon the tsar their belief in the continued viability of the 
Ottoman Empire.41 Moreover, little was done to disabuse Nicholas of his 
motivated bias as the Russian foreign minister Nesselrode’s later memorandum 
of the royal’s conversation was clumsily affirmed by Aberdeen when he 
expressed “much pleasure to find that no differences exist respecting the 
accuracy of your statement.”42 Although this document was deposited at the 
Foreign Office, not released publicly, but passed on from government to 
government, the British considered it to be little more than a moral obligation on 
individual ministers to manage the possible disintegration of the Ottoman 
                                                            
39 Gillard, The Struggle for Asia 1828-1914, op. cit., p. 82. 
40 Clayton, Britain and the Eastern Question, op. cit., pp. 96-97. 
41 Wetzel, The Crimean War, op. cit., p. 29.  
42 Serge Goriainov, “The Secret Agreement of 1844 between Russia and Great 
Britain,” Russian Review, vol. 1, no. 3 and no. 4 (1912), pp. 85-115 and pp. 76-91. 
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Empire whereas the tsar believed it to be a solemn binding pledge between 
sovereign governments.43 Henderson captures the problem of mutual motivated 
biases: “if Nicholas was singularly willing to deceive himself, the British 
Ministers were singularly unwilling to undeceive him.”44   
At the same time the tsar paid his visit to London, the British and the 
Russians were encroaching on each other’s imperial interests. This should have 
raised mutual alarm, as it did in the 1830s, but both sides now wishfully believed 
that the other was only securing its legitimate claims. Two related dynamics 
were debated in Parliament and similar arguments were made in Russian foreign 
policy circles. The first dynamic was that of the ‘uncontrollable principle’ and the 
other was the ‘turbulent frontier’ argument.  As elaborated by Peel in the House 
of Commons regarding the brutality of Charles Napier in his annexation of the 
Sind, “whatever may be the principle which may regulate the conduct of 
civilized nations when coming into contact with each other, when civilization 
and barbarism come into contact there is some uncontrollable principle of a very 
different description, which demands a different course of conduct to be 
pursued.”45 Peel was constantly importuned by regional security experts on the 
spot to take aggressive steps to secure British imperial interests; thus, the 
‘turbulent frontier’ was the necessity of annexing territories that abutted British 
                                                            
43 Hansard’s Parliamentary Debates, 3rd series, vol. cxxxii, p. 156; Conacher, The 
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44 Gavin B. Henderson, Crimean War Diplomacy and Other Historical Essays 
(Glasgow: Jackson, Sons & Co., 1947), p. 11. 
45 Hansard, vol. lxxxii, op. cit., pp. 443-44. 
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interests in order to quell native violence.46 There seemed to be no end to the 
expansion and Peel was keenly aware that this was vitiating British power rather 
than increasing it. Privately, he expressed to Hardinage,  
“consider that the annexation of the Punjab would have been a source of 
weakness and not of strength; that it would have extended our frontier at 
the greatest distance from our resources, and at the weakest points; that it 
would have been a perpetual blister, from bringing us into contact with 
new tribes, unused to our sway, unconscious of its advantages, unable to 
appreciate the benefits of government on settled principles; that you 
would have been with reference to Afghanistan and all the bordering 
countries in a much worse position than you were in September last with 
reference of the Punjab, at a greater distance from your resources, with a 
hostile country and difficult rivers in your rear.”47 
 
Both the ‘uncontrollable principle’ and the ‘turbulent frontier’ thesis were not 
grand strategies, but rather default options that needed to be taken because of 
anticipated negative regret in failing to take action when one was believed to be 
in control of the situation.48 Thus, although a projected alliance system with 
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into this onward march, where the greatest difficulty is to know where to 
stop” (1866 Gorchakov memorandum, cited in Alexis S. Krausse, Russia in 




Afghanistan, the Sind and the Punjab was scrapped, the northwest frontier was 
nevertheless occupied to the edge of the Indian strategic frontier that abutted 
Russia, the Hindu Kush.49 
Russia, in turn, made inroads into Asia that surely would have alarmed 
Palmerston in the past, but even he had motivated biases to believe that his 
deterrence polices of the earlier decade were justified. As foreign minister he 
took significant criticism in European capitals for overdramatizing the Russian 
threat during the tsar’s efforts to manage the Eastern Question in 1839. Thus, a 
more conciliatory stance gave the impression that Palmerston’s policies were 
bearing fruit, when, in fact, despite Nicholas’s reassurances, British interests 
were threatened as never before. Russian troops conquered the Kazakhs and 
pushed eastward on the steppes from the Caspian Sea to threaten Khiva and 
other khanates of Central Asia, thus, threatening India.50 Defeat in the First 
Afghan War forced the British out of Kabul and Nicholas was only too happy to 
cooperate to prevent new attacks on Herat in 1842. Russian helpfulness did not 
come cheap to the British as it allowed the Russians the opportunity to 
consolidate their gains in Central Asia.51 
“While the two empires were natural rivals in Asia, an Anglo-Russian 
entente existed which Nicholas furthered by every courteous attention to Great 
                                                            
49 Gillard, The Struggle for Asia 1828-1914, op. cit., p. 72. 
50 Sir Henry Lytton Bulwer and the Hon. Evelyn Ashley, The Life of Henry John 
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Britain.”52 In consequence, both states were remarkably unworried about each 
other’s creeping imperialism as it affected their vital interests. In effect, they were 
engaging in mutual conciliatory affective abandonment. Nicholas wanted to 
make his informal predominance of the Ottoman Empire as inoffensive to Britain 
and Austria as possible. Continued autocratic despotism through the 
Conservative Alliance was his lifework and Nicholas was determined to ensure 
that revolutionary France did not bring down that edifice.53 It wasn’t that 
Nicholas failed to anticipate the implications that a conciliatory policy toward 
Britain and Austria might have on French motivations to make imperialistic 
inroads in North Africa and the Levant. That hand had been played long ago, but 
the tsar believed that his secret agreements, both with Britain, and Austria, 
respectively, would isolate France, and thus leave it manageable to deal with.54  
Nicholas could perhaps be forgiven for failing to anticipate that Austrian 
and Russian interests were not identical. Schwarzenberg, the Austrian foreign 
minister, readily accepted the tsar’s help in putting down the revolutions in 
                                                            
52 Curtiss, Russia’s Crimean War, op. cit., p. 33. It should be noted that Curtiss 
takes a slightly different view of the situation than does Gillard. Instead of 
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outran realities; what Napoleon really needed were diplomatic, not military, 
victories, respectively, to keep the Second Republic from crumbling. See, Wetzel, 
The Crimean War, op. cit., pp. 23, 45; Clayton, Britain and the Eastern Question, 
op. cit., p. 107. 
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Hungary, and later, in Germany. But occupation of the Principalities, however 
temporary, was alarming to Austria. Thus, Nicholas failed to see that Austria 
wanted to be relieved of its dependency on Russia and that the Conservative 
Alliance was dead. Austria was in such a parlous state; it was feared that both 
revolution and repression (another Russian occupation) alike would cause 
Austria to disintegrate. Schwarzenberg’s famous prediction that Austria would 
soon amaze the world by the enormity of her ingratitude, would later leave 
Nicholas sputtering that “the two most foolish Kings of Poland were Sobieski 
and I, who helped Austria.”55    
Nicholas also failed to realize that Britain never could decide for itself 
whether France or Russia was its primary enemy.56 Despite its revolutionary 
proclamations, France had, for all intents and purposes, become a kindred soul 
of liberal Britain.57 Moreover, France was much more of a threat to Russian 
autocracy as a law-abiding member of the community of nations than it was as a 
                                                            
55 Heinrich Friedjung, Der Krimkrieg und die österreichische Politik (Stuttgart: 
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56 Clayton, Britain and the Eastern Question, op. cit., p. 96; Wetzel, The Crimean 
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predisposed than was Palmerston, a liberal Whig, to see an existential threat 
from France. 
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revolutionary outlaw.58 Thus, Britain interjected a good deal of uncertainty into 
this triadic relationship by keeping all options open and only allying with one 
against the other as the immediate situation dictated.59 Theoretically, while 
imbalanced alignments tend to promote uncertainty as to who will ally with 
whom,60 it can be argued that such uncertainty promotes caution among the 
major actors.61 But when imbalanced alignments combine, and in a sense, are 
reciprocally influenced by, motivated biases, the system can be one of dangerous 
uncertainty even as the major actors are convinced of the rectitude of their 
beliefs. Unfortunately, the Russians and the French read much more 
commonality of interest into their individual relations with Britain and the latter 
insufficiently communicated the limits of its diplomatic assistance to both states. 
Likely it did not know what it wanted to do other than to buy time.62 All three 
states suffered from a strong motivated bias to believe that its ally of the moment 
had its interests at heart and it is quite possible that better communication of 
intent would still not have disabused any major power of the bias.  
Aside from the more tactical reasons by the tsar for keeping Russian 
predominance in the Ottoman Empire deliberately inoffensive, a larger problem 
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bulked in the minds of both the Russians and the British and it was never 
discussed because doing so would have revealed the deep incompatibilities 
associated with their respective interests. Nicholas read much more into Russian 
informal predominance than the western powers would allow. The tsar believed 
his informal predominance to have the same juridical status as that of a 
recognized territorial border to be respected by all. In contrast, the western 
powers saw Russian predominance as an obvious fact of the moment, but not 
necessarily immutable and thus subject to whittling away through a progression 
of inroads to be made.63 One impetus for this feeling is that the terms of trade 
with Turkey were quite favorable to Britain and increasing as the repeal of the 
Corn Laws in 1846 brought cheap foodstuffs to an increasingly industrialized 
British workforce. In turn, the Turks bought British manufactures whereas 
Russia erected high tariff barriers to outside trade and sought a closed system 
with Turkey because its serfs were poor and thus unattractive as a target for 
competitive trade.64 During a speech in the House of Commons in 1849, 
Palmerston cited this increased trade as one reason why Britain intended to 
compete with Russia over the Ottoman Empire,65 but it is difficult to know 
whether this was a primary impetus.66 Similar arguments were made, and then 
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refuted, regarding rising French economic interests throughout Europe and the 
Levant in threatening to overthrow the Vienna Settlement.67   
Of importance is that perceptions regarding the status quo were changing, 
but these perceptions were not mutually shared. In fact, until the outbreak of the 
Crimean War, both Russia and the western powers had identical interests in the 
1841 Straits Convention that mandated closure to warships while Turkey was at 
peace. All benefited from the maintenance of free navigation for the purpose of 
commerce and this happy commonality of interests masked the deeper 
undercurrents of discontent. Not only were perceptions in long-term shifts in the 
status quo not shared, but the implications from incidents that might have forced 
a reckoning were fitted to different preconceived notions. Palmerston read into 
Russian abandonment of the Treaty of Unkiar Skelessi hope for British interests 
                                                                                                                                                                                 
The free-trader Cobden strangely believed that Russian predominance would 
raise up Turkish culture and thus make it more attractive as a trading partner. 
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67 Wetzel, The Crimean War, op. cit., p. 20. 
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in the future, but the tsar perceived insufficient success to give him any cause for 
alarm. Although Stratford de Redcliffe, the British ambassador at Constantinople 
from 1842-52, was a minor kingmaker in Turkish circles due to a diplomatic style 
similar to Palmerston’s, and he continued the latter’s goal of westernizing 
Turkey under British tutelage to serve as a bulwark to Russian expansion, the 
promotion of British reforms contributed much to social disturbances and 
consequent Muslim backlash in the region.68 
In 1849 the British had just annexed the Punjab with Russian approval and 
the Hungarians were suppressed in Austria with Nicholas’s aid and British 
approval.69 But a much less spectacular incident should have revealed to the tsar 
that Russia and Britain were not of a mind. The Austrians and Russians went too 
far in demanding from the Porte extradition of Polish and Hungarian rebels 
involved in the uprising. The Turks refused and the British and French 
                                                            
68 The first movement was to centralize Turkish rule as well as to secularize it by 
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supported their position. Palmerston believed that the Hapsburg Empire needed 
to be maintained at all costs in order to maintain stability in eastern Europe even 
as he privately sympathized with revolutionaries, such as Kossuth.70 Moreover, 
he believed that Austria and Russia were bluffing in lodging such extreme 
demands.71  Thus, concerning Austria and Russia, Palmerston cautioned 
Stratford, “in this affair we are trying to catch two great fish, and we must wind 
the reel very gently and dexterously, not to break the line.”72 To Russell, 
Palmerston later confided, “with a little manly firmness we shall get successfully 
through this matter.”73 Nevertheless, during a joint Franco-British naval 
demonstration, the British fleet sailed into Besika Bay just outside of the 
Dardanelles.74 Perpetually an inconsistent if not unfaithful servant of the Crown, 
Stratford encouraged the fleet to stray nearer to Constantinople, thus technically 
violating the 1841 Straits Convention.75 Tempers flared, but the tsar cancelled his 
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demand for extradition at the behest of the Sultan while Palmerston apologized 
for the naval infraction.76  
According to Gillard,  
“to all appearances the atmosphere of mutual understanding had been 
severely tested and triumphantly preserved. In fact, all the crisis had done 
was to reinforce the wishful thinking of both governments. Palmerston 
could reasonably believe that the Russian emperor had backed down 
before a discreet display of force. Nicholas had gracefully given way on an 
issue more important to the Austrians than to himself and could feel that 
the basic soundness of the Russian position in the area had been 
demonstrated. The Sultan’s direct appeal to him showed Turkish 
recognition of their special relationship with St. Petersburg, while 
Palmerston’s anxiety to reassure him about the Straits looked more 
significant to Nicholas than the precautionary movement of the British 
squadron, and helped the emperor to go on believing in a special Russo-
British relationship over the Ottoman Empire. The easy resolution of the 
crisis obscured from Nicholas the reasons for British hostility and from 
Palmerston the strength of Russian determination about the Ottoman 
Empire.”77 
                                                                                                                                                                                 
Russian provocations, he worked tirelessly at the eleventh hour to keep war from 
breaking out. The original argument concerning Stratford’s culpability, not fully 
dispelled by more recent scholarship, was made by Alexander W. Kinglake, The 
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Puryear, and Gillard, respectively, and not with that of Conacher. As noted, 
Nicholas had a predilection for gentlemen’s agreements and was enamored with 
statesmen of high caliber who could carry a cabinet with them. It is not 
surprising that a despot could come to terms with liberalism only by assuming 
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Two important incidents prior to the crisis over the Holy Places further 
confirmed in Nicholas’s mind both that the western powers would not oppose 
him in the Ottoman Empire and that Turkey could be cowed into doing his 
bidding. First, in 1850, while Palmerston’s bullying during the Don Pacifico 
incident alarmed Nicholas, it also caused a rupture between the French and the 
British such that the tsar believed they could no longer ally with each other. 
Recall that the British, French, and Russians jointly oversaw Greece as an 
independent state since 1832. Pacifico, born in Gibraltar, and therefore a British 
subject, petitioned the Greek government for damages to his private property. 
Greek obstreperousness towards Pacifico awakened the British who earlier had 
                                                                                                                                                                                 
that the great man theory still operated to override the untidiness of democratic 
politics. Thus, despite inconstant enmity, Nicholas believed that he and 
Palmerston could coordinate their opinions when necessary. Although friendly 
with Aberdeen, the tsar believed him to be a lesser statesman than Palmerston. 
Nicholas was correct, but he failed to understand the implication of this fact. The 
reassignment of Palmerston to the home office gave the tsar reason to believe 
that a renewed effort to make a deal with the British in 1852 (the Seymour 
conversations) over the disposition of the Ottoman Empire would bear fruit. See, 
Reid, Lord John Russell, op. cit., p. 214; Conacher, The Aberdeen Coalition , op. 
cit., p. 141. But, Nicholas failed to realize that British foreign policy still ran 
through Palmerston. Nevertheless, there is an unbroken continuity between the 
1844 and 1852 solicitations of Britain by Nicholas. According to Henderson, the 
tsar was not a ‘plotter’, but a ‘blunderer’. See, Henderson, Crimean War 
Diplomacy and Other Historical Essays., op. cit., p. 11. As evidence, according to 
Clayton, “Nicholas would have been wise to remember the line taken by Britain 
during this 1849 crisis. He might not have so unfortunately misjudged the 
probabilities in 1854” (Clayton, Britain and the Eastern Question, op. cit., p. 99). 
The opinions of Henderson, and Clayton, respectively, seem to indicate that 
Nicholas suffered from a severe motivated bias to believe that a special 
relationship existed between Russia and Britain, when, in fact, there was little 
rational basis for this belief. 
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half-heartedly supported his claim. The British fleet was recalled from the 
Salamis to Athens and blockaded the southern coast of Greece until Pacifico 
received satisfaction.78 In turn, the Greeks appealed to the French and Russians 
for assistance. Although the crisis was resolved peaceably, the French recalled 
ambassador Thouvenel from London. Both France and Russia protested both an 
intolerable threat of the use of force as well as the fact that, as fellow guarantors 
of Greek sovereignty, they were not consulted beforehand.79 In defending his 
actions, Palmerston engaged in a bit of chauvinism, giving a speech to 
Parliament in which he asserted the right of the British abroad to unqualified 
respect redolent of citizenry during the heyday of the Roman Empire.80 
Nicholas took from this crisis the realization that he could not operate 
alone in the Ottoman Empire. While the British were preferred partners, Palmer 
rightly notes that Nicholas began to believe that he might be able to do business 
with France: “there was nothing wrong with Louis Napoleon as head of state 
provided he forgot to be a Bonaparte.”81 Unfortunately, the tsar continued to 
believe that, in any contemplated alignment, he could continue to call the tune.82  
The second incident, occurring in 1851, concerns an Austrian mission that 
inflicted a humiliation on the Porte, and thus gave Nicholas reason to believe 
that he could easily dictate Russian foreign policy to the Sultan in the future. A 
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change in succession in Montenegro prompted a change of protocol (the offices 
of the Prince and the Metropolitan were to be separated and Danilo declared 
himself hereditary lay prince) which, in turn, was treated as a violation of 
Turkish suzerainty. The Turks sent an army to oppose the Montenegrins while 
Franz Joseph dispatched Leiningen to Constantinople and successfully faced 
down the Sultan with an ultimatum to cease and desist. Austrian prestige was 
enhanced, but more importantly, Nicholas saw the incident as precedent setting 
for Russian interests.83 
It is time to take stock of the nature of the imbalanced alignments that had 
taken place prior to the outbreak of the Crimean War. Both Britain and Russia 
engaged in mutual affective abandonment of clarified strategic interests with 
each other for different reasons. Britain needed to believe that it was reassured 
by Russian peacefulness because the former might find itself at war with both 
France and the United States regardless of whether it proceeded cautiously or 
not. Thus, collecting an additional great power enemy was not in British 
interests. Britain also developed motivated biases to believe that the Ottoman 
Empire was not decadent and could rehabilitate itself because it was always 
happy to maintain the status quo there provided that everyone else did the work 
to prop it up.84 Russia wanted to keep France from making gains over the 
projected demise of the Ottoman Empire and thus needed Austria and Britain in 
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its camp. Moreover, the tsar blindly believed that Austria was a mere auxiliary of 
Russia and that Turkey was its lackey. Nicholas drew the wrong conclusion from 
British bullying of Greece; not that Britain would oppose Russia in the Ottoman 
Empire, but that France and Britain could no longer ally with one another to 
Russia’s benefit. Finally, Napoleon’s desideratum was to ally with Britain in 
order to gain victories for himself in the Mediterranean in order to restore the 
prestige of the French Empire and to diminish the growing influence of Russia 
throughout Europe.85 
French aggression, Russian restraint, and British non-committance. 
In 1852 the Second Republic was on the verge of collapse. In one of history’s 
many ironies, in order to maintain himself, Louis Napoleon allied with 
conservative clerics in France by launching a revolutionary policy in the Ottoman 
Empire.86 Since the defeat of Napoleon Bonaparte, France had lost its influence in 
the Mediterranean, but it never reconciled itself to the new status quo that had 
been in effect for nearly forty years. Employing the argot of prospect theory, 
France was unable to renormalize itself for such loss, or so thought the British 
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and the Russians (more of this later). Thus, “in his endless search for prestige,”87 
Napoleon was determined to reassert Catholic influence abroad. He upstaged 
Nicholas by asserting the rights of Latins to the Turks over Russian Orthodox 
Christians regarding the Holy Places. Specifically, Napoleon demanded the keys 
to the inner and outer churches at Bethlehem.88  
 The French were clearly opportunistic. Despite arguments based on 
religious claims dating as far back as 1535; a 1690 firman granting the Latins 
dominant standing at the churches in Jerusalem, Nazareth, and Bethlehem; and a 
1740 Turko-French treaty giving Latins preference over their Greek antagonists, 
this superiority was largely annulled as Russian pilgrims poured into the Holy 
Land during the 1840s. As a practicality, twelve million Christians trumped the 
rights of only 300,000 Latins. Moreover, although the Pope named a patriarch to 
Jerusalem, the job was largely functionary and the patriarch lived in Rome failing 
even to attend to the interests of his designated See.89 
 Nicholas countered French claims by invoking the vague and generalized 
concessions given to Russia by the Turks through the 1774 Treaty of Kutchuk 
Kainardji. This treaty, reaffirmed at Bucharest in 1812, at Akerman in 1826, at 
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Adrianople in 1829, and at Unkiar Skelessi in 1833, respectively, gave the tsar the 
right to protect Christians and Christian churches in the Holy Places.90 
 Both an international commission as well as a special commission 
composed of Turkish legal scholars and Ottoman bureaucrats, respectively, 
examined the conflicting claims. Not surprisingly, both Russia and France 
disputed the contradictory findings of the two commissions when they failed to 
support their respective interests.91 Napoleon bolted. Blatantly violating the 
Straits Convention, the French ambassador Lavelette arrived in Constantinople 
in early 1852 aboard the Charlemagne, a new screw-driven, 90-gun battleship. 
Later that year, the French threatened to bombard Tripoli on the pretext that they 
needed to reclaim several deserters.92 Such gunboat diplomacy impressed the 
Sultan and he relented to the French demands.      
 The Russians sustained a diplomatic defeat at the hands of the French in 
an area of presumed Russian predominance. Nicholas believed that he would 
have to react in order to stem the decline of his influence. Nevertheless, he 
initially exercised restraint. In early 1853, despite Nesselrode’s pleading to 
                                                            
90 Seton-Watson, Britain in Europe, op. cit., p. 303. The conflicting demands made 
by the French and the Russians of the Turks over the churches also dealt with the 
right to rebuild a cupola and to install their own security guards at the church 
doors during preferred times at which to say Mass. As usual, French Catholics 
and Russian Orthodox Christians would continue to share the churches with 
each other. At this level of specificity, this was an uninteresting dispute to the 
Sultan between the French and the Russians that he could easily have disposed 
of had the two European powers been able to come to terms with one another 
and not ratcheted up their demands. For details, see, Curtiss, Russia’s Crimean 
War, op. cit., pp. 84-106. 
91 Saab, The Origins of the Crimean Alliance, op. cit., p. 12. 
92 Curtiss, Russia’s Crimean War, op. cit., pp. 74-75. 
 207 
refrain from doing so, the tsar sounded out on a number of occasions Seymour, 
the British ambassador at St. Petersburg, in a manner reminiscent of his 1844 
conversations with Aberdeen. Again, the tsar attempted to make a deal with the 
British over the projected demise of the Ottoman Empire. He reiterated that 
Constantinople not fall into British or French hands, that it perhaps become a 
free city. The British could have Egypt and possibly Crete.93 Sure to awaken 
Austrian suspicions, Nicholas later declared that Russia should occupy the 
Principalities even though he initially stated that only a temporary occupation 
might be necessary.94  
Again, the British were cool to his entreaty. Seymour was a sounding 
board for Nicholas’s ideas without offering anything in return regarding British 
intentions. Thus, the present foreign secretary, Russell, wrote a cordial, but non- 
committal, letter to the tsar, based on Seymour’s faithful report of the 
conversation. Predictably, Nicholas was pleased, thus reinforcing his motivated 
bias that he had a free hand in dealing with the French in the Ottoman Empire.95 
Two reasons likely convinced him that this was the case. First, unlike 
Palmerston, Aberdeen was much more distrusting of French intentions not to 
overthrow the Vienna Settlement. Thus, the tsar believed that an Anglo-French 
combination against Russia with Aberdeen as prime minister was more unlikely 
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than one with Palmerston calling the shots.96 Second, Russell blundered in 
affirming to Nicholas the right of a Russian protectorate over Christians in the 
Ottoman Empire by making an oblique reference to the Treaty of Kutchuk 
Kainardji.97 Thus, Russell’s dilatory reply cemented in Nicholas’s mind precisely 
the opposite of what he intended. Instead of making clear that the British did not 
believe that the Ottoman Empire was in danger of collapsing and that the status 
quo was to be maintained, Nicholas saw approval for a Russian free hand 
without interference.98 
The Seymour conversations caused no stir within the British cabinet. (This 
would later change with the unfortunate leak of those conversations for public 
consumption, contributing in part to a preference reversal by Aberdeen to make 
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the dispute over the Holy Places a major power war).99 None in the cabinet 
initially believed that a European war over the Ottoman Empire was worthwhile, 
regardless of whether it survived or not. Moreover, Aberdeen was becoming 
increasingly convinced that the Ottoman Empire would become partitioned 
without an agreement with Russia, and perhaps Austria, to prevent it. The tsar 
had a right to damages for Turkish duplicity; the British government rebuffed 
French overtures and worked instead to persuade the Turks to grant Russia its 
demands.100 In short, France was clearly seen to be in the wrong and the tsar 
stood on firm ground. 
Emboldened by the Austrian success of the Leiningen mission, and 
finding endless negotiations unrewarding, Nicholas sent the arrogant and 
indiscreet Menshikov to intimidate the Sultan into revoking the firman granting 
new privileges to the French. The special envoy deliberately snubbed the Turkish 
foreign minister, Fuad, by failing to call on him, thus forcing the latter’s prompt 
resignation. The immediate appointment of the mediocre Rifaat in Fuad’s stead 
gave Menshikov the belief that the new appointee “envisages the interests of his 
country in their true light.”101 Personalities matter because sending Orlov, a 
brilliant, distinguished diplomat and military figure prominent during the fall of 
                                                            
99 Clayton, Britain and the Eastern Question, op. cit., p. 103. 
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Napoleon in 1815, in Menshikov’s stead would likely have smoothed the 
situation.102  
It has been argued that Nicholas’s aggressive posture with the Menshikov 
mission destroyed the standing of the non-interventionists within the Aberdeen 
cabinet allowing the aggressive militarism of Palmerston and Russell to carry the 
day.103 This is largely true, but it is important to remember that the cabinet 
members most engaged in the issue!Russell (leader of the House of Commons), 
Clarendon (foreign secretary), Palmerston (home secretary), and Aberdeen 
(prime minister)!had long experience in dealing with Ottoman Empire crises 
and viewed with varying degrees of suspicion Russian intentions there.104 While 
the divisions within the cabinet look undignified, they were appropriate enough 
at a time when the intentions of the Russians were likely unclear to the Russian 
government itself.105 Russell was quite wrong in arguing to the prime minister 
that the government would fall had they adopted the latter’s undiluted policy of 
conciliating Russia.106 Gladstone, chancellor of the exchequer, retrospectively 
observed that the cabinet was not rent by divisions and that he had never served 
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in a government where there was less dissension.107 This may have been 
precisely the problem as most of the cabinet members preferred to compromise 
their differences with muddled foreign policy rather than to allow the 
government to dissolve. The results were unfortunate. Aberdeen ultimately 
failed to control his cabinet as well as his diplomats in the field. Moreover, he did 
a poor job of explaining his Russian policy to the public and thus allowed rising 
hostility towards the tsar to increasingly frame the situation. Palmerston was 
complicit in whipping up British public opinion and then used it in order to 
hijack foreign policy from Aberdeen. Thus, the Aberdeen coalition appears 
incompetent only in retrospect.108 
Initially, Aberdeen had significant room for maneuver. Russell was 
initially hissed at by the rest of the cabinet for raising doubts as to the sincerity of 
the tsar in tamping down the crisis even as evidence of the Menshikov mission 
was being parsed.109 Palmerston was more circumspect, observing that “the 
Emperor of Russia is ambitious and grasping, but he is a gentleman and I should 
be slow to disbelieve his positive denial of such things as those in question.”110 
Aberdeen deplored Menshikov’s tactlessness, but the prime minister blamed 
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Turkey’s ineptness and believed it to be a weak and useless partner. While he 
had a sense that the Russian demands might be humiliating, Aberdeen asserted 
that “there is nothing whatever to justify the reproach of territorial aggression, or 
hostile ambition.”111   
While Nicholas believed that Russia was merely seeking to redress a 
legitimate grievance, and while Aberdeen agreed with him, the tsar failed to 
understand that Aberdeen also saw resistance to Russia as impracticable.112 
Moreover, popular Russophobia in Britain at this time was latent at best; only 
hot-house intellectuals noisily expostulated it.113 Still, surprisingly, Nicholas 
overreached by ratcheting up his demands beyond a restoration of the status 
quo. On a return visit, Menshikov was instructed to demand future compliance 
by the Sultan that no more disturbances of this kind would take place.114 
Moreover, a firman confirming such assurance would be insufficient; a 
convention (or sened) was demanded.115 In effect, Nicholas wanted to make the 
Sultan cede to him political control of twelve million Christians within the 
latter’s territorial purview. Whereas the Austrian demands were brutal, but 
limited, Nicholas was demanding Turkish subservience to Russia in perpetuity, a 
demand to which no major European power would ever accede. Because of 
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motivated biases, both Britain and Russia made a crucial mistake regarding the 
presumed Turkish response. As noted earlier, when cognitive biases 
predominate, we tend to extrapolate the recent behavior of one actor to another. 
This is usually an invalid manner of proceeding, but, if employed in more long-
term fashion over a variety of important issues, it is not always wrong and can be 
an economical manner in which to rationally read the environment. It is true that 
Turkey was weak and Russia was strong. But, to fail to reckon that the amour-
propre of Turkey could not be insulted as would the sentiment of a major 
European power in similar circumstances was to fail to recognize that Turkey 
believed that it had options, notably in a combination with France and Britain 
against Russia.116 
Nesselrode and Orlov acutely recognized this problem and they pleaded 
with Nicholas to replace Menshikov with the latter and to simply concentrate on 
demands for a restoration of the status quo and to drop any demands for the 
future.117 Nevertheless, Nicholas felt that his actions were quite conservative 
given that he was sure that Britain and Austria would side with him, that France 
was isolated, and that Menshikov made a secret offer to the Turks to protect 
them against any possible retribution by the French.118 Nicholas assured Orlov 
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that Menshikov’s demands could be modified as suggested if the Turks refused 
or if the reaction of the western powers was too strong.119 That Nicholas resisted 
sound advice given by two respected and trusted diplomats in his own 
government is further evidence that he suffered from motivated bias. The tsar 
believed that he was framing the situation conservatively, that the insurance 
premium was being employed in conservative fashion in order to retrieve what 
had opportunistically been taken from him by the French regarding his 
presumed predominance over the Ottoman Empire. While Nicholas was being 
risk acceptant for loss, he seems to have believed that his demand for future 
compliance by the Turks, while perhaps a bit risk acceptant for gain, was quite 
justified given the harm done to his prestige and could nevertheless be rescinded 
were he to encounter resistance. War with the Turks was a possibility, but 
Nicholas believed that the British would restrain the French from fighting by 
refusing them assistance.120 Given the tsar’s somewhat nuanced appreciation of 
the situation, it seems reasonable to classify Menshikov’s demands as an instance 
of defensive avoidance although somewhat weaker than the theory implies.121  
Though there was immense hesitation about doing so, Aberdeen 
dispatched Stratford to Constantinople in order to respond to Menshikov’s 
demands.122 Given strict marching orders, Stratford encouraged the Turks to 
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accede to the Russian demands for a restoration of the status quo. Doing so 
would put them in a stronger position to resist the demand for a Russian 
protectorate of all Christians within the Ottoman Empire.123  
At the same time that Orlov was having an effect on softening Nicholas’s 
demands, the Turks stiffened their backs. During the 1849 extradition crisis of 
Polish and Hungarian refugees discussed earlier, the Sultan came away believing 
that British resolve forced the Russians to yield.124 Thus, remembering this 
prompted him to believe that British and French assistance might allow Turkey 
the best opportunity since the reign of Peter the Great to throw off the yoke of 
Russian domination.125 Alarmed at Menshikov’s additional demands, the French 
dispatched their fleet to the Salamis. These demands for the future also 
convinced Rose, the British chargé d’affaires at Constantinople, that Russia was 
bent on the destruction of the Ottoman Empire. But Clarendon, who had 
replaced Russell as foreign secretary, denied a request from Rose (in concert with 
the Sultan), to dispatch the British fleet. Together, Aberdeen and Clarendon 
successfully opposed calls by Russell and Palmerston to dispatch the fleet in 
order to engage in ‘violent measures’.126 Aberdeen recognized that sending the 
British fleet would only encourage the Turks to resist Russia.127 
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The British government had to determine the real motives of the tsar. On 
the one hand, there were his professions, through Brunnow, the Russian 
ambassador in London, of continued peaceful intentions regarding the Holy 
Places dispute. This, Aberdeen focused on. On the other hand, the Menshikov 
mission was undeniably threatening in nature, which was quite germane to 
Palmerston’s outlook.128 At this juncture, Aberdeen stated “I am quite ready to 
admit that [the Menshikov demands] are unreasonable and ought to be resisted. 
But I cannot yet believe that it will be necessary to do so by war if the Emperor 
should hitherto have been acting in good faith; if his whole conduct should have 
been a cheat, the case is altered.”129 Thus, a very interesting exchange between 
Aberdeen and Palmerston prefigures the extent to which the former was 
factoring anticipated negative regret into his decision calculus. In 1849, threats to 
Turkish territorial integrity were predictably and reliably thwarted by the 
presence of the British fleet at the mouth of the Dardanelles (the European 
side).130 For Palmerston, such deterrent action was a standard instrument in the 
quiver of British foreign policy. But here he went further, arguing that the fleet 
should be sent up the Bosphorus (the Asian side), thus clearly violating the 
Straits Agreement. Aberdeen curiously responded that such action was only a 
half measure that would merely relieve Russia of its responsibility to maintain 
the peace. Rather, if and when Constantinople needed to be defended, Aberdeen 
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argued that the British fleet should immediately be dispatched to the Black 
Sea.131 Whereas Palmerston wished to engage in graduated measures of 
deterrence with Russia, Aberdeen seemed to view deterrence as an all or nothing 
affair. Palmerston’s approach had the advantage of making fine and timely 
adjustments in signaling to deter the tsar from graduated aggression against the 
Turks before he took an overextended position due to his amour-propre. In 
theory, Aberdeen’s conciliatory approach offered the benefit of reassuring an 
otherwise insecure state, much as is argued by cooperation (or the spiral) theory. 
But, while Aberdeen’s remarks do not indicate that he had a motivated bias for 
peace at any price,132 he seemed more concerned to avoid involvement in the 
Eastern Question than to reassure a possibly insecure state. In effect, Aberdeen 
wanted to give the tsar as much rope as he needed with which to hang himself 
and then to grudgingly react with military force. Unfortunately, Aberdeen’s 
attitude merely reinforced Nicholas’s belief that he could continue to deal with 
the Sultan with impunity.        
 Menshikov offered a modification to the tsar’s demands, dropping the 
requirement for a defensive treaty with Turkey and life tenure for the Greek 
Patriarch in the Holy Land. Nevertheless, the requirement of a sened confirming 
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a Russian protectorate over Orthodox Christians remained.133 The Sultan’s 
council communicated its rejection of the offer to Menshikov through Reshid, an 
intermediary without portfolio, foolishly thought to be in Russia’s pocket. Reshid 
treacherously blamed Stratford’s attitude as the reason for the refusal.134 There 
would be no change in the status of the Holy Places without the concurrence of 
both the French and Russian governments.135 
Russian, British, and French reactions. 
Russia broke relations with Turkey; Nesselrode stated that Russia would occupy 
the Principalities until such time that Turkey complied with Menshikov’s 
demands.136 Nicholas vented spleen by issuing a manifesto for all his subjects to 
go forth and “fight for the Orthodox faith against the obstinate and blinded 
Ottoman Government.”137 
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 The crisis over the Holy Places had previously been a remote concern for 
both Aberdeen and the British public.138 Nevertheless, as the tsar fulminated, 
Napoleon contemporaneously baited the prime minister. Walewski, the French 
ambassador in London, warned the Belgians that, with an outbreak of war in the 
east, the French would no longer consider itself bound by the Vienna Settlement. 
Thus, if Britain wished to preserve Belgian neutrality, it would have to work 
more closely with France in Constantinople. This move was prefigured as 
Drouyn de Lhuys, the French foreign minister, warned Cowley, the British 
ambassador in Paris, that France had as much right to enter Belgium to keep 
order as had Austria when it intervened in Switzerland.139 France was clearly 
contending the status quo whereas Britain wished to maintain it. But which 
status quo and where? In order to maintain the status quo in Europe, Britain had 
to abet France to change it in the Ottoman Empire. Moreover, Britain was 
increasingly coming to believe that, if it failed to act with France, the latter would 
steal a march on it both in Europe and in the Levant. Communications were 
seriously deficient between the two governments and they did not deal with 
each other in good faith.140 Each thought that the other would proceed 
unilaterally if it did not go along, but that, in reality, neither would have moved 
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without the other.141 France took the early lead in aggressive action, then 
faltered, and the lead was taken over by Britain. With regard to each other, 
British and French actions were a pis-aller, a means to ensure that the other did 
not take action alone: “From start to finish the maritime Powers were drawn 
along by the need to prove to each other their mutual good faith.”142 Thus, 
during the pre-war diplomacy, in working at cross-purposes to each other, both 
Britain and France found themselves in the curious position of engaging in risk 
acceptant behavior for gain in order to maintain their risk acceptance for loss. 
This was not all. French blustering reinforced Nicholas’s motivated bias 
that he had a free hand to deal with the French in the Ottoman Empire and was a 
significant cause in the aggressive posture that he took there.143 Although 
Napoleon overextended himself with his support of the clerics in the Holy Land 
at precisely the time that he did not need to do so, his threat to violate Belgian 
neutrality was largely idle.144 Though the Tories were disinclined to believe this, 
they did have options that the tsar hadn’t fully thought through. Nicholas saw 
French threats to Belgium as being more vital to Britain than any threatened 
interests in Turkey. In this Aberdeen agreed with him,145 but instead of opposing 
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France in Belgium, he worked with the former in order to restrain it. The price 
was joint cooperation in the Ottoman Empire. Nevertheless, Aberdeen gave too 
much away. Due to Louis Napoleon’s insecurity, the French needed an alliance 
with the British more than the British needed an alliance with the French.146 As 
late as October 1853, Aberdeen recognized this, yet he failed to use this inherent 
leverage to control French pretensions as well as to more vigorously lobby for a 
policy of joint European action to force Russia to desist in its aggressive 
diplomacy.147    
Napoleon’s proposal for an entente was adopted by the British cabinet at 
the end of May 1853. This action was largely in response to Russell’s argument to 
Aberdeen that the government would fall unless decisive action was taken.148 
Russell was not a disinterested advisor; he was looking to replace Aberdeen as 
prime minister in the near term and traded on rising Russophobia to ingratiate 
himself with the public. Russell and Palmerston were Whigs, although Russell 
was a true liberal whereas Palmerston was decidedly more muted.149 Both were 
hawkish toward Russia, but Russell was also devoted to enlarging the voting 
franchise in Britain and did not see the practical contradiction between both 
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stances. Palmerston was determined to quash legislation that would ultimately 
become the Second Reform Act of 1867. Thus, although Palmerston did not state 
outright, he rightly saw that beating the war drum against Russia effectively 
killed voting reform domestically.150 There was significant daylight between the 
political views of Russell and Palmerston, to say nothing of the personal enmity 
between them. Graham, first Lord of the Admiralty, wisely observed to 
Gladstone that public opinion becomes the arbiter when the cabinet is too finely 
balanced.151 This observation applies a fortiori in the presence of two strong-
willed statesmen such as Russell and Palmerston. But Aberdeen, although highly 
intelligent, was not a political animal.152 He made no effort to drive a wedge 
between his cabinet adversaries, perhaps by allying with Russell on the reform 
issue in exchange for a more conciliatory view of Russia.153 Together, then, 
Aberdeen and Russell might have framed the Eastern Question as one of 
conciliation toward Russia as being both in the interest of British imperialism as 
well as the promotion of liberalism abroad. This was not unthinkable as 
Aberdeen successfully framed British-American relations regarding North 
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America in such manner. Palmerston, then, would have been isolated and not 
able to occupy the bully pulpit.  
Palmerston did not believe that a major power war would be necessary in 
order to defend the Ottoman Empire. As noted earlier, he thought that the 
presence of the British fleet at the Straits would be a sufficient deterrent to 
Russian aggression: “My opinion is that if England & France stoutly support 
Turkey in this matter by negotiation, backing up their negotiation by adequate 
naval demonstration, they will ultimately succeed even if Austria and Prussia 
give them no assistance.”154 But Palmerston felt that a long delay in intervening 
would make “[Britain] the laughingstock of Europe,”155 despite Aberdeen’s 
observation that Britain was not bound by any treaty to come to the aid of 
Turkey.156 Unfortunately, it did not largely matter that he was currently the 
home secretary, because, since the resolution of the 1841 Straits crisis, Palmerston 
was widely recognized as the British foreign policy expert.157 But he developed a 
very strange motivated bias regarding the viability of the Ottoman Empire that 
was clearly connected to his increasing opposition to Russia. Making a patently 
false argument, Palmerston argued that liberal revolutionaries in the Balkans 
were not seen as being fit to govern, but the reactionary Sultan was apparently 
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making great strides toward modernizing and liberalizing Turkey.158 Russia was 
clearly self-interested, conservative and reactionary, and did not support liberal 
reform movements per se. But the Balkan people recognized that their only hope 
for independence lay with Russia and not with the Porte. The limited autonomy 
that they presently enjoyed was due to exertions on the part of the tsar.159 Thus, 
as Seton-Watson notes, “it was a fatality that [the Russian] autocracy should have 
stood for progress and civilization in the Balkans, and that its evil reputation 
should have betrayed the West into supporting a still more odious and decadent 
tyranny in Turkey.”160 
Grudgingly, Clarendon and Aberdeen came over to Palmerston’s view 
without realizing the extent to which such a position would be negatively 
perceived by Nicholas. Clarendon confided to Walewski that he wished that 
Britain had called up the fleet earlier as he believed that hostilities against 
Turkey were imminent.161 To Aberdeen, Clarendon argued that the fleet should 
be called to the Aegean, blithely believing that Russia would have no right to 
take offense “after the patience with which we have endured her enormous and 
unexplained armaments. [This would be] the least measure that would satisfy 
public opinion, and save the Government from shame thereafter.”162 Temperley 
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argues that hostile public opinion forced Clarendon’s preference reversal.163 But 
Clarendon argued that Russian action forced this change of heart.164 These two 
opinions can be reconciled because the imminence of a significant event, 
irrespective of its certainty, can contribute to preference reversal due to affect.165 
Thus, Gillard argues that, “consideration for public opinion, such as Clarendon 
expressed, could conveniently sanctify the change of mind which politicians 
always find so embarrassing.”166 Clarendon’s preference reversal was due to 
affect; adverse public opinion was the rationalization for a change of policy taken 
for another reason. 
 Aberdeen thus relented to the demands of Russell, Palmerston, and 
Clarendon despite his better judgment. The fleet was dispatched eastwards 
although Clarendon was instructed to communicate the benign motive and spirit 
with which the decision was made in hopes that it would not destroy “Britain’s 
salutary influence”167 with Russia. Aberdeen confided to Clarendon in an oft-
stated phrase, “we are drifting fast towards war.”168 
Both Nicholas and Aberdeen deluded themselves into believing that the 
other should take no offense to their respective actions. Brunnow continued to 
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tell Aberdeen what the prime minister most wanted to hear: that Russia sought 
only a rectification of the status quo and nothing more, and that the tsar’s amour-
propre was not engaged.169 In June 1853, the British fleet steamed towards Besika 
Bay with the French fleet arriving the day after. Russian troops crossed the Pruth 
into Moldavia in July of that year. The tsar did so because he did not want to be 
seen backing down before threats made by the western powers.170 Moreover, 
Russia had special treaty rights with regard to the Principalities, and it had 
occupied them on four previous occasions. Thus, Orlov only retrospectively 
agreed that the most recent occupation was high-handed.171  
 Nesselrode later wrote a memorandum arguing for the propriety of the 
occupation. But he also inflamed western sentiments by arguing that the action 
was taken in response to hostile western naval actions.172 Reflexively hostile 
towards Nicholas, Palmerston quickly lost his loosely-guarded restraint upon 
news of the occupation and loudly argued that “Russia was led on step by step 
by the apparent timidity of the government of England.”173 The Tory Press and 
Morning Herald wrote pieces demanding the impeachment of Aberdeen and 
Clarendon for aiding and abetting Menshikov. But The Times wrote quite a good 
opinion of Aberdeen’s policy. Public opinion was not yet inflamed to the point of 
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being causal in affecting British foreign policy.174 Given the tsar’s motivated bias 
to prevail, Palmerston was quite wrong in his diagnosis, but he did put his finger 
on the problem regarding the prime minister’s strategy. Aberdeen pursued a 
straddle strategy when the situation clearly did not call for it. As elaborated by 
Glenn Snyder, the composite security dilemma operates when walking a fine line 
between being entrapped by a forward ally and being abandoned by that ally 
and consequently being left alone to face an aggressive adversary. Always 
difficult to achieve, the key to successfully employing the straddle strategy is to 
restrain the ally at the same rate that the adversary is deterred from 
aggression.175 The problem here, as the Belgian king and others noted, is that a 
way must be found for the tsar to retreat from his overexposed position “avec 
honneur.”176 Moreover, Napoleon was forward but, as will be shown, was 
looking for a way to tamp down the dispute over the Holy Places. Thus, the 
push-pull dynamics requiring a mixed, straddle strategy simply were not present 
in this instance. Why then, was Aberdeen engaging in actions that had no 
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consistency of purpose?177 His comment that “we are drifting fast towards war 
without raising a hand to prevent it” was prescient, but he was in the best 
position to stop it and did not take appropriate action. 
 As evidence, in a curious report to the Queen, Aberdeen summarized a 
June 11 1853 cabinet meeting in which all agreed that Britain was not obliged by 
any treaty to come to the aid of Turkey and that a peaceful solution was desired. 
But then the prime minister seemed resigned to his belief that Stratford would 
encourage the Turks to resist the tsar’s demands, whereupon the Russians would 
proceed to occupy the Principalities. He stated that preventive measures had 
been taken,178 but they were too little too late and served only to embolden the 
Turks and anger the Russians. A number of questions are relevant. First, why 
was Stratford not relieved of his post when the documentary evidence indicates 
that Aberdeen, Graham, and the Queen no longer had confidence in him?179 Even 
if Stratford was conducting his country’s foreign policy in good faith, the very 
fact that Aberdeen believed this not to be the case, undermined the latter’s ability 
to control the situation. Second, why were instructions delayed to Turkey not to 
make the occupation of the Principalities a casus belli? Third, if the second point 
was British foreign policy, why was Stratford (or a replacement diplomat) not 
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expressly refused authority to call up the fleet?180 Removing Stratford from his 
post and refusing authority to authorize fleet movements would have sent an 
unmistakable signal to the Turks that Britain would not be party to any 
contemplated aggression on their part. By failing to do so, actions spoke louder 
than words.  
Anticipated negative regret was clearly at work here. Aberdeen was 
worried that there was the possibility that Turkey might be vanquished by 
Russia were the British fleet not nearby as a deterrent. Failing to order the fleet 
movement would bring opprobrium through hostile British public opinion, thus 
causing his government to fall. But, the tsar stated that his troops would remain 
on the defensive in the Principalities and tolerate Turkish skirmishing across the 
Danube.181 Unfortunately, the Sultan believed Aberdeen to be bluffing when the 
latter communicated through Stratford that Britain would not support Turkish 
aggression.182 Thus, Turkish, and not Russian, aggression, respectively, was the 
primary contingency to guard against.          
 In addition, France was backing down as Napoleon authorized Austria to 
draw up the Vienna Note that essentially reinstated the status quo regarding the 
Holy Places. Nicholas immediately accepted the provisions of the Note outright. 
All that was left was for the Sultan to agree. By August 1853, it appeared that the 
straddle strategy was working. According to Granville, the anticipated success 
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would “be principally owing to Aberdeen, who has been staunch and bold in 
defying public clamour, abuse, and taunts, and in resisting the wishes and advice 
of Palmerston, who would have adopted a more stringent and uncompromising 
course.”183 Regarding the Eastern Question, Gladstone seconded Granville by 
writing to Aberdeen, “whatever be its final issue you are the person to whom we 
owe its present state. There is clearly no other man in the Cabinet who combined 
calmness, solidity of judgment, knowledge of the question, and moderation of 
views, in a manner or degree (even independent of your personal and official 
authority) sufficient to have held the country.”184 
 Gladstone’s encomium of Aberdeen was off the mark. The Turks were 
invited by Buol, the Austrian foreign minister, to write a note of their own, but 
the four European powers (Britain, France, Austria, and Prussia) drawing up the 
Vienna Note refused to pass it on and substituted their own based on the French 
proposal. Angered that they had no part in its writing, the Turks then refused the 
Vienna Note.185 Subsequent Turkish modifications to the Vienna Note included a 
declaration of protection of Orthodox Christians in the Holy Places through the 
sufferance of the Sultan, and deletion of Russian rights achieved as the 
                                                            
183 Greville, Reeve, ed., Memoirs, 3rd ed., vol. 6, op. cit., p. 438. 
184 Gladstone letter to Aberdeen, August 12 1853. Cited in Conacher, The 
Aberdeen Coalition , op. cit., p. 173. 
185 It is possible that Stratford induced them to reject it, but this is a point of 
endless scholarly controversy. See, Bourne, Foreign Policy of Victorian England 
1830-1902, op. cit., p. 76. 
 231 
consequence of the Treaty of Kutchuk Kainardji, respectively.186 Nicholas 
countered by refusing to accede to what he dubbed the ‘Turkish ultimatum.’ 
 It was not the intent of the Turkish amendments to the Vienna Note to 
allow Russia a protectorate over Orthodox Christians in perpetuity, but 
Nesselrode interpreted it as such. Unfortunately, in September 1853, his 
confidential written interpretation to the tsar was leaked to the German press 
and published, with the anti-Russian German opinion that the proposed 
amendments as understood by the Turks were justified. Clarendon then referred 
to Nesselrode’s interpretation as ‘violent’ and British public opinion was both 
outraged and engaged.   
Contemporaneously, at the Olmütz Conference (also known as the Buol 
Project) composed of Russia and Austria, the tsar made serious concessions. 
Specifically, he pledged that “the Cabinet of St. Petersburg gives a new assurance 
that it will in no way exercise for itself the protection of a Christian cult inside 
the Ottoman Empire, and the duty of protecting this cult and maintaining its 
religious immunity has devolved on the Sultan and that Russia only reserves to 
itself that of watching that the engagement contracted by the Ottoman Empire in 
the Treaty of Kainardji be strictly executed.”187 In effect, Nicholas was refuting 
the ‘violent interpretation’ given to the Turkish amendments to the Vienna Note 
by Nesselrode as the private opinion of a diplomat. Moreover, Nicholas was 
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dropping his demand for a future protectorate over Orthodox Christians in the 
Holy Places.  
Russell’s preference reversal from his belief in the need for Turkish 
acceptance of the Vienna Note to the conclusion that he drew from Russia’s 
rejection of the Turkish amendments was due to an irrationally consistent belief 
that Russia intended to subjugate the Ottoman Empire, despite the tsar’s 
disavowal of the ‘violent interpretation’. Originally, Russell agreed with the 
prime minister that the tsar might accept the Turkish modifications to the Vienna 
Note but that he could not be pressed into doing so. He further argued that both 
the Turks and the Russians should be urged to maintain the status quo.188 But 
then, Russell reversed course writing to Aberdeen, “the question must be 
decided by war, and if we do not stop the Russians on the Danube, we shall have 
to stop them on the Indus.”189  
Clarendon followed suit by rejecting the Olmütz proposal and arguing 
that the ‘violent interpretation’ still stood. He engaged in irrational consistency 
as well. The foreign secretary was determined to reject the Olmütz proposal even 
before he saw evidence of the ‘violent interpretation’. He did so by believing 
there was a catch somewhere when Nicholas accepted the Vienna Note.190 
Moreover, as further evidence of his confused state of thinking, Clarendon 
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opined to Seymour that, at Olmütz, the tsar “did eat dirt and went far to 
neutralize the dispatch of objections to the modifications.” Seymour agreed, 
stating that “the Buol project was a clear example of [Nicholas trying to back 
down].”191 Moreover, Clarendon’s later peace proposals were scarcely different 
from the Olmütz proposal that he dismissed out of hand only a few weeks 
earlier.192 One explanation for this vacillating behavior is that Clarendon had no 
political following; he commanded no popularity in the House of Commons, 
where he had never sat, nor throughout the country.193 Thus, he was unusually 
susceptible to the friendly but constant pressure of Palmerston’s importuning to 
take an aggressive stance towards Russia.194 But this sequence of behavior is also 
consistent with the prospect theory phenomenon that decision-makers are 
frequently unaware that they are framing situations differently despite the fact 
that the status quo has not materially changed.195  
In September 1853, the war party in Turkey had taken control of events 
and was spoiling for a war with Russia. Riots and demonstrations endangered 
the lives and property of British nationals in Turkey. Without cabinet 
concurrence, Aberdeen authorized Stratford to call up the fleet in order to protect 
British interests that the Turkish government seemed unable to protect. The 
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prime minister was following a French suggestion for concerted action. Thus, 
Aberdeen found an excuse to call the fleet to Constantinople and still cling to his 
motivated bias that Britain was merely engaging in defensive action to which the 
tsar had no reason to object.196 This action merely emboldened the Turks and 
they formally declared war on Russia in October.  
As noted, the tsar continued to tolerate Turkish skirmishing across the 
Danube. Moreover, he was equally restrained in the Balkans in deference to 
Austrian insecurity. But Nicholas could not abide Turkish military actions that 
encouraged resistance to Russian rule in the Caucasus. At the end of November, 
with great difficulty, the Russians inflicted a heavy defeat on the Turkish army 
attacking Georgia. At the same time, Turkey made a crucial tactical blunder by 
mooring its fleet in the open at Sinope, while enroute to resupplying troops in 
the Caucasus. Upon demand, the Turks foolishly failed to raise the white flag. 
Thus, the fleet was easily destroyed and four thousand Turks perished at the 
hand of the Russian navy. British public opinion then reached a fevered 
Russophobic pitch.  
Preference reversals by Aberdeen, and then, Nicholas, respectively. 
Although Russia was acting within its legal rights at Sinope,197 Palmerston seized 
the moment by holding forth on Nicholas’s seemingly increasingly aggressive 
behavior and taking aim at the pacifists, notably Bright and Cobden. Earlier, 
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Palmerston declared: “I am desirous that England should be well with Russia as 
long as the Emperor allows us to be so, but if he is determined to break a lance 
with us, why, then have at him, say I, and perhaps he may have enough of it 
before we have done with him.”198 He later lampooned Bright in public by 
arguing that the latter would have “…[Britain] submit to any degradation rather 
than have recourse to war.”199 Now, with Palmerston leading the charge, public 
opinion excoriated Aberdeen for not stationing the British fleet in the Black Sea 
in order to protect the Turks and to prevent the massacre at Sinope, as it was 
now dubbed. Never mind that the Russians had previously sunk the Turkish 
fleet at Navarino in 1827, and that the British ‘Copenhagened’ the Danish fleet in 
1807, two events to which hostile British public opinion was decidedly mute. In 
this instance, the tsar had indeed taken precipitant action. Nevertheless, he was 
resolved to restore the status quo in the Holy Land through his public 
declarations at Olmütz at the same time that Aberdeen reversed his preference 
for action-oriented behavior in which the insurance premium was now to be 
used in risky fashion as a lottery ticket. As discussed below, this preference 
reversal occurred despite the fact that the status quo had not materially changed. 
The Russia of 18th century Catherine II had indeed been predatory. But the 
19th century version had shown great moderation. On two separate occasions, 
during the 1828-29 Russo-Turkish war, and during the 1839-41 Straits crisis, 
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respectively, Turkey was on the verge of collapse. But Russia was not 
opportunistic and did not try to profit at its expense. In the present instance, 
Brunnow wrote a cost-benefit analysis for Nicholas that indicated that war 
would not be advantageous for Russia. The ambassador believed that war would 
destroy the Ottoman Empire; thus the Treaty of Kutchuk Kainardji would be null 
and void. Consequently, small states, such as Greece and the Principalities, 
would break away and become troublesome neighbors, or remain as ungrateful 
vassals. France, Britain, and Greece would profit at Russia’s expense.200 Thus, as 
before, there was little reason to believe that Russia had any interest in 
precipitating a general war. 
Aberdeen had earlier made his own cost-benefit analysis regarding the 
Holy Places dispute. In the prime minister’s estimation, the tsar was a reasonable 
man, notwithstanding his public outbursts. In contrast, Napoleon was playing 
with fire with his adventurism in the Ottoman Empire. Europe might be 
embroiled in a major power war for years to come with implications for the 
solidity of Continental relations. It was madness to believe that Muslims and 
Christians could cohabitate with each other in the Levant. Aberdeen reviled the 
Menshikov mission, but Turkey had largely brought it upon itself by its disunion 
and treachery. Russia was redressing a grievance and would control itself and 
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continue to cooperate with Britain in the Ottoman Empire after receiving 
satisfaction.201     
Thus, despite appearances to the contrary, the larger status quo had not 
changed significantly in the estimation of both Nicholas and Aberdeen, 
notwithstanding the unfortunate incident at Sinope.202 As noted, Turkey had 
gone to war with Russia in 1829 and lost, just as it later would in 1877. In both 
wars, the major European powers put diplomatic limits on the military victories 
after the fact, just as they would have constrained Russia in this instance.203 
Given Nicholas’s framing of the situation as continuing to be risk acceptant for 
loss, but refraining to take risks in order to make gains, coupled with the fact that 
the status quo had not materially changed, a great power war should not have 
erupted. Public opinion in Britain was hostile, but it merely served to rationalize 
the preferences of those predisposed to taking an aggressive stance toward 
Russia. Moreover, public opinion in France was decidedly muted and was not 
warlike.204 Since neither Britain nor France would have acted without the other 
(despite each’s disbelief regarding the other’s intentions), public opinion could 
not be a galvanizing force because it was not coincident in both states.  
A more proximate reason for the war is to be found in the mutual 
suspicions that Britain and France harbored toward each other. These suspicions 
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eventually foreclosed policy options that might have brought this crisis to a 
relatively peaceful conclusion. It has been argued that Britain was formerly faced 
with the problem of deterring Russia from opportunistically gaining privileges in 
the Holy Land with a protectorate of Orthodox Christians in perpetuity. Now, 
with the disaster at Sinope, it is further argued that the new problem was to 
prevent the destruction of the Ottoman Empire and a consequent cataclysmic 
repercussion throughout Europe due to a scramble for its remnants.205 Thus, two 
options to prevent this latter hypothetical suggested themselves. The first option 
was to steadfastly align with the other European powers to force Russia to quit 
the Principalities and to restore the status quo in the Levant.206 This would have 
required an undiluted Aberdeen policy in which Britain would expressly deny 
Turkey military support by refusing to call the British fleet in support. Here, the 
insurance premium would be used in conservative fashion and the endowment 
principle would hold for all parties. Moreover, this policy provided the only 
certainty that major power war would not break out.207  
The second option was to give Turkey financial and military backing in 
order to defeat the Russians. Here, the insurance premium would be used in a 
risky fashion with regard to Russia, but the insurance premium might be used in 
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a conservative fashion with regard to the Franco-British relationship.208 Since 
Aberdeen’s cabinet did not trust Napoleon (and Austria signaled that it would 
stay neutral, much to both Russia’s and Britain’s chagrin), the action-oriented 
option in which Britain still believed that it could control the situation was to 
defend Turkey backed with British and French military force.209 In this 
adventure, the two western powers could keep an eye on each other in order to 
ensure that neither stole a march on the other. Thus, a mixed lottery situation 
would result for both Britain and France. Foregoing relative gains by marching in 
lockstep with another forward power might be seen as an instance of being risk 
acceptant for loss. In effect, Britain and France courted the possibility of war with 
Russia in order to avoid going to war with each other.210 But this elevates the 
secondary to the essential. Moreover, this option only makes sense were Turkey 
to have been in danger of being dismantled by Russia, an action that the tsar 
expressly denied any interest in. As evidence, Nicholas was largely begging the 
rest of Europe to adopt the first option. Given his bona fides, all of the major 
powers would have enjoyed a greater certainty of outcome (peace without the 
attendant uncertainties that come with major power conflict), the retainment of 
all endowments, and a conservative use of the insurance premium.          
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Although Aberdeen recommended that the Olmütz proposal deserved 
consideration, that was the extent of his pursuance. Instead, by mid-December, 
after Palmerston’s resignation (ostensibly over Russell’s raising the Reform 
issue), Aberdeen wrote to the Queen that, “some rather strong measures were 
adopted in consequence of the catastrophe at Sinope, by directing the presence of 
the English and French fleets in the Black Sea; but no violent or very hostile 
decision was taken.”211 Although Palmerston returned to the cabinet shortly 
thereafter, it is important to note that Aberdeen took the decidedly hostile and 
aggressive action against Russia on his own. To be more precise, Aberdeen took 
the hostile action in order to draw both Palmerston and Russell back into the fold 
(the latter was threatening to resign as well). Thus, the prime minister took a 
warlike stance in order to keep his government from falling.212 Here is another 
example of a mixed lottery; Aberdeen was determined to recoup his losses 
regarding a domestically deteriorating situation even as he recognized the 
unattractive alternative of the possibility of fighting a war that he did not believe 
was worth the candle.213 The French proposal to intercept Russian ships on the 
Black Sea and to force them to return to port was adopted by the British cabinet 
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with little thought to how such action might be perceived in St. Petersburg.214 
Aberdeen wrote to the Queen: “it was stated categorically that the Emperor of 
the French would either act alone or that he would withdraw his fleet to Toulon. 
Public opinion in the country would not permit the dissolution of the Alliance at 
so critical a juncture by the assertion of a little independence.”215 Palmerston’s 
hostile motivated bias towards Russia kept him from realizing that war was 
imminent as the consequence of these naval actions. Both the French and British 
governments continued to believe that presence of western warships on the 
Black Sea merely raised the diplomatic stakes and that the tsar would back down 
before superior military power. But Aberdeen was whistling past the graveyard; 
he and the other dovish members of his cabinet, including Graham and Wood, 
hoped to avoid war even as they were more or less resigned to it because of the 
foreign policy option that they saddled themselves with.216 
Western fleet actions in the Black Sea were not even-handed. When 
queried by Brunnow, Aberdeen had to admit that the two navies were not there 
to interpose themselves between two belligerents, but rather, to protect Turkish 
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forces and to turn a blind eye to their aggression.217 Contemporaneously, both 
France and Britain issued an ultimatum to Russia to vacate the Principalities 
within two months with no mention of peace terms. The Aberdeen government 
then took the unusual step in publishing the Seymour conversations conducted 
in 1844. Coupled with Nesselrode’s ‘violent interpretation’ of the Turkish 
amendments to the Vienna Note, British public opinion was further inflamed.218 
Head of state diplomacy ensued as Nicholas, in a letter, unsuccessfully 
implored Queen Victoria to disavow her ministers.219 Napoleon wrote a 
misguided note to Nicholas that ended up infuriating the tsar. He argued that 
the massacre at Sinope had been an outrage and a military affront to both France 
and Britain. It was also gratuitous. Now, France and Britain wanted a firm 
understanding. If not, “then France, as well as England, will be compelled to 
leave to the fate of arms and the fortunes of war that which might now be 
decided by reason and justice.”220 Nicholas tartly responded: “Russia will be 
[with France] the same in 1854 as it was in 1812.”221 Finally, Nicholas reminded 
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Franz Joseph of their agreement at Münchengrätz to cooperate against Turkey, 
pitting Christianity against Islam.222 But Austria was the most vulnerable major 
power on the Continent and an Austro-Russian alignment would have been 
disastrous for it. The Balkans would become rife with revolutionary sentiment. 
Field reports were pouring in of revolts brewing in Bulgaria, Serbia, Thessaly, 
and Epirus, fomented, both tacitly and overtly, by Russia. The Swiss and the 
Poles would revolt, but against the Russians.223 Buol advised the Emperor that 
French agitation in Italy would result were an Austro-Russian alliance to be 
formed.224 Thus, Franz Joseph turned down Nicholas.225  
Upon consideration of all this, Nicholas recalled his ambassadors from 
Paris and London in February 1854 and then handed the western ambassadors 
their passports.226 Nicholas did not declare war at this point. At first blush, he 
appeared to employ the insurance premium in conservative fashion by tolerating 
western naval actions. Turkish skirmishing in the Principalities was more an  
annoyance than dangerous to the Russians.227 But, Palmerston was quite wrong 
in believing that the tsar could tolerate the hostile western actions on the Black 
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Sea in his rear at the same time that he was fighting the Turkish army in Asia.228 
Rather, Nicholas had finally reversed preference to use the insurance premium in 
risky fashion by ordering military preparations in anticipation of war against the 
western powers. He had to proceed carefully. Expected support from Austria did 
not materialize. Moreover, Russia did not have the finances to prosecute a long 
war against the western powers, in large part because it relied on British and 
French loans to pay for its military.229  
Britain and France obliged Nicholas by formally declaring war against 
Russia in March of that year. Aberdeen had lost control of his cabinet and 
Palmerston had hijacked British foreign policy. On or near the British declaration 
of war, Palmerston wrote to Russell of his ‘beau ideal’ concerning the peace 
terms to be pressed upon Russia: “Åland and Finland restored to Sweden. Some 
of the German provinces of Russia on the Baltic ceded to Prussia. A substantive 
Kingdom of Poland reestablished as a barrier between Germany and Russia. 
Moldavia and Wallachia and the mouths of the Danube given to Austria. 
Lombardy and Venetia set free from Austrian rule and either made independent 
states or connected with the Sultan as suzerain.”230 Aberdeen bemoaned that “we 
have the plan sketched out for a thirty years’ war.”231 
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Results of the Crimean War. 
The intent of this chapter is to analyze the diplomacy leading to the outbreak of 
the war. But, a number of details regarding the war will aid in assessing the 
plausibility of mutual affective abandonment as being a primary factor. It did not 
matter that, in June 1854, Nicholas volitionally ordered his troops to vacate the 
Principalities and allowed Austria to occupy them as a neutral arbiter for the 
duration of the war. Thus, there was no reason left for the western powers to 
prosecute a war against Russia other than to teach it a lesson, which it did. Since 
the Balkans were now lost as a theater to the western powers, Sebastapol, on the 
Crimean Peninsula in the Black Sea, became the military object of desire, what 
Graham famously referred to as the “eyetooth of the Bear.”232 There, the British 
navy performed poorly while the French army acquitted itself quite well.233 
Aberdeen’s government fell at the end of January 1855 due to the unexpected 
resistance of the Russians at Sebastapol, publicized disease ravaging the troops 
in the Crimea, as well as the incompetence of British military leaders operating in 
that theater of war.234 Although Palmerston came to power as prime minister, he 
did little better. Napoleon sued for peace and Palmerston could only convince 
him to carry on the conflict were they able to realize his ‘beau ideal’. Both sides 
quickly realized that this was infeasible.235 In short, both sides quickly lost their 
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risk acceptance for gain. Palmerston assured Gladstone that “he was not so 
destitute of common sense, so as not to be able to compare ends and means.”236 
Clarendon was closer to the mark when he argued that “a continuation of war 
would hardly have been possible either with or without France.”237 Because of 
their mutual suspicions, France and Britain had gone to war together and now 
they had to quit the war together. Thus, Clarendon continued, “if we had 
continued the war single-handed, France would feel that she had behaved 
shabbily to us, and would therefore have hated us all the more, and become our 
enemy sooner than under any other circumstances.”238 
The Treaty of Paris codified the cessation of hostilities as well as the peace 
terms. Thereafter, Palmerston publicly stated that, while the results, “if not 
spectacular, [were] at least satisfactory for the present.”239 He further opined that, 
“we went to war not so much to keep the Sultan and his Mussulmans in Turkey 
as to keep the Russians out of Turkey.”240 But Bourne argues that the new prime 
minister believed that the war was a mistake after the Turks and Russians came 
to blows, although the latter continued to believe that earlier deterrent measures 
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against the tsar would have been successful.241 In contrast, Aberdeen later 
lamented that the war might have been prevented had he fought harder against 
Russell and Palmerston and not allowed good offers, such as the Vienna Note, or 
the Olmütz proposal, to pass by.242 Nicholas died before the end of the war and 
his son, Alexander II, succeeded him as ruler. Orlov later admitted that a number 
of mistakes were made by Russia. The Menshikov mission, the occupation of the 
Principalities, the disaster at Sinope, and the refusal of the Turkish amendments 
to the Vienna Note, were mistakes cited.243 Alexander’s eagerness for peace, 
coupled with Orlov’s comments, indicate that it was Nicholas’s motivated bias to 
salve his wounded amour-propre, rather than anything peculiarly Russian, or 
geopolitical, that was a significant cause of the war.   
The war was not cheap, either in blood or treasure. Russia lost 100,000-
200,000 troops; France, 100,000; Britain, 23,000; and Turkey, 30,0000, respectively. 
The war cost Britain £76 million. A punitive peace treaty was forced on Russia, 
which Gladstone presciently considered an unwise humiliation.244 Russia lost 
possession of the Principalities, but Austria, much to its anger, did not gain them. 
Russia lost any overarching claims to Christianity in the Ottoman Empire, which 
was now protected by all of the major European powers. Bessarabia went to 
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Moldavia and the Russian navy was forbidden to operate on the Black Sea. 
Finally, Turkey was admitted to the European Concert.245 
Conclusion: the dynamics of mutual conciliatory affective abandonment. 
New information based on the value of the outcome of dissolution of the 
Ottoman Empire or of a major power war over the Eastern Question, or on the 
probability of either of those two outcomes, or on the risks of intervention, 
would suggest that preference reversals could be best explained by a rational 
choice perspective. But, the rational choice perspective primarily fails here 
because the status quo did not materially change when preference reversals were 
made in Britain and Russia, thus leading to the outbreak of the Crimean War.   
Were the Sinope incident to have been a prelude to the dismemberment of the 
Ottoman Empire, it is not unreasonable to argue that the outcome of war would 
indeed have required the other major European powers to defend Turkey against 
Russia. Aberdeen was in favor of continuance of the Ottoman Empire; he just 
thought that its preservation was best assured by a policy of peace than of war.246 
In this, Palmerston agreed with him, but he believed that deterrence short of war 
would achieve this outcome and if deterrence failed, then war would be 
preferable to the dissolution of the Ottoman Empire.247 In contrast, Aberdeen did 
not believe that maintenance of the Ottoman Empire was worth a general war. 
These differences of opinion would only matter from a rational choice 
                                                            
245 Bourne, Foreign Policy of Victorian England 1830-1902, op. cit., pp. 79-80. 
246 Stanmore, Aberdeen Correspondence, 1852-55, op. cit., pp. 235-38. 
247 Stanmore, Aberdeen Correspondence, 1852-55, op. cit., pp. 228-30. 
 249 
perspective were the probability of dissolution significantly raised after the 
Sinope incident. As was demonstrated, given the tsar’s attempts to extricate 
himself from his overextended position after Sinope, an increase in the 
probability of dissolution simply was not there. The risks to intervention did 
increase the probability of major power war; at times Aberdeen worried that 
breaking the Straits Convention would put Britain and France legally in the 
wrong with regard to Russia.248 Retrospectively, Palmerston believed that Britain 
had crossed the Rubicon when the fleets were dispatched.249 But this was 
certainly not Aberdeen’s thinking as he continued to deceive himself that the tsar 
should have no reason to object to the fleet being called to Constantinople in 
defense of British subjects due to Turkish disturbances. Palmerston’s opinion 
correctly marks Aberdeen’s preference reversal. Again, it is not surprising that 
the prime minister was largely unaware that he had made such a change. 
Previously, Aberdeen saw no profit in intervening in the Holy Places dispute. 
But he ultimately allowed his cabinet subordinates to convince him that Britain 
needed to take action against Russia even though the fleet movement 
authorization was taken ostensibly in response to Turkish disturbances. At times, 
Aberdeen recognized that such action was putting Europe on a course towards 
general war. The Turkish disturbances in Constantinople now allowed Aberdeen 
to frame the situation as a loss should Britain not intervene in some manner. The 
loss that he had in mind was the dissolution of his government, not the 
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dissolution of the Ottoman Empire, the latter to which he was, at best, 
indifferent.  
The rational choice perspective is further embarrassed by Russia’s 
vacating the Principalities, thus giving the western powers no reason to go to 
war. Palmerston’s ‘beau ideal’ as an increased value in the worth of a major 
power war in which the western powers won and Russia was defeated was 
clearly not rational given the results that were actually achieved. On paper, 
Russia ended up with a punitive peace, but unless the western powers were to 
permanently station their fleets on the Black Sea (they did not), the terms could 
not be enforced (they were not). Both Britain and France could easily see that the 
price of enforcing the peace in terms of military resources was not sustainable 
even before hostilities erupted. Both fighting and winning the war or fighting 
and losing the war made no rational sense. It was a Pyrrhic victory at best. 
As detailed above, an explanation of the outbreak of the Crimean War 
provided by a combination of prospect theory and mutual motivated biases is 
more persuasive than one provided by rational choice theory. In November 1853, 
Russell encapsulated the problem when he observed to Aberdeen  
“we are now in an anomalous and painful position and although I shall 
admit it to no one but yourself, I have arrived at the conviction that it 
might have been avoided by firmer language, and a more decided course 
five months ago. Russia would then, as she is now, have been ready to 
come to terms, and we should have exercised a control over the Turks that 
is now not to be obtained…You cannot be more adverse to war than I am, 
but if our pacific determination is too securely reckoned upon, we may 
render war inevitable.”250 
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Russell’s understanding of the dynamics involved are spot on, but his 
time frame is off. These dynamics had been building for the past twenty-five 
years, not just the five months that he makes reference to. Both Russia and 
Britain, for different reasons outlined in this chapter, developed motivated biases 
in which they failed to make clear to each other their respective determination to 
protect their interests in the Ottoman Empire. In this they engaged in mutual 
conciliatory affective abandonment. Aberdeen was not eager to collect another 
major power enemy in Russia at a time when Britain had fractious relations with 
both France and the United States. This strategic situation predisposed the prime 
minister towards a conciliatory response to Russian diplomatic and military 
aggressiveness. In turn, Nicholas tried to make his dominance of the Ottoman 
Empire as inoffensive as possible to Britain and Austria in order to isolate France. 
One effect of this conciliatory stance was ultimately to inculcate an aggressive 
notion of opportunism on the parts of France, and later, Britain, respectively, in 
the Levant. Napoleon had motivated biases to prevail in the Levant, but they 
were not immutable and he likely would have been dissuaded had Aberdeen 
used Britain’s inherent leverage in any prospective Anglo-French alignment to 
better effect. Additional incidents, such as the Russian and Austrian demand for 
Hungarian revolutionaries, the Don Pacifico incident, and the Leiningen mission, 
were opportunities for all of the major powers to reckon on the true nature of 
their triadic relations. But, all three major powers failed to object to each other’s 
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aggressive posturing sufficiently during these incidents and sufficiently early 
during the Holy Places crisis diplomacy when doing so would likely have 
provided appropriate deterrent effects. Worse, wrong conclusions were drawn 
by the aggressive parties. Instead of feeling that they had been lucky to have 
prevailed in a particular instance, thus promoting caution in the future, 
unpunished aggression merely bolstered in the minds of the relevant statesmen 
the rectitude of their actions. Thus, having failed to check French opportunism in 
the Holy Places, Britain allowed Russia the opportunity to be humiliated and an 
imperious, proud Russian autocrat to take an overextended position due to his 
wounded amour-propre. Turkey might have been controlled early, but too many 
humiliations were inflicted with the Menshikov mission in response to French 
opportunism. In this regard, the tsar engaged in a weak version of defensive 
avoidance due to his belief held that he had a free hand to deal with Turkey as he 
saw fit. 
Once one gets this far into a crisis, coupled with the motivated biases that 
had been allowed to germinate over a number of years, it is difficult to argue that 
Palmerston’s aggressive deterrent stance would have prevented war. British and 
French fleet movements served only to anger the tsar at the same time that they 
emboldened the Sultan and excited British, and to a lesser degree, French, 
publics, respectively. This is why deterrent measures tend to exacerbate the 
situation when the systemic dynamic is characterized by conciliatory affective 
abandonment.  Rather, staunchly refusing assistance to Turkey in order to make 
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it back down, and if that failed, diplomatically circumscribing any Russian 
military victory, would surely have prevented a major power war. Even so, war 
was still not a foregone conclusion because serious concessions made by the tsar 
through the Olmütz proposal surely would have maintained the relative peace. 
Thus, this dispute of the moment over the Holy Places would have been 
remembered as little more than that, rather than a major power war that nobody 
wanted, but refused to avoid.        
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Chapter 4: Mutual aggressive affective abandonment: The 1859 War of Italian 
Unification. 
 
This chapter examines the systemic phenomenon of affective abandonment from 
an aggressive standpoint in which the major parties to a conflict have motivated 
biases to precipitate a war. France, with the abetment of Russia, colluded with 
Sardinia to provoke a war against Austria in to order force the latter out of Italy. 
Austria, in turn, had motivated biases to fight that war and largely obliged 
France and Sardinia by attacking first. Of critical importance to this conflict is the 
imbalanced nature of the European system after the conclusion of the Crimean 
War. A number of the major powers were isolated, some by choice, others by 
circumstance. Such isolation allowed France and Sardinia the opportunity to 
provoke a war of aggression against Austria despite the fact that Austria had all 
of the treaty rights in its favor. Because the Italian war of 1859 was clearly the 
result of opportunism on the parts of France, Sardinia, and Austria, the 
remaining European powers maintained their preferences for risk aversion in 
counterintuitive fashion. They did this by bidding up their demands for 
concessions in exchange for assistance to the point that the major combatants 
preferred to end the conflict and to settle for much less in the way of gains than 
they had originally contemplated as the incentive for going to war. Thus, 
aggressors eventually were deterred, not by threats of intervention, but by the 
failure of intervention sufficiently to break a stalemate on the part of states that 
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demanded too much compensation for their efforts.1 That Italy was the clear 
winner was not foreordained; this was largely the result of the other major 
powers failing to make the necessary concessions to each other that might have 
obviated this outcome. 
Secret diplomacy and the Franco-Austrian war of 1859 ultimately resulting in the 
unification of Italy. 
 
The Franco-Austrian War is a limiting example of pure aggression; thus it should 
be a most likely case study in favor of an expected utility explanation for the war. 
Conversely, the case study should be a least likely example for a prospect theory 
explanation; risk aversion should not feature as the controlling dynamic in the 
resurrection of a unified Italy. Taylor perhaps exaggerates when he argues that 
the 1859 Italian war is the only example of a major power war being fought for 
purely aggressive reasons. According to the historian,  
“even aggressive wars have usually an element of prevention. Napoleon I 
had some grounds for feeling that Alexander I was preparing to attack 
him when he invaded Russia in 1812; the Germans had some grounds for 
feeling ‘encircled’ when they launched both the First and Second World 
wars in the twentieth century; even Bismarck could plausibly, and 
perhaps convincingly, claim that he was merely getting his blow in first 
against both Austria and France. In 1859 neither France, nor even Sardinia, 
had any ground whatever for fearing an attack from Austria; and they 
could not have attacked her, unless she had given them the occasion. Both 
sides mobilized, not from fear, but to force the other side into war.”2 
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 The motivated biases toward war will be process-traced shortly, but, as 
noted, the other crucial dynamic is the imbalanced nature of the international 
system during this period in which the major powers suffered severe alliance 
handicaps with each other. An alliance handicap is usually construed to mean 
that a state, for non-systemic reasons, sometimes ideological, sometimes 
idiosyncratic, refuses to ally with another state in order to cooperate in warding 
off a threat from a third state. Less imagined is an alliance handicap in which one 
state refuses to break with a second aggressive state, both at the expense of the 
interests of a third state, and to the state itself, respectively. Italy could not have 
been made by its own exertions; it required that Prussia refuse to ally with 
Austria, and Russia refuse to break with France, even as both Prussia and Russia 
took a dim view of the fast-spreading revolutionary war taking place on the 
Italian peninsula. Both the motivated biases on the parts of the major powers and 
the imbalanced configuration of the European Continental system mutually 
reinforced each other; thus neither independent variable is causally prior to the 
other. With these preliminary comments in mind, I now turn to the motivations 
for the war. 
 At the Paris conference of 1856 terminating the Crimean War, Austria 
extended its perfidy towards Russia by demanding that the latter lose Bessarabia 
to Moldavia as well as lose its right to operate a navy on the Black Sea. 
Gorchakov, the new Russian foreign minister who succeeded Nesselrode, 
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famously stated that “Russia is not sulking; she is silently biding her time.”3 
While Alexander II longed to overturn the terms of the Paris conference, he knew 
that Russia was militarily too weak to do so. It was important to concentrate on 
domestic imperatives and to disengage from an activist foreign policy until the 
bases of national power could be rebuilt.4 What this meant was that Russia 
would not provide troops for aggressive foreign policy adventures, but this did 
not preclude Russia from cutting a deal with another revisionist state by offering 
benevolent neutrality in exchange for aid in overturning the Paris conference 
terms of 1856. Thus, Russia informally isolated itself from being a supporter of 
the status quo in Europe to being a revisionist on the cheap.5    
 Napoleon III longed to undo the terms of the 1815 Vienna conference that,  
in part, gave Italy to Austria. Nevertheless, the temporal power of the Pope in 
Rome was maintained by the strength of French troops. Napoleon aimed to rid 
himself of this situation but he had to walk a fine line between the Catholic 
clerics and the Ultramontanes in France that supported the Pope, on the one 
hand, and French public opinion that despised the autocracy of the Holy See, on 
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gain an ally for its opportunism, but passes over the Franco-Russian connection.  
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the other hand. Napoleon was an adventurer who talked himself into believing 
that the natural frontiers of France might be restored by taking Nice and Savoy 
from Austria. Further, he thought that the rest of the terms of the Vienna 
conference would crumble by the consequent unification of Italy by war but 
without the necessity of another major power war. Walewski, his conservative 
foreign minister, thought otherwise. Consequently, in January 1858 Napoleon 
circumvented his own diplomat and secretly wrote the tsar as to the possibility 
of a joint revisionist adventure expressing hope that “a great chance might occur 
in which they could march side by side.”6 
 Domestic politics was the driving force behind Napoleon’s impulse. His 
arrival to power through coup d’etat and the consequent autocratic nature of his 
rule was the price to pay for a return to economic prosperity in France.7 In 1857, 
an economic crisis threatened the stability of the Second Empire and the 
emperor’s raison d’etre was being called into question. Opponents of the costs of 
empire challenged Napoleon’s leadership. In order to combat this issue the 
emperor believed that achieving a striking success in foreign policy could restore 
his reputation with the French people.8 Yet, it is not clear that the French had 
failed to renormalize for the territorial losses inflicted by the 1815 Vienna 
conference. Walewski believed that the time for a revision of the Vienna treaty 
was not ripe and that the French people would interpret participation in a war in 
                                                            
6 Cited in Taylor, The Struggle for Mastery in Europe 1848-1918, op. cit., p. 101.  
7 Roger Price, The French Second Empire: An Anatomy of Political Power 
(Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2001), Chapter 7. 
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Italy as “an adventure and a disruption of the general peace for personal 
interest.”9 
 The catalyst for action by Napoleon was the assassination attempt on his 
life by the Italian patriot and terrorist Orsini. Relations with Britain were strained 
as it became evident that Orsini hatched his plot in London. A demand by 
Napoleon that London clamp down on revolutionary activity met with a 
populist retort that Britain would not be dictated to by a foreign power. 
Palmerston's government fell when he attempted to assuage the emperor and it  
was replaced by a mediocre Tory government. A state visit to Paris by Queen 
Victoria and the Consort failed to mend relations as Napoleon shocked them 
with a military display of his new steam-powered navy. Invasion war scares 
ensued in Britain producing the Volunteer Panic of 1859-60. 
 Napoleon’s first impulse was to side with Austria against Italian 
revolutionary activity despite his belief that Austria was the last state with whom 
he would ally. This was a fleeting preference; the emperor strangely considered 
Orsini a hero, thought of pardoning him, and had the assassin’s appeal on the 
scaffold for French intervention to free Italy published. Then the Sardinian king 
Victor Emanuel’s prime minister, Cavour, outbid Austria and offered to 
Napoleon an Italian war of unification against Austria, as well as a dynastic 
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1869 (Paris, 1954) [unpublished thesis], p. 544. Cited in G.J. Thurston, “The Italian 
War of 1859 and the Reorientation of Russian Foreign Policy,” The Historical 
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marriage of the king’s daughter to the emperor’s reprobate cousin prince 
Napoleon (Plon Plon).10 Victor Emanuel made a famous speech that inflamed 
Austrian sensibilities when he declared a ‘cry of anguish’ by the Italians against 
the despotism of the Austrians and their inevitable march toward freedom. 
Napoleon and Cavour met at Plombières in July 1858 to concoct the secret 
plan for a war of aggression against Austria. France would receive Savoy and 
Nice as compensation for helping Sardinia defeat Austria and setting up a 
kingdom of Upper Italy from the ‘Adriatic to the Alps’. Italy would become a 
federation of four states under the presidency of the Pope!the kingdom of 
Upper Italy or Piedmont augmented by Lombardy-Venetia; Parma and Modena; 
the kingdom of Etruria composed of Tuscany and most of the Papal states; a 
kingdom of Naples. Papal Rome would be reduced to the patrimony of St. 
Peter.11 That Napoleon and Cavour had motivated biases to precipitate a war 
against Austria but to make the latter appear as the aggressor is found in the 
                                                            
10 The kingdom of Sardinia is also alternatively referred to in histories as 
Sardinia-Piedmont or Piedmont-Sardinia. Sardinia, Piedmont, Savoy, Nice, and 
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Piedmont, respectively, throughout the narrative where appropriate because 
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the interests of both states are related through Emanuel’s rule.     
11 Count Camillo Cavour, Luigi Chiala, ed., Lettere Inedite, vol. 3, nos. 1-14 
(Turin: Roux ec., 1887). Cited in Robert W. Seton-Watson, Britain in Europe, 
1789-1914: A Survey of Foreign Policy (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 
1955), p. 381.  
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count’s cynical report to Emanuel that “this search for a cause of war [is] so 
difficult to find.”12 
At Napoleon’s direction Plon Plon met with Alexander at Warsaw and 
sounded him on a Franco-Russian entente. Gorchakov records that Alexander 
responded by stating that “Russia had wisely retired from the role of 
Agamemnon, and the habit of letting herself be exploited to the detriment of her 
own proper interests.”13 As Thurston argues, this was a clear break from the 
conservative status quo supporting diplomacy of Nicholas I. The key here is that 
Alexander was not necessarily being risk acceptant for gain; rather, the new tsar 
was “responding objectively to a different world that he had no part in shaping. 
And the salient characteristic of that world was its unkindness to those who 
neglected opportunities.”14 
Plon Plon later met with Kiselev, the Russian ambassador in Paris, and the 
subject of a war in Italy was discussed. Plon Plon inquired as to the degree to 
which France could count on Russian support. Although the tsar was not 
interested in declaring a war should a crisis erupt in Italy, Kiselev nevertheless 
assured prince Napoleon of Russia’s cooperation with France. Plon Plon’s aide, 
La Roncière Le Noury, was dispatched to St. Petersburg where he offered the tsar 
                                                            
12 Count Camillo Cavour, Luigi Chiala, ed., Lettere Inedite, ibid. Cited in Seton-
Watson, Britain in Europe, 1789-1914: A Survey of Foreign Policy, ibid., p. 381. 
13 Gorchakov correspondence, Württembergisches Hauptstaatsarchiv, Stuttgart, 
G 2-8, Hausarchiv, Abteilung cccxiv, Büschel no. 7, October 12, 1858. Cited in 
Thurston, “The Italian War of 1859 and the Reorientation of Russian Foreign 
Policy,” op. cit., p. 127. 
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the drafts of two secret treaties. The first specified the conduct of both states at 
the outset of a war in Italy. Russia should agree to benevolent neutrality, but 
station sufficient troops on the Galician border in order to neutralize 150,000 
Austrian troops, keep her Mediterranean force anchored in La Spezia and 
Toulon, exchange military missions with France, and deter Prussia from 
aggression against France. France would undertake a similar deterrent threat 
towards Britain on behalf of Russia. The second treaty specified that Russia 
would allow France to take Savoy and Nice, increase Emanuel’s domains by ten 
million inhabitants and refrain from opposing independence for Hungary. In 
turn, Russia would receive France’s support for an abrogation of the Black Sea 
clauses in a conference to be convened after the conclusion of the Italian war.15 
Alexander wanted a single treaty and he would provide the military 
demonstration of support provided that he could be “certain that France for her 
part will consider her guarantee of Article Two of the Treaty of Paris as abolished 
and will work actively to get [the Black Sea clauses] annulled.”16 The tsar later 
added that he did not care to sever relations with Austria; rather, he would deter 
Prussia from aiding Austria by using the tactic that Austria employed towards 
Russia during the Crimean War, i.e., by deploying an observation corps of 70,000 
                                                                                                                                                                                 
14 Thurston, “The Italian War of 1859 and the Reorientation of Russian Foreign 
Policy,” op. cit., p. 144. 
15 B.H. Summer, “The Secret Franco-Russian Treaty of 3 March 1859,” The 
English Historical Review, vol. 48, no. 189 (January 1933), p. 72. 
16 Gorchakov correspondence to prince Napoleon, M.A.E. Memoires et 
Documents, Russie, vol. xlv, November 15, 1858. Cited in Thurston, “The Italian 
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troops on the Austrian border. Finally, Russia had no desire to be rewarded with 
more territory.17 
The Panslavist, Nikolaevich, the tsar’s younger brother, met with 
Napoleon in Paris where the emperor outlined a scenario in which “Russia 
arouses the slavs against Austria and is compensated with Galicia and revision of 
the Treaty of Paris.”18 What is interesting here is the moderated offer of a single 
treaty by France and Walewski’s discovery and reaction towards the secret 
negotiations. Specifically, Walewski believed that France had been bested by 
Russia due to Plon Plon’s diplomatic incompetence: “[France] had been duped 
by the Russians into a promise of benevolent neutrality and the assembly of an 
army corps whose destination is at least problematical since [Alexander] does 
not even want to break diplomatic relations with Austria.”19 
Napoleon failed to accept Walewski’s resignation, fired Plon Plon, and  
put the foreign minister in charge of negotiations with Russia. Formerly, 
Walewski had no interest in a joint war with Russia in Italy. Although he could 
not disabuse Napoleon of this adventure, the French foreign minister was 
determined to make it more respectable. Although he had to indulge his 
                                                            
17 Gorchakov correspondence to prince Napoleon, op. cit. Cited in Thurston, 
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superior, Walewski did so by making the terms unattractive to Russia, thus 
inducing a measure of risk aversion on the part of both parties. Walewski’s 
anticipated negative regret is revealed in the manner in which he now demanded 
a preposterous treaty with Russia. Specifically, he demanded of Kiselev the size 
and the condition of the observation corps to be put on the Austrian border. 
Walewski justified this demand to Napoleon by observing that “the Russians are 
known for cheating at play; they do not think it dishonourable to do so. They 
behave in this way in all their transactions. Business is for them a game to be 
won by fair means or foul.”20 Discussions between France and Russia regarding 
the Italian campaign cooled considerably, which suited Walewski perfectly. 
Taylor draws quite a different conclusion from the French foreign 
minister’s diplomacy:  
“Walewski offered the Russians a vague hope of treaty revision at some 
point in the future in exchange for their benevolent neutrality in the 
coming war. Alexander II and Gorchakov knew that they were being 
tricked; and Gorchakov would have liked to break off. Alexander, 
however, was obsessed with the treaty of Paris and recognized that war in 
Italy was the essential first step towards its revision; he therefore fell back 
on the usual manoeuvre of those who are at a loss in diplomacy and relied 
on a scamp’s good faith. He wrote to Kiselev in Paris: ‘I believe that 
Napoleon will do what he has promised; i.e., to annul the treaty of Paris, 
which is a perpetual nightmare to me.’”21 
 
                                                            
20 Chalamon de Bernardy, Un fils de Napoleon: Le Compte Walewski, 1810-1869, 
op. cit., p. 833. Cited in Thurston, “The Italian War of 1859 and the Reorientation 
of Russian Foreign Policy,” op. cit., p. 130. 
21 Taylor, The Struggle for Mastery in Europe 1848-1918, op. cit., p. 106. 
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As Thurston argues, Taylor’s diplomatic account is oversimplified so as to 
heighten the dramatic possibilities of the narrative.22 Rather, Alexander, unlike 
his father, gave much more leeway to his impressive diplomats to craft an 
agreement with France, even though the tsar ultimately made the final decision. 
Even though Kiselev and Gorchakov both wanted a Franco-Russian entente, the 
Russian ambassador was much more circumspect about abetting France in 
Austria whereas the foreign minister welcomed the war as a means to taking 
Europe’s mind off the Near East. Gorchakov was a more seasoned diplomat than 
was Kiselev; he was also more risk acceptant for gain. But he tempered this 
predilection by offering the French very little in the way of support other than 
benevolent neutrality which was relatively costless and might actually bring 
benefits through the annulment of the Black Sea clauses. In contrast, Kiselev 
believed that war could not stay limited; he also believed that a revision of the 
Black Sea clauses could not take place without a general war.23   
Napoleon continued to call the tune and was the driving force behind the 
aggressive diplomacy. The French press was given free rein to insult the 
Austrians and the possibility of war was perhaps one of the worst kept secrets by 
November 1858. The Moniteur published tirades against Papal misgovernment 
and La Presse, opined “we do not love war, and hope that it will some day 
disappear from the surface of Europe, we should nonetheless like to see one war, 
                                                            
22 Thurston, “The Italian War of 1859 and the Reorientation of Russian Foreign 
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and that one directed against Austria.”24 Moreover, Napoleon deliberately 
insulted Hübner, the Austrian ambassador in Paris at a New Year’s Day 
reception in which the emperor publicly lamented the fact that relations between 
both countries had deteriorated. Hübner misunderstood Napoleon’s motivated 
bias to precipitate a war with Austria choosing instead to believe that the 
propertied classes and the clerics in France would not allow it. Moreover, the 
Austrian ambassador failed to conceive that Napoleon had in mind a limited war 
and was enlisting other states to hold the ring for him. Kiselev hosted a dinner 
later that month to celebrate the decision by Russia to support France and 
Sardinia in Austria with benevolent neutrality. Instead, Hübner mistook the 
festivities as an attempt to put a good face  on a deteriorating Franco-Russian 
relationship: “The Russians are beginning to understand that their flirtations 
with France are coming to naught. This comedy has had its day, and Kiselev was 
wrong to use such means to try to maintain the illusion.”25 
The secret treaty, signed at the beginning of March 1859, gave Napoleon 
less than Walewski had demanded of Gorchakov. While Russia would maintain 
benevolent neutrality while France took Savoy (Nice was excluded), nothing was 
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mentioned of a Russian military demonstration on the Austrian border. A peace 
conference at the conclusion of the war would address alterations of both the 
Vienna and Paris treaties to the satisfaction of both parties.26 
In Bismarck’s phrase, Britain made ‘à trois’ in Europe out of five great 
powers with France and Russia. If Russia merely promised not to interfere with 
France in Austria, British public opinion espoused ‘Italy for Italians’, but not 
much more. This largely left Austria isolated and Prussia had its own reasons not 
to come to her aid (more of this later).27 The conclusion of the Crimean War left a 
sour mood in Britain and, while not isolationist, the British now expressed only 
moral disapproval of unprovoked aggression instead of holding the fabled 
balance by leaguing with a victim state against an aggressor. A series of Tory and 
Liberal governments came and went during this period and were largely 
indistinguishable from each other in foreign policy outlook because both were 
suffused with Peelites and Cobdenites who were essentially non-interventionist. 
Both the court openly, and the Tories secretly, supported the Austrians, but both 
knew that British public opinion would not actively support maintaining Austria 
in Italy. Despite this latter sentiment, even Palmerston, who was predisposed to 
an alignment with France, had to publicly argue in February 1859 that “no Power 
                                                            
26 Summer, “The Secret Franco-Russian Treaty of 3 March 1859,” op. cit., p. 72. 
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could violate the settlement of 1815 by attempting, without reason or cause, to 
dispossess Austria of what that treaty gave her. [Alluding to an Austro- French 
war over the possession of Lombardy, Palmerston stated that] this would be to 
involve Europe in calamities…for a cause which, however in the abstract 
desirable, would by no means justify such a war.”28 He stated this because Queen 
Victoria was so strongly non-interventionist to the point that Russell, then 
foreign secretary, complained that “to leave France to settle with Austria the 
future condition of Italy would be to withdraw voluntarily from the first rank 
among the Powers of Europe.”29  
Napoleon opened the Legislature with the words ‘L’Empire, c’est la paix,’ 
but his speech was not reassuring on this score. Moreover, the government-
inspired pamphlet L’Empire et Italie repeatedly denounced Austria’s 
stranglehold on the minor states of the Italian peninsula. Cowley, the British 
ambassador in Paris, asked Napoleon to state frankly whether he was for peace 
or war. The emperor stated that he was for peace, but unafraid of war, and that 
he feared it to be inevitable in this instance. Napoleon then asked why Britain 
did not ally with France since it hated Austria’s presence in Italy as well. Cowley 
answered: “if [the emperor] attempted without reason any scheme so iniquitous, 
he would have both the moral and material efforts of England arrayed against 
                                                            
28 Hansard’s Parliamentary Debates, 3rd series, vol. clii, pp. 89-90. 
29 Lord John Russell, George P. Gooch, ed., Later Correspondence of Lord John 
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him…[France could best] help Italy by pacific means rather than by drawing the 
sword.”30  
Speaking in the House of Lords, Malmesbury, the foreign secretary, was 
hardly more effective, arguing on the one hand of his sympathies for the 
Austrians, who are of similar Teutonic origin but with a despotic government, 
and on the other hand of his sympathies for the Sardinians, who are of not the 
same race or descent as Britons, but who aspire to democratic government.31  
Seton-Watson notes that such contradictory sentiments conveyed a sense of 
weakness and hesitancy abroad; it incensed Vienna but encouraged Turin, 
precisely the opposite intent of the British foreign secretary.32  
Thus, Britain was predisposed to mediate but not to punish an actual 
aggressor to the peace. At Malmesbury’s instruction, Cowley’s plan was to 
neutralize Piedmont. Austria, in turn, would renounce her rights of interference 
in the Italian central states. Clarendon, speaking in the House of Lords, was more 
clear-eyed than was Malmesbury concerning this dismal prospect for peace: 
“That one despotic Power has proposed to another despotic Power that by means 
of a Congress a third despotic Power should pave the way for liberal institutions 
in Italy.”33 Not surprisingly, Piedmont vetoed Cowley’s peace plan. Cavour 
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knew that mediation would ruin his patient efforts over years to goad Austria 
into war without exposing Italian complicity to bring about this event. Cavour 
was offered British attempts to achieve liberal reforms in other parts of Italy 
(Piedmont was unquestionably liberal whereas the rest of Italy was authoritarian 
and resigned, if not pleased, to remain so). It was explained to Hudson, the 
British ambassador in Turin, that Italy did not require more liberalism, but rather 
national independence even if liberal reforms were a casualty and a military 
dictatorship was installed.34  
Austria pretended to accede to the British plan to put itself in a good 
diplomatic light, but it secretly instructed the Italian states not to ask for a 
renunciation of their treaties with the former.35 Russia wanted France to appear 
reasonable as well. Thus Kiselev petitioned Napoleon to propose a conference 
himself which would improve the emperor’s popularity at home as well as 
mitigate German mistrust of French intentions.36 Napoleon acceded to the 
conference proposal as a means toward driving Austria into war. Russia, in turn, 
hoped to use the conference as a means to keep the war limited. Prussia was the 
driving factor and Russia did not want to have to choose between its entente 
with France and having to fight Prussia should it attack France. Russia’s long-
term goal was to split France from Britain in order to effect a revision of the Black 
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Sea clauses. For Prussia, Italy was of minor importance; it had its design on 
Schleswig-Holstein and it needed British help to procure it. Thus, Prussia was 
not willing to oppose Britain by allying with Russia. The Prussian position 
would soon become a good deal more complicated than this. But for now, 
neutrality suited Britain, Russia, and Prussia and the peace conference was a 
means to achieving this. 
All of the combatants did their best to sabotage the peace conference. Plon 
Plon invited Cavour to restate his case to Napoleon for war in Italy. Again, 
Walewski threatened to resign should a conservative foreign policy not be 
followed. Although Napoleon appeared to give in to him, ultimately he sided 
with Cavour by promising that France would not abandon her allies.37 
Buol, the Austrian foreign minister, demanded that Sardinia disarm 
immediately and unconditionally. He knew full well that the Austrians would be 
forced to make concessions at the conference without a shot having been fired. 
The disarmament demand was intended to convey to the conference the 
aggressive nature of the Italians. Cavour was pressed by Napoleon to disarm 
immediately, but the Italian prime minister demanded a seat at the conference 
table as his reward for doing so. Buol then blundered by holding to the 
unconditional nature of his demands. As Taylor correctly notes, Austria was 
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determined to deter Italy, not with French persuasions or British promises for the 
future, but by Austrian threats.38 
This was an egregious mistake on the part of Buol for it left Austria 
completely isolated in Europe. Sardinian obstreperousness had put Austria in a 
better light with Britain and Prussia. But Austria’s motivated bias to punish 
Italian revolutionary activity caused it to overreach. It wrongly believed that 
British and Prussian sympathy for Austria would continue regardless of whether 
it remained restrained or not. One could argue that the Austrians suffered from a 
cognitive bias in believing that its failure to fight in this instance would lead to 
dismal results similar to those experienced when it failed to fight during the 
Crimean War. But such bias would have been corrected by taking the time to 
ascertain the Italo-French response. Both the latter were losing diplomatic 
ground and were weakening because Sardinia did not even have the excuse of 
suppressing populist uprisings in Lombardy and Venetia as it did in 1848. But 
Austria had no intention of even meeting Sardinia halfway by admitting it to the 
conference. Thus, Malmesbury reported to Cowley that Buol was told that a war 
would soon assume a revolutionary character and that, while Britain would 
remain neutral, public opinion would actively sympathize with the Italian 
nationalists. Buol, Malmesbury continued, “has received our counsels of 
prudence with nearly equal sulkiness, and I think the best attitude for us now is 
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to fold our arms like men who have advised madmen in vain to refrain from 
mutual follies…and leave them with sorrow to their fate.”39 
Cavour rejected the unconditional nature of Buol’s demands. Malmesbury 
made one last plea for peace by urging the foreign minister to delay an Austrian 
attack on Piedmont, again reiterating that Austria would find itself completely 
isolated. Buol retorted, “perhaps, but we are fighting against Revolution and for 
European order.”40 Austrian forces marched into Sardinia on April 29, 1859, thus 
opening the war. Cavour was at the point of despair when Napoleon rescued 
him with the proclamation that either Austria must rule up to the Alps or “Italy 
must be free from the Alps to the Adriatic.”41 Walewski telegraphed Cavour 
promising full military support. French forces traversed the Alps and landed at 
Genoa. On the battlefield the Austrians were both unprepared and incompetent. 
On June 4, the Austrians were defeated at Magenta and routed from the plains of 
Lombardy. Victor Emanuel and Napoleon jointly entered Milan on June 8. On 
June 24, the Austrians were defeated at Solferino as they attempted to break out 
of the fortresses of the Quadrilateral. A revolutionary conflagration instigated by 
Cavour drove the grand duke from Tuscany and the dukes, from Parma, and 
Modena, respectively. Both the Pope and the King of Naples, the latter a hated 
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Bourbon supported by Russia, knew that they were next in line to be 
overthrown.  
Buol mistakenly believed that Britain and Prussia would provide Austria 
with support should Napoleon side with Sardinia. Until late he retained the 
motivated bias to believe that Napoleon would compel Sardinia to submit.42 
None of this occurred and the noncombatant powers agreed to keep the war 
limited. Cowley conveyed to Malmesbury, Kiselev’s suggestion for mutual 
neutrality: “[Kiselev] sees no harm in Austria and France cutting each other’s 
throats and weakening themselves reciprocally.”43 This comment was a manner 
of indicating that the price for intervention on the part of the noncombatant 
powers had increased considerably, in particular for Prussia, as will be discussed 
shortly.  
Kiselev’s comment is also the key to understanding the mutually 
reinforcing dynamics of systemic imbalance and the motivated biases to make 
gains. A number of dynamics peculiar to the case at hand operated, as will be 
briefly summarized. First, Austria was roundly hated in Europe and a number of 
the major powers failed to reckon that a stable Austria was still important for 
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avoiding systemic war in Europe.44 Schleinitz, the Prussian foreign minister, only 
belatedly realized that Russia should not allow Austria to be utterly overthrown 
in Italy. He had reason to be concerned. Openly breaking with Austria would 
likely cause the small German states in the south to rally to Austria’s side, thus 
isolating Prussia in Germany.45 Moreover, revolutionary activity in Italy could 
easily spread to Hungary, and then Poland, the latter of which would seriously 
concern Russia.46 The second factor is the relative unimportance of Italy to the 
rest of Europe. As Taylor notes, Italy from a diplomatic perspective, counted for 
more presently than she would later on. Still, she did not count for much and this 
was likely the reason that Napoleon made a play there for restoring French 
prestige in Europe. At this early date, a trial of strength on the Rhine was beyond 
French power and for France to engage itself in the Mediterranean rather than in 
central Europe was a confession of its weakness. Moreover, Austria was isolated 
whereas Prussia was not and had many suitors for its friendship.47 Finally, 
Italian independence was largely supported throughout Europe with the caveat 
that a revolutionary contagion not take hold. Emanuel and Cavour were political 
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impressarios, having gained the gratitude of France and Britain during the 
Crimean War by dispatching 15,000 Sardinian troops in timely fashion to aid in 
the fall of Sebastapol. That Sardinia was given a seat at the Paris peace congress 
and the subject of Italian independence handsomely raised by Clarendon, the 
British representative, though ultimately tabled for the time, spoke well of Italian 
feeling throughout Europe.48 Thus, a number of the major powers were happy 
about their preferences for Italian independence (they would have liked to take 
pieces for themselves), but were quite ambivalent about Italian unification per se. 
Russia had ulterior reasons for dispossessing Austria of Italy on the one hand, 
but it greeted unification with loud disapprobation on the other hand.49 
Napoleon’s eventual preference reflected Europe’s ambivalent nature concerning 
the Italian war. According to Valsecchi,  
“when put to the test, Napoleonic policy revealed all its contradictions 
and ambiguities. The French emperor could not and would not approve 
the ever-increasing expansion of the Italian national movement, by giving 
it his support. The unification of Italy was neither in his interest nor in his 
plans. But he could not, nor did he wish to, oppose the liberation 
movement as an enemy, having himself set the movement in motion, and 
he could not repudiate the costly and glorious heritage of Magenta and 
Solferino.”50  
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Victoria was fearful for Britain as well: “[Napoleon] sees…only what he wishes. 
If he made war in Italy it would in all probability lead to war with Germany and 
if north Germany will embrace Belgium and if so it must according to our 
guarantees drive us into the quarrel. France must thus have the whole of Europe 
against her as in 1814 and 15.”51 
The Queen’s comment here is theoretically relevant because her strictly 
non-interventionist stance is quite at odds with it. This is an extreme example of 
a motivated bias to hope that Europe would combine to deter unprovoked 
aggression but not to take any individual action to bring about the desired 
outcome. Theoretically, balanced systems can at least provide an organized 
counterpoise to those with motivated biases to conduct aggression. Such 
formidable opposition should at least give aggressors some reason for pause. But 
imbalanced systems can reinforce the motivated biases to precipitate aggression 
when status quo states recognize that opposition is necessary but offer little more 
than moral hectoring as a response.       
To return to the immediate dynamics of diplomacy, Napoleon wanted to 
keep Prussia neutralized by offering it a guarantee against poaching on German 
federal territories. Alexander offered to underwrite this offer.52 The French 
emperor was prepared to offer a good deal more to sweeten the deal. The 
resurrection of France’s natural frontiers was never far from his mind. In 
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exchange for Prussian concessions on the left bank of the Rhine, Napoleon would 
approve an extension of Prussian territory in North Germany at the expense of 
both France and Austria. Such an exchange of territories would promote 
Prussian supremacy in Germany.53 The French emperor expressed this interest 
on a number of occasions to Wilhelm, the prince regent of Prussia, who 
succeeded Frederick William IV in 1858 after the latter became physically 
incapacitated. The German king had looked favorably on a Prusso-Franco-
Russian relationship in order to punish Austria for its perfidy during the 
Crimean War. Unfortunately for Napoleon, the prince regent was inclined in an 
opposite direction with a liberal alliance with Britain and Austria even though 
the latter was governed despotically. The German liberals were also nationalistic 
and this stance favored solidarity with kindred Austria.  
Worse, France would have to proceed in Italy largely at its own risk. It 
had to mind its friends as well as its enemies. Russia provided France with only 
benevolent neutrality. Nikolaevich was forced from the diplomatic scene because 
his preference for active Russian participation with the French in a war in Italy 
was seen as being wildly impractical by Alexander.54 This is perhaps the best 
evidence that a prospect approach to risk trumps an expected utility explanation. 
If we are to believe Taylor’s dramatic account, Russia could be considered 
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contingently risk acceptant for gain. He asserts that if Prussia attacked France, 
Russia would not defend it. Rather, Russia would attack Austria, thus effecting a 
revision of the Black Sea clauses without allowing France a revision of the 
Vienna treaty.55 Napoleon was not attuned to this double game on the part of the 
Russians. Alexander, through Gorchakov, would weakly attempt to deter Prussia 
from intervening through diplomatic cajolery, though he would not inform 
France of this for fear of emboldening Napoleon into conducting the Italian war 
in a revolutionary manner.56 
The last part of the account is true but it is difficult to substantiate the 
earlier assertion because Prussia did not attack France and no documentary 
evidence is adduced by Taylor to indicate that Russia intended to sell France out 
in this manner. Rather, Napoleon would have been happy for Russia to attack 
Austria in the event that Prussia attacked France and he was disappointed to find 
that Gorchakov demurred when the hypothetical question was posed.57 Once the 
hostilities began, Kiselev revealed his anticipated negative regret by reversing 
preference and lobbying for aiding France to the fullest extent. This did not 
please Gorchakov, who continued to call the foreign policy tune, because such 
open expression of Russian support was likely to embolden France, thus obliging 
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Prussia to intervene. Gorchakov instructed the French ministers and the press to 
refrain from abusing the term ‘nationality’ because it allowed Napoleon’s  
detractors to accuse him of following a revolutionary course of action.58 Thus, in 
this more accurate diplomatic account, Russia was being contingently risk 
acceptant for gain, but not in the manner that Taylor envisages. Recalling 
Thurston’s earlier comment regarding Alexander, the tsar could not afford to 
pass up the opportunity to make gains in the Near East as a consequence of 
limited war in Italy. But he would not precipitate a general war, either by 
goading Prussia into action, or by fighting against Prussia and/or Austria, 
respectively, in order to effect a mere revision of the Black Sea clauses.    
The Ballplatz in Vienna was quite alarmed at France’s entreaties toward 
Prussia because it was convinced that France had in mind to separate Prussia 
and Austria thereby bringing about the conquest of Venetia by Italy. According 
to Werther, the Prussian ambassador to Paris: “at this prospect [Vienna felt] the 
French emperor would not be opposed to a strong and united Italy, which would 
completely paralyze Austria. Having achieved this aim, France would turn 
against Prussia and Germany in the certainty that Austria, paralyzed by the 
Italian menace, would no longer be able to come to the aid of her German 
confederates. The success of Louis Napoleon’s policy consisted exclusively in his 
ability to isolate the Great Powers at the right moment. He put these tactics to the 
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test by provoking the Crimean War against Russia and subsequently the war in 
Italy against Austria. He was undoubtedly thinking of doing the same thing with 
Prussia and Germany in order to realize the so-called natural frontier on the 
Rhine.”59 
In retrospect, the Ballplatz attributed more aggressiveness to France than 
is warranted but, given this mistaken viewpoint, one would expect the former to 
make concessions to Prussia in order to avoid the predicted outcome. It did not. 
Rather, Vienna was stubbornly risk acceptant for loss to the point that it refused 
to prioritize the holdings that it would have to sacrifice in order to retain the 
more important ones. Thus, Prussia was not deterred by Russia’s hollow threats, 
but rather by Austria’s unwillingness to put Prussia in command of the German 
federal forces fighting on the Rhine. Such a move would grant Prussia 
supremacy in Germany. This was not an unreasonable demand since Austria had 
its hands full in Italy. Bismarck, then Prussian ambassador to Russia, acutely 
realized that for Prussia to work with Austria without achieving command in 
order to deter France from aggression on the Rhine would merely abet Austrian 
hegemony in Germany.60 In sum, Austria was decidedly risk acceptant for loss as 
it refused to give way to Prussia in Germany, to France and Sardinia in Italy, and 
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to Russia in the Near East. As argued, Austria was also a bit risk acceptant for 
gain in Germany by asking Prussia to fight its battles without giving due credit. 
It was also significantly risk acceptant for gain by subverting the peace 
conference and forcing war on Sardinia in order to humiliate it. This Austrian 
preference reversal was precipitated by the blundering Buol but sanctioned by 
Franz Joseph when the status quo had not materially changed. It is certain that 
Austria would have had to make some concessions at the peace conference, but 
since it had all of the treaty rights in its favor, Italian independence and unity 
would not have been granted by the other major powers. The motivated bias to 
punish Sardinia was a fateful mistake on the part of Austria.   
Napoleon could win battles, but not the war. The carnage at Solferino took 
a toll on his psyche. Moreover, serious domestic disturbances occurred in France 
as a consequence of the war. For the time, both of these considerations caused the 
emperor to quail because he worried that he was unleashing something that he 
could not stop.61 To Kiselev he later stated, “the war threatened to become 
general; insurrection in Hungary would have been helpful, but not without 
disadvantages. After Hungary would come Poland, then the Christians of the 
East. All that would have too much complicated a war already messy enough.”62 
Napoleon was also unaware that Austria could no longer provide reinforcements 
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and had unreliable forces in order to meet her commitments with Prussia in the 
German confederation and was thus on the verge of capitulating in Italy.63 
Finally, the French emperor found that the promise given to him by Alexander! 
to provide a military demonstration on the Galician border but not codified in 
the secret treaty!was hollow if not a fraud. This was revealed in an exchange 
between both sovereigns. Napoleon wrote to the tsar, “…the position of Russia 
will naturally have great weight in the circumstances that are developing now, 
but…permit me to say that it must be sharply defined and completely clear. Only 
such a diversion as Y.M. promised me…can lead to favourable results, since 
Austria is presently secure on her northern border.”64 Alexander replied that 
Austria would appropriately remain uncertain of her security and that “I am 
certain there would be no advantage to be gained by clarifying the position I 
have taken. Uncertainty fits my intentions!it is a bridle whose necessity 
circumstances have already proved.”65      
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Unstable preference reversals. 
Napoleon was the first to propose an armistice with Austria. He had felt 
betrayed by Alexander. True, he was afraid of Prussian intervention,66 but he 
was also dissatisfied by the lack of Russian support and told Kiselev as such.67 
The Russian corps did not materialize thus leaving France to fight alone on the 
Galician border.68 The British failed to support Napoleon and he doubted the 
solidity of Italian unity. Russian and Ultramontane pressure wanted the conflict 
to end, the former because of apprehension over revolutionary contagion and the 
latter because of clerical support for the Pope.69 
Walewski reasserted himself here. Gorchakov tried to cobble together a 
Franco-Russo-Austrian alliance in order to be paid for his meager efforts. But 
because France could not prevail, Walewski then punished Russia by stipulating 
that the three eastern emperors come to agreement on the Near East before 
France would entertain a revision of the Paris treaty. Rechberg, the new Austrian 
foreign minister, threw cold water on the scheme by being “opposed in principle 
to the formation of small, independent states, republics, or Principalities which, 
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sooner or later, must fall prey to the Colossus of the North [Prussia].”70 
Additionally, France declared that its price for participation was a revision of the 
Vienna treaty. Austria would not participate, having just ceded much territory in 
Italy.71        
Instead, Napoleon’s bitterness led him to take revenge on his allies. Thus, 
he would cut a deal with Austria at Villafranca (just as he had reversed course 
and reconciled with Russia over Britain to conclude the Crimean War). Sardinia 
would not get its reward in Italy; neither would Russia in the Near East nor 
Prussia in Germany. Sardinia, stripped of the fortresses of the Quadrilateral, 
would be more dependent on France than previously for its existence. An 
independent Italian peninsula would be denied to Britain.72  
Napoleon proposed to Franz Joseph that he receive Lombardy which he 
would turn over to Cavour. Parma would remain in Piedmontese control. The 
Pope would recover Tuscany and Modena and head an Italian Confederation. 
Austria would retain Venetia. Napoleon would renounce his claims to Savoy and 
Nice, but he wanted to be reimbursed for the cost of the war.73 Cavour resigned 
his office and raged at Napoleon, “this treaty will never be executed: I will turn 
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conspirator.” To which the French emperor declared, “to serve Italian 
independence I made war against the wish of Europe; as soon as the fate of my 
country seemed imperiled, I made peace.” Napoleon told Cavour that to 
continue the war required 300,000 Italian troops that never materialized.74   
Franz Joseph again appeared to reverse his preference by coming to terms 
with Napoleon instead of making concessions to Prussia. The Austrian deluded 
himself into believing that ceding Lombardy was counterbalanced by a 
restoration of the deposed rulers in central Italy. Franz Joseph preferred a 
compromise peace with France over Italy to ceding supremacy to Prussia in 
Germany as the price to be paid for Prussian assistance. Buol was dismissed as 
the foreign minister because of his diplomatic blundering and the emperor then 
tried to free Austria from its isolation by concluding an agreement with France in 
order to keep Austria in Italy.75 One term of the armistice allowed Austria to 
retain continued influence in Italy as a member of a proposed federation of the 
Italian peninsula instead of a unified Italy.76 Thus, it appeared that the insurance 
premium would be used in conservative fashion here. The Austrian emperor 
preferred to make concessions to Sardinia in order to retain what was left of his 
position in Italy. He was ceding part of his lawfully-granted endowments in 
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order to avoid the certainties, either, of being forced to make unrecompensed 
concessions at the peace conference, on the one hand, or of being replaced by 
Prussia as head of the German confederation in exchange for diplomatic support 
to retain the Austrian status quo in Italy, on the other hand. 
 Napoleon accepted Franz Joseph’s stipulation as long as the rulers were 
not restored to their thrones by force. This point had no basis in reality because a 
revolutionary contagion spread throughout Italy that ensured that exile for the 
deposed despotic rulers would be their only option.77 Napoleon thus played the 
sorcerer’s apprentice to Cavour’s revolutionary machinations. The French 
emperor had not deceived Franz Joseph even though the former looked on with 
favor at the discomfiture of the deposed. Rather, the Austrian deluded himself 
once again by believing that the grand duke of Tuscany could restore himself to 
power without assistance. Moreover, merely ceding Lombardy could not stanch 
the Italian demand for independence that eluded official policy. A full-fledged 
revolution broke out in Emilia, in Romagna, and in Tuscany. Thus, Austria was 
being utterly defeated in Italy and it was in danger of receiving nothing for its 
compromise peace.  
Immediately, both sides regretted their decisions to compromise. 
Napoleon had not liberated Venetia. Therefore, he was not entitled to Nice and 
Savoy, the very reason for which he went to war. Public opinion in France 
punished him for instigating the war; now it punished him for ending it in such a 
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desultory fashion. Thus, Napoleon contrived to wreck the Treaty of Villafranca, 
signed on November 10, 1859 in Zurich. Essentially, the treaty was a dead letter 
because, late in December, the French emperor launched an anonymously 
inspired pamphlet entitled Le Pape et le Congrès which argued that the Pope’s 
spiritual authority was being hamstrung by his temporal power in Rome. Thus 
the States of the Church should be restricted to the Eternal City and the 
Patrimony of St. Peter; the Pope’s defense should jointly be provided for by the 
Catholic Great Powers and the proposed Italian federation. Anti-Catholic Britain 
approved of this scheme, but the French clerics accused Napoleon of having 
“burnt the Pope on the altar of the English alliance.”78 Pius IX unwisely engaged 
in polemics against the pamphleteer and the Austrians demanded that Napoleon 
disavow himself from this opinion by guaranteeing the integrity of the Papal 
States.79 When the French emperor refused to do so, the Austrians abandoned the 
peace conference. Cavour returned himself to power at this news and Napoleon 
tried to get him to refrain from directly incorporating Sardinia. Cavour 
demanded a plebiscite on the matter as well as plebiscites throughout Italy as to 
whether the other states would vote to be annexed by Piedmont. Napoleon could 
not defy this logic and he demanded Nice and Savoy as compensation for an 
increase in the power of Sardinia, subject, of course, to the outcome of a 
plebiscite in the former states. Napoleon regained his risk acceptance for gain. He 
stated none too tactfully to Emanuel that the Sardinian expansion, not merely to 
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the Adriatic, but now across the Apennines to the border of Rome was not 
contemplated in the original agreement. Thus, France’s revised strategic security 
needs dictated the incorporation of both Nice and Savoy. The two states went 
overwhelmingly for reincorporation with France while Emilia and Tuscany 
joined Sardinia in opting for a unified Italy in March 1860. In April, Emanuel 
opened the first National Parliament of modern Italy.80 
Continued risk aversion for gain by the non-combatant powers. 
An expected utility explanation for the dynamics of this conflict should exhibit 
increased deterrence measures on the parts of the non-combatant states in 
response to the opportunistic aggression on the parts of France, Sardinia, and 
Austria, respectively. Some evidence of this thinking follows, but there is also 
little follow-up in the way of action. Rather, the non-combatant powers deterred 
the aggressive states by bidding up their demands for assistance rather than by 
threatening them with adverse intervention. As will be demonstrated, this is a 
manner of risk aversion for gains on the part of the status quo powers. Said 
another way, a status quo state needs to be handsomely recompensed in order to 
be tempted to make gains when others are clearly acting in an opportunistic 
manner, have overreached, and are in need of assistance. 
 Vague, but uneasy, fellow feeling for France throughout Europe that it 
was supporting Italian independence quickly gave way to consternation that 
Napoleon was determined to retrace the footsteps of his uncle on the Rhine after 
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vanquishing Austria.81 Palmerston had been changing his mind regarding 
Napoleon when he wrote to Russell: “Till lately I had strong confidence in the 
fair intentions of Napoleon towards England, but of late I have begun to feel 
great distrust, and to suspect that his formerly expressed intention of avenging 
Waterloo has only lain dormant, and has not died away. He seems to have 
thought to lay his foundation by beating, and with our aid or with our 
concurrence or neutrality, first Russia, and then Austria, and by dealing with 
them generously to make them his friends in any subsequent quarrel with us.”82 
Napoleon was attuned to this sentiment that was growing throughout Europe 
and he wrote a missive to be passed on to Palmerston stating rather 
unconvincingly: “Since Villafranca I have only had one thought and one aim!to 
inaugurate a new era of peace, and to live on good terms with all my neighbors, 
especially England. I had given up the claim to Savoy and Nice, and it was only 
the extraordinary enlargement of Piedmontese territory which made me reassert 
the right to restore to France provinces essentially French.”83  
Others were not assuaged as well. Earlier in the year the war party in 
Prussia forced the prince regent to station an observation corps on the banks of 
the upper Rhine. Bismarck told Gorchakov that French success might force the 
Prussians to intervene on behalf of the Austrians. In turn, Gorchakov reiterated 
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that he had restrained Napoleon from using the term ‘nationalities’ in his official 
statements and that Russia and Britain had obtained a promise from Sardinia to 
refrain from sending revolutionary committees into the Christian provinces of 
the Ottoman Empire. But after Magenta, Napoleon turned down Russian offers 
for peace and this disinterest continued to concern Prussia.84 Alexander 
explained to Bismarck on June 16, 1859 that Napoleon had agreed to desist from 
planning an attack on the Dalmatian coast, but that the tsar had no interest in 
giving up his entente with France.85 
Britain offered a new four-point peace plan in January 1860 that Napoleon 
immediately accepted. First, France and Austria were to refrain from interfering 
in central Italy unless invited by the five great powers. Second, French troops 
should evacuate from Rome and northern Italy. Third, Austria must be allowed 
to administer Venetia without interference. Finally, Britain and France would 
recognize the right of Sardinia to send troops into central Italy to implement a 
plebescite in favor of annexation to Piedmont should that possibility occur.86 
Austria agreed to the second and third points, but objected to the other 
two points. Thus, Rechberg instead requested that Gorchakov support efforts to 
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reinstate the traditional defensive Holy Alliance (Prussia, Austria, and Russia), to 
which the latter refused to recommend to Alexander. In turn, Gorchakov 
recommended that Austria join a Franco-Russian alliance. Gorchakov wanted to 
avoid a reassertion of the Crimean coalition of Britain, France, and Austria and 
he did this by arguing to Rechberg that the British proposal was a ploy to rescue 
France from its embarrassing Roman commitment.87   
When Austria turned down Russia, Alexander then tried to restrain 
Napoleon in a Franco-Prusso-Russian alliance. At the tsar’s urging, Napoleon 
met Wilhelm at Baden-Baden in June 1860, but the Frenchman was rebuffed 
when the latter demonstrated solidarity by inviting all of the German princes to 
attend. Vienna, in turn, was impressed by this spectacle and made yet another 
pitch for Prussian assistance in Italy. Gorchakov would not make a third in a 
putative Russo-Austro-Prussian alliance, but he was not averse to the latter two 
attempting a reconciliation.88 Wilhem met with Franz Joseph at Teplitz on July 
26, 1860 but the meeting was a repetition of the original entreaty. The crux of the 
matter was that Prussia could easily find allies whereas Austria remained 
isolated. Schleinitz prepared a memorandum detailing such: “The purpose of the 
negotiations is …to recognize that if Prussia concludes an alliance with Austria 
which guarantees the Veneto, she will be entitled to an adequate reward for the 
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services rendered in the European cause and above all to the need of defending 
Austria. It is …well to be clear that it is Austria who needs help, whereas Prussia 
can easily find allies and is not dependent on Austrian help.”89  
Such leverage allowed Wilhelm to drive a hard bargain. If France tried to 
achieve the ‘natural frontiers’, both states would “face together the dangers 
which threatened them both…with joint resistance to a French attack on the two 
States; [and an undertaking] to oppose jointly, and if necessary by the force of 
arms, any French attempt to incorporate Belgium or parts of Swiss or Dutch 
territory.”90 If Sardinia attacked Austria, Prussia was not obliged to assist unless 
the federal territories were violated because this would provoke Sardinia and 
bring about a break with France. Concerning Prussian aims in Germany, Austria 
then made a vague promise to address them in the future. Valsecchi notes that, 
“as had already happened in 1859, Vienna refused to make concessions in 
Germany, and so Berlin had no intention of running any risks for Austrian 
interests in Italy.”91 
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 Contemporaneously, Cavour held himself out as the arbiter of peace in 
Italy. He publicly disavowed charges of subversion made by the major European 
powers by arguing that the monarchy of the House of Savoy (Emanuel) was the 
best instrument for obviating anarchy and chaos in Italy. It appeared that a race 
was gearing up between a revived Holy Alliance which would coalesce against 
the revolution in Italy, on the one hand, and the unification of Italy on the other 
hand.92 This race was won easily by the Italians because, as was just intimated 
and as will later be demonstrated, a revival of the Holy Alliance remained 
stillborn due to risk aversion for gain. Thus, the problem before Cavour was in 
“helping the revolution, but in such a way that in may appear in the eyes of 
Europe to have been a spontaneous act.”93 Nevertheless, he dreamed that after 
the conquest of Palermo would come the richer prizes of Rome and Venice. 
Cavour and Emanuel were conducting a monarchical revolution. Thus, the prime 
minister had to pretend to disavow the actions of the leftist Garibaldi with an 
open veto to the world, while secretly and tentatively approving them. The 
Redshirts had cryptic support from Turin to be diverted to Sicily on May 6, 1860 
where they prevailed and thereafter sailed to the mainland. Cavour was 
concerned with Garibaldi’s dictatorial methods and the possibility that the 
revolution might turn anti-monarchical.94 Thus, as long as Rome was not 
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attacked, Napoleon indicated in August 1860 that he would not intervene and 
thus allow Emanuel’s forces to occupy Umbria, the Marches, and the other Papal 
States before Garibaldi could get there. 
 Napoleon did not want these instructions to Cavour to be made public. 
While he wanted to be rid of his duty to protect the Pope, Napoleon knew that 
the French Catholics would not tolerate an expulsion of His Holiness from Rome. 
This would surely occur were Garibaldi to sail from Messina to the mainland 
unchecked. Thompson identifies the main foreign policy problem that beset the 
Second Empire: “Ancient Rome had been the capital of a Mediterranean Empire, 
not of an Italian state. The inheritance of the Caesars had passed to the Popes, 
and their Temporal Power!the political and military control of the Papal 
States!was the symbol of a super-national government incompatible with a 
secular Kingdom of Italy.”95 This is why Napoleon feared a unified Italy. It 
spelled the end of the Vatican in Rome unless he could convince Cavour to adopt 
the notion of ‘a free church in a free state’ (he did). Napoleon could not publicly 
disavow Cavour’s plan for a united Italy, on the one hand, but he could also not 
allow it, on the other hand. Thus, Napoleon’s flirtation with risk acceptance for 
gain had run too far ahead of his essential risk aversion to avoid loss and he had 
to pull back. A lame attempt was made with the British, who were equally at a 
loss as to what policy to pursue in Italy. Both Palmerston’s and Russell’s riper 
judgments regarding Napoleon’s intentions began to prevail. Two weeks earlier, 
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Russell regretted that Prussia had not gone to war with France in the previous 
year.96 Now, upon further consideration, Russell publicly conceded that Austria 
regarded the annexation of Savoy by France as an event not worse than that of 
Tuscany to Sardinia whereas Alexander opined that Victor Emanuel was “free to 
give away his own province and Napoleon free to receive it.”97 In Alexander’s 
opinion, one can see Gorchakov’s influence to continue to favor the entente with 
France for what it might produce in the Near East. The British realized that they 
would have no allies on this issue and thus were loath to isolate themselves.    
Thouvenal, who succeeded Walewski as foreign minister, suggested that 
the French and British fleets be dispatched to the Straits of Messina in order to 
waive Garibaldi off from transferring his expedition to the mainland. Russell was 
on the verge of acceding to this scheme when Lacaita, a trusted Italian 
nationalized in, and living in, London at the behest of Cavour, petitioned the 
British for non-intervention. It is doubtful that Garibaldi could have been 
deterred. Nevertheless, instead of working with the French, the British navy 
abetted Garibaldi’s efforts, thus leaving France to act alone, which it would not.98  
Garibaldi would surely have attacked Austrian occupied Venetia had 
Emanuel not taken control of the situation, thus perhaps making the war general 
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with Prussian intervention on behalf of Austria.99 A phony quarrel was picked 
with the Pope and Emanuel’s forces marched on September 11, 1860, ostensibly 
to restore order. “Diplomacy will make great cries, but will allow you to act,”100 
was Cavour’s quip to Nigra, the Italian ambassador to France. The Papal states 
were swiftly overrun and Cavour called parliament into session in order to ratify 
the recent annexations. Emanuel then conquered Naples and thus took the wind 
out of Garibaldi’s sails while also checking the designs of the republican Mazzini 
and the extremists. To D’Azeglio, the Italian ambassador to London, Cavour 
confided, “if we did for ourselves what we are doing for Italy, we should be 
great knaves.”101   
Meanwhile, Napoleon worried about a resurrection of the Holy Alliance. 
In September, Alexander let it be known that he was inviting Franz Joseph and 
Wilhelm to a meeting in Warsaw. Alexander may have had in mind a rather 
illogical combination of the old conservative Metternichean alliance and the 
continuance of Russia’s flirtation with France.102 Gorchakov intended to use the 
meeting as a means towards provoking France into offering better terms to 
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Russia on the Eastern Question.103 The gambit appeared to work and Napoleon 
was thus forced to bid higher for Russian assistance. The French emperor’s 
whole Italian policy would be viewed as a failure at home should Sardinia be 
deprived of Lombardy while France lost possession of Savoy and Nice. Prussian 
intervention and/or an Austrian attack on Sardinia might precipitate this 
outcome. Thus, Napoleon interfered by tempting Alexander with a new 
expectation of revision in the Near East should some unspecified catastrophe 
take place. France would settle with Russia before any of the other powers, thus 
allowing the tsar the opportunity to recover Bessarabia. Moreover, Thouvenal 
planned to exclude Austria from Romania, and Britain from both Egypt and the 
Dardanelles, respectively. In return, Russia was to support a new French-
inspired four-point plan in Italy. First, France promised to refrain from offering 
assistance to Piedmont should it attack Venetia. Second, Austria could not 
recover Lombardy even if she was victorious in a new war. In turn, France 
promised to support the federation called for in the Villafranca and Zurich 
treaties as a sop to Austria. Third, a peace conference would realistically assess 
the prospects for the deposed rulers to be returned to power in central Italy (in 
other words, highly unlikely). Finally, the dispositions of both Nice and Savoy 
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would not be contested.104 Again, this proposal did not confer any immediate 
benefits to Russia, nor did it require any sacrifice on the part of Russia.  
Thus, when the three monarchs met at Warsaw from October 25-27, 1860, 
Prussia and Austria expected a conservative crusade against Italy, but Wilhelm 
and Franz Joseph were left disappointed. Both monarchs were expected to 
remain neutral unless Sardinia attacked Venetia, this stipulation being fully 
consistent with Napoleon’s offers to Alexander. Schleinitz acted as an 
intermediary for Gorchakov when the former requested of Russell that Britain 
abandon the Black Sea clauses in order to mollify Russia. This request was met 
with a stiff refusal. Thus, since Prussia refused to contravene Britain because it 
anticipated the latter’s assistance later in acquiring Schleswig-Holstein for 
itself,105 and Austria refused to give way on the Black Sea clauses (it was the 
originator of these terms), this new Franco-Russian scheme had little chance of 
bearing fruit. As Cook notes, “though the Warsaw meeting failed to achieve 
anything conclusive in terms of bringing about a definitive settlement of the 
Italian problem, it did not shore up the Russo-French entente as Gorchakov had 
hoped. Since Russia had failed to win Austrian support for the French proposals 
on Italy, Napoleon apparently hoped that his promises on the Eastern Question 
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would be quietly forgotten. For some time, therefore, Russo-French relations 
remained rather cool.”106  
On October 26, 1861 Garibaldi greeted Emanuel with the words “Hail to 
the King of Italy” and Italy was informally unified. Both Russia and Spain 
protested Emanuel’s breach of international law by recalling their ministers from 
Turin. Prussia refused to join in this futile gesture. Nevertheless, Alexander and 
Wilhelm restrained Franz Joseph from provoking a war in Venetia. Napoleon 
voiced outrage at Cavour but it was a pretense. Russell could not believe that 
Austria refused to give way to Russia regarding the Black Sea clauses given the 
former’s dire situation in Italy. Since Britain had no intention of renouncing those 
clauses as well, Russell preempted that possibility by famously publicly 
declaring his support for the revolution in Italy on October 27. Cavour’s 
unscrupulous behavior was thus given a moral sanction by Britain.107 The 
following March 1861, with the exception of Venetia and Rome, a national 
parliament was called to formalize the unification of Italy. Shortly thereafter 
Cavour died, unable to bear witness to the fruits of his labor. Italy would not 
truly be unified until the Austrians were driven from Venetia (1866) and Rome 
was occupied (1870).  
Conclusion: the dynamics of mutual aggressive affective abandonment. 
New information regarding both the value of the outcome of a limited war in 
Italy, or of a general war in Europe, respectively, as the consequence of 
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opportunistic aggression on the parts of France, Sardinia, and Austria would 
explain preference reversals on the parts of all the combatant and non-combatant 
powers from an expected utility perspective. So would new information 
regarding the probabilities of both those outcomes occurring. Napoleon initially 
convinced himself that a limited war in Italy and recovery of France’s ‘natural 
frontiers’ would be a stepping-stone to overturning the Vienna treaty without the 
necessity of a general war. Walewski’s conservative opinion to the contrary 
might be regarded as new information, but the emperor clearly had a motivated 
bias to precipitate the war in Italy and he repeatedly gave little credence to his 
foreign minister’s opinions. Moreover, the fact that Napoleon circumvented his 
own diplomats in order to petition Alexander to jointly engage in a revisionist 
adventure indicates that he was little susceptible to rational argument. Only late 
when revolutionary activity appeared to be uncontrollable as the consequence of 
war did Napoleon recognize the potential for contagion in the Near East and a 
consequent outbreak of general war. Still, despite recognition of this very real 
possibility, the emperor continued to prosecute the war and was little interested 
in a Russian offer to mediate peace after his battlefield successes. On the Russian 
side, Kiselev played a similar role as did Walewski regarding his conservative 
advice to Alexander. For their parts, Palmerston, Victoria, Kiselev, and the 
Ballplatz, separately, expressed concern at the potential for the outbreak of 
general war should the war in Italy fail to stay limited and thus take a 
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revolutionary turn. From the status quo powers one would expect increased 
deterrent threats of intervention should the combatant powers not come to terms 
with each other. In turn, the combatant powers should quit the war because they 
feared outside intervention by the status quo powers and the possibilities, either 
that they would be dispossessed of their battlefield gains, or of the war becoming 
general. None of this occurred despite diplomatic evidence of perceptions that 
such dynamics could easily occur.  
True, France and Austria reversed preferences and tried to come to terms 
with each other, but they only did so because of disappointment at the assistance 
that they had heretofore expected from third parties. That France and Austria 
were largely not worried about adverse intervention from outside parties is 
reflected by their eagerness to revert to their original aggressive motivations and 
to continue to prosecute the Italian war. Thus, the increased risks to general war 
as a consequence of increased risks to intervention by outside parties was simply 
not evident. Finally, the war might have been avoided had Austria let the peace 
conference do its work by gaining small concessions from the former while 
holding Italian demands for independence and unity at bay. Thus, the status quo 
did not materially change from the pre-war posturings on the parts of France, 
Sardinia, and Austria until all three conspired to wreck the peace conference and 
precipitate the war. 
A prospect approach provides a better explanation for the dynamics of 
this war than does expected utility. Russia was clearly trying to renormalize for 
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its losses in Bessarabia and on the Black Sea as a consequence of losing the 
Crimean War. But Alexander was unwilling to precipitate a general war in order 
to effect those desired revisions. Gorchakov’s foreign policy preferences won out 
over the initially more conservative preferences of Kiselev. Kiselev reversed 
preference and lobbied for backing France to the hilt when hostilities began. His 
preference reversal was not the result of new information; rather it was the shock 
of war itself that revealed his anticipated negative regret at failing to back France. 
In contrast, Gorchakov stayed the course in offering Napoleon no more than 
benevolent neutrality. His motivated bias to overturn the Paris treaty led him to 
give short shrift to the problem of a revolutionary conflagration should the war 
fail to stay limited. Gorchakov’s attitude toward international politics was a 
decided switch from the status quo supporting diplomacy of the Holy Alliance 
that broke down at the conclusion of the Crimean War. Gorchakov believed that 
there was no necessary relation between revolutionary ferment, which he 
believed to be a passive force that needed to be manipulated, and the outbreak of 
general war. Thus, it was easy for him to believe that the Italian war could stay 
limited as long as the major powers desired it to stay so.108 Gorchakov’s opinion 
was a decided departure from the essentially conservative views held both by 
liberal and authoritarian states at the conclusion of the Napoleonic wars 
concerning the relationship between international war and domestic revolution. 
Thus, it could be argued that Gorchakov’s motivated bias to abet war in Italy for 
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what it might produce in the Near East led him to adopt an irrationally 
consistent view of the relationship between international war and domestic 
revolution. Moreover, the foreign minister evinced little interest in breaking the 
diplomatic logjam at the conclusion of the war by stating that: “Russia has no 
direct interest in the affairs of Italy, and with the conditions prevailing today, the 
collective authority of Europe runs the risk of playing a sad role. The directly 
interested parties have reached an impasse and are counting on us to break 
it…We have no desire…to pull chestnuts out of the fire for others, and our good 
friends will be surprised at the passive role they will see us playing.”109 This 
attitude is both cynical and indicative of his risk acceptance for gain considering 
that the Italian war could not have been precipitated without Russian 
connivance.  
Napoleon, in turn, allowed domestic politics to drive his preference for 
conducting war in Italy. He did not think through the implications of Italian 
unity for it created another significant power and potential adversary with 
whom he would have to contend. Although the Roman commitment was an 
embarrassment, Napoleon’s attempt to rid himself of it by fobbing it off on the 
European community after provoking a war brought much opprobrium in 
France with the clerics upon whom much of his domestic support depended. The 
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anti-clerics pilloried him for overextending himself in Italy for personal prestige. 
Thus, Napoleon was forced to continue the war in order to collect scraps of the 
‘natural frontier’ in Nice and Savoy. The victory was hollow because this risk 
acceptance for gain earned him the distrust of the rest of Europe, in particular 
from Prussia and Britain. 
Austria suffered from the most severe motivated biases to punish Italian 
revolutionary activity. Through Buol’s diplomatic blundering, Franz Joseph 
threw away any residual goodwill for Austria on the parts of Britain and Prussia 
by continuing to believe that it could act with impunity towards Sardinia 
regardless of whether it remained restrained or not. Moreover, the Ballplatz was 
in high dudgeon over interference by outside powers regarding its territorial 
affairs and it never believed until too late both that Sardinia would not be held 
back by France and that Prussia and Britain would fail to support her. Franz 
Joseph fundamentally did not understand the Prussian demand for equality in 
Germany and thus foolishly believed that Prussian assistance could be had for 
nothing.  
To varying degrees, then, Alexander, Napoleon, and Franz Joseph 
preferred to use the insurance premium in risky fashion in order either to regain 
what they had previously lost or to keep from losing any endowments. 
Essentially, the latter two sovereigns converted the insurance premium to the 
risky use of a lottery ticket. Alexander was the least risk acceptant of the three. 
Although he deplored the terms of the Paris treaty and was willing to give 
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Gorchakov leeway to conclude revisionist agreements with France, Alexander 
nevertheless could not countenance the outbreak of general war in order to effect 
a revision of the Black Sea clauses. The French emperor could be considered 
more risk acceptant for gain insofar as he solicited Alexander to abet his Italian 
war. In Taylor’s view, Napoleon was a procrastinating adventurer;110 his search 
to restore French prestige that was largely personal in origin pushed him into 
revisionist schemes even as he intermittently drew back because he recognized 
that the situation could get out of control. He also had a poorly thought out plan 
regarding the desirability of Italian unification and was looking to relieve himself 
of this adventure towards the end of the war in order to concentrate on more 
promising imperialistic adventures in Syria, China, and Mexico, respectively.111 
As demonstrated, Franz Joseph briefly thought of using the insurance premium 
in conservative fashion in order to retain what was left of his position in Italy. 
But this was only after he blundered by giving Buol license to refuse to admit 
Sardinia to the peace conference and then vainly attempt to humiliate Sardinia 
by attacking it, thus precipitating a revolution that eluded official control. This 
stubborn combination of risk acceptance for loss as well as risk acceptance for 
gain left Austria repeatedly isolated in Europe. Cavour was obviously risk 
acceptant for gain and thus hoped to be rewarded by playing a long-shot 
winning lottery ticket. This is understandable. Since Italy was so disunited, it is 
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hard to argue that it was renormalizing for loss. Thus, this risk acceptance is 
essentially the result of having nothing to lose.     
Prussia, for its part, had a motivated bias to appease the British for future 
help that it could provide. In turn, Russia could not understand why Prussia 
would not press Britain harder for a renunciation of the Paris treaty. Both Prussia 
and Austria could not understand why Russia did not take a stronger line 
against Italian unity through a revival of the Holy Alliance. Motivated bias on 
the parts of the major decision-makers reinforced systemic imbalance; Russia 
would not break with France while Prussia would not ally with Austria without 
being properly compensated. While these two preferences were independent of 
each other, both were necessary in order for the war to occur. Britain was 
significant largely due to its failure to aid in punishing unprovoked aggression, 
on the one hand, and due to its imprimatur of the Italian revolution after the fact, 
on the other hand. Thus, Italy could steal a march on the rest of Europe. 
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Chapter 5: Asymmetric affective abandonment: Bismarck’s wars of unification: 
The Second Polish Uprising and the Danish War over the Elbe Duchies. 
 
Prussian minister-president Otto von Bismarck was the architect of three wars 
fought seriatim against Denmark (1864), Austria (1866), and France (1870) that 
resulted in the unification of Germany and the founding of the Second Reich. A 
brilliant diplomat and statesman, Bismarck neutralized all potential powers that 
might have thwarted his efforts and was able to fight and defeat an isolated 
opponent with repeated declarations that he was merely upholding the status 
quo. In the 1850s Prussia was the fifth-rate European great power, humiliated by 
Austria at Olmütz1; in twenty short years it became the predominant European 
power. 
 During this period, the European system was severely structurally 
imbalanced. Given the hindsight of two World Wars in which Germany was 
designated the aggressor, it is hard to remember that Britain continued to view 
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France during the nineteenth century as the prime disturber of the peace2 and 
that it largely welcomed German unification as providing a potentially liberal 
counter to the avowedly revisionist ambitions of both France and Russia.3 France 
and Britain fell out with each other completely, first, as the consequence of the 
British failure to support the French on behalf of the Poles during the Second 
Uprising (1863), and second, as the consequence of the French failure to support 
the British on behalf of the Danes regarding the disposition of the Elbe Duchies 
(Schleswig and Holstein) (1864).4 In turn, Austria and Prussia were given a free 
hand against Denmark because of Russia’s benevolent neutrality. This was 
payment for Prussia’s neutrality during the Polish uprising that Russia brutally 
suppressed. (Bismarck was able to keep Russia effectively at bay with well-
timed, thinly-veiled, threats to incite German Poles to revolution.5) Additionally, 
the domestic politics of economic prosperity as the consequence of free-trade and 
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empire predisposed successive governments to policies of strict non-intervention 
on the Continent when British interests were not believed to be at stake. Both 
Tory and Whig governments alike developed motivated biases to abstain from 
intervention to the point that Victoria believed that Britain had abrogated its 
status and influence as a great power to be reckoned with in European politics. 
Thus, during Prussia’s wars of unification, both Britain and Russia largely 
absented themselves from intervening effectively on the Continent. It was left to 
France’s Napoleon III to prevent Prussian success and in this he was not up to 
the task.6 
 The Austro-Prussian War of 1866 was precipitated by Bismarck’s 
motivated bias to dissolve the German Confederation in which Austria held 
hegemonic leadership and refused to accord Prussia equality. Austria stubbornly 
refused to make timely concessions, despite the fact that Prussia was the rising 
power in Europe on all relevant indicators, notably demographic, economic, and 
military-political power while Austria was increasingly becoming the ‘sick man 
of Europe’. Thus, Prussia found Austria technically in violation of the Treaty of 
Gastein, which specified the terms of Prusso-Austrian occupation of the Duchies, 
and forced war on its partner. Napoleon, for his part, had motivated biases to 
achieve some foreign policy victory in order to shore up his declining domestic 
political power and thus offered separate deals of benevolent neutrality to both 
                                                            
6 Taylor, The Struggle for Mastery in Europe 1848-1918, ibid., pp. 156-57. 
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Prussia and Austria, hoping to collect with the winner. Austria returned France 
this favor by failing to come to its aid during the Franco-Prussian War.   
 This sequence of events just described can be considered as a piece for 
theoretical consideration. In its purest form an aggressive power has motivated 
biases to engage in revisionist behavior while the victim states are overdeterred 
by such aggressive posturing and the latter eventually break out of their 
predicament by precipitating war because they are unable to find defensive 
allies.7 The other great powers, in turn, play the role of tertius gaudens (the 
watchful (laughing) third), largely expecting to be rewarded by the true 
aggressor for their benevolent neutrality later only to be disappointed. Motivated 
biases are developed by such third parties in order to avoid the reality that they, 
too, have been overdeterred. Thus, this examination can be considered a crucial 
case study in demonstrating the explanatory validity of affective abandonment 
as a phenomenon in international relations when the system is significantly 
structurally imbalanced. 
 Historical, as well as political science, treatments of Bismarck’s wars 
regard these crucial events over time as of a piece. Seton-Watson argues that “the 
events of 1866 and 1867…represent the high-water mark of British non-
intervention: from this point of view 1870-1 was a mere sequel, as our attitude 
then had virtually been predetermined by our attitude in 1866. In a word, our 
non-intervention was most marked at the very moment when effective 
                                                            
7 Taylor, The Struggle for Mastery in Europe 1848-1918, ibid., p. 166. 
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intervention would have had the most decisive results.”8 Gall’s magisterial and 
largely sympathetic study of Bismarck concludes that “the year 1866 does in fact 
represent a crucial turning–point in the history of central Europe, much more so 
than the actual founding of the Reich in 1870-1, which in many respects merely 
translated into reality what had been laid out four years before…Abrupt though 
the caesura was, however, in reality it represented simply the breaking through 
of very much deeper, long-term trends of development, the opening of the 
curtain, as it were, on a set that had been in place for a long time.”9 Finally, 
Bueno de Mesquita and Lalman argue that, “during the months remaining in 
1866 after the war ended and through 1867, a sequence of events unleashed 
forces that shaped the course of European history up to and beyond the outbreak 
of World War I. These forces were all clearly visible and given intelligible shape 
well before the outbreak of the Franco-Prussian War, itself made possible by the 
events of 1866.”10 
 In a sense, this analysis lacks the dynamism of the two previous case 
studies regarding affective abandonment. The Crimean War was fought quite 
reluctantly by Britain and Russia, while the Austro-Italian War was fought quite 
ardently by the antagonists. In the case at hand, it is necessary to consider the 
degree to which Bismarck neutralized prospective powers that were already 
                                                            
8 Seton-Watson, Britain in Europe, 1789-1914, op. cit., p. 485. 
9 Lothar Gall, translated by J.A. Underwood, Bismarck: The White Revolutionary, 
volume 1, 1851-1871 (London: Allen & Unwin, 1986), p. 313. 
10 Bruce Bueno de Mesquita and David Lalman, War and Reason: Domestic and 
International Imperatives (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1992), p. 238. 
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predisposed to maintain neutrality for domestic purposes.11 It will not do, as 
some have argued, that Bismarck was merely responding to opportunities 
presented by the inability of the other major European powers to concert their 
efforts to thwart his ambitions.12 Nor will it do to argue that Bismarck plotted the 
                                                            
11 Goddard argues that the manner in which Prussia was able to legitimize its 
expansion toward the other major European powers is key to explaining the 
puzzle as to why it was largely unopposed. The argument is quite persuasive but 
it gives short shrift to the degree to which the major powers were both 
antipathetic toward working with one another to prevent this expansion as well 
as the degree to which motivated biases stemming from domestic sources 
prevented significant diplomatic and military action. See, Stacie E. Goddard, 
“When Right Makes Might: How Prussia Overturned the European Balance of 
Power,” International Security, vol. 33, no. 3 (Winter 2008/09), pp. 110-142.      
12 See, for instance, Halperin’s criticism of Kolb’s argument that neither war nor 
provocation was Bismarck’s aim that set off the Franco-Prussian War. Halperin 
regards Kolb’s work a piece of “special pleading… despite the author’s 
protestations of objectivity and scientism” (S. William Halperin, “The Origins of 
the Franco-Prussian War Revisited: Bismarck and the Hohenzollern Candidature 
for the Spanish Throne,” Journal of Modern History, vol. 45, no. 1 (March, 1973), 
p. 88; Eberhard Kolb, Der Kreigsausbruch 1870: Politische 
Entscheidungsprozesse und Verantwortlichkeiten in der Julikrise 1870 
(Göttingen: Vandenhoeck & Ruprecht, 1970), p. 150)). Of German unification, 
Bismarck famously stated, “one could put the clock forward, but time will go no 
faster for that, and the ability to wait while circumstances unfold is a prerequisite 
of practical politics” (Bismarck, Die gesamme Werke, vol. 6b, op. cit., p. 3.) This 
insight Gall puts to good use in the nuanced appreciation of his subject. For 
example, it is usually thought that the initiator of an action has the advantage of 
surprise, but Bismarck thought quite differently. According to Gall,  
 
“contrary to Bismarck’s own statements, …his watchword had to be not 
patience but action. It is not inconsistent with this that for long periods he 
preferred to act reactively, that is to say to build his own actions on those 
of others. Knowing as he did that he had to move, the obvious course was 
to make the crucial moves apparently from the defensive in order not to 
let his opponent have the advantage of marking time in a rest position. 
That the attacker in fact must formally be the defender had been one of 
Bismarck’s political axioms from the beginning” (Gall, translated by J.A. 
Underwood, Bismarck, op. cit., p. 333).     
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unification of Germany at the outset in pure defiance of external influences.13 The 
German statesman was given to braggadocio after the fact; thus, we cannot 
necessarily take his remembrances as true reflections of his attitude toward risk-
taking at the time of occurrence.14 Moreover, Bismarck made many statements 
that were contradictory in the whole, but individually made for specific purposes 
to particular audiences.15 Not only did he have to convince the rest of Europe of 
his professed attachment to evolutionary political change regarding the 
unification of Germany, but he also had to convince the lesser German states 
south of the River Main even as he was conducting a monarchical ‘revolution 
from above’.16 To wit, if Prussian aggression scared the British on the one hand, 
Bismarck’s subsequent proposal to press for universal male suffrage in Germany, 
on the other hand, intrigued as it scared them even more. British liberalism 
                                                            
13 J.M. Thompson, Louis Napoleon and the Second Empire (New York: Columbia 
University Press, 1983). Wawro argues that both Bismarck and Napoleon went to 
war for almost purely domestic reasons in their respective states. See, Geoffrey 
Wawro, The Franco-Prussian War: The German Conquest of France in 1870-1871 
(Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2003), pp. 16-40. Wetzel refutes this 
arguing that the Bismarck conducted war in order to prevail in the European 
balance of power. See, David Wetzel, A Duel of Giants: Bismarck, Napoleon III, 
and the Origins of the Franco-Prussian War (Madison: University of Wisconsin 
Press, 2001), p. 72. 
14 Wetzel, A Duel of Giants: Bismarck, Napoleon III, and the Origins of the 
Franco-Prussian War, op. cit., pp. 72, 103; Gall, translated by J.A. Underwood, 
Bismarck, op. cit., pp. 279, 362. 
15 Gordon A. Craig, Germany: 1866-1945 (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1978), 
p. 14. 
16 A the end of 1866, the historian Heinrich von Treitschke wrote, “our revolution 
is being completed, as it was begun, from above, and with the limited 
understanding of subjects we are groping in the dark” (M. Cornicelius, ed. 
Heinrich von Treitschkes Briefe, vol. 3, part 2, (Stuttgart: S. Hirzel Verlag, 1920), 
p. 103, fn. 1, letter to G. Reimer, December 1, 1866). Cited in Gall, translated by 
J.A. Underwood, Bismarck, op. cit., p. 313. 
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meant the propertied right to vote, not the specter of socialism (also referred to as 
republicanism at the time).17 But, Bismarck was brilliant enough to know that 
socialism would not obtain in Germany because ninety-percent of the populace 
favored king Wilhelm I. Thus, parliamentary democracy would not be 
threatened from below, but from above, with the help of the peasantry.18 
 As indicated above, it is impossible to understand the ease with which 
German unification largely proceeded without understanding the falling out 
between France and Britain. The rupture between these two states was not 
abrupt; Britain had been losing interest in Continental politics ever since the 
debacle of the Crimean War. British disinterest in Europe was not one of kind, 
but rather of degree, itself waxing and waning more or less depending upon the 
proclivities of the various prime ministers in power at the time, but certainly 
declining.19 Palmerston was the last nineteenth-century interventionist British 
statesman and he favored a close liberal alliance with France if for no other 
reason than he believed that Britain could not influence politics on the Continent 
without an ally. Still, Palmerston distrusted Napoleon, particularly regarding the 
emperor’s revisionist intentions over Belgium later revealed to be well founded. 
The French annexations of Nice and Savoy during the Austro-Italian War of 1859 
                                                            
17 Agatha Ramm, review of Gall, Bismarck, der weisse Revolutionair (Frankfurt: 
Propyläen Verlag, 1980) in English Historical Review, vol. 96, no. 381 (October 
1981), p. 882. 
18 Herman von Petersdorff et. als, eds., Bismarck: Die gesammelten Werke, vol. 1 
(Berlin: Otto Stolberg, 1923-33), pp. 60-61. Cited in Gall, translated by J.A. 
Underwood, Bismarck, op. cit., p. 287. 
19 Millman, British Foreign Policy and the Coming of the Franco-Prussian War, 
op. cit., p. 5. 
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and Britain’s refusal to second a Napoleon inspired congress in 1863 over Poland 
made a close understanding with France over the Danish Question near 
impossible.20 Moreover, Palmerston died in 1865, thus removing one of the last 
effective voices in foreign affairs with respect to Europe during the period under 
examination (Clarendon was the other). The Tories, Derby, Stanley, and later, 
Disraeli, promoted strict non-intervention to the point that Millman chronicles 
this period as ‘the fall from the pinnacle’.21 Thus, the events of the Second Polish 
Uprising and the Danish War over the Duchies will be analyzed in this chapter to 
show how Britain and France became estranged as Britain developed closer ties 
to Prussia based on presumed common liberal precepts, that reflected more 
wishful thinking than reality. The remaining two empirical chapters will then be 
devoted to the diplomatic history of the outbreaks of the Austro-Prussian, and 
the Franco-Prussian, Wars, respectively, with particular emphasis on the 
attitudes toward risk-taking on the parts of the leaders and foreign ministers of 
the major European powers. Prospect analysis is particularly suited to this 
examination. Certain themes spring to mind here. First, much of Europe did 
Bismarck’s work for him inasmuch as the lack of a stabilizing influence in the 
form of a Franco-British alignment to counter aggression with military power left 
a power vacuum in Europe to which Bismarck was only too willing to fill. 
Napoleon tried to piggyback on Bismarck’s successes only to be rebuffed and 
                                                            
20 Millman, British Foreign Policy and the Coming of the Franco-Prussian War, 
op. cit., pp. 4-5. 
21 Millman, British Foreign Policy and the Coming of the Franco-Prussian War, 
op. cit., pp. 1 –26. 
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thus turned to reestablishing the status quo when it could no longer be 
reclaimed. Second, Bismarck’s protestations nothwithstanding, Prussia and the 
kleindeutsch solution that he effected by kicking Austria out of Germany, 
enabled the minister-president to frame the new status quo as continuous 
advancement and thus the replacement of French hegemony in Europe with that 
of German. The Franco-Prussian War was instigated by Bismarck’s baiting the 
severely wounded amour-propre of an insecure and physically debilitated 
French emperor whose empire was already at the end of its tether. 
The Second Polish Uprising (1863). 
Taking its cue from the successful 1859 Italian War of Unification, a second 
Polish uprising22 occurred that is significant here because it was the point of 
departure for Bismarck’s early success in developing a constellation of 
international alignments that allowed him to subsequently isolate his opponents 
on the way to German unification.23 Rival patriot groups receiving support from 
expatriates living in Paris precipitated the revolt in Warsaw. Tsar Alexander II 
tried to quell the revolt and restore limited autonomy to Poland. His 
appointment of the grand duke Constantine as governor-general was seen as a 
                                                            
22 The first uprising dates to 1830-31, in which Russia destroyed the Polish 
Constitution enacted as part of the Vienna Treaty of 1815. ‘Congress Poland’ was 
the tributary rump of a kingdom bound in perpetuity to the Russian imperial 
dynasty. See, Alan Palmer, Bismarck (London: Weidenfeld and Nicolson, 1976), 
p. 82. 
23 Mosse, The European Powers and the German Question 1848-71, op. cit., p. 
110. 
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concession, but it backfired.24 The conservative occupying powers of Russia, 
Prussia, and Austria initially coalesced to suppress the revolt which is consistent 
with essential risk acceptance for loss. On February 8, 1863, the Alvensleben 
Convention was signed between Prussia and Russia that codified joint efforts to 
disarm Polish insurgents along the common frontier.  
Both France and Britain were alarmed and angry that Prussia would 
concert with Poland’s oppressor. Feeling for Polish independence was 
traditionally high in Paris owing both to Catholicism and Napoleon’s penchant 
for supporting nationalist movements, less so in Protestant London, but 
nevertheless sympathetic.25 Initially, Palmerston, then prime minister, believed 
that the revolt would be crushed, had little inclination to interfere, but expected 
Napoleon to take the initiative. At the beginning of February, public opinion in 
France forced Napoleon to act by pressing conciliation on St. Petersburg, but the 
emperor also wanted to present a joint declaration by France, Britain, and 
Austria in order to force Prussia to abandon the Alvensleben Convention.26 
Cowley, the British ambassador to France warned Russell, the British foreign 
secretary,  
                                                            
24 The insurgents saw through a conscription order that had the intention of 
carrying off Polish revolutionary youth to Siberia or the Caucasus. See, Seton-
Watson, Britain in Europe, 1789-1914, op. cit., p. 432.  
25 France had relations with Poland dating to the sixteenth century, failed to 
obstruct its partition in the eighteenth century, and failed to thwart the Russian 
suppression of 1830-31 with a consequent loss of liberties there. See, Thompson, 
Louis Napoleon and the Second Empire, op. cit., pp. 257-58. 
26 Kenneth Bourne, Foreign Policy of Victorian England 1830-1902 (Oxford: 
Clarendon Press, 1970), p. 105.   
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“the feeling in this country is warming again in favor of the Poles. The 
emperor has taken up their cause… The public press too, particularly the 
papers which are supposed to be under Government influence, have not 
been very mild lately towards Prussia and there has been for the last two 
days considerable agitation in the political and monied world. Prussia will 
do well not to go too far, for although I am sure that at this moment war is 
not in the emperor’s thoughts, there is no saying how soon a warlike 
feeling with respect to Poland may not be raised, and Prussia would be 
the first to bear the brunt of it.”27 
 
 News of this possible combination left Prussia isolated, much to the 
satisfaction of the tsar: “our dear Bismarck is a terrible blunderer.”28 The German 
Diet was none too pleased at Bismarck’s having signed the Alvensleben 
Convention and Bismarck, whom Wilhelm appointed minister-president in 1862, 
offered his resignation, but the king preferred to allow his diplomat to extricate 
himself from his precipitate policy. Bismarck overreacted to the Polish uprising 
stationing four army corps around Posen and in western Prussia. In reality, 
Alexander did not need Prussian help to quell the revolt and Gorchakov, the 
Russian vice chancellor, resented Bismarck’s interference. But the tsar did not 
want to insult Wilhelm, his uncle, and thus allowed Bismarck to work himself 
out of the jam.29 First, the German told Buchanan, the British ambassador to 
                                                            
27 Private letter of Cowley to Russell, February 20, 1863, Foreign Office 519/230 
draft. Cited in Mosse, The European Powers and the German Question 1848-71, 
op. cit., p. 111. 
28 Mosse, The European Powers and the German Question 1848-71, op. cit., p. 
115. 
29 Palmer, Bismarck, op. cit., p. 83. 
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Prussia, that the Convention was not likely to come into force.30 Then, he 
informed Oubril, the Russian ambassador, that Prussia would stand by the 
Convention if assured of Russian support. But would Russia come to Prussia’s 
aid if need be? In the margin of Oubril’s report Alexander penned, “aid for a war 
against France and England: no thanks.”31 Thus, Gorchakov replied to Bismarck 
that, “since Prussia judges it in her interest to renounce the arrangement, the 
emperor will not oppose.”32       
 Contemporaneously, Russell, in the House of Lords, criticized the 
conscription order in Poland as “a measure which no British Minister could 
venture to justify” and that he had informed the Russian government that he 
believed “it was the most impudent and unjust step it could take.”33 Palmerston 
followed in the House of Commons a week later stating that the British 
government had “always held that the conduct of Russia towards Poland had 
been a violation of the stipulations of the Treaty of Vienna.”34 
 But Palmerston and Russell were not necessarily of a mind and neither 
were France and Britain. Earlier, Russell had become favorably disposed towards 
the French approach whereas Palmerston felt that diplomacy should be directed 
                                                            
30 Buchanan telegram to Russell, February 26, 1864, cited in Robert H. Lord, 
“Bismarck and Russia in 1863,” American Historical Review, vol. 29, no. 1 
(October 1923), p. 34. 
31 Oubril letter to Gorchakov, February 17, 1863, cited in Lord, “Bismarck and 
Russia in 1863,” ibid., p. 35. 
32 Gorchakov telegram to Oubril, February 27, 1863, cited in Lord, “Bismarck and 
Russia in 1863,” ibid., p. 34.   
33 Hansard’s Parliamentary Debates, 3rd series, vol. clixix, pp. 560-68. 
34 Hansard, ibid., vol. clixix, p. 934. 
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towards Russia, the real culprit.35 Moreover, Napoleon had conflicting opinions 
here insofar as he wanted to maintain the cordial relations with Russia formed at 
the conclusion of the Crimean War in order to relieve his dependence on Britain, 
but also to support nationalist movements whenever possible.36 Moreover, he 
intended to drive a wedge between Prussia and Russia.37 Doing nothing was not 
an option as pressure from factions within the court and in Paris at large placed 
the emperor in a predicament. Drouyn de Lhuys, his Prussophobe foreign 
minister, offered a way out of this quandry by arguing that France should take 
up against Prussia and not against Russia.38 Additionally, Napoleon did not 
want to base Polish rights on the Vienna Treaty, which he longed to overturn, 
but which Britain believed to continue to be in force.39 
 Opinion regarding the Polish affair in Britain was curious but revelatory. 
The Times argued that “whatever may be our hostility to the bear, there is no 
doubt of our feeling towards the jackal.”40 Kennedy observes that this feeling did 
not presage a change in the otherwise cordial relations between Britain and 
Germany, but indignation that Prussia’s actions would give Napoleon an excuse 
                                                            
35 Bourne, Foreign Policy of Victorian England 1830-1902, op. cit., p. 105. 
36 Otto Pflanze, Bismarck and the Development of Germany, vol. 1 (Princeton: 
Princeton University Press, 1990), p. 195.  
37 Thompson, Louis Napoleon and the Second Empire, op. cit., p. 258. 
38 Palmer, Bismarck, op. cit., p. 83. 
39 Seton-Watson, Britain in Europe, 1789-1914, op. cit., p. 433. 
40 K.S. Pasieka, “The British press and the Polish insurrection of 1863,” Slavonic 
and East European Review, vol. 42, no. 98 (December 1963), pp. 17-18. 
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to move on the Rhine.41 Granville’s account of Victoria’s concern gives further 
evidence: “The Queen is terribly alarmed at the French language and proposals 
respecting Poland, and thinks we must on no account let ourselves be dragged 
into what may be a war with Germany! The Queen shudders at the very thought 
of what if we are not very careful, and very guarded in our expectations of 
France, we may find ourselves plunged into! The proposals of France would 
inevitably bring us into collision with Prussia!and we should have a French 
army on the Rhine before we could turn round.”42 
Palmerston suspected a French trap too and he refused to cooperate in the 
joint note to Prussia.43 Austria cooled to any joint action against Prussia as any 
Polish insurgency in Austrian-held Galicia was problematic. Gorchakov reported 
                                                            
41 Paul M. Kennedy, The Rise of the Anglo-German Antagonism 1860-1914 
(London: Ashfield Press, 1980), p. 10. Kennedy argues that Anglo-German 
antagonism did not come to the fore until the latter threatened to develop a navy 
that would compete worldwide in the latter part of the nineteenth century. 
Otherwise, there were many points of commonality between both states. 
Connections between royal families, cultural interactions, shared bonds of 
religion and race complemented rising economic prosperity and mutual 
admiration for political structures. British enthusiasm for Greek and Italian unity 
largely extended toward the German quest and saw a path through liberalism. 
There were reservations, but they seemed manageable, in particular, the rise of 
the Zollverein and the possibility of increased tariffs. But German 
industrialization and the creation of a common German market was seen to 
potentially benefit Britain economically. See, Kennedy, The Rise of the Anglo-
German Antagonism 1860-1914, ibid., pp. 3-8; John Mander, Our German 
Cousins: Anglo-German Relations in the 19th and 20th Centuries (London: John 
Murray, 1974), pp. 173-95.     
42 Victoria to Granville, February 23, 1863, Royal Archives, Windsor Castle, 
54/50. Cited in Mosse, The European Powers and the German Question 1848-71, 
op. cit., p. 113. 
43 The real British concern was French annexation of Belgium, not the upper 
Rhine. See, E. Ann Pottinger, Napoleon III and the German Crisis, 1865-1866 
(Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1966), p. 30. 
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to Napier, the British ambassador to Russia, on March 7, that the Convention had 
not been ratified and thus was a dead letter.44 Bismarck assured Buchanan that 
no practical effect had been given to the Convention.45 Thus, Russell was able to 
report to the Queen that, “…the question of the Convention of Prussia and 
Russia may be considered as set at rest by the despatches from Berlin.”46 
Napoleon was clearly risk acceptant for gain here. Public opinion, which was 
being cultivated by the government, would have been satisfied at this point with 
remonstrating Russia. It was not necessary to humiliate Prussia. But Cowley 
reported to Russell that the emperor and his ministers were “bitterly 
disappointed at your declining the combined note.”47 Drouyn described the 
Convention as “an incident of which we should have taken advantage.”48 
Having been rebuffed by Britain and Austria in condemning Prussia, 
Napoleon took a more dangerous turn against the latter by offering Franz Joseph 
an offensive alliance. The more fantastical ideas for French revision may be 
                                                            
44 Napier letter to Russell, March 3, 1863, no. 121, Royal Archives, Windsor 
Castle, 91/50. Cited in Mosse, The European Powers and the German Question 
1848-71, op. cit., p. 116. 
45 Buchanan telegram to Russell, March 4, 1863, Royal Archives, Windsor Castle, 
96/50. Cited in Mosse, The European Powers and the German Question 1848-71, 
op. cit., p. 116. 
46 Russell letter to Victoria, March 9, 1863, Royal Archives, Windsor Castle, 
103/50. Cited in Mosse, The European Powers and the German Question 1848-
71, op. cit., p. 116. 
47 Cowley letter to Russell, March 1, 1863, Royal Archives, Windsor Castle, 84/50. 
Cited in Mosse, The European Powers and the German Question 1848-71, op. cit., 
p. 117. 
48 Grey, personal secretary to Victoria, letter to Russell, March 12, 1863, no. 19, 
Royal Archives, Windsor Castle, 88/50. Cited in Mosse, The European Powers 
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discounted including those of prince Napoleon (Plon Plon) and the empress 
Eugénie. But, Napoleon stated to Drouyn that he was “ready to bind himself 
with body and soul” to Franz Joseph and quite awkwardly stated that “hitherto 
he had only had mistresses, but now wanted a wife!”49 Thus, Metternich, the 
Austrian ambassador to France, was dispatched to Vienna to sound out a plan 
for substantial revision of Europe!a reunited Poland under an Austrian 
archduke, cession of Venetia to Italy, Silesia and Serbia to Austria, the Rhineland 
to France, Saxony and Hanover to Prussia, and a partition of Turkey to the 
Balkan States. Franz Joseph politely turned down Napoleon; secretly he was 
happy to see friction continue between France and Russia.50 But Rechberg, the 
Austrian foreign minister, discerned the kernel of the problem stating that “the 
risk was certain and the advantages problematic.“51 
Similarly driven by public opinion, Russell urged St. Petersburg to give 
immediate amnesty to the rebels and to restore the Kingdom of Poland. As 
Bourne notes, Britain did not intend to drive a wedge between the Franco-
Russian alignment, nor to divert Russian attention from the Balkans, nor to snub 
the French emperor, but these were the unexpected consequences of its decision 
to intervene.52  
                                                            
49 Seton-Watson, Britain in Europe, 1789-1914, op. cit., p. 434. 
50 Seton-Watson, Britain in Europe, 1789-1914, op. cit., p. 433-34. 
51 Richard B. Elrod, “Austria and the Venetian Question, 1860-1866,” Central 
European History, vol. 4 (1971), p. 154. 
52 Bourne, Foreign Policy of Victorian England 1830-1902, op. cit., pp. 105-06. 
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An invitation by Russell to the signatories of the Vienna Treaty to consider 
the status of Poland was reluctantly agreed to by Napoleon considering the 
British rebuff of his earlier initiative.53 But, Austria was less forthcoming, 
revealing its risk acceptance for loss. As Apponyi, the Austrian ambassador to 
Britain, explained, “no one could expect that Austria would embark in an 
enterprise which in its ultimate result might deprive her of a rich and tranquil 
province. She could not be an accomplice in the work of dismembering her own 
Dominions.”54 Thus, what resulted on April 10-12 was a very disjointed response 
to Russian aggression in the form of separate notes rather than one of joint 
solidarity. Austria’s note was milquetoast, expressing concern over the revolt 
toward the interests of the three conservative powers. France invoked the 
interests of Europe, but Russell was determined to have at Russia, asking the tsar 
to remember his obligations under the Vienna Treaty and stating that the Polish 
Question was not only a source of danger to Russia, but to Europe as a whole. 
Although Alexander offered to pardon the rebels if they surrendered within a 
month, he nevertheless reminded Britain, through Gorchakov, that the Polish 
Constitution of 1815 was a free act of grace on the tsar’s part, and thus he was not 
obliged to consult the other European powers regarding the disposition of 
                                                            
53 Pottinger, Napoleon III and the German Crisis, 1865-1866, op. cit., p. 6. 
54 Mosse, “England and the Polish Insurrection of 1863,” English Historical 
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Poland.55 France was treated better than the other two powers as Gorchakov 
assured it that he would not object to a discussion of the Polish Question at a 
European congress provided that all other questions were discussed as well, an 
obvious reference to overturning the Black Sea clauses associated with the Treaty 
of Paris of 1856.56   
France and Britain worked at cross-purposes. Napoleon hinted at the 
possibility of war with Prussia, whereas Russell was willing to remonstrate with 
Russia but do no more.57 Still, Russell’s criticisms of Russia became more strident 
from April to November and they had the unintended consequence of giving 
false hope to both France and Poland that Britain would support them to the 
point of military action. The insurgents rejected the Russian amnesty offer 
proclaiming that “Poland will crush the hordes of Russia,” thus forcing Napier to 
inform Russell that “if the Government does not mean to fight, let them say so 
and stop the loss of life and suffering attendant on a rising which unaided cannot 
succeed.”58 Alexander reasserted his authority by appointing the brutal 
Muravyev as governor-general to crush the revolt. He also offered Wilhelm an 
alliance. Bismarck advised to decline the offer as the tsar had earlier refused to 
guarantee Prussia against a French attack. Nevertheless, Bismarck was able to 
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gain the pivot in which other parties needed him more than he needed them. 
Western reaction, rather than shrewd diplomacy, had more to do with 
Bismarck’s success here and his later claim that his diplomacy during the Polish 
uprising set the course for Prusso-Russian relations for the next few years thus 
enabling him to lay the true foundations of the German national state is surely 
exaggerated regarding cause but true in effect.59 
By June the three powers offered their advice in the form of Six Points a 
general amnesty, a Polish National Assembly, an autonomous administration, 
freedom for the Catholic Church, use of Polish language in public life and 
education, and a legal recruiting system!with a suspension of hostilities and a 
congress composed of the Vienna signatories.60 Drouyn asked Cowley of British 
intentions should Russia refuse their advice or that the congress terminate 
inconclusively. The Frenchman pressed for a strong statement to the effect that 
the three powers should “have recourse to such other measures, as they might 
deem advisable.”61 It was here that France openly broke with Russia; thus the  
entente between the two powers was at an end. Drouyn, as well as Russell and 
Palmerston, separately, convinced themselves that Russia was too weak to stand 
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up to the diplomatic pressure.62 Still, the British demurred believing that France, 
as in 1853, again intended to drag it into war by playing upon its sympathies for 
national self-determination. Thus, Russell wanted Cowley to impress upon 
Drouyn that, “it would be misleading the French government if we were to allow 
them to suppose that in the present state of things, and in the existing state of 
feeling and opinion in Parliament and in the Country, Her Majesty’s 
Government would undertake, or would find support in a war against Russia for 
Poland, however great the sympathy and interest may be which are felt 
throughout the United Kingdom in favour of the Poles.”63 Drouyn responded by 
stating that the emperor’s regret would equal his own.64 This was the second 
time during the Polish crisis that Britain had to throw cold water on French 
stirrings for war, first against Prussia and now against Russia.   
The Russians were willing to risk isolation through a resurrection of the 
old Crimean coalition of France, Austria, and Britain. But this was not much of a 
risk as Britain clearly did not want to go to war. It was largely preoccupied with 
the American Civil War (tempted to side with the South but maintained 
neutrality in large part due to its anti-slavery stance), its navy was in decay, and 
it cared more for the territorial integrity of Germany at risk by a potential French 
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invasion of the Rhine than it cared for Poland. Napoleon had related problems; 
his adventure in Mexico was the result of American distraction, but it would not 
go well as Maximilian, Napoleon’s brother, soon to be installed as the emperor of 
Mexico, would eventually be captured and executed by the revolutionary 
government.65 With lukewarm British and Austrian support, Napoleon knew 
that he could not fight on behalf of the Poles single-handedly. Thus Gorchakov 
dug in his heels and on July 18 refused a congress as well as amnesty for the 
insurgents. Russell made contradictory statements in public, arguing first that 
Poland “could count on our sympathies, but not on our material aid” and 
“neither the obligations, the honour nor the interests of England require that we 
should go to war for Poland…and I think it would be unbecoming to rail at 
Russia when we are not prepared forcibly to resist her assertions.”66 But, the 
foreign minister also stated that “if Russia…does not enter upon the path which 
is open to her by friendly counsels, she makes herself responsible for the serious 
consequences which the prolongation of the troubles of Poland may produce.”67 
Liberals, both in Prussia and in the lesser German states south of the River 
Main, were alarmed at Bismarck’s aggression towards Poland.68 Liberals were 
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also nationalists; the concept of conservative nationalism did not yet exist.69 
Thus, Franz Joseph made a phony bid for their favor by exploiting Bismarck’s 
mistakes. Wilhelm was invited to a congress of princes to be held in Frankfurt on 
August 3 to consider a reform of the German Confederation that was ostensibly 
based on liberalization. In reality, the Austrians hoped to ‘majoritize’ Prussia in 
perpetuity, thus giving Vienna the permanent upper hand. According to Gall, 
“faced with the Greater German federal plans of an Austrian government that 
was clearly bent on liberalization at home, should they, despite the situation in 
Prussia, stick to their lesser German plans and support Bismarck’s foreign policy 
in what might be a highly confusing fashion!or should they execute a decisive 
change of course? In fact close examination of the Austrian proposals, which fell 
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far short of liberal expectations, made the decision a relatively easy one for them 
to take.”70 Princes of the lesser German states consented to the congress provided 
that Prussia be invited to give her consent. But Bismarck dissuaded Wilhelm 
from attending the congress despite the king’s fear that he was insulting his 
fellow sovereigns. Moreover, Bismarck exposed the Austrian ruse by arguing 
that only a central parliament directly elected by the ‘entire nation’ and sharing 
legistlative power could counteract the dynastic particularism that plagued the 
lesser German states. Thus, Prussian interests were identical to those of all 
Germans. Such a parliament would have hived off all Germans from the non-
Germans in the Habsburg Empire, precisely what the Austrians wished to 
avoid.71 
When the proposal for Confederation reform fell in defeat, Bismarck did 
one better by asking assistance from Russia in a prospective Prusso-Austrian 
war. When the Russians demurred, claiming preoccupation with Poland, 
Bismarck intimated that he might troll for support, perhaps by offering France 
concessions on the Rhine. Taylor argues that Bismarck was likely not serious; he 
only wanted to make Russia keen to the benefit that Prussia provided as a buffer 
state between France and Poland. The lesson was not lost. Thereafter, Russia 
dropped its claim that Austria and Germany should become one and now 
tolerated Prussian disputes and even a later Prussian victory over Austria. While 
the tsar was not enamoured with Prussian aggrandizement, he did desire the 
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weakening of Austria in order to oppose it in the Balkans. It is too much to argue 
that Russia was irretrievably committed to Prussia as a result of the Polish 
Uprising because there was always the possibility that Russia would turn on her. 
But it is safe to say that this outcome was never imminent and that Prussia was 
able to use this relative certainty in its future strategic calculations regarding 
unification.72 
Bismarck’s success in raising the national question provoked Napoleon to 
action. By November the emperor proposed a European congress to consider the 
status of Poland, but also to review the 1815 settlement by offering a 
reconstruction of the map of Europe.73 Austria had the most to lose because a 
congress would raise the question of national self-determination. Moreover, 
Austrian weakness took Berlin out of Napoleon’s sights only to be replaced by 
Vienna.74 Franz Joseph had overreached with Prussia and now drew closer to it 
due to French hostility. As will be analyzed shortly, this newfound, but short-
lived, working relationship would manifest itself in Austro-Prussian cooperation 
to suppress the Danes over the disposition of the Duchies.75 But Russell rebuffed 
the French emperor directly stating, “it is the conviction of H.M.’s government 
that the main provisions of the treaty of 1815 are in full force…and that on those 
foundations rests the balance of power in Europe…H.M.’s government would 
feel more apprehension than confidence for the meeting of a Congress of 
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Sovereigns and Ministers without fixed objects, ranging over the map of Europe, 
and exciting hopes and aspirations which they might find themselves unable 
either to gratify or to quiet.”76 Palmerston’s earlier letter to the King of Belgium 
made similar points.77 Both ministers feared both French, as well as Russian, 
revisionism.78 
Napoleon was gratuitously insulted by the British in as much as the tsar 
was sure to thwart any efforts to convene a congress for the purpose of 
considering Poland. Thus the uprising vanished from international attention as 
Russia successfully brutally suppressed it. Queen Sophia of Holland wrote to  
Clarendon that Russell’s reply was “deplorable…It is the death-blow of an 
alliance which ought to have dominated the world, managed the affairs of the 
Continent, assured us an era of peace.”79 She was guilty of overstatement as 
Britain, as well as most of Europe, distrusted the motives behind Napoleon’s 
foreign policy adventures. Thus Britain conducted “a reconnaissance in force” 
which did not commit it to any ill-advised action.80 Prussia was somewhat 
separated from Russia. Alexander did not blame Wilhelm from backing out of 
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the Alvensleben Convention under pressure from the western powers. But when 
Russia stated that it would continue to prosecute its actions in Poland even at the 
risk of war, Britain let the matter drop.81 
Testing asymmetric affective abandonment. 
Does an expected utility approach provide a reasonable explanation regarding 
the diplomatic and military actions of the relevant powers? Immediately it 
breaks down. The Polish uprising had little chance of succeeding, 
notwithstanding the successful example of the Italian revolution. Because of 
geographic importance, the conservative powers were much more concerned 
with Poland than they ever were with Italy.82 Moreover, the extremist Polish 
insurgents drowned out the demands of their more moderate brethren. Thus, 
they had motivated biases, both to misunderstand initial Russian concessions as 
weakness and to take any diplomatic statements on the parts of France and 
Britain as official policy with the intention of military action to follow. In support 
of an expected utility explanation is the reaction of Russia. That Russia and 
Prussia were safe allies for each other gave the former reasonable belief in the 
latter’s backing against western power intervention on behalf of the Poles. This is 
because direct military assistance from the western powers would have to 
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traverse either Prussia or Austria and this was highly unlikely given that both 
states also occupied portions of Poland. Thus, the tsar could punish the uprising 
with reasonable certainty of impunity.  
Even so, initial aggressive diplomatic posturing on the parts of Britain and 
France, respectively, in reaction to the Russian aggression might be regarded as 
new information that a limited, or even general, war might erupt. Thus, we see 
preference modifications (rather than outright reversals) on the parts of both 
Bismarck and Alexander. Bismarck, who was first posted as Prussian 
ambassador to St. Petersburg before becoming minister-president, overreached 
with regard to Russia, but he was not significantly punished for his initial risk 
acceptance for gain. Friendly dynastic ties between Prussia and Russia allowed 
him to recover from his precipitate policy and to allow the Alvensleben 
Convention to become a dead letter. Although Bismarck had a noted animated 
bias toward the Poles, it is unlikely given his brilliance, that this character trait 
drove his foreign policy in this instance.83 Rather, the minister-president was 
relatively untutored in foreign policy at this early stage in his diplomatic career 
and he miscalculated. Alexander appeared to reverse preference and indulged 
the western powers by offering to give amnesty to the rebels if they quit the 
revolt in reasonable time. But Alexander then hewed to his initial aggressive 
preference after the Poles refused to back down. And Bismarck then made the 
tsar keen to the importance of Prussia as a conservative ally, first, by turning 
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down an offer of alliance, and then by forcing the Russian to reveal himself in a 
bogus plan to attack Austria with Russian assistance. Although Prussia and 
Russia mutually thwarted each other’s more risk acceptant plans for gain, the 
diplomatic exchange was useful in that it better clarified the limits that each 
would go to in order to support the other. In essence, both sides were being 
rationally consistent in their relationship with each other. 
Nevertheless, in addition to the Polish stance, the real problem with an 
expected utility explanation inheres in the disjointed Franco-British diplomacy. 
Given the trend away from intervention on the continent on the part of 
Parliament, coupled with Palmerston’s understanding that Russia would protect 
its possessions, why did the prime minister not recognize that his warlike 
diplomatic pronouncements were so likely to provoke the belief of British 
support in the minds of the Poles and the French, neither of whose motives he 
trusted? Cowley conveyed as much with his initial report from Paris regarding 
Napoleon’s sympathy for Poland. Moreover, Napoleon’s ire was purposely 
misplaced, initially directed at Prussia rather than Russia. Napoleon had an 
interest to drive a wedge between Prussia and Russia and to keep the Franco-
Russian alignment intact in order to relieve his dependence on Britain. But he 
aimed to do this by exploiting Prussia and Britain, two parties that were quite 
incidental to the Polish uprising. Napoleon’s motivated bias for aggression was 
shortly revealed after Bismarck let drop the Alvensleben Convention, thus giving 
the emperor no reason to quarrel with Prussia. But Napoleon nevertheless 
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continued to intimate that his country might press war on Prussia. His risk 
acceptance for gain was also clearly revealed in his willingness to align with 
anyone in order to achieve a foreign policy victory, first with Britain and then 
with Austria. Both states turned Napoleon down because they rightly saw that 
he aimed to exploit them for his own purposes and that he risked provoking a 
general war over Poland should they support his machinations. Then, 
Napoleon’s preference reversal to fight Russia was not well thought out 
considering France’s geopolitical interest in remaining friendly with the latter. 
Finally, the emperor changed preference a third time by attempting to take 
advantage of Austrian weakness after the failure of Confederation reform. He 
threatened Austria with hostilities, thus driving the latter into the arms of 
Prussia, precisely the opposite of his intent. One could argue that the situation 
materially changed as Russia proceeded to crush the revolt and refused amnesty 
for the insurgents. Then it could be argued that Napoleon’s preference 
modification to contest Russia instead of Prussia was rational. But the third 
preference change to threaten hostilities against Austria because of presumed 
weakness on the part of the latter indicates a motivated bias for opportunistic 
aggression rather than a careful consideration of the situation.  
From Britain, Palmerston failed to restrain, and at times, abetted, the 
importunate diplomatic comments of Russell. When Russell realized that Britain 
would not intervene militarily, why did he give verbal ammunition to both the 
Poles and the Russians? These actions merely served to embolden both sides to 
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press aggression more forcefully against each other. Affective abandonment, that 
is, a prospect approach in combination with motivated biases, is more convincing 
here than expected utility. Russia refused to give up its endowments in Poland 
and the rest of Europe should not have been surprised. But it was. Britain and 
France were clearly overdeterred by Russia, but they pretended not to be. The 
certainty principle pointed to general war should the western powers persist in 
compelling Russia to desist. Britain eventually used the insurance premium in 
conservative fashion by conceding Poland to Russia at the risk of seeing Prussian 
territorial integrity impaired by a Napoleonic assault on the Rhine. It did so by 
finally making clear to France its preference for strict non-intervention. But 
Britain did so late in the game, thus allowing unnecessary Polish blood to be 
shed in a lost cause!lost because Palmerston knew that Britain would not 
intervene militarily on the continent.  
Additionally, and not surprisingly, Napoleon felt betrayed by the British; 
he suspected a plot to separate France from Russia. It is true that Britain played 
its hand poorly by Russell’s curt rejection of Napoleon’s proposal for a congress. 
Moreover, as indicated above, both Palmerston and Russell, with their public 
comments, seemed to lead on both Napoleon and the Polish insurgents. Thus, 
Derby famously excoriated Russell for his incompetent handling of the Polish 
crisis as “meddle and muddle.” Disraeli agreed, writing that “the Polish question 
is a diplomatic Frankenstein, created out of cadaverous remnants, by the mystic 
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blundering of Lord Russell.”84 But Napoleon was clearly risk acceptant for gain 
and he felt humiliated when all of his machinations over Poland came to naught. 
Both Britain and Austria sensed a motivated bias to drag Europe into war in 
order to gratify his redrawing the map of Europe. Thompson argues ironically 
that “some such redrawing of the map of Europe on nationalist lines was 
overdue and, if carried through, might have anticipated by peaceful means the 
settlement of 1918.”85 But Napoleon was a weathervane, always cocking towards 
opportunities for self-aggrandizement, but without the will to persist in any one 
plan. 
Bismarck was the true beneficiary of the Polish Uprising. Mosse argues 
that Napoleon learned that the Franco-British entente was “a curb, not a 
partnership for action.”86 Nevertheless, there was misunderstanding on both 
sides. While Britain did not match words with actions, the emperor did not listen 
to soundings from Cowley through Drouyn. Both diplomats blamed Austrian 
inaction as the reason why a stronger stand could not be taken against the 
Russians.87 Thus, this ruled out single-handed action, but it did not rule out a 
Franco-British démarche. This was never in the cards. Britain kept France in the 
fold in order to restrain it, but Napoleon merely felt emboldened to aggressive 
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action. Thus, mishandling on both sides sundered the Franco-British entente in 
effect since the Crimean War. Napoleon also estranged Russia because he felt 
that the latter was taking insufficient notice of his diplomatic influence. Thus this 
alignment was broken. But Russia and Prussia drew closer due to Prussia’s 
benevolent neutrality leaving Bismarck to exploit the imbalanced structure of the 
European system with his foray into the succession dispute over the Danish 
Duchies. 
The Danish War over the Elbe Duchies (1864). 
By the end of 1864, Prussia had the most room for maneuver in foreign affairs 
than any state on the continent.88 Bismarck was able to use his success in the Elbe 
Duchies both to consolidate Germany north of the Main as well as to gain assent 
by the recalcitrant Landtag (Prussian parliament) for his illegally funded army 
reforms and thus draw Prussian liberals to his side.89 This was no small feat. 
France and Britain, despite some posturing, had little interest in working 
together to aid the Danes and alternatively torpedoed plans to jointly oppose 
Prussian aggression. Morier, the Germanophile British diplomat, intrigued 
Russell with the possibility that Prussia would be a liberal bulwark against both 
French and Russian revisionism. Palmerston was not taken in by this argument 
although he had been supportive, since 1848, of any plan that might consolidate 
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Germany in order to give it more political vigor.90 Napoleon was willing to be 
drawn in by Bismarck with the possibility of future compensations on the west 
bank of the Rhine. Russia was happy to see Prussia and Austria work together 
because they served as a buffer between France and Poland. Austria thought it 
was gaining Prussia for a conservative alliance as Bismarck appeared to take his 
stand in the Duchies on respect for international treaties rather than on national 
aspirations. This pretension also relieved Britain and Russia from taking 
significant action as Bismarck was merely claiming to uphold the status quo. 
Russia claimed to be indifferent as to whether control of the Sound passed from 
Denmark to Prussia as long as a Scandinavian union of Denmark and Sweden 
did not come to fruition.91 
 The status of the Duchies is one of the most vexing diplomatic issues of 
the 19th century, complicated by rival national claims of Danes, Germans, and 
Schleswig-Holsteiners. France, Britain, Russia and Sweden had outside claims as 
well. Situated between Denmark and Germany, the southern half of the Jutland 
peninsula contained the two territories of Schleswig and Holstein (with 
Lauenburg). Since the 15th century, the two Duchies were united and held as 
dukedoms under a personal union with the Danish crown.92 A treaty of 1720, 
supported by France and Britain, guaranteed this relationship. In 1806, during 
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the Napoleonic Wars, Christian VII of Denmark incorporated both Duchies. 
Under the 1815 Vienna settlement, the Duchy of Lauenburg was added to 
Christian’s territories. The populace of both Holstein and Lauenburg being 
overwhelmingly German, the region had long been a member of the Holy 
Roman Empire. Thus, under the Vienna settlement the Danish crown was made 
a member of the newly constituted German Confederation due to the king’s rule 
over Holstein.93 In contrast, while the southern portion of Schleswig was largely 
German, the rest of the Duchy was Danish. Thus it was never a member of the 
German Confederation. The 1848 revolutions that swept Europe led to the 
dissolution of the union between Schleswig and Holstein, the former 
incorporated into Denmark, the latter remaining a member of the German 
Confederation.94 The Danes attempted to annex the Duchies outright, but a 
strong counter-movement in Germany prevented this action.95 In 1849 Denmark 
and the German Confederation fought a war with each other in which the latter 
was defeated, having been preoccupied with revolution itself. Parallel mediation 
by Britain and Russia resulted in a protocol entirely favorable to Denmark. 
Austria imposed a humiliating settlement on Prussia at Olmütz in 1850. Thus 
resistance to the Danish problem was impossible for the Prussians.96 In 1852 the 
Treaty of London pledged Austria, France, Britain, Russia, Prussia, and Sweden 
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to maintain the integrity of the Danish crown, although Holstein and Lauenburg 
continued to reserve their traditional rights and privileges. 
 Earlier in 1839, King Frederic VI of Denmark was succeeded by his cousin 
Christian VIII. Christian’s son, Frederick VII, was the last male member of the 
House of Oldenburg, which had held the Danish crown for the last four 
centuries.97 The Treaty of London also claimed to solve the succession problem 
by recognizing crown prince Christian of Glücksburg, a more distant cousin in 
the female line of succession. Moreover, the treaty specified that Denmark and 
the Duchies should remain under the same sovereign.98 While Prussia assented 
to these terms, the Schleswig-Holsteiners disputed Christian’s claim to the throne 
because the Duchies had always upheld Salic Law, which denied the possibility 
of succession through the female line. Thus, the Schleswig-Holsteiners argued 
that the Duchies should be ruled by the duke of Augustenburg, a direct 
descendant of an early 16th century ruler of Denmark, Christian III.99 
 Neither the Danes nor the Germans were happy with the London Treaty 
and Frederick VI began a series of encroachments on the rights of Holsteiners 
and enacted a policy of Danisation in Schleswig, thus fanning the flames of 
German nationalism.100 The Federal Diet in Frankfurt contested the new Danish 
constitution of 1855 in which Holstein was to retain autonomy but Schleswig was 
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to be incorporated. But the Danes had freedom for maneuver as Austro-Prussian 
relations were strained during the Italian War of Unification. Two years after 
accession as minister-president Bismarck stated it is “certain that the whole 
Danish question can only be solved by war in a sense favourable to us: the 
occasion for war can be found at any moment, when our relation to the Great 
Powers is one favourable for the conduct of a war.”101 If he could bring Austria 
over to his side, Bismarck was sure that Russia, Britain, and France would be 
incapable of united action on this issue. The Danes hoped for a Swedish alliance 
and were convinced of western support. In turn, the Federal Diet threatened 
Execution; that is, German troops should occupy Holstein until Frederick 
withdrew his contemplated administrative changes and abided by the London 
Treaty.102 
 As British foreign secretary, Russell weighed in by asking the Danes to 
liberalize their administration of Schleswig, but The Times opposed the Diet’s 
threatened action. Again, Napoleonic adventurism was the real cause of the 
newspaper’s displeasure. This was a poor time for Prussia to be  “meddling in 
her neighbor’s affairs” given the emperor’s likelihood to exploit the situation.103 
Again, “we are careful not to inquire whether Prussia is right or wrong in 
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considering that Denmark has failed to fulfill the obligations of the treaties into 
which she has entered. We heard enough of the stammverwandtschaft!affinity 
of race!between these famous duchies and the rest of the German people in 
1848; but we were sanguine enough to hope that people in these days were no 
more inclined to go to war for sentiments than for ideas.”104  
British public opinion pushed in the direction of intervention on behalf of 
the Danes whereas Russell was taking his advice from Morier, who was posted 
to Berlin in the 1850s and became friendly with Prussian liberal-nationalists. 
Thus, the diplomat forcefully put forth his views in a rebuttal to The Times. 
According to Murray,  
“Morier described German nationalism as an important means for 
forestalling Napoleon III’s aggressions: ‘The Organization of Italian 
nationality is…for a successful resistance of Napoleonic ideas as nothing 
compared with the imperative necessity of Germany being united by the 
only bond which can unite her, that of national Bewusstein.’ By criticizing 
Prussia’s German policy in Schleswig-Holstein, The Times was in fact 
alienating England’s best ally in any future struggle against France. It was 
in England’s interests, therefore, to support Prussia as it followed the only 
course open to it: ‘[Prussia] must stand and fall with Germany, and if the 
struggle is to come, better, far better, for her that it should overtake her 
whilst boná fide carrying out a national policy and at the head of 
Germany heartily supporting her in such a policy, than in some doubtful 
personal quarrel, when dynastic jealousies would be sure to put her 
conduct in a false and odious light.’”105  
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Morier directly advised Russell that “running amuck against German national 
sentiment was the most suicidal act which England can be capable of.”106 Russell 
was essentially being told what he wanted to hear. As early as September 1861, 
Russell wrote to Clarendon, “it is clear that the course of Prussia, although not 
easy, is grand and glorious. As Austria declines, the star of Prussia must rise. But 
she must avoid on the one hand the delusions of Nationalverein, and on the 
other the feudal dreams of his late Prussian Majesty...She must comply with the 
demand for a free government in Prussia, but not assume stiffly, harshly, 
pedantically, and prematurely the supremacy in Germany. The pear will fall 
when it is ripe.”107 In consequence, in September 1862, Russell announced his 
famous ‘Gotha Despatch’ which proposed that Schleswig be granted self-
government and Denmark, Schleswig, Holstein, and Lauenburg have four 
independent assemblies of equal authority, even in matters of finance. Morier 
claimed to be the ‘moral author’ of this strange project as he had been advising 
Russell for nearly a year.108 Naturally, this preference met with enthusiasm in 
Germany as well as with Victoria, whose preference for Germany was scarcely 
veiled. But Russell’s proposal was short-lived and he had to retract it as 
Denmark and Sweden objected outright and no support could be found within 
the British Cabinet considering that public opinion was decidedly pro-Danish. 
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At the end of March 1863, Frederick rashly issued a Patent that intended 
to incorporate Schleswig while recognizing that Holstein belonged to the 
German Confederation, but demanding from it a monetary contribution for joint 
affairs. This was a clear violation of the Treaty of London that, in turn, produced 
an uproar among Prussians and Austrians alike, because the German minority 
was being incorporated against its wish. On July 9 the Federal Diet gave 
Denmark six weeks to withdraw the Patent and raised again the threat of 
Execution. Confident of foreign support, on August 26, the Danes rejected the 
Diet’s demand and declared Execution a warlike act. A prime factor in its 
decision was Palmerston’s provocative speech in which he declared  
“an important matter of British policy to maintain the independence of 
and integrity of the Danish Monarchy…[and while Holstein was a 
German state, the Confederation had] no rights [in Schleswig, which was] 
a matter of international law and of European concern. [There was no use 
in disguising the fact that] what is at the bottom of the German design [to 
connect Schleswig with Holstein] is the dream of a German fleet and the 
wish to get Kiel as a German seaport…If any violent attempt were made 
to overthrow those rights,…it would not be Denmark alone with which 
they would have to contend.”109  
 
Russell seconded Palmerston’s opinion by writing to Rechberg that, “if Germany 
persists in confounding Schleswig with Holstein, other Powers of Europe may 
confound Holstein with Schleswig and deny the right of Germany to interfere 
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with the one any more than she has with the other, except as a European 
Power.”110 
On September 28, Frederick promulgated a unitary constitution for 
Denmark and Schleswig!”our kingdom.” The Federal Diet countered by 
demanding that Frederick rescind the Patent by the end of October or else it 
would proceed with Execution. Succession became a live issue immediately 
because Frederick died shortly thereafter. All of the lesser German states were in 
favor of the liberal duke Frederick of Augustenburg as sovereign of the united 
Duchies. German sentiment ran high in favor of reclamation of the Duchies, just 
as their ancestors had reclaimed East Prussia from Poland, Pomerania from 
Sweden, and the Rhineland from France.111 Immediately, Russell sounded 
Drouyn as to the possibility of joint action, but he was brusquely reminded that it 
“would be analogous to the course pursued by British and French in the Polish 
question [and that the emperor] desires to preserve entire liberty of action for 
France.”112   
Bismarck appeared to take his stand on respect for international treaties; 
thus he supported Christian, angering Prussian liberal nationalists. It was not 
obvious to the liberals at first, but Bismarck wanted the Duchies for Prussia, not 
for Frederick. Creating another medium-sized state, like Hesse and Hanover, 
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that would fear Prussia and curry favor with Austria was not in his interest.113  
Christian ascended to the throne but was put in the cruel position of either 
adopting the new constitution, thus bringing on a casus belli by Prussia and 
Austria, or refuting the constitution and risking his throne due to Danish 
anger.114 Public opinion in Austria preferred the Augustenburg candidature, but 
Franz Joseph was relieved that Bismarck took his stand on international law 
rather than on national self-determination. Championing the latter throughout 
Europe but denying it with regard to the Hungarians put the Austrian in a 
hypocritical light.115 Christian adopted the constitution and the majority of the 
German officials in Schleswig then refused to take the oath of allegiance. 
Russell was put in an awkward position. He petitioned the Danes to 
withdraw the constitution as the only way to prevent Execution, but they 
refused. Thus, the foreign secretary despaired to Monrad, the new Danish 
premier, “we cannot give active support to a Government which puts itself so 
manifestly in the wrong.” But he also recognized that Germany “was mixing 
federal right in Holstein, international promises in Schleswig, a common 
constitution and the succession to the Crown, all in one hash.”116 Palmerston 
knew that Britain’s diplomatic hand was weak, writing to Russell, “Schleswig is 
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no part of Germany, and its invasion by German troops would be an act of war 
versus Denmark, which would in my clear opinion entitle Denmark to our active 
military and naval support. But you and I could not announce such a 
determination without the concurrence of the Cabinet and the consent of the 
Queen.”117  
Holstein was occupied by Confederation forces on December 24 and 
Bismarck warned Buchanan that, by adopting the constitution, Denmark had 
violated the status quo and that the occupation of Schleswig must follow. If 
Britain interfered, Prussia would declare the London Treaty void since Prussia 
could not simultaneously adhere to the treaty while tolerating Denmark’s 
violation of it.118 This was clearly casuistry insofar as one clause did not preclude 
the other. Upon advice from ambassadors Bloomfield and Buchanan, Russell 
petitioned the queen that strong language toward Vienna and Berlin would be 
“conducive to the maintenance of the peace.”119 Russia, France, and Sweden 
should be invited with Britain to jointly represent to the Diet that the invasion of 
Schleswig would be “an act of aggression on non-German territory” which 
would probably meet resistance. Denmark proposed a conference for 
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consideration of the Duchies question to which the Germans should assent.120 
But Victoria demanded that Russell’s proposal be vetted by the Cabinet, which 
then deleted any aggressive diplomatic language towards Prussia. Palmerston 
and Russell were therefore defeated by a government that had no intention of 
going to war over the Duchies.121 The Cabinet marked time by consenting to 
petition the other powers as to their attitudes toward Prussian aggression. Not 
surprisingly, Cowley reported a conversation with Drouyn in which the latter 
stated that “the question of Poland had shown that Great Britain could not be 
relied upon when war was in the distances…”122 Napoleon preferred a 
modification to the treaty instead of war with Germany. Cowley attributed this 
reasoning to “1. A rankling disappointment at the failure of the projected 
Congress and a desire to justify the project in the eyes of the world by the 
spectacle of a conflict which might have been avoided had the project been 
accepted. 2. Anger towards Her Majesty’s Government for their imputed 
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abandonment of France in the Polish question. 3. The possibility that out of the 
complications something may turn up advantageous to France.”123   
Austro-Prussian forces invaded Schleswig on February 1, 1864. The British 
Cabinet immediately supported a proposal for an armistice following the 
evacuation of Schleswig by the Danes. Both Austria and Prussia rejected the 
proposal. Not for public consumption, it was later disclosed that Roon, the 
Prussian war minister, revealed Bismarck’s motivated bias to seize the Duchies 
for Germany: “the question is not one of right, but of force, and we have the 
force.”124 Russell angrily denounced the military invasion by opining that France 
should march her army to the Rhine and Britain send the fleet to Copenhagen.125 
But Palmerston was more circumspect, confiding to Russell that he doubted 
“whether the Cabinet or the country are as yet prepared for active interference. 
The truth is, that to enter into a military conflict with all Germany on continental 
ground would be a serious undertaking.”126 The reality was that Britain could 
only send an army of 20,000 troops whereas Prussia and Austria together could 
field 200,000-300,000 troops. Moreover, fear for French adventurism and 
consequent security of the Low Countries figured in the prime minister’s 
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reticence as well.127 Palmerston’s reasoning revealed the kernel of the problem 
regarding the Duchies. Without the help of Napoleon, British action alone 
against the Germans would be ineffective. But to enlist the help of France would 
court dangers on the Rhine. A choice between Germany in the Duchies or France 
on the Rhine would come down in favor of the former. Palmerstonian diplomacy 
had consistently restrained France (while intermittently working with it) and 
Russia and strengthened Germany. To reverse course would involve a 
diplomatic revolution likely to bring down the government. Russell was the only 
Cabinet member prepared to oppose Germany and in this he had vacillating 
opinions.128 
Both Austria and Prussia professed their adherence to international law to 
the tsar as the reason for invading the Duchies, but also their continued belief in 
maintaining the integrity of Denmark. These professions also allayed fears by the 
British Cabinet regarding its conciliatory attitude.129 But Alexander hoped that 
Bismarck would attend the conference proposed by the Danes. The Prussian 
agreed as long as no pre-conditions were set. Thus, the Danes were turned down 
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by the signatories to the London Treaty regarding military intervention.130 But 
the Prussians crossed near Denmark proper itself by invading Jutland. 
Palmerston confided to Somerset, first lord of the Admiralty, that “Austria and 
Prussia, reckoning upon our passive attitude, contemplate the occupation of 
Copenhagen…and mean to dictate at the Danish capital their own terms of 
peace. We should be laughed at if we stood by and allowed this to be done.”131 
Cowley then reported that a Prussian threat to invade Saxony alarmed Napoleon 
and that a joint naval demonstration might be entertained. Russell, without 
consulting the Cabinet, informed Drouyn that he intimated in Vienna that if 
allied troops remained in Jutland, a British squadron would be sent to 
Copenhagen.132 Russell then asked Gorchakov through Napier to assist in the 
naval demonstration, but the vice chancellor temporized by stating that because 
the Gulf of Finland would be frozen until May, Russian warships could not 
appear before the middle of that month. When asked about Russian ships in 
American ports, Gorchakov stated that it would be two months before they could 
reach the Baltic; besides they were of a class not befitting the dignity of the 
Russian navy for the purpose of armed mediation.133 
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Even Russell was not in earnest. Assurances from both Berlin and Vienna 
that the advance into Jutland was accidental and that there was no determination 
to attack Denmark proper led him to inform Drouyn that the proposal to send a 
British squadron to the Baltic has been dropped.134 Metternich, the Austrian 
ambassador to Paris, informed Napoleon that a Franco-British naval 
demonstration would keep Austria and Prussia together, whereas Austria 
desired to get out of the scrape.135 This importuning at the behest of the 
conservative Drouyn and empress Eugénie, coupled with Russell’s hesitancy, led 
the emperor to quash any idea of opposing Germany with Britain as an ally. 
When the Cabinet repudiated Russell’s initiatives, France and Russia were 
informed that there was no chance that the British fleet would be dispatched to 
Danish waters.136  
Upon hearing that Prussia accepted a conference to be attended by the 
London Treaty signatories, as well as a member of the German Confederation, 
both Russell and Gorchakov deluded themselves into believing that it was the 
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threat of armed mediation that brought the aggressors to the peace table.137 They 
were quickly disabused of this notion as the German powers decided to extend 
hostilities to the entire Jutland at the same time they signaled their readiness to 
conclude an armistice and attend the conference. By March 20 the entire southern 
Jutland had been captured.  
In anticipation of the conference, Cowley was sent to Paris for one last 
effort at joint action. Clarendon reported that Napoleon stated that, “we had 
received a gros soufflet with respect to Poland from Russia and to get another 
from Germany without resenting it was more than he could stand. He could not 
therefore join us in strong language to the German Powers, not being prepared to 
go to war with them…He must be all the more cautious owing to the widespread 
belief in his designs for compensation on the Rhine: and he was not ready to 
pursue one policy on the Eider and a totally different one on the Po.”138 
Napoleon would therefore not champion Italian nationalism, on the one 
hand, but thwart the nationalism of the Schleswig-Holsteiners by supporting the 
Danish monarchy, on the other hand. It is true that the Duchies bristled under 
Danish chauvinism, but it is also true that the Duchies had interests of their own 
apart from Denmark, as well as Germany. While Napoleon was cognizant of the 
distrust expressed throughout Europe towards his presumed pretensions on the 
Rhine, he was not being fully honest with Clarendon. Napoleon proposed that a 
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plebiscite be called to consider the wishes of the inhabitants of the Duchies. 
Oddly, Palmerston advocated this plan in 1848 and Russell backed a plebiscite in 
Italy, but now Britain vetoed it as being too new for Europe to handle. The 
foreign secretary stated that “the Great Powers had not the habit of consulting 
populations when questions affecting the Balance of Power had to be settled.”139 
This was an obvious slap at France because it was scarcely hidden that Napoleon 
had also cast about for an understanding with Prussia, offering to support 
Bismarck in annexing the Duchies outright for Germany as long as the plebiscite 
would be called. Napoleon was looking for future favors to come.140 Bismarck 
kept Napoleon interested by dangling the carrot of territory on the west bank of 
the Rhine.141 Moreover, he stated that he would consider the plebiscite as long as 
the partition of Schleswig was inevitable. Even if it could be determined how the 
plebiscite was to be conducted, popularly, or through consultation of the ducal 
estates, it was obvious to Russell that the election would be a sham: “in fact even 
the evacuation of the Duchies by the troops of Austria and Prussia and of 
Denmark also would not now render it possible to have an election of a 
sovereign fairly conducted, even if the principle were admitted. For German 
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agitators have so disturbed all the elements of peace and order that the 
population would give their votes under the influence of terror.”142      
By April 18 the lines of the Düppel, the last fortification on Schleswig, had 
been breached and abandoned by the Danes. Only the small Danish navy and the 
Baltic Sea separated the Germans from an invasion of Denmark proper as the 
conference opened in London. Napoleon congratulated Wilhelm on his military 
success and then advised the king of Sweden to abandon any idea of an armed 
intervention on behalf of Denmark.143 At the end of the month Napoleon 
informed the Danes that Britain would do nothing for them and that “they 
would be wise to accept the frontier line [in Schleswig] offered by Prussia as 
otherwise she risked losing everything.”144 
The London Conference opened on April 25 and sat for two months, 
breaking up after the failure to achieve any agreement. Victoria opposed any 
alliance with Napoleon whereas Palmerston believed that Britain and France 
could work together to keep the entire 1852 London Treaty intact. Russell took a 
middle position believing that Britain should support Napoleon’s plan for a 
plebiscite. But due to fractiousness within the British government, Clarendon, the 
British plenipotentiary, showed with no instructions other than to propose an 
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armistice.145 Thus the conference was a dismal affair for all members save for the 
German aggressors. Bismarck demanded a victor’s peace; no longer was the 
integrity of the Danish monarchy even being given lip-service. The German 
powers earlier professed to base their invasion of the Duchies on respect for the 
London Treaty of 1852. After initial military success, they then proposed that a 
personal union between the Duchies and the king of Denmark might be 
continued. This, of course, was unacceptable to the Danes who wanted to 
incorporate the Duchies within Denmark outright.146 Bismarck now became 
annoyed that a plebiscite in the Duchies might demand a withdrawal of German 
troops. This was incomprehensible to him.147 Now, in light of their unopposed 
success, outright annexation of the Duchies was being demanded.148 Gorchakov 
warned Bismarck that due to British public opinion, Prussian intransigence 
would force Britain into the arms of France. Britain might not sanction French 
aggression on the Rhine outright, but it would surely follow were Britain and 
Prussia to become embroiled with each other.149 Bismarck countered by arguing 
that a war with Britain would serve his purposes because it would unite all of 
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Germany.150 Moreover, in the event of a French attack, Russia would have to 
come to the aid of Prussia in order to avoid having French troops in Posen and 
Cracow.151 Finally, Bismarck made the rather unanswerable claim that if Prussia 
failed to annex the Duchies as demanded by the liberal-nationalists, Wilhelm 
would be forced to abdicate and he would resign his office, thus ushering in a 
liberal German state with revolutionary aspirations. The British were 
sympathetic toward the German liberals, but Morier despised Bismarck’s 
authoritarianism as traitorous to the German cause, and he, like his fellow 
Whigs, would welcome the minister-president’s departure from the political 
scene.152 Thus, Bismarck argued that this was yet another route by which 
revolution might sweep Europe to the detriment of the conservative powers. On 
May 28 Apponyi, on behalf of Austria and Prussia, proposed that the Duchies be 
separated from Denmark. Russia was the last of the London signatories to 
abandon the 1852 treaty as Alexander ceded his rights in Holstein to Christian 
who was recommended as the future ruler of the united Duchies. The conference 
broke down because Prussia refused to renew the expiring armistice save for a 
period of six months. Monrad, the Danish premier, appealed to London, 
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reminding it that “Denmark had step by step followed the advice of the neutral 
Powers, and especially that of the English Cabinet, [but that] Denmark was still 
without allies.” Russell replied on July 6 that H.M.G. sympathized “with king 
and people in the severe trial which they have been obliged to undergo, [but that 
they] have never engaged themselves, nor can they now, to support the Danish 
cause by force of arms, or to impose upon Germany the conditions suggested in 
the conference.”153 The armistice expired as the conference concluded and 
Prussian forces proceeded to capture the island of Alsen, thus threatening the 
integrity of Zealand. Consequently, the Eider-Dane Cabinet fell and Denmark 
had to sue for peace by ceding Lauenburg, Schleswig, and Holstein to the 
German aggressors. Russell tried to put a good face on the debacle of unopposed 
German aggression: “I trust the Danes and Germans will now make peace, 
leaving the Danes free from German interference and giving the Germans over to 
German rule…I am very glad we have not given in to the temptation of war 
between France and Germany. The French, if they get an inch, will certainly take 
an ell.”154 
Testing asymmetric affective abandonment. 
At first blush expected utility might provide a reasonable explanation of the 
Danish War over the Duchies. British diplomats tended to take notice of 
increasing Prussian and Austrian aggression and initially offered suggestions 
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(e.g., the Gotha Despatch) as to how Denmark might mollify German 
nationalistic impulses regarding the Duchies. Moreover, Russell twice sounded 
out the French for joint action, but was repeatedly rebuffed. Then the foreign 
secretary himself engaged diplomatically, first, to petition the government to use 
strong language in protest of German aggression, and second, to threaten the 
Austrians to halt their persistent attacks on Jutland. Finally, he also tried to 
organize a three-party naval demonstration in support of armed mediation 
against the Germans, but was rebuffed, both by France and by Russia. Although 
Palmerston and Russell were far out in front of what the Cabinet was willing to 
do, the prime minister was spot on in identifying Prussian ambitions to obtain a 
naval port in Kiel as well as to annex Schleswig and Holstein. Thus, in favor of 
an expected utility explanation, new information was appropriately being 
employed to further cement preferences for intervention on behalf of the Danes 
as the situation materially changed due to increasing German bellicosity. It is 
true that Denmark was technically in the wrong to issue a Patent to incorporate 
Schleswig. But Palmerston began to realize that Bismarck was looking for any 
excuse for a casus belli in order to invade the Duchies.155 
Nevertheless, as the international stakes increased with Prussian 
aggression towards Denmark, the British Cabinet became more and more 
convinced that it could maintain its diplomatic prestige by a policy of strict non-
intervention in Continental affairs. Unfortunately, such a stance lowered its 
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prestige as the Continental powers had historically grown used to valuing 
Britain to the degree that she made her presence felt.156 Napier later revealed the 
growing German attitude towards Britain which stands as a proxy for the rest of 
Europe: “There never was a period in wh. England was an object of so much 
dislike to all parties in Germany, as at present, Conservatives, Constitutionalists, 
Ultra Liberals, Unionists, separatists,!all join in one way only!in repugnance 
to England, in noting her prosperity, & in undervaluing her power…France is 
hated too. But France is watched with anxiety and respected.”157 
This motivated bias to conduct British foreign policy on the Continent in a 
strictly non-interventionist manner is well revealed in the acrimonious 
parliamentary debate in which Palmerston and Russell were censured by the 
opposition. Disraeli began with Palmerston’s  
“fatal encouragement of the Danes in his speech of 23 July 1863, and then 
turning to [Russell’s] Polish policy and ‘that curt, and as I conceive, most 
offensive reply’ to the emperor’s suggestion of a congress. If, however, the 
intervention urged by Russell had been accepted by Napoleon, it ‘must 
inevitably have produced a great European War.’ As it was, the 
Government’s policy was one of ‘menaces never accomplished and 
promises never fulfilled.’ The London Conference just completed was a 
‘barren failure’, and the British Government’s contribution to it had been 
proposals for ‘the dismemberment of Denmark!so much for integrity,’ 
and for a ‘joint guarantee of the Powers!so much for independence…The 
position of England in the counsels of Europe is essentially that of a 
moderating and mediatorial Power. Within twelve months we have been 
twice repulsed at St. Petersburg, Austria has allowed our menaces to pass 
her like the idle wind. We have threatened Prussia, and Prussia has defied 
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us…They [Palmerston and Russell] have alienated Russia, they have 
estranged France, and then they call Parliament together to declare war 
against Germany…I find Europe impotent to vindicate public law, 
because all the great alliances are broken down.’”158  
 
The Tories summarized by arguing that Britain’s national interests lay overseas 
in its colonies rather than in Europe and that the balance of power was “founded 
on the obsolete traditions of an antiquated system.”159 Thus, Disraeli and the 
Conservatives offered nothing other than to hew to a policy of strict non-
intervention in Continental affairs.  
For her part, Victoria, through her ministerial confidant, Granville, 
repeatedly exploited the divisions within the Cabinet to frustrate what she 
considered to be the anti-German policy of “those two dreadful old men,” 
Palmerston and Russell.160 Although the queen discerned the complexity of the 
issue insofar as the Duchies had interests apart from both Denmark and 
Germany, still, the true nature of the conflict was that of a major power bullying 
a smaller one. Thus, even though she appeared even-handed in her detestation 
for both Denmark and Prussia over this issue, Victoria’s attitude ended up 
abetting a Cabinet that was predisposed to a policy of strict non-intervention in 
Continental affairs. Her motivated bias to leave Denmark to its fate also figured 
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in the calculations made by the other major powers that might have assisted 
Britain in opposing this German aggression.161 
The Whigs were also attacked from the opposite end of the political 
spectrum as the Radicals argued that the philosophy of laissez-faire ought to be 
applied to foreign policy. Thus, Cobden was able to ominously crow that “there 
is one great change amounting to a revolution which has been accomplished in 
our foreign policy. After the fiasco last Session on the Danish question, our 
Foreign Office will never again attempt to involve us in any European 
entanglements for the Balance of Power, or for any dynastic purpose. 
Henceforth, we shall observe an absolute abstention from Continental politics. 
Non-intervention is the policy of all future governments in this country.”162 
Bernhardi, a Prussian diplomat posted to Italy at the time, put his finger on an 
aspect of the British problem by sneering that, “they don’t want to pay more than 
7d. in the £ income tax, and know very well that it will rise to 10d. if there is 
war.”163 Thus, self-interested awareness regarding the loss of trade, the ruin of 
credit, material losses, and attendant civil unrest associated with war were the 
factors dominating British foreign policy during this period.164  
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In consequence, Palmerston’s policy over the Duchies question was one of 
pure bluff given how constrained he was by the Cabinet. As Bourne notes, 
“Palmerston’s policy of bluff was certainly always dangerous!and it was made 
more so by Russell’s tendency to forget that it was bluff.”165 Thus, one could 
argue that both diplomats, with their bellicose public comments directed toward 
the Germans, unintentionally led on the Danes to a degree that was deplorable, 
but the latter had motivated biases to believe that international support could 
automatically be assumed. Palmerston’s gambit was to scare off the aggressors 
early with loud talk. But Bismarck was not the least concerned after he was able 
to ensure Austrian cooperation. Ultimately, both British statesmen were beaten 
down by their isolation. They eventually professed to be swayed by Prussian and 
Austrian assurances that the aggressive actions comported with international 
law and support for the status quo. These preference reversals were likely the 
result of anticipated negative regret considering Palmerston’s stark assessment of 
the imbalance of military forces that would occur with British participation in a 
war against Germany. Such preference reversals might be considered rationally 
consistent regarding one’s environment, but one engages in irrational 
consistency to believe that it is German rectitude rather than being manifestly 
outmanned as the reason for coming to terms with the situation. Thus, it is 
difficult to accept that Russell really believed his statement cited above in which 
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the Germans were exonerated for their aggression but in which the French were 
manifestly in the wrong for proposing war. 
Still, it is not clear at what point Britain would be forced to intervene. It 
was taken for granted that an invasion of Denmark proper would be a casus belli 
for Britain. But even this threshold is debatable. Palmerston allowed that Britain 
might intervene effectively in the narrow territory of Jutland and Schleswig. 
Thus, with the aid of 30,000 Danes and 20,000 Swedes, 20,000 British troops 
would not necessarily be outnumbered at the point of attack by Prussian and 
Austrian forces. Given that Britain possessed the world’s finest navy, the prime 
minister feared a national disgrace were Prussia and Austria to sail before British 
shores enroute to occupying the capital of a friendly power with which Britain 
had mutual interests and treaty obligations. Palmerston argued that this action 
should be disallowed regardless of whether Britain had to act alone or not.166 It 
was lucky for Britain that the German aggressors refrained from conducting such 
an enterprise, but it is still not clear that the British would have opposed them 
militarily had they done so. 
From this analysis, it can be argued that Britain used the insurance 
premium in risky fashion. It is usually believed that making concessions in order 
to avoid war, hence casualties, is a conservative approach. But given Britain’s 
proximity to the Baltic Sea, it was fatuous to believe that the Black, or the 
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Adriatic, Sea, respectively, was a more important security concern as had been 
variously argued.167 How could the British Cabinet even contemplate allowing 
German naval forces to pass before the British mainland enroute to attacking a 
threatened ally? Of what use was the British navy if not for deterring such 
aggression? Not only were the Germans unlawfully taking endowments from 
Denmark, but they were also taking from Britain in as much as the latter’s 
prestige to stem this motivated aggression was brazenly being challenged. 
Pflanze argues that the odds against Bismarck annexing the Duchies for Prussia 
were enormous. Britain and Austria were completely against annexation; Russia 
mildly so. All of the lesser German states favored the Augustenburg candidature. 
Napoleon’s secretive support for Prussia was both costly, and, when found out, 
quite treacherous.168 Britain had potential allies with which to thwart Prussian-
led aggression against Denmark, but it frittered away this option with a half-
hearted, and quickly reversed, preference for joint action. 
The motivated biases on the part of Napoleon to avoid intervention were 
equally debilitating. The British learned quickly how linked the Duchies, and the 
Polish, questions, respectively, were related in the mind of the emperor. The 
French response to the Duchies problem merely made manifest the end of the 
Franco-British entente that was sundered over the British response to the Polish 
Uprising. In particular, due to his indelicate diplomatic style, Russell’s 
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appointment to the foreign office was seriously resented by the French. But if 
Palmerston and Russell were at fault it was largely due to their failure to 
recognize that they had to come to terms with France, perhaps risk Napoleonic 
adventurism on the Rhine, and risk see their government fall over this 
diplomatic revolution.169 Napoleon would only act “if England sends troops and 
disembarks them”was the caustic reply to Cowley’s query regarding possible 
French participation in joint military action against the Germans during the 
London Conference.170 Thus, the emperor wanted to see the British committed 
beyond recall before he would act. But the price he was demanding for his 
assistance included territorial revisions for Italy, Poland, and, of course, 
France.171 Since Britain would not pay that price, Napoleon indiscriminately 
reversed preference by offering benevolent neutrality to Bismarck in exchange 
for favors to come. This was a mistake because Bismarck tempted but ultimately 
made no offer of territorial concessions. The emperor wanted to settle scores with 
Palmerston and Russell, but he overreached. Thus, by failing to cooperate with 
Britain, however non-committally, France ended up estranging her without 
achieving anything substantive. Moreover, Napoleon ended up sacrificing 
                                                            
169 Mosse argues that Palmerston and Russell should have tendered their 
resignations to the queen had they been serious about intervention. See, Mosse, 
“Queen Victoria and her Ministers in the Schleswig-Holstein Crisis 1863-1864,” 
op. cit., p. 273. 
170 Rouher, French minister of state, to Cowley, de La Gorce, Historire de la 
Seconde République, vol. 4, op. cit., p. 512. Cited in Seton-Watson, Britain in 
Europe, 1789-1914, op. cit., p. 452. 
171 Mosse, The European Powers and the German Question 1848-71, op. cit., p. 
211. 
 370 
nationalist principles that he ultimately could not enforce without risk to both 
France and his throne (the coming Franco-Prussian War of 1870) because he was 
then without allies, having estranged Russia and Austria as well.172 
Thus, for different reasons, both France and Britain used the insurance 
premium in risky fashion by failing to jointly oppose the German powers. 
Napoleon’s overreaching in this instance cost him future British goodwill. British 
dithering, and its unwillingness to take a chance on France, was costly in terms 
of prestige both then and in the future. The certainty principle is relevant here in 
that the western powers were not willing to cooperate enough to produce joint 
action in order to substantially reduce the risk of Prussian-led aggression 
succeeding. 
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Chapter 6: Asymmetric affective abandonment: Bismarck’s wars of unification: 
The Seven Weeks’ Austro-Prussian War (1866). 
 
Ostensibly a dispute over joint administration of the Elbe Duchies, Bismarck 
demonstrated a motivated bias to maneuver Austria into declaring war on 
Prussia in order to dissolve the Confederation and kick Austria out of Germany. 
This view is contestable from two quarters. The first is a rational choice 
explanation which argues that Bismarck might have been satisfied with an 
Austrian sale of Holstein to Prussia in conjunction with Prussian support, both 
for Austria’s position in Venetia and for aid in the reacquisition of Lombardy 
from Italy, respectively.1 The second position, notwithstanding the minister-
president’s boasting,2 argues that the situation was extremely fluid and that a 
fortuitous concatenation of external and internal forces allowed for a largely 
unexpected resounding success in unifying Germany north of the River Main.3 
Neither of these positions is tenable. Again, this case study will argue that the 
severely imbalanced nature of the European system, largely resulting from 
motivated biases on the parts of the major powers to abstain from intervention, 
allowed Prussia a free hand to engage in motivated aggression against an 
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isolated Austria. Austria, in turn, proved irrationally risk acceptant for loss to a 
degree unwarranted by the situation. 
 In August 1864, negotiations between Austria and Prussia over 
administration of the Duchies ran aground when Bismarck refused modest 
requests regarding the renewal of the Zollverein. Rechberg, the Austrian foreign 
minister, who worked to conciliate Prussia, resigned and foreign policy fell to the 
anti-Prussians, Mensdorff and Esterházy.4 The earlier Danish war was largely a 
Prussian affair; the Austrians did not want possession of the Duchies, but they 
could not allow Prussia to take them outright. Now, Austria proposed that 
Prussia should annex the Duchies in exchange for the county of Glatz (lost to 
Prussia in 1742). Both Wilhelm and Bismarck vetoed this offer and the latter 
essentially demanded that Prussia annex the Duchies outright without giving 
compensation. Franz Joseph, in turn, rejected this option. The Prussian crown 
council considered war against Austria, forcing the latter to come to terms 
codified in the Gastein Convention. Austria sold its rights in Lauenburg to 
Prussia. Thus, Austria was to administer Holstein while Prussia was to 
administer Schleswig and Lauenburg.  
Upon receiving Schleswig, Bismarck immediately petitioned Austria for 
Holstein in return for an indemnity to which Vienna declined. According to 
Pflanze, “like two boxers, Bismarck and Mensdorff circled warily, the one 
aggressive, the other defensive. The Junker’s task was to find, the general’s to 
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avoid, a casus belli that would place Austria in the wrong.”5 Spoiling for a fight, 
Bismarck sent furious missives to Vienna regarding its perfidy, intended to 
convince Wilhelm that the issue could only be settled by war. Wilhelm was 
stubbornly conscientious and Bismarck was afraid that he could not bring his 
sovereign to take action based on the possibilities associated with a policy of 
Machtpolitik. Thus, “like a clock, it was said in Berlin, the king had to be wound 
up each morning by his minister-president.”6 Since the 1850s, Bismarck argued 
that the federal relationship between Prussia and Austria must be reconstituted 
because the two states were “smothering each other”. Bismarck’s objectives were 
manifold; dissolve the Confederation likely through war, keep Britain and Russia 
from intervening, secure benevolent neutrality from France and mobilize the 
lesser German states in order to unify Germany.7 Domestic politics were failing 
Bismarck; he could not deliver a Constitution and the liberals engaged in a 
decade-long attempt to increase parliamentary power at the expense of royal 
prerogative.8 As Eulenburg, minister of the interior, argued, success in foreign 
policy would lead to success domestically by conquering the liberal opposition in 
Prussia. Bismarck replied that domestic success was merely a by-product of his 
motive to prosecute war against Austria: “Even if the government found itself at 
peace with the country [I] would have advised in favour of war…Domestic 
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considerations do not make a war necessary, but they are additional reasons for 
making it seem advantageous.”9 By February 1866 Bismarck convinced Wilhelm 
to begin diplomatic and military preparations for the impending conflict. 
Systemic imbalance. 
What were the reactions of the other major European powers and could they 
cooperate with each other in order to put a stop to Prussian aggression? Before 
process-tracing the diplomatic history of this conflict, empirical evidence 
regarding the imbalanced nature of the European system at this point is 
elucidated. Both the Second Polish Uprising and the war over the Duchies 
significantly influenced the later opinions of others largely in the direction of 
non-intervention. Russia regretted the conflict between Prussia and Austria 
largely because both were territorial cordons against French interference in 
Poland. Moreover, internal reform took top priority with the tsar. Prusso-Russian 
relations were cordial but Alexander regretted Bismarck’s ruthlessness. Both 
Russia and Austria were in agreement over maintaining the status quo in the 
Principalities, but the latter’s turbulent internal and external situation stemming 
from ethnic problems within its empire and its parlous financial condition made 
it a very unreliable and needy potential ally. Franco-Russian relations, although 
cordial, were insincere ever since the former interposed itself in the earlier Polish 
Uprising. British-Russian relations were in agreement over maintenance of the 
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status quo in Europe although there were points of contention between the two 
states in Central Asia. But on the whole, Russia would only react in Germany 
were its direct interests threatened, which it believed not to be the case. 
From Paris, Cowley reported that the anti-Prussian Drouyn took umbrage 
at the Gastein agreement in which the victors divided the spoils: “There was 
really no other excuse for the conduct of the two great German Powers than that, 
having possessed themselves of the Duchies by force, they now thought to treat 
them as suited the political requirements of the moment without reference to 
past declarations and engagements, to the wishes of the Duchies themselves, or 
to the voice of Germany.”10 Nevertheless, Napoleon had no interest in opposing 
the two allied German powers regarding Denmark. Although registering formal 
disapproval of the unprovoked aggression, Paris would do little more than 
admonish the Prussians. Rather, as will later be demonstrated, Napoleon looked 
on in favor of a Prusso-Austrian conflict in which he could benefit in the role of 
tertius gaudens by seeking to collect from the two belligerents in return for his 
benevolent neutrality.        
Britain was now engaged in its high point of non-intervention regarding 
German unification. Although not taken in by arguments that Germany would 
liberalize once it completed unification, Palmerston heartily endorsed Prussian 
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annexation of the Danish Duchies precisely because he knew it would aid in 
keeping France and Russia at bay:  
“[I]t is better that [the Duchies] should go to increase the power of Prussia, 
than that they should form another little state to be added to the cluster of 
small bodies politic which encumber Germany, and render it of less force 
than it ought to be in the general balance of power in the world. Prussia is 
too weak as she now is ever to be honest or independent in her action; 
and, with a view to the future, it is desirable that Germany, in the 
aggregate, should be strong, in order to control those two ambitious and 
aggressive powers, France and Russia, that press upon her west and 
east.”11  
 
Victoria seconded Palmerston’s belief in German unity but wishfully continued 
to believe that “a strong united liberal Germany would be a most useful ally to 
England.”12 She reversed preference by urging that Britain intervene to prevent 
the war, but, as Palmerston not unfairly noted, she reversed course because it 
was obvious that Bismarck was intent on extinguishing the petty dynastic 
thrones, notably that of Coburg.13   
Vienna later petitioned the other major European powers to intervene 
against Prussian aggression but the problem stemmed from the former’s 
essential isolation. Austria might have bought Russian assistance, both by 
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supporting the Oldenburg candidature in the Duchies and by maintaining 
support for Russian suppression of Romanian nationalism in the Principalities. 
But this would incur the ire of Napoleon who championed the Romanians as 
well as liberal opinion in Germany that supported the Augustenburg 
candidature in the Duchies. Austrian support could be won from France and 
Britain through an informal plan to sell Venetia to Italy, but this option involved 
serious complications with Russia because the plan was linked with 
compensations offered to Austria in the Principalities.14 Why were territorial 
compensations necessary? It is not in the nature of a major power to divest itself 
of major holdings for a cash settlement. This reflects an understood risk 
acceptance for loss at the psychological level, but it is also in the nature of a 
major European power during the 19th century not to conduct oneself in this 
manner without appropriate equivalent territorial compensation. This is because 
doing so would call into question one’s rights and status to continue as a major 
European power.15 As Mosse notes, “the policy of buying Russian sympathy, 
therefore, would almost automatically provoke a revolutionary coalition of 
France, Prussia, Italy, the Magyars and probably Romania; that of appeasing 
Napoleon was certain to bring about a Russo-Prussian alliance.”16 Although both 
options posed problems, Franz Joseph was to conduct himself as he had always 
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done by refusing to make timely concessions in order to secure at least one ally. 
Thus, Austria might have maintained itself in Germany by giving up its 
possessions in Italy or it might have maintained itself in Italy by peaceably 
leaving Germany to the Prussians. But it did neither and ended up facing a two-
front war sandwiched between Prussia and Italy without active assistance from a 
single other major European power.17 Russell’s comment that “Austria is wrong 
in Italy, right in Germany,”18 if not derived from a motivated preference for a 
united Italy, at least makes the reasonable observation that Austria needed to 
make choices and that it could not continue to hold on to both territories in 
isolation.19 
French and Prussian overtures for risk acceptance for gain and European non-
intervention. 
 
With these preliminary comments in mind, it is necessary to examine in detail 
the motivated biases of the various major powers for non-intervention as the 
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1866 (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1934); A.J.P. Taylor, The Struggle for 
Mastery in Europe 1848-1918 (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1954), p. 156; 
Robert W. Seton-Watson, Britain in Europe, 1789-1914: A Survey of Foreign 
Policy (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1955), p. 468. 
18 Cited in Herbert Maxwell, The Life and Letters of George William Frederick, 
Fourth Earl of Clarendon, vol. 2 (London: Edward Arnold, 1913), p. 318. 
19 Elrod denies this point arguing that the cession of Venetia would not have 
solved its problems. In particular, he believes that the Italians would have 
demanded more, likely Rome; that Venetia was strategically important to 
Austria; and that there was intangible prestige value to maintaining a position in 
Italy granted to Austria by the Vienna Treaties. But Elrod offers no solution to 
Austria’s problems other than to observe that Vienna steadfastly hewed to the 
status quo at a time when others were aggrandizing and that Franz Joseph was 
no match for the revolutionary machinations of Napoleon and Bismarck. See, 
Elrod, “Austria and the Venetian Question, 1860-1866,” op. cit., pp. 168-70.  
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crisis took shape. Prussia’s motivated bias to conduct war and Austria’s 
desperate attempt to break out of its isolation by lashing out at its tormentor will 
be elucidated as well. Despite quite a bit of diplomatic activity on the parts of 
France, Britain, and Russia to prevent the war, one comes away with the sense 
that this was little more than window dressing. As early as September 1865, 
diplomatic exchanges between France and Prussia revealed Bismarck’s 
enticement that France should expand wherever French was spoken throughout 
the world.20 One month later, the Prussian traveled to Biarritz and then to Paris 
to meet in secret with Napoleon. Although details of the conversations are 
murky, it is clear that the Prussian sounded out the emperor regarding support 
in a war against Austria. Prussian support for the French acquisition of Belgium 
was offered as compensation.21 At this point, Napoleon was not tempted; the 
British caught wind of this offer and Cowley privately reiterated London’s long-
standing determination to Paris that French designs on Belgium would be a 
casus belli for Britain.22 Nevertheless, the meetings reveal a good deal concerning 
the attitudes of both Bismarck and Napoleon toward risk. Both were sincere 
about some sort of alignment, but unlike the pact of Plombières between France 
                                                            
20 Lefebvre letter to Drouyn, September 27, 1865, France Ministère des Affaires 
Étrangère, Les Origines Diplomatiques de la Guerre de 1870-71, vol. 7 (Paris: 
Ficker [etc.] Imprimerie Nationale, 1910), p. 1590. Cited in Taylor, The Struggle 
for Mastery in Europe 1848-1918, op. cit., p. 158. 
21 E. Ann Pottinger, Napoleon III and the German Crisis, 1865-1866 (Cambridge: 
Harvard University Press, 1966), pp. 29-31. 
22 Dotézac letter to Drouyn, September 27, 1865, France Ministère des Affaires 
Étrangère, Les Origines Diplomatiques de la Guerre de 1870-71, vol. 7, op. cit., p. 
92. Cited in Pottinger, Napoleon III and the German Crisis, 1865-1866, ibid., p. 31. 
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and Italy, this was not a plan for joint action for aggression. Rather, it was a plan 
to ensure that the other did not take up a hostile alliance against the other thus 
allowing for a free hand on both parts.23 Bismarck wanted to make sure that 
Napoleon would not ally with Austria against Prussia, an option favored by 
Drouyn. Moreover, he wanted to bring Napoleon within his orbit by gauging 
whether the emperor would object to a Prusso-Italian alliance for the benefit of 
both. Since Napoleon fairly championed Italian unification (not without 
misgivings), it would be difficult for him to object to this arrangement. For his 
part, Napoleon wanted to break up any alliance between Austria and Prussia 
because he suspected that the latter was guaranteeing Venetia for the former. 
Bismarck stated that no guarantee had been given and Napoleon reciprocated by 
stating that a Franco-Austrian alliance was impossible!”he would not go and 
stand behind a target.”24 The issue of territorial compensations for both did not 
feature seriously in the conversations. Rather, both wanted to ensure the 
benevolent neutrality of the other.25 Nevertheless, both statesmen would later 
cover their bets. As will later be shown, up until the last moment, Bismarck was 
ready to conduct an economic and territorial exchange with Austria (the Gablenz 
proposal), not in order to avoid a war, but in order to avoid a war in which 
Prussia was also opposed by France.  
                                                            
23 Taylor, The Struggle for Mastery in Europe 1848-1918, op. cit., pp. 158-59. 
24 Otto von Bismarck, Friedrich Thimme, ed., Die gesamme Werke, vol. 5 
(Paderbron, GE: Schöningh Verlag, [1924-35] 2004), p. 315. Cited in Taylor, The 
Struggle for Mastery in Europe 1848-1918, op. cit., p. 159. 
25 Taylor, The Struggle for Mastery in Europe 1848-1918, op. cit., pp. 158-59. 
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The situation was considerably more complicated for France. Domestic 
politics were weighing heavily on the emperor’s legitimacy. A poor harvest 
coupled with a pacifist populace made the army an easy target for budget cuts.26 
Opponents of the government in the corps législatif, headed by the now-pacifist 
Thiers, and Ollivier, were bent on trimming government expenditures. By 1865, 
Napoleon was propounding a series of cosmetic liberal reforms (the Liberal 
Empire) intended to pacify a restless public that was much disillusioned by his 
foreign policy fiascos and their domestic problems.27 Thus, economic distress, 
popular demand for domestic reform, and a hostile corps législatif forced the 
emperor to become more risk averse for gain. Although the reductions amounted 
to less than 3% and were spread throughout the military with relative ease, the 
national mood did not augur well for an active military policy.28 These factors, 
coupled with the anticipated British negative reaction, compelled Napoleon to 
turn down Bismarck’s offer of Belgium. The unreality of taking Belgium right 
from under Britain’s nose did not preclude Napoleon from being tempted by 
                                                            
26 Egon Caesar, Count Corti, translated by Brian and Beatrix Lunn, The Reign of 
the House of Rothschild 1830-71 (New York: Cosmopolitan Book Corporation, 
1928), p. 368.  
27 Napoleon wrote to Rouher, the minister of state, that he wanted “to give to the 
[government] institutions of the Empire their fullest possible development, and a 
fresh extension of public liberties, without compromising the power entrusted to 
him by the nation.” Rouher, derisively referred by government opponents as the 
vice-emperor, opined that the “Liberal Empire meant no more to him than minor 
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Napoleon III (New York: Putnam, 1930), p. 267). 
28 Pottinger, Napoleon III and the German Crisis, 1865-1866, op. cit., pp. 38-40. 
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future offers from Bismarck. Rather, it is precisely the pacifist nature of the 
French citizenry at the time that precluded Napoleon from aiding Bismarck’s 
project of unification, even tacitly, unless the emperor received an important and 
tangible reward as compensation.29 Thus, it was the risk averse, not the gain, 
aspect of the equation, respectively, that forced Napoleon to demand from 
Bismarck a sure compensation before he would publicly commit French arms to 
aid in German unification.  
However, the military situation did not preclude an active diplomatic 
policy. The French emperor had two other options that he might pursue. Instead 
of a pro-Prussian alignment, he might align with Bavaria and the other lesser 
German states south of the Main. Known as the Third Germany option, this was 
always problematic due to the sheer number of governments and personalities to 
deal with, not to mention the problem of particularism, in which the various 
dynastic thrones could never agree to a common policy because of the 
requirement for unanimity voting.30 But Bavaria now intimated that it would 
solve this collective action problem by exercising its leadership over a loose 
union of the small states. Thus, Napoleon would have someone with whom he 
could negotiate. But any effort on the part of France to involve itself in the 
German Question invariably drew hostile Prussian denouncements of French 
meddling. Thus, due to Prussian primacy, Napoleon feared that a forward policy 
                                                            
29 Pottinger, Napoleon III and the German Crisis, 1865-1866, op. cit., p. 70. 
30 Enno Kraehe, “Austria and the Problem of Reform in the German 
Confederation, 1851-1863,” American Historical Review, vol. 56, no. 2 (January 
1951), p. 277. 
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might force the lesser German states to bandwagon with Prussia against France. 
Therefore, the easier and relatively costless manner would be to curry favor with 
Prussia by deflecting Bavarian overtures for cooperation. It might also produce 
later favors to come on the part of Bismarck.31  
This was not all. The third option, which Napoleon did pursue as well, 
was a benevolent neutrality agreement with Austria. Thus, the emperor might 
have it all. Bismarck saw that Napoleon favored a long, exhausting struggle 
between Prussia and Austria in which France might either collect with the 
winner or take his prizes in a Third Germany option that might also become 
French satellites.32 France floated a loan to Austria at the same time that 
Bismarck petitioned to buy Holstein, thus putting Vienna in a stronger position 
to decline the Prussian.33 Economic ties were enhanced between France and 
Austria and Napoleon had earlier offered to aid Austria in the destruction of 
Italian unity (the anti-Italian elements in Paris led by Drouyn and Eugénie 
proposed this idea) were it to relinquish Venetia.34 Now, Nigra, the Italian 
                                                            
31 Pottinger, Napoleon III and the German Crisis, 1865-1866, op. cit., pp. 40-41. 
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ambassador to Paris, concocted a plan by which Italy would receive Venetia 
while Austria would be recompensed with Romania (in February Couza, the 
prince of the Principalities was overthrown). Napoleon played a double game 
here. He knew that Austria would not part with Venetia unless forced to do so.35 
Thus, he instructed Nigra to press for a Prusso-Italian alliance in order to 
frighten the Austrians into capitulation.36 Nevertheless, in this scheme the 
Austrians saw nothing but trouble with the Russians. One other possibility was 
to give Prussian-held Silesia to Austria in exchange for Venetia, but such an 
action would deal a severe blow to the Prussian monarchy and thus precipitate 
war.37 Rechberg’s earlier refusal to deal away Venetia is even more apt here: 
“[France was advising Austria] to go to war in order to lose a province.”38 Thus, 
the Austrian refusal to relinquish Venetia by sale to Italy (a plan also informally 
championed by Russell although unaware at the time of the impending Prusso-
Italian overture), in short, the impossibility of separating the Italian, from the 
German, issues, respectively, left the French and the Austrians with little more 
than improved atmospherics. At this juncture the crisis had not reached the point 
of intensity when France would have to declare its fealty, so Napoleon’s 
                                                            
35 Alfonso La Marmora, translated by Gustave Niox and Ernest Descoubès, Un 
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diplomacy can be characterized as risk averse for gain but with enough feelers 
out so that he might profit in the role of tertius gaudens.  
In Britain, Palmerston, although aged, died unexpectedly in October 1865 
and he was succeeded by Russell as prime minister in a short-lived Whig 
government. Clarendon took over as foreign minister. Along with the queen, 
both statesmen were agreed that the opprobrium attached to Britain’s inept 
handling of the 1864 war over the Duchies should not be repeated. In the 
estimation of the ministers, once the Duchies had been lost to Prussia, London 
did not deem their disposition to be a vital British interest worth contesting. 
Thus, military intervention was never in the cards.39 Consequently, Clarendon 
was not taken in by foreign minister Mensdorff’s appeal through Apponyi, 
Austrian ambassador to London, that strict British neutrality in the crisis abetted 
the Prussian aggressor. The Austrian foreign minister continued that 
repercussions would occur were Vienna to be defeated as she would then be 
unable to assist Britain in maintaining the status quo both in the Principalities 
and in the Ottoman Empire.40 The British foreign minister replied that, because 
Britain’s advice regarding the Duchies was refused two years ago, he could not 
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be concerned over their disposition now and thus Britain would remain passive 
over Bismarck’s plan to annex them,41 although privately he was not unhappy 
that the Austrians were going to stand up to the Prussians.42 Nevertheless, 
Clarendon instructed Loftus, British ambassador to Berlin, to communicate 
informally to Bismarck London’s dismay at his pretensions!“But in the name of 
all that is rational, decent, humane what can be the justification of war on the 
part of Prussia. She cannot publicly plead her greed for territorial 
aggrandizement & she cannot with truth say that the administration of Holstein 
by the Austrian Authies has been of a kind to constitute a casus belli…”43 
However, the most that Clarendon would do was to instruct Loftus to informally 
ask Bismarck whether the quarrel might be referred to a neutral third party in 
accordance with the 1856 Paris Treaty. 
Mensdorff simultaneously appealed to St. Petersburg for assistance but 
Gorchakov informed him that the tsar would not condemn Bismarck’s policy of 
annexation, would not exert diplomatic pressure on Berlin, and would not decide 
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which party was the aggressor.44 But Gorchakov softened his stance by sounding 
out Britain as to its stance regarding Bismarck. The vice chancellor opined to 
Buchanan that “if Prussia had reason to fear that Austria would be supported by 
Great Britain, she would not attempt to realize her ambitious projects by 
violence.”45 But the British ambassador replied similarly as had Clarendon to 
Mensdorff that Britain’s advice was rejected two years ago and that Britain 
reckoned that if she wished to defend Denmark, she would have to do it alone.46 
Nevertheless, Britain softened as well. Russell was alarmed at the prospect 
of war in which he believed that Austria would be devastated by Prussia. This 
was a very prescient view inasmuch as most of Europe took it for granted that 
the Austrian army would prevail.47 The prime minister believed that war could 
be avoided were the Oldenburg candidature promoted as the duke of both 
Duchies. This plan had possibilities insofar as it had enthusiastic support of 
Russia. Bismarck unenthusiastically accepted this plan. Austria would certainly 
have supported this illiberal candidate. Thus, Napoleon would have little choice 
but to accept this fait accompli in the face of British, Russian, Prussian, and 
Austrian endorsement. But Victoria lost any sense of realpolitik here because she 
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vetoed the plan with the argument that the liberal duke of Augustenburg was 
the popular choice of the inhabitants of the Duchies. Thus, Russell dropped this 
promising plan and instead allowed Clarendon to continue with his option for 
third-party mediation.48 
Prussian risk acceptance for gain. 
On March 14, Franz Joseph was persuaded by his generals to mobilize a few 
regiments in order to protect the Bohemian defenses. This was the pretext that 
Bismarck was looking for and he exaggerated its import and publicly declared 
Vienna’s warlike intentions.49 Thus, Bismarck prevaricated regarding 
Clarendon’s option of mediation because, “[in the minister-president’s] opinion 
[as rendered by Loftus], there were no means of deciding the difference with 
Austria but by the sword, and the present was the most favorable opportunity 
for Prussia, an opportunity which might not again offer itself for a century.”50 
Clarendon refuted Bismarck’s claim by stating that “Austria neither wanted war 
nor was preparing for it.”51 Despite his penchant for circumscribing action with 
enough conditions so as to render it impossible, Clarendon had a deep 
understanding of Continental politics as well as of Bismarck’s motives: “Count 
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Bismarck was not an ordinary Minister, he exercised supreme power, he dictated 
the policy of Prussia which was territorial aggrandizement; he was a man of 
purpose and that which he announced he was likely to execute. War with 
Austria had become necessary for his position and his designs, and Austria was 
right in preparing to repel the blow that might at any moment be aimed at her by 
Prussia.”52 
At this point Wilhelm was not yet under the total sway of his minister-
president. Loftus repeated Clarendon’s option of mediation to which the king 
was well-disposed. Mensdorff publicly stated that Austria’s intentions were 
peaceful and that Prussia was challenged to state the same. The ‘Coburg intrigue’ 
to which Bismarck derisively referred, was Mensdorff’s effort to organize an 
array of diplomatic forces designed to appeal to Wilhelm’s desire for peace.53 
Unfortunately, Bismarck ran interference and although his reply to Mensdorff 
was abrupt, the anti-Prussian Biegeleben, who served in the German branch of 
the Austrian foreign office, replied in a crude and threatening manner, thus 
wounding Wilhelm’s amour-propre.54  
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Events moved quickly. As early as February 28, Prussian chief of the 
general staff, Moltke, argued in a crown council meeting that Italy would be an 
indispensable ally in any war against Austria. The council also agreed with 
Bismarck that French restraint ought to be cultivated with ambiguous assurances 
of benefits to come all the while refusing to enter into any firm commitments. 
The minister-president, much to the consternation of the conservatives, declared 
that all previous understandings with Austria to share hegemony in Germany 
were to be disposed of. Bismarck declared that “Prussia was the only viable 
political creation to have emerged from the ruins of the old German Reich. [This 
was the foundation of its legitimate claim] to take the lead in Germany. [Austria, 
on the other hand, had] always jealously opposed Prussia’s natural and 
legitimate strivings in this direction by not allowing Prussia to assume control of 
Germany, although incapable of doing so itself.”55 By March 14, the Italians had 
been closeted with the Prussians over the details of an alliance in which the 
former would receive Venetia as compensation for their efforts. Dissatisfied with 
the terms of the Gastein Convention, La Marmora, the Italian prime minister, 
wanted to bind Bismarck more firmly to a timetable for war against Austria. But 
Bismarck kept his options open because he could not be sure of the French 
response and Wilhelm was not yet ready to prosecute war.56 Thus, a not-so-very-
secret treaty signed on April 8, 1866 that would expire at the end of three months 
obliged Italy to come to Prussia’s aid in the event of war with Austria, but 
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Prussia was not obliged to reciprocate with assistance should the Austrians 
attack Italy. Still, this was a good deal for the Italians. Although the treaty did 
not guarantee them a war with Austria, it did guarantee them Venetia in the 
event of war. Napoleon informally advised the Italians to sign the pact and he 
even promised to protect them against the Austrians should the Prussians not do 
so.57  
The signing had the odd effect of tying Napoleon’s hands while freeing 
those of Bismarck. For three months Napoleon could not offer Italian neutrality 
to Austria in the event of war with Prussia at the cost of ceding Venetia, nor 
could he threaten Prussia if Austria offered to let him take territories west of the 
Rhine should Bismarck withhold this offer.58 Once the Prusso-Italian treaty was 
signed, Napoleon was no longer in a position to forbid Bismarck to go to war 
with Austria and there is strong evidence that the minister-president was 
determined to do precisely that. 
Unstable French preference reversal and then reversion to risk acceptance for 
gain. 
 
Napoleon’s anticipated negative regret began to manifest itself here. By the end 
of April he felt that he had lost control of the situation and thus called for a 
European congress in order to regain the initiative. Clarendon favored the idea, 
but the Cabinet vetoed it feeling that a separate appeal by Britain would be too 
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clear a manifestation to Prussia that France and itself were not agreed. Failing to 
see how a congress could solve the Venetian, and Duchies, problems, 
respectively, the British foreign minister again proposed that both France and 
Russia join with Britain in invoking the 1856 Paris Treaty in order to compel 
Prussia to return to the status quo. In turn, Napoleon and Drouyn vetoed this 
proposal contending that France could not sustain a rebuff from Prussia. 
However, the real reason for their negative position was the disposition of 
Venetia; the British appeal to the status quo position disallowed any formal 
cession of the province to Italy.59 It was one thing to informally suggest the 
transfer, well another to publicly dispossess states of what they were lawfully 
granted by the Vienna Treaties. An ill-conceived speech by Napoleon at Auxere 
in the rural district of the Yonne, in which he derided the said treaties and 
envisioned the reclamation of the Rhineland territories, destroyed any common 
purpose that France and Britain might have attained in preventing Prussian 
aggression. This was clearly a pro-Prussian alignment as Berlin had now become 
the revisionist power in Europe with its support for German nationalism.60 The 
most that Clarendon could do would be to order Italy to remain neutral and for 
the lesser German states to refrain from any actions that might provoke Prussia. 
The foreign minister was unaware at the time of the Prusso-Italian alliance for 
the purpose of aggression. Thus, not surprisingly, the Italians responded that it 
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was impossible to stay neutral and they “must await the circumstances of 
fortune.”61  
Napoleon then proposed a preliminary conference in order to outline the 
agenda for a general conference to which Prussia, Austria, and Italy would be 
invited!“the question of the Elbe Duchies, the Italian dispute and the reforms to 
be introduced into the Federal Pact, so far as they may affect the Balance of 
Power in Europe”62 were to be considered. Venetia would be on the agenda. All 
were agreed in the British government that the congress might be a French trap 
to commit London to the cession of Venetia to Italy.63 Drouyn calmed British 
apprehensions by stating that the major powers would not have to bind 
themselves beforehand and retained full liberty of action in the event that there 
were differences of opinion at the conclusion of the congress.64 Clarendon then 
agreed to a congress that he thought would do no good because the 
responsibility for a refusal outweighed the potential commitments incurred in 
acceding to the conference.65 Russia began to warm to the idea as on April 9, one 
day after signing the treaty with Italy, Bismarck proposed again a motion in the 
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Confederation Diet for a German parliament based on universal male suffrage, a 
revolutionary move to which the tsar took extreme alarm.66 Bismarck grudgingly 
accepted the offer of a conference; he did not want Prussia to be seen as the 
revisionist power intending to overthrow the status quo without attempting to 
assuage the objections of others. But Vienna accepted the congress proposal 
provided that no changes to the territorial status quo were allowed. This position 
rendered the congress useless to the French, while the British were relieved that 
the burden of failure would not be placed on them.67 Austria was left looking like 
the power steadfastly resolved to refuse any reasonable compromises. Its 
position had the effect of relieving any anxiety that Bismarck might have had 
regarding possible third party interference in the war.68 
Despite unsuccessful eleventh-hour attempts by Clarendon to employ 
Victoria to informally appeal to Wilhelm’s good sense to fire Bismarck and to 
prevent a war “begun for mere objects of ambition, for imaginary affronts and 
wrongs”69, the foreign minister salved his wounded sense of propriety by the 
prospect of an Austrian victory.70 Clarendon was not alone in this thinking, but 
the motive for elation at this prospect on the part of the French was more risk 
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acceptant for gain than that of the British. Napoleon confided to Walewski that 
“war between Austria and Prussia is one of those unhoped-for happenings that 
never seemed likely to occur; and it is not for us to oppose warlike intentions 
which contain so many advantages for our policy.”71 The emperor, too, was 
blithely convinced that Austria would prevail against Prussia. But he wanted to 
make sure that Austria properly compensated him for his benevolent neutrality 
and by June 12, as war became inevitable, the Austrians promised to cede 
Venetia even if they were victorious.72 This, of course, made an Austro-Italian 
war pointless. Nevertheless, if Prussia was beaten, Napoleon could take what he 
wanted west of the Rhine; if Prussia prevailed, he could demand that as well as 
price for his efforts. The Italian problem would largely be solved. But, as 
Thompson notes, “here [Napoleon] made his greatest blunder; for, expecting the 
first eventuality, he had made no preparations for dealing with the second.”73 
Why would Austria make such a poor deal with France? As the war 
neared, Mensdorff and Franz Joseph became convinced that France needed to be 
neutralized. Napoleon made the threat to Metternich, possibly idle,!”give me 
guarantees in Italy in case you win and I will leave you free in Germany…If not, 
I should be forced to arm in my turn and eventually to intervene.”74 But because 
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the Austrians were so risk acceptant for loss, procrastination had a price. Had 
they ceded Venetia in March, peace would have been assured with Italy. Now a 
much poorer deal was on the table. In retrospect, it is not clear that Austria 
would have prevailed in a war against Prussia singly, but it was the height of 
folly to believe that it could prevail in a two-front war as long as France and 
Russia were neutralized. Napoleon would no longer support Austria’s 
acquisition of Silesia and he now demanded Belgium and the creation of a buffer 
state comprised of the lesser German states in the Rhineland. As Metternich 
noted, “Napoleon’s knife was at Austria’s throat.”75   
A minority viewpoint, which cannot be sustained, is that Bismarck’s room 
for maneuver was significantly circumscribed by Napoleon’s call for a congress. 
Gall argues that Bismarck rushed the war with Austria precisely in order to seize 
the initiative from Napoleon.76 Nevertheless, the French emperor’s hand was 
significantly weaker than Gall makes out. The calling of a congress was always 
Napoleon’s fall-back position in order to see whether he could wheedle gains for 
France peaceably. That is why the rest of Europe largely mistrusted his 
diplomatic moves. It was odd to Clarendon that Napoleon would veto a British-
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initiated congress only to later initiate one of his own.77 It turns out that the 
emperor’s speech at Auxere was badly received throughout largely pacifist 
France.78 The Rhineland aspect of the speech did not please Bismarck as well; in 
it he saw an attempt on the part of Napoleon to dissuade Prussia from war by 
making it too costly.79 Thus the congress proposal was popular with the French 
people and a gambit by which Napoleon might be able to maintain himself in 
power. Gall also overstates the degree of Russian hostility towards Prussia. The 
tsar took alarm, as did most of Europe, at Bismarck’s proposal for German 
universal male suffrage, but this was a ruse on the part of the minister-president. 
Bismarck had no intention of leaguing the non-propertied populace with the 
Prussian monarchy in order to govern; he just wanted to scare the middle-class 
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liberal movement into making concessions to a royalist Constitution.80 This 
position could easily have been intimated to the tsar.81 Moreover, although he 
declined at the time, Bismarck’s offer of Prussian aid in overturning the Black Sea 
clauses gave Alexander good incentive to refrain from opposing Prussian plans 
for war with Austria.82 
It was well recognized that the Austrian military needed to mobilize well 
ahead of the Prussians. The Austrian military was traditionally organized, while 
the effect of Bismarck’s army reforms, although taken notice by the rest of 
Europe, was underestimated. The superior firing power of the needle gun, the 
use of railheads to bring troops quickly to the front, and a reorganization of the 
army on mass lines, should have pointed to Prussian superiority over the 
Austrians.83 The ‘Young Turks’ in the French military command urged these 
points upon Napoleon, but the conventional argument was that the Austrians 
had more men under arms than did the Prussians. Thus, a war of attrition would 
eventually favor Vienna.84 Moreover, all of the major European powers suffered 
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from a collective cognitive bias in believing that the future would be just like the 
past. According to Millman, “[Clarendon] like almost everyone else 
underestimated Prussia and Bismarck. He saw the danger to Britain’s position 
from out of the past, and thus allowed Napoleon, and to a lesser degree, 
Alexander, to obscure the future.”85 
On April 20, Franz Joseph ordered mobilization along the Venetian 
frontier in response to reports of Italian military preparations. The reports were 
exaggerated; it was likely that Bismarck was the source of this dissembling. But 
King Victor Emmanuel made the rumors reality by openly mobilizing the entire 
Italian army.86 The Austrian monarch deemed war inevitable at this point. In 
turn, Wilhelm was indignant and responded by ordering mobilization of the 
Prussian army on May 3. Earlier, throughout April, the Gablenz brothers 
shuttled back and forth between Berlin and Vienna in an attempt to find a 
diplomatic solution that would avoid war.87 Bueno de Mesquita and Lalman 
approvingly cite Crankschaw’s observation that “there was a moment when it 
looked as though Austria might be ready to sell Holstein to Prussia, as she had 
sold Lauenburg. Bleichröder was active in raising funds for this; Bismarck was 
ready for it… Had Austria got rid of Holstein for cash and then sold Venetia to 
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Italy, which she could also have done at this time, the face of history would have 
been changed. For Bismarck would have had no excuse to go to war and no 
Italian ally if he did so.”88 These transactions comprised the Gablenz proposal. 
Thus, Germany would be divided at the Main with Berlin militarily commanding 
the north and Vienna commanding the south. Austria could expect Prussian 
assistance in protecting her trans-Alpine territories against both France and Italy. 
Franz Joseph would only accede to this proposal were he to find support 
among one or two of the lesser German states. Since he could not find such 
support, the proposal became stillborn. Bueno de Mesquita and Lalman rely on 
this thin evidence to make the argument that the outbreak of the Austro-Prussian 
War turned on a rational choice calculus without delving into the strategic 
context in which Bismarck acceded to the proposal. The Prussian continued to 
play a double game here. Military mobilization continued apace even as he 
intended to demonstrate to the rest of Europe his willingness to work for a 
diplomatic solution. Thus it would be hard for France and Russia to intervene at 
a late date and Bismarck had diplomatically worked hard to ensure that they did 
not do so.89 On the eve of the war, Victoria’s remembrance of Clarendon’s 
comments to her are characteristic of the mood at the time!“Europe was in a 
most combustible state and there was great danger of our being isolated, he 
thought, and God knows how long we should be able to keep out of it. Belgium 
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we were bound to defend.”90 The foreign minister was convinced that neither 
threats, nor remonstrances, nor joint action with France, nor a naval 
demonstration, could prevent this inevitable war.91 As demonstrated, all of the 
major European powers had motivated biases to abstain from intervening and 
last minute efforts, such as the Gablenz proposal, merely gave them diplomatic 
cover for their inaction. More to the point, it is hard to believe that the minister-
president would have been satisfied with this territorial transaction; it is more 
likely that he would have found another later pretext in order to prosecute war 
against Austria in order to expel it from Germany. 
 On May 9, at the behest of Saxony, the Confederation Diet in Frankfurt 
agreed to demand that Prussia explain its mobilization. Three weeks later 
Austria forced the issue by declining the invitation to the congress and, instead, 
putting the future of the Duchies in the hands of the Diet. This was tantamount 
to a declaration of war as Berlin was forced to defy the Diet, thus providing the 
mechanism by which Confederation forces could be mobilized. Bismarck 
responded publicly by issuing a circular to the rest of Europe that “we can see 
nothing in this action by the Austrian government except a deliberate, direct 
provocation and a desire to force a rupture of relations and war.”92 On June 9, 
Prussian troops invaded Holstein, but the Austrian troops refrained from 
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engaging them. A Prussian motion of federal reform aimed at excluding Austria 
from the Confederation and dividing supremacy between Prussia and Bavaria 
failed to carry. But the motion formally contained Prussia’s demand for the 
Duchies, thus informally declaring war on Austria. Vienna responded on June 11 
by obtaining the Diet’s assent for the mobilization of the Confederation’s non-
Prussian army in order to protect the “internal security of Germany and the 
threatened rights of its confederate members.”93 Von Savigny, the Prussian 
envoy to the Diet, declared with a statement prepared well in advance that the 
federal treaty, having been breached, had now lapsed, and that his job was at an 
end.94 In order to clarify the war front, Bismarck threatened Hanover, Saxony, 
and the electorate of Hesse to declare their neutrality and to adhere to the reform 
plan put forth by Prussia. When they refused, Prussia invaded and overran them 
and the war began in earnest because the Diet authorized military assistance to 
its threatened members.95 
The Austrians defeated the Italians in the south at Custozza on June 24, 
but the war was all but over by July 3 as the Austrians were routed by the 
Prussians between Sadowa and Könningrätz in Bohemia in which the largest 
number of troops were engaged in pitched battle since the Napoleonic Wars. 
Franz Joseph appealed to Napoleon to intervene and the latter asked the 
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aggressors to agree to an armistice the next day. Both Wilhelm, and Victor 
Emmanuel resented his interference. The former wanted to annihilate Austria by 
invading Vienna, the latter wanted to attain Venetia through conquest, not as a 
gift.96 Even Bismarck was heard to mutter on July 5 that “in a few years’ time 
Louis will probably be sorry he took sides against us like this; it may cost him 
dearly.”97 Thus both aggressors concerted with each other to maintain hostilities 
in mopping up operations by obfuscating communications with Napoleon and 
deliberately providing misleading information regarding the war theaters. 
Bismarck advised the Italians to reject the armistice proposal until he was certain 
that Napoleon would sanction all of his war aims.98 Nevertheless, having 
dissolved the Confederation and ejected Austria from Germany, Bismarck 
achieved his objective and he convinced Wilhelm to give Vienna easy peace 
terms, much to the anger of Moltke and the Prussian army. 
Risk aversion for gain followed quickly on the heels of Prussia’s 
astounding military success. The threat of French intervention wasn’t Bismarck’s  
only reason for treating with Austria. The lasting hostility by Austria “must not 
                                                            
96 France Ministère des Affaires Étrangère, Les Origines Diplomatiques de la 
Guerre de 1870-71, vol. 10, op. cit., p. 323. Cited in Thompson, Louis Napoleon 
and the Second Empire, op. cit., p. 265.  
97 Robert von Keudell, Fürst und Fürstin Bismarck, Erinnerungen von 1846 bis 
1972 (Berlin: W. Spemann, 1902), p. 295. Cited in Erich Eyck, Bismarck and the 
German Empire (New York: W.W. Norton & Co., 1964), p. 129. 
98 France Ministère des Affaires Étrangère, Les Origines Diplomatiques de la 
Guerre de 1870-71, vol. 10, op. cit., p. 374. Cited in Pottinger, Napoleon III and 
the German Crisis, 1865-1866, op. cit., p. 164.  
 404 
be allowed to become an organic fault in Prussian foreign policy.”99 Thus, the 
minister-president later reminisced that “my two greatest difficulties were first to 
get King Wilhelm into Bohemia and then to get him out again.”100 As early as 
July 9, 1866 he had written to his wife Johanna, “provided we are not excessive in 
our demands and do not think that we have conquered the world, we shall also 
achieve a worthwhile peace. But we are as quickly carried away as we are cast 
down, and I have the thankless task of pouring water into the bubbling wine and 
pointing out that we are not the only inhabitants of Europe, but live in it with 
three other powers that detest us and envy us.”101 
British non-involvement. 
In seven short weeks the distribution of power in Europe had materially 
changed. Yet both Britain and France did not initially realize its import. Britain 
was self-deterred from intervening; Russell’s government made a desperate 
attempt to sever the connection between domestic politics and foreign policy. It 
did so because it was intent on passing the Second Reform bill and thus did not 
want to alienate support for this measure by intervening abroad either 
diplomatically or militarily. Nevertheless, the Whig government fell over defeat 
of that bill and the Tories took over with Derby as prime minister in a minority 
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government with Stanley, his son, as foreign minister.102 The conservatives were 
even more anxious than the liberals to avoid intervention in Continental politics. 
Disraeli made the fatuous claim that “the abstention of England from any 
unnecessary interference in the affairs of Europe is the consequence, not of her 
decline in power, but of her increased strength.”103 That strength, of course, was 
derived from becoming a wealthy trading state. As Kennedy argues, “there was 
probably no other period, before or since, when so many members of the British 
establishment were imbued with the doctrines of political economy; and an 
intense dislike of the destructive processes of war was, of course, one of the 
fundamentals of that faith.”104 A French observer keenly stated of Britain “there 
was a time when they interfered with everything and they have finished by not 
wishing to interfere with anything.”105 
As early as July 4, alarmed that Bismarck intended to dispose of dynastic 
privilege, the tsar proposed a congress to settle the conflict by insisting that the 
overthrow of the Confederation was an illegal act in the absence of sanction by 
the Vienna Treaties signatories. When Stanley forebore to respond to him this 
attitude was abandoned and he accepted the Prussian aggression as a fait 
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accompli to be tolerated.106 In response to a plea on the part of Austria for British 
intervention, the foreign minister remarked to Apponyi “the danger of 
disturbance to the peace of Europe lay in the weakness rather than the strength 
of Germany.”107 Thus, the foreign minister finally responded to the tsar’s 
entreaty in the House of Commons on July 20 by declaring, “ours will be a 
pacific policy, a policy of observation rather than action. I think there never was a 
great European war in which the direct national interests of England were less 
concerned…If North Germany is to become a single great power, I do not see 
that any English interest is in the least degree affected.”108 But Stanley’s policy of 
strict non-intervention later brought Clarendon’s indictment that “I begged him 
however not to proclaim our determined inaction on every opportunity that 
arises!the policy of our not meddling is of course the right one but it is not 
necessary that all mankind shd. be let into the secret twice a day.”109 Thus, 
although willing to support an armistice at the behest of Drouyn for the sake of 
peace, Stanley would not further entangle Britain should Prussia protest. 
Moreover, he turned down Mensdorff’s request for British intervention as a 
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mediator as he questioned its success.110 Morier’s acute analysis of the geopolitics 
associated with the war, while essentially correct, reveals more than a bit of 
wishful thinking:  
“The heartbreaking part of this war is that its aims, as regards the anti-
Prussian portion of it, are so thoroughly legitimate, while the means used 
are so thoroughly damnable. The presence of Austria in Germany and 
Italy is the fatal bar in the way of progress, first for Austria, second for 
Germany, third for Italy. I am myself convinced this might have been 
effected by peaceful means and by the mere natural course of liberal 
development. Bismarck has determined it otherwise. He has had recourse 
to a brutal surgical operation to effect what, I am convinced, might have 
been done by diet and steady training. But heartily as I hate the operation, 
I must wish for its success. A signal victory on the part of Austria in the 
present struggle would throw Europe back three generations….[Because 
of her strength, Prussia could assert her predominance] with instead of 
against the liberal and national forces of Germany.”111  
 
As keen an observer of German politics as Morier was, he fundamentally still did 
not understand that Bismarck was willing to use any and all forces (even 
revolutionary) at his disposal in order to conduct a revolution from above. 
Liberalism was merely co-opted for his purposes.112 
Continued French risk acceptance for gain. 
It was at this point that British diplomacy largely absented itself only to return 
when it was learned that Napoleon had asked for compensations from the 
Prussians. Aside from the background factor of political economy pointed out by 
Kennedy, two other immediate factors were responsible for British self-
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deterrence. The first had to do with the disposition of Italy. Should Austria have 
prevailed against Prussia it would then turn on and destroy Italian unification. 
Thus, Bismarck largely neutralized both Britain and France from intervening 
with his masterstroke of an alliance with Italy.  
The second factor, not surprisingly, was British distrust of Napoleon’s 
motives. The emperor was deeply apprehensive about the Prussian military 
victory. What did he think he was getting by supporting Prussian nationalism 
through benevolent neutrality? Napoleon naively believed that a small compact 
state in North Germany would be akin to a unified Italy, a satellite perhaps, but 
posing no greater threat than that.113 But the attendant reality was quite different. 
Cowley reported that “the emperor is getting alarmed at his Frankenstein.”114 
Nevertheless, Napoleon was irresolute, not from debilitating illness as has been 
argued,115 but from an irrational continued flirtation with risk acceptance for 
gain. Eugénie was more rational than her husband; her quip that “I shall go to 
bed French and I shall wake up Prussian,”116 was not far off the mark. Napoleon 
might have gracefully accepted the Prussian victory but made clear to Bismarck 
that no new territorial annexations would be tolerated. Or he might have 
provided military support for Austria in order to defeat Prussia although doing 
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so before Sadowa would have made the task much easier than after. But he took 
the disastrous third way by asking Bismarck for compensations after the fact, a 
policy derisively referred to at the time as la politique des pourboires (the politics 
of an innkeeper’s account). The second and third options will be examined in 
turn. 
On July 5, a council of ministers meeting was hurriedly called at Saint-
Cloud. Franz Joseph had already ceded Venetia and accepted French mediation. 
Drouyn proposed a military demonstration on the Rhine; thus, France might 
engage in armed mediation. In response to a query by Eugénie, Randon, the 
minister of war, stated that 80,000 troops could be dispatched immediately with 
the total reaching 250,000 in about three weeks. La Valette, minister of the 
interior, argued, as did the British, that to support Austria was to lose support 
for Italian unification. Moreover, he blithely believed that Bismarck could be 
trusted to give the compensations that he had vaguely promised. Again, Eugénie 
was realistically correct in arguing that Bismarck would now forget his promises 
should the French not threaten him.117 The council resolved to ask the legislature 
to authorize general mobilization of the army including a demonstration of 
50,000 troops on the Rhine immediately and a diplomatic threat that France 
would not allow Prussia to unilaterally make territorial changes without the 
consent of Europe. The details were to have been published in the Moniteur the 
next day, but they never appeared because Napoleon countermanded the 
                                                            
117 Thompson, Louis Napoleon and the Second Empire, op. cit., pp. 265-66. 
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order.118 Bismarck later admitted in the Reichstag that the appearance of even 
15,000 troops on the Rhine would have led to an anti-Prussian uprising in South 
Germany, the reinforcement of the Austrian army in Bohemia by forces drawn 
from Italy, and a Prussian withdrawal of troops in order to defend Berlin.119 At 
the start of the war Wilhelm had to withdraw practically all of his troops from 
garrisons in Trèves, Luxembourg, and Saarlouis in order to fortify his army, thus, 
Bismarck’s admission is likely correct.120 But here, Napoleon raised the 
secondary to the essential by arguing that his restraint demonstrated to Europe 
(in particular Britain) that his intentions were peaceful.121 He was likely also 
deterred by the possibility of Bismarck unleashing a war of nationalities. The 
argument is odd in that La Valette used the potential repudiation of the doctrine 
of national self-determination on the part of Napoleon as the catalyst for 
arousing the German nation. Bismarck played on this fear and he instructed 
Goltz, Prussian ambassador to Paris, to counter French threats by invoking “a 
national uprising in Germany [on the basis of the Frankfurt constitution of 1849. 
Prussia would use] every means, regardless of party standpoint, [to excite 
national resistance.] Progressives and democrats [were ready] for every sacrifice 
                                                            
118 Maurice Paléologue, Entretiens de l’impératrice Eugénie (Paris: Plon, 1928), p. 
117; Oncken, Die Rheinpolitik Kaiser Napoleon III. von 1863 bis 1870, vol. 1, op. 
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119 Paléologue, Entretiens, op. cit., p. 124. Cited in Thompson, Louis Napoleon 
and the Second Empire, op. cit., p. 266; Taylor, The Struggle for Mastery in 
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120 Bismarck was amazed that Napoleon did not take his compensations here. 
121 Thompson, Louis Napoleon and the Second Empire, op. cit., p. 266. 
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in a war against France. [Prussia would bring about] the complete ignition of the 
national spirit.”122 Contemporaneously, Bismarck, as communicated to 
Gorchakov, made a similar threat to invoke a nationalist uprising on the basis of 
the Frankfurt constitution should the tsar fail to accept his peace terms outright. 
The national ambitions of the Poles would be incited. 123 
It took little time for Napoleon to rue his mistake, but he decided, instead, 
to send his diplomat Benedetti to visit Bismarck on July 23 with hat in hand. 
Benedetti was instructed to sound out the Prussian as to the possibility of 
restoring the French frontiers of 1814 with the addition of Luxembourg. Shortly 
thereafter, Napoleon asked Goltz whether Prussia would consent to the cession 
                                                            
122 Bismarck, Thimme, ed., Die gesamme Werke, vol. 6, op. cit., pp. 45, 55. Cited 
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Bismarck’s threats both to France and Russia stand Goddard’s legitimation 
theory on its head. First, the minister-president did not indicate that he was 
willing to abide by established international norms through the naked threat of 
the use of force. Second, while Napoleon had nationalist proclivities, Alexander 
certainly did not. Thus, while the emperor may have been rhetorically trapped 
by Bismarck’s framing of expansion in a manner that deprived the opposing 
state of grounds for resistance, the tsar certainly was not. Finally, while Bismarck 
appealed to Napoleon’s ontological security through a common attempt to 
secure Prussia’s identity in international politics, he accomplished precisely the 
opposite with the tsar. To wit, Napoleon was alone in celebrating Bismarck’s 
proposal for universal male suffrage!“henceforth the two countries would pay 
homage to the same political system” (cited in Pflanze, Bismarck and the 
Development of Germany, vol. 1, op. cit., p. 308). But it is ironic that Bismarck 
would use nationalism as a cudgel, rather than as tool to appeal to a common 
ontological security, in order to bring Napoleon to heel. These criticisms are fair 
because Goddard argues that legitimation theory precepts were used in 
Bismarck’s wars of unification that she does not examine. See, Stacie E. Goddard, 
“When Right Makes Might: How Prussia Overturned the European Balance of 
Power,” International Security, vol. 33, no. 3 (Winter 2008/09), pp. 110-142.  
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of Landau and Luxembourg in order to gain a defensive cordon. Drouyn drew 
up a memorandum suggesting the establishment of a neutral buffer state that 
comprised provinces west of the Rhine. Benedetti was then instructed to ask 
Berlin for the cession of Landau, Saarbrücken and Luxembourg and a secret 
treaty entitling France to annex Belgium but leaving Antwerp as a free city in 
order to meet British objections.124 Goltz revealed to Paris the impossibility of 
ceding German land, but that France might take Belgium and thus it would be 
important that Prussia not oppose this move.125 Bismarck, in turn, would not 
consider the frontier of 1814 as long as the inhabitants did not evince a desire for 
change. Prussia had no interest in Luxembourg, but France would have to sound 
out the Dutch on its own and could not compensate the latter with German 
territories. A secret convention regarding Belgium would be recommended to 
Wilhelm, notwithstanding anticipated British objections. On August 20, Goltz 
advocated a Prusso-French alliance in order that Prussia might have a free hand 
in South Germany.126 Bismarck then played a masterly game while Benedetti 
committed a grave diplomatic error by writing out in detail these revisionist 
demands asking for Belgium and Luxembourg, but abandoning the 1814 
frontiers. Bismarck turned him down but pocketed the handwritten demands 
                                                            
124 Oncken, Die Rheinpolitik Kaiser Napoleon III. von 1863 bis 1870, vol. 2, op. 
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and publicly produced them on the eve of the Franco-Prussian War in order to 
shock public opinion in Europe, especially in Britain.  
Contemporaneously, Britain caught wind of Napoleon’s overtures and the 
emperor was forced to reassure Cowley that France was not seeking to annex 
Belgium.127 Nevertheless, Stanley believed that war was imminent between 
France and Prussia!”if the emperor gives way [on compensation], this new 
defeat, following the Mexican failure, and shortly to be followed by a surrender 
of Rome, which I assume to be inevitable, will be the most serious shock his 
dynasty has yet undergone. If he does not give way, it is war. We do not want 
Napoleon upset, nor do we want a new war.”128 Napoleon appeared to reverse 
preference by dismissing Drouyn as evidence of goodwill towards Prussia and 
appointing Moustier as foreign minister. On September 16, La Valette issued a 
circular to Europe that came as a relief to Britain. Surprisingly, Napoleon backed 
down from his demand for compensation from Prussia and he covered this 
failure by proclaiming France’s “splendid situation in Europe ‘governed by the 
principle of liberty of alliances,’ and enjoying an equilibrium due to satisfied 
nationality.”129 
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The peace treaties between Prussia and Austria were signed at Nikolsburg 
on July 26 and at Prague on August 23. In addition to ejecting Austria from 
Germany and dissolving the Confederation, Prussia attained both Duchies with 
the vague promise that Schleswigers would be allowed a future referendum in 
order to determine whether they wanted to be a province of Denmark or of 
Germany. Saxony was allowed to maintain its nominal sovereignty, but Prussia 
could federalize its military in time of need. The dispositions of both the Duchies 
and Saxony were a sop to Napoleon’s pride at having been able to influence the 
peace terms. Prussia later annexed Hanover, Hesse-Kassel, Nassau, and the city 
of Frankfurt. Austria paid a small war indemnity, while Frankfurt, as the seat of 
the Confederation, paid a large indemnity as punishment for its perfidy towards 
Prussia. 
Bismarck was the beneficiary of Napoleon’s failed policy of asking for 
compensation after the fact. The Prussian was able to use this evidence of French 
greed to draw the disillusioned lesser German states into his orbit. Had 
Napoleon accepted Prussian military success without objection and allowed a 
consolidated Germany north of the River Main, it would have suited his 
purposes. This is because the German Confederation, designed by the Vienna 
Treaties precisely to contain France, would be dissolved and the lesser German 
states would retain their independence and thus, along with Austria, provide a 
counter to Prussia in Europe. As it turned out, Bismarck was able to secure 
offensive/defensive treaties with the lesser German states, and also to expand 
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economic relations through the Zollverein, thus, in effect, able to bring Third 
Germany within the Prussian camp four years later prior to the war with France. 
The La Valette circular was intended to assuage quixotic French public opinion 
that was alternatively pacifist and nervously annexationist. Prior to the outbreak 
of the war, Napoleon thought he had anticipated every contingency by securing 
benevolent neutrality agreements with all participants. The long, drawn out 
struggle that he anticipated did not materialize. Thus, the Prussians threatened 
to quickly turn on the French, even by drawing the defeated Austrians into 
alliance, should Napoleon persist in demanding compensation.130 What looked 
promising to France prior to the clash of military forces turned into a major 
diplomatic defeat for Napoleon and the legitimacy of his rule after the fact. 
Revenge crept into the emperor’s mind and, as will later be demonstrated, as the 
diplomacy prior to the outbreak of the Franco-Prussian War took shape, it took 
little for Bismarck to goad Napoleon into precipitating a fight. 
Conclusion: The dynamics of asymmetric affective abandonment. 
How does a rational choice explanation fare regarding this case study? Lalman 
and Bueno de Mesquita argue that the Austro-Prussian War turned on an 
expected utility calculus on the parts of the participants. Without adducing any 
evidence, they observe in passing that whether Bismarck was relentless in his 
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pursuit of German unification is somewhat controversial.131 We should not be 
surprised that scholars largely unsympathetic to Bismarck, such as Pflanze, 
believe this not to be the case. But even more sympathetic scholars, such as Gall, 
disagree as well. The Prussian’s famous observation that “if revolution there is to 
be, let us rather undertake it than undergo it”132 was clearly self-serving in that 
no one other than himself was contemplating it.  On the one hand, a stubbornly 
conscientious monarch coupled with a recalcitrant legislature put up serious 
obstacles to Bismarck’s prosecuting war against Austria. But the Junker’s task 
was made a good deal easier, on the other hand, by a watchful Europe that either 
wanted nothing to do with the crisis (Britain), or wanted to profit from the crisis 
by doing nothing as well (France). Austria, for its part, had a motivated bias to 
maintain its endowments in Germany and Italy without taking a realistic 
measure of the changing strategic landscape in Europe. If much of Europe 
suffered from a cognitive bias in believing that France and Russia were still the 
great disturbers in Europe and thus a unified North Germany would promote 
peace and stability, Austria was keenly aware that a unified Prussia was 
dangerous. Apponyi argued to Stanley that neither France nor Russia would 
long tolerate a power as ambitious as Prussia.133 But Austria also believed that 
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Italian unification would reverse itself and die out, thus bringing the rest of 
Europe to reassert the status quo established by the Vienna Treaties.134 Franz 
Joseph was right about Prussia, but wrong about Italy. He had to separate both 
issues and make a concession on one, but he stubbornly held onto both 
endowments and merely hoped for the best. It was important for Austria to 
make terms with Italy before Prussia concluded an alliance with the latter. Such 
an agreement would likely have required Austria to cede Rome as well in order 
to keep the Italian military off of its southern flank. Prussia did not highly rate 
the Italian military, but Moltke believed its presence to be an essential diversion 
of Austrian troops. Thus, with the Italians neutralized, the Austrian army could 
concentrate on the northern flank, fulfilling one of the aspects that Bismarck 
admitted would have forced his hand to desist from attacking. But Austria 
played into Prussian hands by turning its insurance premium into a risky lottery 
ticket rather than by making necessary territorial concessions. By using the 
insurance premium in conservative fashion, Austria would have then forced 
Prussia to do the same by withdrawing its forces in order to defend Berlin. 
Austria, in short, was irrationally risk acceptant for loss to a degree unwarranted 
by the strategic situation and this irrationality further strengthened Bismarck’s 
motivated bias to believe that he could get away with his kleindeutsch 
unification plans. 
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Britain used the insurance premium in risky fashion while France 
converted it into a risky lottery ticket. Acrimony over failed mutual support in 
the earlier Polish Uprising and the war over the Duchies made it almost 
impossible that the two would work together to suppress Prussian aggression. 
But singly each might have made a difference. We can never be sure whether 
Gorchakov was correct in arguing that British support for Austria would have 
stayed Bismarck’s hand. But if Bismarck is to be believed, Napoleon’s support of 
Austria before Sadowa would have been effective in deterring Prussia. After the 
fact, both Britain and France were neutralized by the Italian alliance with Prussia. 
But they need not have been earlier. Britain demonstrated a penchant for 
formalism unwarranted by the situation. What was the point of Britain 
informally championing the Austrian cession of Venetia to Italy, but then failing 
to consider it formally, especially when Stanley later advised Gorchakov that the 
Vienna Treaties had repeatedly been broken and that he was indifferent to 
supporting them?135 One could say that Britain hoisted itself on its own petard, 
but then an active diplomatic or military policy was never in the offing 
considering the non-interventionist attitude of both the people and government. 
Both Russell and Stanley had little interest in using the government’s good 
offices to mediate the Austro-Prussian dispute. This is why they relied so heavily 
on Victoria to employ interpersonal back-channels to implore Wilhelm to adopt a 
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policy of peace and to dismiss Bismarck. The failure of such efforts could not 
then be pinned on the government. Moreover, her irrational protest against 
Russell’s plan to support the Oldenburg candidature as duke of both Duchies 
could have been overridden. Palmerston had circumvented her opinion when it 
suited his purposes; thus, Russell might have done the same. That the latter did 
not press more strongly for his proposal indicates how little interested he was in 
intervening in the dispute. Russell’s preoccupation with passing the Second 
Reform bill and not in alienating domestic support was a factor in his reticence to 
committing British prestige to mediating Continental problems. But this was a 
losing game for not only did his government fall, but British influence in Europe 
then became a non-factor in Bismarck’s calculations. If Russell also attempted to 
repair his reputation as an ineffectual meddler, Stanley was even less successful 
in promoting British influence through his policy of strict non-intervention. 
Stanley argued that to accede to a congress would merely sanction Prussian 
aggression after the fact and that the major European powers could best maintain 
their influence and independence of action by withholding support for Prussian 
aggression.136 This implied that the freedom of independence of action was 
important because judicious action would actually be forthcoming, not merely a 
cover for British self-deterrence.       
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Napoleon handled himself most poorly during this crisis. Thus it is no 
surprise that Britain would not work with him. For the emperor the insurance 
premium could be used in conservative fashion, either by accepting Prussian 
aggression but indicating that further aggression would not be tolerated, or by 
supporting Austria militarily in order to deter Prussia. Instead, Napoleon was 
self-deterred believing that his benevolent neutrality would be rewarded 
handsomely by a grateful Bismarck. But no one pays for services that can be had 
for free. It was here that the insurance premium was converted into a risky 
lottery ticket. This is because Napoleon’s impulse to ingratiate himself with 
Bismarck in anticipation of future favors to come as well as his belief that the 
Prussian would increasingly become more dependent on French benevolent 
neutrality led him to believe that he could demand greater and greater 
compensations as the war dragged on. The lightning-quick Prussian military 
success at Sadowa greatly alarmed the emperor, but only a fleeting, and quickly 
reversed, preference reversal for opposing Prussia manifested itself. The third 
option of asking for compensations allowed Bismarck to reveal Napoleon’s greed 
to the rest of Europe and destroyed any goodwill that both Britain and the lesser 
German states might have had for the French.  
Russian diplomacy was largely absent throughout the conflict. Bismarck 
alternatively threatened Alexander with unleashing a war of nationalities, on the 
one hand, or of failing to support a revision of the Black Sea clauses, on the other 
hand, should the tsar oppose the Prussian. Britain was the only state whom 
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Alexander would work with in order to deter Prussia, but the tsar wanted 
London to do all of the work in supporting Austria. Again, the certainty 
principle is relevant here in that singly, or in combination, the major European 
powers could have deterred Bismarck from prosecuting war against Austria for 
the time being. Austro-British, Russo-British, or Franco-British combinations 
might have been sufficient. But mutual distrust and a poorly imagined vision of 
a compact unified North Germany that would stabilize Europe drew support 
away from working together to keep the peace. 
 
 422 
Chapter 7: Asymmetric affective abandonment: Bismarck’s wars of unification: 
The Franco-Prussian War (1870). 
 
Motivated biases on the parts of both Napoleon and Bismarck to restore the 
prestige of their respective states after overextending themselves resulted in a 
war that poisoned Franco-Prussian relations for the next seventy years. 
Napoleon’s foreign policy reversed course after the conciliatory Daru was 
replaced by the incompetent prussophobic Gramont, who, spoiling for a Franco-
Austrian alliance in order to undo previous Prussian gains prosecuted a war 
against Prussia. France scored a decisive diplomatic victory over Prussia when 
Wilhelm agreed to withdraw a plan to put a Prussian prince on the Spanish 
throne (such a move would have placed a Prussian and a Prussian-friendly, 
government on either side of France). But Gramont refused to be satisfied and 
thus overplayed his hand by attempting to force a gratuitous humiliation on 
Prussia. Bismarck, in turn, extricated himself from his foreign policy blunder by 
thwarting the peaceful intentions of his sovereign by using diplomatic chicanery 
(the edited Ems telegram) that forced Napoleon into a position of either fighting 
or suffering the loss of his dynasty. This was a false choice only by Gramont’s ill-
conceived motivated bias to rouse formerly indifferent French public opinion to 
make it believe that satisfaction had to be given to salve its artificially wounded 
amour-propre. The essential dynamics of affective abandonment were at play 
during this crisis and war, including the mistaken belief of Bismarck that 
Napoleon was self-deterred through a series of crises in which the emperor 
repeatedly failed to gain his objectives. Thus, the Franco-Prussian War is again a 
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crucial case study whose falsification would largely deny the validity of the 
theoretical dynamics proposed.  
 Beust, the anti-Prussian Austrian foreign minister, pointed up the 
diplomatic absurdity of the final crisis leading to war by asking, “when I look at 
what is happening I ask myself whether I have become an imbecile?”1 This was a 
war that certainly was not inevitable and should never have been fought, but 
there were no major powers willing to prevent it. Even after the shocking success 
in consolidating North Germany after the Austrian defeat in 1866, Napoleon’s 
France was still regarded as the likely disturber of the peace on the Continent. 
Thus, though the remaining major European powers did not want a Franco-
Prussian war, it was not disturbing to them and they blindly believed that its 
outcome (again, mistakenly underrating Prussia’s chances) would not materially 
change the balance of power on the Continent. This essential insight was 
obscured by the existence of an imbalanced international system that Mosse 
characterizes as one in which the major powers were in a state of “diplomatic 
disorientation.”2 Mosse argues that a re-grouping of the powers (France and 
Austria versus Russia and Prussia with Britain abstaining) resulted with a 
resurgence of the Eastern Question, a dynamic largely missing during the 
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Austro-Prussian War. But in reality, both France and Prussia were left isolated to 
face each other. Russia and Austria tacitly agreed to let the antagonists fight it 
out alone. To borrow Taylor’s formulation, the Eastern Question provided crises 
that simply would not boil.3 Thus, the western and eastern issues could not be 
joined so that France could gain an ally in Europe against Prussia. Prussia also 
failed to gain an ally, but it did not need one. Bismarck was rightly confident that 
Prussia would prevail in a war against France. 
 To demonstrate these conclusions I present a discussion of the imbalanced 
international system in which eastern and western issues could not be joined. 
Then I examine a series of crises generated and gambits by Napoleon in a 
desperate attempt to restore prestige to his governance. Special attention will be 
paid to the effect that these risk acceptant attempts to recover lost prestige have 
on the motivated biases of the relevant decision-makers on both the French and 
Prussian sides to prevail in the diplomatic showdown known as the 
Hohenzollern candidature for the Spanish throne, which  ultimately resulted in 
war. 
 After the conclusion of the Austro-Prussian War, each of the major powers 
found itself in relative isolation. The defeated Austria had no friends in Europe, 
and Prussia aroused considerable suspicions as to her aggressive designs. Tsar 
Alexander criticized Bismarck’s annexation of the North German states, while his 
own efforts to Russianize his Polish territories showed him to be a hypocrite. 
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Prussia had no reliable ally; Bismarck’s secret incipient offensive/defensive 
treaties with the lesser German states south of the Main at the time were rather a 
guarantee against Austria than a move to informally incorporate them.4 French 
public opinion was inflamed by the obvious failure of Napoleon to secure any 
territorial success as it became obvious that Sadowa was as much a French 
failure as an Austrian one. Britain had appeared to withdraw entirely from 
Continental affairs. At the urging of Bismarck, Austria attempted to expand 
eastwards and was busy incorporating Hungary into its multiethnic empire. This 
brought Austria into conflict with Russia over the western Balkans. After years of 
self-imposed isolation, Russia was beginning to recover its strength and thus 
decided to use its newfound diplomatic influence to encourage Cretan insurgents 
to rebel against Turkish rule. Greece wished to annex Crete and Russia 
supported this objective because it also encouraged pan-Slavism in the Balkans. 
The installation of a new ruler in Bucharest and a Serbo-Turkish dispute added 
to instability in the Ottoman Empire and fostered a renewed belief that its days 
were numbered.5 
Crete. 
At the end of August 1866, Alexander cast about for allies with respect to the 
Cretan situation. Together with Britain and France, Russia brought the Greek 
state into being and continued to guarantee it after 1830. Gorchakov sought a 
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joint remonstrance against Turkey backed by Russian warships. But France 
temporized; Tallyrand, the new ambassador to St. Petersburg, told him that the 
sultan was installing a new governor in Crete and thus they should wait to see if 
the situation improved. Stanley followed Paris’s lead. Britain was heavily 
preoccupied with its own problems including Irish Disestablishment and the 
Irish Land Bill as well as its attempts to prevent American-backed Fenian raids 
into British Canada. Resolving the Alabama claims regarding British culpability 
during the American Civil War, the introduction of a new reform bill, and 
preoccupation with defending Belgium competed for the foreign minister’s 
attention to the problems of Crete. Crete was strategically important to the 
British Empire because it lay along the Egyptian route to India. But Stanley, more 
than any British foreign minister of his time, advocated strict non-intervention so 
as to husband his resources. Nevertheless, he mimicked France’s diplomatic 
moves in this instance because he feared that British isolation in the Near East 
through a Franco-Russian rapprochement might lead to Russian support for 
French designs on Luxembourg and Belgium.6    
 To complicate matters, Beust’s appointment as Austrian foreign minister 
alarmed Alexander because he feared a Franco-Austrian rapprochement with 
respect to Turkey. Moreover, a Pole was selected by Franz Joseph as governor of 
Galicia, a direct snub to Russia. Nevertheless, cordiality seemed to prevail when 
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Werther informed Gorchakov that Austria would seek no influence in the 
Principalities in the case of a Turkish collapse, if Russia would recognize the 
former’s interests in the western Balkans (Bosnia and Herzegovinia).7 The only 
fly in the ointment, as Beust explained in conversation with Werther, was that 
Russia intended to maintain a monopoly with respect to the protection of the 
Christians in Turkey. Alexander wanted quick results and he had little interest in 
promoting reforms that protected Christians and Moslems alike.8 Unsure of 
French and Austrian support, Alexander turned to Prussia and toned down his 
criticism of Bismarck’s policies. But the tsar had to petition the Austrians and the 
French again because word came that the Christians would rebel against the 
Turks in the Balkans the following spring. Beust saw the possibility of 
overturning the Paris treaty of 1856 in a European congress and informed the 
French that the Black Sea clauses might be lifted in order to secure the 
cooperation of Russia. Moustier, the new ambassador to Constantinople, balked 
at this suggestion;9 he feared too close a rapprochement between Austria and 
Russia at France’s expense. Austria and Russia fell out, as expected, over the 
latter’s lack of interest in promoting reform throughout the Ottoman Empire.  
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When Alexander returned to bilateral discussions with France, Moustier 
proposed that both states should urge the sultan to abandon the Serbian 
fortresses and cede Crete in order to enlarge the frontiers of Greece. In return, 
Moustier expected Russia to support France in its vaguely defined western 
claims. Napoleon was secretly trying to gain Luxembourg from Holland and had 
consequent designs on Belgium, and he did not want to show his hand to Russia 
(or Britain). France agreed to work with Russia with respect to the Ottoman 
Empire because it thought that it was securing Turkey’s interests despite the 
cession of Crete even though Russia believed that this was a prelude to the 
Ottoman Empire’s dissolution. Gorchakov’s lack of interest in demanding 
reforms revealed this and thus brought the discussions to an end. Gorchakov 
turned again to Prussia for support on the Cretan issue, but Reuss, the 
representative of the North German Confederation, explained that it would have 
to defer to the wishes of its western neighbors. Napoleon’s designs on 
Luxembourg were generally known by the 1st of April 1867, and Alexander 
would not support the French, since Bismarck had begun obstructing Napoleon’s 
designs. Gorchakov thus failed to secure western support on Crete and the 
eastern and western issues could not be joined for mutual benefit. 
The Luxembourg Crisis. 
As early as August 1866, Napoleon tried to placate Bismarck by dropping his 
demands on German territory and instead sought the latter’s acquiescence in 
France’s annexing Luxembourg. French public opinion was aroused over the 
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new North German Confederation and it was feared that this was merely a 
prelude to crossing the Main and incorporating the south German states. 
Napoleon attempted to appease public opinion in order to recuperate his 
prestige; and to gain a measure of territorial security. Luxembourg presented 
itself as a possible acquisition because the Austro-Prussian War had dissolved 
the German Confederation. The Grand Duchy of Luxembourg was the King of 
Holland’s personal possession as a consequence of the Vienna treaties of 1815. 
But since that time it had also been a member of the German Confederation and, 
since 1842, a member of the Zollverein. A significant Prussian army garrison was 
stationed there. When Belgium acquired its independence from Holland in 1830, 
a portion of Luxembourg continued to be held by the Dutch, but the grand 
duchy was regulated by the treaties of 1839 that guaranteed Belgium’s 
independence and restored the peace between Holland and Belgium. Since the 
German Confederation had been dissolved and the inhabitants of Luxembourg 
expressed no interest in joining the North German Confederation, the cash-
strapped William III, king of Holland wished to rid himself of this portion of 
Luxembourg and petitioned France to take it off his hands.10 
Benedetti was dispatched to sound out Bismarck on the subject. Bismarck 
was characteristically evasive though favorably disposed. The French 
ambassador was instructed to raise the subject of Belgium as well and offered a 
Franco-Prussian offensive alliance for the profit of both. Napoleon would have 
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no objection to Prussia’s taking over the lesser German states if Bismarck would 
aid France in acquiring Luxembourg and, eventually, Belgium. Although 
admitting that Luxembourg did not wish to join Germany, the newly appointed 
chancellor of the North German Confederation would not aid the French in 
taking it over. The negotiations dragged on from November 1866 until February 
1867. Bismarck’s advice to Napoleon was “commit yourself. Present Europe and 
the king of Prussia with a fait accompli.”11 Napoleon had not given up on the 
idea of friendship with Prussia; in this regard he was out of step with much of 
French opinion. But the emperor failed to realize the extent to which France had 
lost influence and power. France needed Prussia as an ally, but Prussia did not 
need France. Against whom did Prussia need protection? A Franco-German 
alliance would alienate Britain over Belgium and Russia over Poland. Moreover, 
Prussia’s stake in Poland made it unwilling to break with Russia. Had Russia 
taken alarm at Prussian gains Bismarck might have entertained the proffered 
alliance, but St. Petersburg had not. This was because Russia could more easily 
make gains in the Near East should Prussia pin France down in the west. And 
Prussia could make gains beyond the Rhine in a war with France but a Prussian 
war with Russia offered nothing but losses.12 Although Bismarck was careful not 
to commit himself in writing, the upshot of the Franco-Prussian discussions 
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amounted to the following: If the Prussians removed their garrison from 
Luxembourg, the fortress had to be dismantled. Thus, Napoleon was given the 
impression that Prussia would acquiesce in his designs but that he must act on 
his own; that the offer of an offensive alliance had been rebuffed; and that 
Luxembourg could not be used by France as a bastion to threaten Germany.13 
On February 28, 1867, Moustier was ready to guarantee Limburg (largely 
Dutch) and Holland against Prussia in exchange for Luxembourg, but William III 
would not complete the transaction unless Wilhelm assented. This is because 
Bismarck frightened the Dutch king by publicly denying that there had been any 
discussions about renouncing Luxembourg and Limburg. His decision to publish 
at this time the offensive/defensive treaties made with the lesser German states 
at the conclusion of the Austro-Prussian War was a thinly-veiled threat to 
overthrow the Prague treaty and thus incorporate the rest of Germany. Europe 
had been somewhat assuaged by Austria’s exclusion from Germany and the 
north and the south remaining separate but now this was in jeopardy. Bismarck 
went a step further and on April 1 arranged an interpellation with himself and 
Bennigsen, the National Liberal party leader in the North German parliament. 
The latter had delivered a violent harangue against Germany’s ceding any of its 
territory to France. Bismarck revealed the Luxembourg discussions because the 
king of Holland publicly notified the Prussian of the discussions, thus putting an 
end to the pretense that Prussia had nothing to do with them. Bismarck then 
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unconvincingly denied that Luxembourg had been the subject of discussions 
between Prussia and France, thus leaving Napoleon embarrassed and feeling 
that he had been cheated. The king of Holland retreated and the transaction was 
left uncompleted. Moreover, Bismarck declared that the signatories to the 1839 
treaty would have to be consulted. Public opinion in both France and Prussia 
became aroused and warlike. Goltz, the Prussian ambassador, informed 
Napoleon that the German people would rather go to war against France than 
cede Luxembourg to it.14  
Britain was not unaware of these proceedings; it had poor current 
information and was plagued by the fact that reports of a Franco-Prussian 
alliance were almost always in circulation. Nevertheless, Disraeli put his finger 
on the risk acceptant for loss dynamics at play: “the emperor is like a gambler 
who has lost half his fortune & restless to recover; likely to make a coup, which 
may be fatally final for himself.”15 However, it was Bismarck who first 
approached the British to intercede and use their good offices. Bernstorff 
requested that Britain petition the Dutch to withdraw its offer to sell 
Luxembourg. And indeed, what was the position of Britain with regard to the 
status of Luxembourg? It was the opinion of the Prussians that the status of 
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Luxembourg should be considered in the context of the scope of the 1839 
guarantees for Belgium. Stanley refused to see the connection and told Bernstorff 
so.16 By April 3, Bismarck had conveyed to Stanley that war between Prussia and 
France could not be avoided and asked if Britain would side with Prussia. 
Stanley replied that Britain would take no part in this personal quarrel and that 
armed intervention on behalf of either side was out of the question. Derby 
agreed with Victoria that firm and unequivocal language should be directed to 
both Napoleon and Bismarck. Moreover, she wrote to Wilhelm and stressed the 
responsibility that he would incur should war occur over Luxembourg. Stanley 
agreed with this approach but also stated that “there never was a time when 
England’s public opinion was more thoroughly bent on incurring no fresh 
responsibilities for Continental objects.”17 
Both Austria and Russia jumped into the fray. Beust was heavily involved 
in incorporating the Habsburg monarchy on a dualist basis and thus gave 
Prussia a free hand to threaten the basis of the Prague treaty. Nevertheless, a 
Bavarian intermediary proposed a Prusso-Austrian alliance but the foreign 
minister would not consider this and thus he tilted more towards France than 
Prussia.18 It is noteworthy that towards the end of the crisis Gramont proposed 
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an offensive/defensive treaty by which France would gain the left bank of the 
Rhine while Austria would acquire Silesia from Prussia as well as supremacy 
over the lesser German states. Beust turned down the French proposal because 
Slavs, Hungarians, and Germans in the Austrian Empire would object to it.19 
Austria was willing to tolerate French gains on the Rhine only as the 
consequence of a war against Russia in the Balkans.20 To further illustrate the 
unwillingness of states to coordinate their policies in the different theaters, Beust 
reversed the Austrian policy of supporting Turkey and instead sought to 
organize the western powers in a common effort to support the Balkan 
Christians, support that would thus have competed with that of Russia. He 
reasoned that Berlin would have no choice but to support an isolated Russia, its 
only reliable ally. Hungarians would enthusiastically support a war in the 
Balkans; Austro-Germans would be sympathetic as well. As the consequence of 
such realignments due to an eastern war, Austria would gain its chance to take 
revenge against Prussia for its earlier defeat.21 But Gramont shrank back from 
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Beust’s conditions because France was not interested in becoming an enemy of 
Russia.22 
Russia, for its part was more aggressive in rejecting French pretensions. 
Moustier asked Gorchakov to ask Berlin to make concessions in order to break 
the deadlock. In response, the vice chancellor upbraided Talleyrand, the former  
stating of the “terrible extremity” in which Bismarck was likely to be placed 
given his loss of popularity in Germany and the threat of a great war.23 Napoleon 
was clearly grasping at straws. Gorchakov stated that Napoleon had a chance to 
express together with the tsar, displeasure over Bismarck’s dispossessing the 
various petty German dynasties at the conclusion of the previous war: “…the 
circular of M. de La Valette admitted M. Bismarck to be right, and now six 
months later you go back upon the approval which you had accorded him.”24 
Nevertheless, Gorchakov intimated that he would be more sympathetic to 
France’s position regarding Luxembourg were the French to give him relief on 
the Black Sea clauses. Still, this was not an alliance against Prussia.25 Rather, it 
was a weak attempt to join the eastern and western issues for mutual gain. But 
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neither side was willing to offer much more than to engage in studied silence 
regarding the matter. 
Bismarck petitioned his preferred allies, but strictly in order to keep them 
constrained. He had in mind a resurrection of the Holy Alliance (what would 
later become the League of the Three Emperors), but it didn’t materialize because 
of incompatibilities between the interests of Prussia, Austria, and Russia.26 
Alexander took the initiative and offered to put 100,000 troops on the Austrian 
border in case of a Franco-Prussian war. Wilhelm was to reciprocate by ensuring 
that Austria never took over Bosnia and Herzegovinia in the Balkans. Moreover, 
Prussia was to support an end to the neutralization of the Black Sea.27 But 
Bismarck had no interest in Near Eastern affairs and he would not side with 
Russia against Austria. After all, it was Bismarck who encouraged the Austrians 
to expand eastward in order to eliminate any motive for revanche in Germany. 
He also did not want to have to defend the Habsburg Empire militarily. If an 
Austro-Russian war broke out in the Balkans, Bismarck would station troops on 
the French, not the Austrian, border. He was sure that Austria would not move 
without French support.28 Thus, if the three conservative states could mutually 
guarantee each other’s possessions at no cost, Bismarck might continue to unify 
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Germany without outside interference. But Russia would not renounce its Balkan 
ambitions, something which Austria naturally mistrusted. Gorchakov would not 
guarantee Austria’s integrity and even forbade a defensive alliance between 
Prussia and Austria.29 Rather, he wanted an alliance with Prussia that included 
France in order to bring Russia gains in the Near East.30 Thus, Russia would not 
side with Prussia against France and Prussia would not side with Austria against 
Russia. The major powers continued their relative diplomatic isolation and 
attempts to balance the international system through a regrouping of the powers 
could not be achieved. Nevertheless, there was an element of design in all of this. 
Bismarck was largely able to dissociate eastern, from western, issues, 
respectively. His insistence on the existence of two threatening powers to an ally, 
rather than just one, meant that an Austro-Russian clash in the Balkans need not 
necessarily involve western powers nor would a Franco-Prussian war necessarily 
involve eastern powers. Ultimately, Bismarck required that allies merely ‘hold 
the ring’ against encroachment by third parties in order to let the two combatants 
fight it out alone.31   
Again, Napoleon realized that he had overextended himself and he then 
petitioned the British to help him out. On April 6, Napoleon complained to 
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Cowley that Bismarck “had played him false [but that] he was most desirous to 
maintain the peace of Europe and if the Great Powers could prevail on Prussia to 
give him satisfaction, or suggest any mode of settling this question, he would be 
only too glad to adopt it.”32 The emperor had in mind that Luxembourg should 
be made over to the grand duke while Prussia withdrew its garrison from the 
fortress. The independence of Luxembourg would be guaranteed by the great 
powers. Both Alexander and Gorchakov pressed for moderation on the part of 
Berlin. By April 26, they were able to propose a London conference to settle the 
issue and they knew Bismarck would agree.33 The Prussian saw the importance 
of a collective guarantee given by the other major European powers to 
Luxembourg. From May 7-11, Stanley headed a conference and the Luxembourg 
crisis was defused. The king of Holland continued to own the grand duchy, but it 
was neutralized under a collective guarantee of the great powers. Luxembourg 
remained a member of the Zollverein; Prussia withdrew its military and the 
fortress was demolished. Limburg was incorporated by Holland. A nonsensical 
debate took place in the House of Commons regarding the distinction between a 
‘collective’, and a ‘several’, guarantee, respectively.  A ‘several guarantee’ 
obliged each signatory to defend its charge, individually, if necessary. A 
‘collective guarantee’ imposed no such restriction and a state was not required to 
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discharge its obligations unless all other parties did likewise. British legal 
reasoning saw that Luxembourg fell under a collective guarantee, while Belgium 
fell under a several guarantee. Bismarck was rebuffed at the conference in his 
request to put both Luxembourg and Belgium under an identical guarantee. 
Moreover, he was angered to find out the hollowness of the British interpretation 
of the collective guarantee, although Granville noted that it “was so utterly free 
from danger, that it is difficult to understand the importance which Prussia 
attaches to it.”34 But as Eyck notes, “there is good reason to believe that 
[Bismarck] knew beforehand that Britain would undertake the guarantee only in 
this very limited sense, and that he accepted it in order to be able to close the 
affair.”35 
It is unlikely that Bismarck originally intended to set a trap for Napoleon 
here. Else, why would he not just attack France in the rear as it moved into 
Luxembourg and then Belgium?36 Rather, Bismarck likely overestimated his 
ability to offer a concession that would satisfy France while going over the head 
of German public opinion. Napoleon’s vague soundings with the Prussian 
regarding territorial designs had been the former’s stock-in-trade for years. But 
Bismarck was significantly preoccupied with Prussia’s digesting the gains made 
from the previous war and he needed to goad the constituent Reichstag into 
action. Critical debates on ministerial responsibility, remuneration of deputies, 
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the budget, which largely involved the military, were flagging. The constitution 
for the new North German Confederation had yet to be adopted.37 Thus, he 
improvised as the Luxembourg crisis was reaching its high point. It is less ironic 
than cynical that Bismarck would intervene to whip up German sentiment 
(colluding with Bennigsen beforehand to conduct an interpellation) in order to 
get himself out of a foreign policy dilemma largely of his own making. On the 
one hand, discredit would be brought upon Prussia should it fail to remain the 
guarantor of German nationalism wherever it existed. On the other hand, 
without external pressure, Bismarck’s credibility with Paris would be 
jeopardized were he found to be a setter of diplomatic traps.38 Thus, he fobbed 
off responsibility for the Luxembourg decision on aroused German public 
opinion. The influence of Prussian military success on national public opinion 
was beginning to create a juggernaut that Bismarck increasingly found he could 
not ignore, and it was to become the strongest weapon in his hand in the future.39 
It could be argued that both France and Prussia were employing the endowment 
effect and insurance premium in conservative fashion. Both sides envisioned 
trading bits of territory in order to satisfy each other’s security needs. It is 
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obvious that this was not their endowment to barter with. But even the king of 
Holland was a willing, if not a nervous, trader. Nor was Stanley averse to 
Napoleon’s acquiring Luxembourg if it could reduce the emperor’s insecurity 
about the stability of his rule.40 The annexation of Luxembourg is a transaction 
that should have been made from the standpoint of using the insurance premium 
in conservative fashion. In the end, both sides made concessions and the problem 
was peaceably resolved with the intervention of third powers. But it is shocking 
to learn that Napoleon decided against war with Prussia in this instance because 
Niel, his new minister of war, stated that the military would not be ready to fight 
for the next eight months.41 For his part, Bismarck considered war and 
proclaimed the dangerous doctrine that “if a nation feels that its honour has been 
violated, then this honour has in fact been violated, and action has to be taken 
accordingly.”42 Nevertheless, he acted cautiously because he could not get the 
lesser German states on board.43 The casus belli for the activation of their treaties 
apparently had not been met. The real reason is that a number of the southern 
German states were becoming less enchanted with the prospect of German 
unification. There was foot-dragging on the part of the various states, in 
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particular Bavaria and Württemburg, in implementing the military treaties with 
Prussia. To a large degree, the lesser German states could not ignore the 
economic benefits associated with their inclusion in the Zollverein, but political 
unification was stalling if not reversing. This was due to resistance to Prussian 
efforts to establish uniformity in military practices, increase the costs which had 
to be borne by the states, the introduction of more rigid military disciplinary 
codes, and an increase in the lengths of military service.44 It is safe to argue that 
both France and Prussia were not eager to go to war with one another at this 
time and thus were willing to be restrained by others after earlier overextending 
themselves. 
Other Napoleonic failures to include the proposal for a Triple Alliance, the 
Belgian Railways Dispute, the Liberal Empire, and the proposal for 
disarmament. 
 
Conventional wisdom has it that after the Luxembourg crisis, Bismarck began to 
realize that war with France was becoming inevitable.45 In reality, Bismarck held 
the mistaken belief that Napoleon would not fight and was therefore becoming 
self-deterred. This hypothesis has to be qualified somewhat, however. Bismarck 
had known since 1855 that Napoleon would always back down in the end. The 
emperor was a noted procrastinator; the step from deliberation to action was 
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always difficult for him.46 The failure of the French to support the Austrians in 
the previous war because Napoleon countermanded his own orders was 
evidence for this belief. Nevertheless, Bismarck also knew that Napoleon was not 
always firmly in charge of foreign policy, much less of his own administration, 
and the war party, which included the empress, Rouher, la Guéronnière (the 
ambassador to Belgium), and Gramont could always potentially hijack French 
policy. Moreover, after the Luxembourg crisis, Europe was on edge to the degree 
that any small incident might be magnified out of all proportion and lead to war. 
Both Niel, in France, and Moltke, in Germany, were engaged in a competitive 
arms race equipping massive standing armies. This was a race that only Prussia 
could really afford to run. Thus, France always found itself in a position where it 
would need a head start on mobilization if it was to have any chance of meeting 
Prussia on equivalent terms on the battlefield. To that one must add Napoleon’s 
insecurity about his own regime. As Lyons, British ambassador to Paris, noted, 
that while the emperor might not admit that he was afraid of Prussia, he could 
not deny that he was afraid of France.47 
 Also, a series of foreign policy failures which can only be summarized 
here, put France in a state of high anxiety. Maximilian I of Mexico, the emperor’s 
brother, was executed at Queretaro by the revolutionary Mexican government in 
June 1867. French troops protecting him had to be withdrawn after Napoleon 
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wasted 360 million francs on this imperial misadventure. By November of that 
year, Napoleon was also forced to reestablish a French garrison to defend the 
Pope after defeating Garibaldi’s forces at Mentana. At Mentana, the emperor 
claimed to see a Prussian plot to undercut him.48 France had expended much 
blood and treasure to bring about Italian independence. Thus it was 
embarrassing to hear Rouher fulminate in the corps législatif that “Italy shall 
never possess herself of Rome” in order to retain support of the clerics in 
France.49  
After the Luxembourg crisis, Napoleon tried to establish a Triple alliance 
of France, Austria, and Italy directed against Prussia and he erroneously 
believed, at the opening of the Franco-Prussian War, that the alliance was 
“morally signed” and thus in effect.50 Maximilian’s death was an occasion for 
Franz Joseph and Napoleon to meet at Salzburg. Negotiations for a Triple 
alliance began with France and Austria in July 1868 and were joined by Italy in 
December of that year. They went on until October 1869. Napoleon had in mind 
an offensive alliance but Beust rebuffed Gramont at every turn. An alliance with 
a foreign power would alienate the Germans upon whose support Austria 
needed to restore its influence in Europe. If Napoleon had in mind to attract the 
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lesser German states, nothing could undercut that objective more than to make 
Prussia popular again by threatening it. But both Austria and France were 
worried that the other might come to terms with Prussia to their respective 
detriment. Thus, although no treaty was signed, an exchange of letters of good 
intentions on the parts of both sovereigns is known to have taken place. 
Napoleon stated that if Austria was attacked, France would come to its aid. 
Moreover, France would not negotiate with another foreign power without first 
consulting Austria. There is no record of Franz Joseph’s letter, but Beust’s 
records indicate that the Austrian did not go that far. There was no promise of 
assistance in case France was attacked and certainly none if France was the 
aggressor. Victor Emanuel promised nothing unless Rome was evacuated 
beforehand, which Napoleon found himself unable to do.51 The emperor deluded 
himself into believing that this foreign policy failure was in fact a success. (Thus, 
on the eve of the Franco-Prussian War, Napoleon was without an ally, but he 
blithely presumed that Austria and Italy would aid him in prosecuting war 
against Prussia, and they might have if his forces had not been devastated so 
quickly.) He also believed that Niel’s army reforms (they were ineffective 
because they were only cosmetic and did not come close to competing with 
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Moltke’s reserve system) had put France in a good position to “fac[e] the future 
without fear.”52  
The Belgian Railways Dispute. 
 It is against this background that the Belgian Railways dispute took place. It was 
peaceably resolved but la Valette, newly appointed French foreign minister, 
unwarrantedly saw a Prussian intrigue here53 and Britain believed that France 
intended to annex Belgium by stealthy means.54 Bismarck unwarrantedly 
believed that fear of Prussia deterred Napoleon from taking Belgium.55 He 
further believed that the Liberal Empire was a consequence of Prussian 
deterrence and that the appointment of Daru as foreign minister was further 
proof that Napoleon had reversed course and had now taken a conciliatory 
attitude toward Prussian unification. 
 In early 1868, two Belgian rail lines chartered by the Belgian government, 
the Grand Luxembourg, and the Liégeois-Limbourgeois, were heavily in debt. In 
October of that year, both companies opened negotiations to be taken over by a 
large French concern, the Chemin de Fer de l’Est. An excited Belgian government 
refused to allow this commercial transaction to proceed, seeing policy  
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implications in national security in tolerating foreign control of a resource that 
would be needed in time of war. This was particularly the case with France 
which, since 1866, had continually been rumored to have designs on Belgium. 
Thus, the Belgians petitioned the British to intervene and rushed through 
legislation that forbade any such takeovers. Stanley resented the Belgian petition. 
He felt that the right of refusal claimed was correct, but that the Belgians had to 
take that step and then perhaps ask the British to intervene should they not like 
France’s response.56 It is noteworthy that, in this context, as if to put a legal 
stamp on Britain’s non-intervention, in March 1868 the House of Commons 
deleted from the Mutiny Bill traditional reference to preserving the balance of 
power in Europe as a prime reason for the existence of the British army.57 Thus, 
Belgium was not likely to get much help from Britain. As the negotiations 
dragged on, Clarendon, who replaced Stanley in 1868 as foreign minister in a 
liberal Gladstone government, became annoyed that the Belgian government did 
not prevent the transaction simply by buying the railway companies outright 
instead of claiming a right of veto, the latter a move that was surely provocative 
to France.58 
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 France did not dispute Belgium’s right to forbid the transaction; it merely 
believed that the latter’s handling of the affair was clumsy and discourteous.59 
But Napoleon also saw in the acquisition of the Belgian railways an opportunity 
to restore his image with his countrymen. Thus, he hoped that by threatening 
war he could obtain the rail lines, stating, “it is necessary to act as if [war] will 
arise.”60 He also wrote to Niel asking about the possibility of war, but this is not 
evidence that he intended to go to war with Belgium.61 Rather, it was the excited 
state of tension between France and Prussia that led France to see Belgium’s 
response as the result of Prussian connivance, even as Napoleon’s risk 
acceptance for gain contributed to the anxiety.62 
 Clarendon, who was both a Francophile and knew Napoleon well, was 
able to see through these conflicting motivations. He observed that “if the 
emperor attaches value to the English alliance, he ought not to sacrifice it by a 
sneaking attempt to incorporate Belgium by means of a railway company and its 
                                                            
59 La Guéronnière telegram to la Valette, January 3, 1869, France Ministère des 
Affaires Étrangère, Les Origines Diplomatiques de la Guerre de 1870-71, vol. 23, 
op. cit., pp. 112-14. Cited in Millman, British Foreign Policy and the Coming of 
the Franco-Prussian War, op. cit., p. 131. 
60 Napoleon comment to Metternich, cited in la Valette letter to la Tour, February 
28, 1869, France Ministère des Affaires Étrangère, Les Origines Diplomatiques de 
la Guerre de 1870-71, vol. 23, op. cit., pp. 282-83. Cited in Millman, British 
Foreign Policy and the Coming of the Franco-Prussian War, op. cit., p. 130. 
61 Craig, “Great Britain and the Belgian Railways Dispute of 1869,” American 
Historical Review, op. cit., p. 747. 
62 Clarendon letter to Lyons, March 13, 1869, Clarendon Papers, Bodleian 
Library, Oxford University. Cited in Mosse, The European Powers and the 
German Question 1848-71, op. cit., p. 298. 
 449 
employees.”63 The foreign minister later continued, “I am getting rather anxious 
about the Belgian railway business which is an audacious attempt on the part of 
the French govt. to incorporate Belgium. It is absurd for la Valette to say or rather 
complain that the objections raised by Belgium shew mistrust of France!what 
would the French govt. and public say if the Ligne du Nord was bought at a 
ruinously high price by the Chatham and Dover Companies and that English 
officials were to be in charge of the line up to the walls of Paris?”64 
 True, Napoleon had nothing to do with the initiation of what was 
essentially a commercial transaction, but the tenuous status of his rule in a 
demoralized France made him risk acceptant for gain and thus always on the 
lookout to profit at others’ expense. As early as January 1868, Lyons opined that, 
“the real danger to Europe appears to be the difficulties of the Emperor 
Napoleon at home. The discontent is great and the distress amongst the working 
classes severe. The great measure of the session, the new Conscription Act, is 
very unpopular. There is no glitter at home or abroad to divert public attention, 
and the French have been a good many years without the excitement of a 
change.”65 Thus, Millman is correct when he argues that, “it is difficult to 
conceive how the Chemin de Fer de l’Est could have acted in defiance of Brussels 
without the financial and political support of its own government. The French 
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government stood to gain if the contemplated arrangement took effect. If the 
French company managed to obtain the two Belgian lines, these, together with 
the already acquired Luxembourg railroad, would give France a railway network 
extending from Switzerland through Luxembourg to Brussels in one direction, 
and from Luxembourg through Liège into Holland in the other. Such a network 
would have been invaluable in a war with Prussia, and also a step leading to the 
annexation of Belgium.”66 
 The British foreign minister gave la Valette his word of honor that Prussia 
had nothing to do with Belgium’s response.67 This doesn’t mean that Bismarck 
did not intend to profit from the dustup. Bernstorff, who never spoke without 
instruction, intended to drive a wedge between France and Britain by stating that 
Prussia would not defend Belgium by itself, but that a Prusso-British alliance 
against France could be had for the asking. Moreover, he pretended to be 
perplexed that Britain would not publicly undertake a defense of Belgium in this 
instance by allying with Prussia.68 Bismarck knew that Clarendon knew that 
Britain would not be likely to defend Belgium alone should France decide to take 
it.69 The chancellor later shocked Loftus by stating that he could resign himself to 
France’s annexing Belgium and that he would know where to find his 
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compensations. When the British ambassador stated that this was the politics of a 
brigand, the chancellor concluded that British abstention forced him “into almost 
a state of vassalage to Russia, and the only way we can recompense Russia is by 
supporting her. This is not congenial to our interests!but we have no choice.”70  
Bismarck did have choices and Clarendon knew that Prussia was as likely to 
assist France in annexing Belgium as it was to aid Britain in resisting it. He was 
just trying to identify the highest bidder. As evidence of Prussia’s room to 
maneuver, Bismarck threatened to punish Britain for the rejected alliance offer by 
working for Russian interests, thus against Britain, in the Near East. 
 The railways dispute was peaceably resolved on April 27, 1869. The 
Belgians initially offered to pay economic damages for the contracts that were 
signed but abrogated by their government. The French finally acceded to this. 
Napoleon needed friends and he could not afford to alienate Britain when 
Franco-Prussian tension was running so high. Lyons believed that Britain had 
successfully made an understated defense of Belgium in Paris and thus did not 
threaten war with her. But this was whistling to keep one’s courage up. At 
bottom, Britain had no interest in going to war with France over Belgium but it 
did not want to advertise the yawning chasm between reality and its long-stated 
interest in protecting Belgium. Moreover, Clarendon did not trust Bismarck; thus 
he was not interested in a Prusso-British alliance. Bismarck reconsidered and was 
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relieved to be free of such an alliance, because he was not really interested in 
fighting France over Belgium, which he considered to be just a pawn in the 
diplomatic game, much as he viewed Luxembourg.71 Again, Napoleon had 
backed down and Bismarck believed that it was due to Prussian deterrence in the 
guise of proffered support for Britain. It is irrelevant that Clarendon never 
suggested the possibility of a Prusso-British alliance to Paris. What is relevant 
here is the conclusion that Bismarck drew and this added to his fund of evidence 
that Napoleon was becoming self-deterred from a clash with Prussia. 
The Liberal Empire and the proposal for disarmament. 
Upon taking over the foreign office, Clarendon interviewed both Napoleon and 
Bismarck. He came away with the opinion that Napoleon “has nothing to fear 
from Prussia if he does not give her just provocation, but on the other hand that 
Prussia does not fear a war if she can show Germany and the world that she is 
really forced into it.”72 Clarendon came away impressed by the French side after 
the report of an interview that Lyons had with Prince Napoleon (Plon-Plon), the 
largely underestimated cousin of the emperor. Plon-Plon was an ardent 
champion of nationality and he considered a Franco-Prussian war to be an 
abomination in European civilization.73 Plon-Plon believed in a program of 
domestic, social and political reform, as well as a foreign policy that included 
partial disarmament, peaceful relations with Germany, and the French 
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evacuation of Rome.74 He also had the emperor’s ear at a time when his opinion 
could be decisive for French policy. Napoleon had twice previously engaged in 
plebiscite elections in order to reduce the influence of the legislature. But the 
1869 general election showed extreme dissatisfaction with the imperial empire. 
Support for the monarch’s policies in the corps législatif was assured, but a 
significant proportion of voters in the urban cities opposed him. This was not 
new, but the loss of popular support in the countryside was evidence that 
Napoleon’s reign was in jeopardy. Plon-Plon argued to the emperor that the 
populace was indeed liberal and that the largely hollow reforms of 1867 
spearheaded by Rouher would not stand up. Thus, according to the prince, 
Napoleon had three choices: reaction, conciliation, or compromise (a policy of 
drift). Conciliation required that the emperor concede genuine responsibility to 
the legislature, engage in constitutional changes, and liberalize his regime. 
Should he do so, past mistakes would be forgotten while the opposition would 
be muzzled. Plon-Plon continued that should the emperor engage in reaction, he 
might stay in power for a short period, but republican, socialist, and 
revolutionary forces would be strengthened. Any crisis, whether domestic or 
foreign, would be exploited. Previously, a physically ill and exhausted emperor 
had considered abdication, but abdication might not even be a possibility given 
an aroused and strengthened opposition.75 
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 Unfortunately, Napoleon continued with a mix of repression and the 
appearance of legislative progress to muzzle discontent. Although he allowed 
the outward forms of parliamentary procedure, the ministers nonetheless were 
still appointed by and responsible to the emperor. The legislators balked and 
Napoleon then had the good sense to dismiss Rouher and abolish the hated 
position of minister of state. The liberal Ollivier was appointed prime minister 
and was invited to form a government. A murder scandal involving the 
emperor’s dissolute cousin, Pierre Bonaparte, prompted demonstrations 
numbering in the 100,000s and widespread rioting in Paris to which repressive 
measures were employed, thus putting Ollivier in an incongruous position. 
Rouher called for a plebiscite and on May 8, 1870, the people were invited to vote 
for or against Napoleon’s Liberal Empire. Cleverly worded, the referendum  
gave the liberal electorate no choice but to also vote for the emperor’s personal 
empire (political responsibility for the nation resided exclusively in Napoleon) 
while those who voted against the personal empire were branded as anti-liberals. 
The electorate cast 7.1 million yes votes against 1.5 million no votes. This was 
more than technically a win, but ominously, 20% of the army, which had just 
been given the right to vote, opposed Napoleon as did 25 of his palace guards. 
The Prussian military attaché to France reported to Berlin his grim opinion that 
Napoleon would be wise to distract the military from demoralizing political 
questions by using it in battle.76 
                                                            
76 Geoffrey Wawro, The Franco-Prussian War: The German Conquest of France 
 455 
 The liberal and dovish Daru was appointed foreign minister and his first 
course of action was to sound out Britain on the subject of partial disarmament 
with Germany. Ollivier knew too well the fragile state of France’s collective 
psyche. In order to appease the peasantry, a reduction in the army was 
necessary. But a public rebuff on the disarmament proposal from Prussia, he 
argued, would be fatal!un échec, c’est la guerre! for a parliament less able 
than before to risk “any wound to the national pride.”77 Thus, Clarendon took up 
the disarmament offer and made it appear that the overture came from London, 
not from Paris. The foreign minister was respected in Berlin; thus, in February 
1870 he approached through Loftus, Bismarck and Wilhelm on the subject. But 
both Prussians were equally indisposed to consider the subject; disarmament 
would benefit the lagging French and the king was unwilling to give up his prize 
(the army is his idol said Clarendon to Victoria) through international sleight of 
hand. Bismarck told the British foreign minister that Prussia was “surrounded by 
three empires with armies as large as our own, any two of whom might coalesce 
against us.”78 Daru took the failure in stride and he even heeded Clarendon’s 
proposal that France take the first step and begin to disarm unilaterally in order 
to induce Prussia to follow. By reducing the army by 10,000 to a standing 
strength of 90,000 troops and ridding itself of equipment79 France was in fact self-
deterring because it was generally believed that war might break out at any 
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moment just as the country was engaged in a credulous pacifism.80 This was the 
last proposal for peace as Clarendon died on June 27, 1870. Such was his 
diplomatic weight on the Continent that Bismarck later famously remarked to 
Clarendon’s daughter that, had he not died, the Franco-Prussian War would 
never have occurred.81 Granville was an ineffectual replacement. Gladstone had 
stated of Claredon that he “was the only living British statesman whose name 
carried any influence in the councils of Europe.”82  
 France was certainly isolated. The chancellor referred to reports of a Triple 
Alliance directed at Germany as “conjectural rubbish.”83 French occupation of 
Rome disallowed an alliance with Italy and the Austro-Germans objected to an 
alliance with Paris as well. Russia could get what it wanted in the Near East by 
working with Prussia rather than with France. The Luxembourg and Belgian 
railways crises were clumsily handled and further cemented British suspicions of 
Napoleonic aggrandizement. The war party in Paris, alluded to earlier, 
concerned Bismarck not because he feared a conflict, but because he feared that it 
would keep Napoleon from adopting a conciliatory policy toward German 
unification. 
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 The chancellor argued that “it will be possible to remake Germany 
peacefully without war if a constitutional regime continues in France.”84 
Moreover, it was in Bismarck’s interest to bolster Ollivier’s government, because 
the new prime minister had come to believe that continued opposition to 
German unification was futile. Ollivier stated in the Kölnische Zeitung that 
France would have no objection to unification provided that the lesser German 
states were not forcibly annexed.85 However, even on this point he equivocated 
stating, "as far as the Main goes it has been crossed a long time; German unity 
has already been made against us; what remains is political unity, and that is 
important only to Prussia to whom it will bring more difficulties than she cares 
to imagine.”86 Perhaps Bismarck took Ollivier for granted, because he supported 
the French government in a rather backhanded manner. As discussed below, 
turning down Baden’s petition to join the North German Confederation was, in 
part, intended so as not to excite the French. But his attempt to hide Prussian 
complicity in the candidature for the Spanish throne was too clever by half. On 
the one hand, he reasoned that the hawks would scream for redress, but that 
Prussian innocence in the matter would discredit them. This would allow 
Napoleon to commit himself more fully to the liberal program, thus increasing 
the probability of German unification through peaceful means. On the other 
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hand, if the hawks won out, Prussian arms would successfully resolve the 
situation.87  
 The stick was also employed as well as the carrot in order to test whether 
the emperor was self-deterred. As if to further demoralize Napoleon, Bismarck 
continued to set the pace in Germany. To be sure, the Prussian saw serious 
setbacks in his quest for unification, but the question throughout Europe was not 
whether Germany would unify but whether it would unify slowly and peaceably 
such as not to excite an insecure France.88 From this standpoint what looks like  
risk acceptant behavior for gain is really seen from the initiating state as the 
maintenance of progress on an upward trajectory. In prospect theory this is 
known as a changing reference point.89 The failure of gain is seen as a loss and 
thus the state believes that it is engaging in risk acceptance for loss where third 
parties see only risk acceptance for gain. The chancellor rightfully saw that the 
failure to advance unification would eventually undermine his and his 
sovereign’s basis for continued governance. Bismarck was a political genius and 
he intended to unify Germany from above, not from below. Thus, he tamped 
down Badenese enthusiasm for joining the North German Confederation 
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famously cautioning against the “…shaking down of unripe fruit, and that the 
unity of Germany is no ripe fruit at this time.”90 Bismarck made this 
pronouncement even as he pushed forward on other fronts to advance 
unification. His abortive effort to have Wilhelm proclaimed kaiser (emperor) of 
Germany is a case in point. Opening the North German Reichstag in 1870, the 
king reluctantly called for a national union and a common German fatherland. 
But as Wawro notes, these words were dynamite to the ears of Napoleon. Even 
the great sponsor of both nationalism and of a United States of Europe could not 
tolerate a brazen unified German colossus. Thus, he warned Bismarck in 
February 1870, “no more violations. If Prussia moves again, France will strike.”91 
To that incident is added a Bismarckian adventure to finance a railway through 
Switzerland in June 1870 with the full expectation that it would anger Napoleon. 
Here, Bismarck was hinting at an Italo-Prussian alliance directed against France 
and the strategic railway link was evidence of his intention. In accord with 
Napoleon’s fear of the military and the government, the corps législatif 
demanded that the emperor draw the line with Bismarck.92 
 Nevertheless, Wetzel gives convincing evidence that Bismarck believed 
Napoleon to be self-deterred. Above all, the emperor was a man of caution. 
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France shrank from war, with Russia in 1854, and with Italy in 1859, respectively. 
In both cases, Napoleon’s allies pushed him into war and he then made a hasty, 
ill-conceived, and premature peace. Mexico was given up in 1867 when it 
appeared that war with the United States was imminent, and, after 1866, the 
emperor submitted to a string of humiliating reversals.93 Thus, Bismarck stated 
that “if Napoleon had wanted to go to war with Prussia, he already had ample 
provocation.”94  
The Hohenzollern candidature resulting in the Franco-Prussian War (1870). 
Berlin reciprocated London’s overture on disarmament with an overture of its 
own. On March 12, 1870, the crown princess of Prussia confidentially asked 
Victoria for her opinion concerning the Hohenzollern candidature for the 
Spanish throne.95 Since March 1869, Benedetti informed la Valette of this 
possibility and thus France was privy to this project. The dictatorial Isabella II 
had been overthrown by revolution in 1868 and fled into exile in France. The 
National Assembly, the Cortes, led by Prim, a decorated officer from the Mexican 
War, drew up a democratic, but monarchical, constitution. It was important to 
find a suitable, Catholic prince who commanded respect throughout Europe to 
assume the throne in order to put an end to Spain’s endless political upheavals. 
Prince Leopold, son of Prince Anton of the Prussian Hohenzollern-Sigmaringen 
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dynasty96 was fourth on a list that included royal candidates from Portugal, 
Belgium, and Italy. Leopold’s brother Charles had ascended the Romanian 
throne just four years earlier with Napoleon’s acquiescence. But a German ruling 
in the east in Romania did not pose the same problem as a German ruling Spain 
on France’s western flank.  
It was understandable why the princess wanted her letter to Victoria to 
remain secret; the Prussians did not want the French to catch wind of Prim’s 
offer. Neither Wilhelm, nor Anton, nor Leopold, was in favor of the idea; all felt 
that there were more legitimate claimants to the Spanish throne. Victoria 
sounded out Clarendon and the foreign minister, in his last days, advised her not 
to render an opinion on a proposal that was considered unlikely and did not 
concern Britain in the least. However, Clarendon did recognize that the 
candidature would create an unfavorable impression in France.97 Unfortunately, 
in conveying Clarendon’s advice to the Prussians, Victoria gave the 
Hohenzollern family the impression that Britain had no objection to Leopold’s 
candidacy.98 
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On February 27, 1870, Bismarck was formally apprised of the offer 
through a missive from Prim. It was at this point that the chancellor’s 
involvement became crucial. The arguments that he set forth in a letter of March 
9 to Wilhelm endorsing the candidacy were not even-handed and thus revealed a 
motivated bias to proceed with the plan. In the event of war with France, a 
monarch sympathetic to Germany on France’s southern flank would be worth 
two military corps. Should Leopold refuse the offer, a member of the Bavarian 
house of Wittelsbach would accept and thus thwart Prussia’s predominance in 
Germany. Madrid and Munich would be influenced by France, Austria, and 
Rome. A republic might be established in Spain that would then spread the 
democratic spirit to Italy and France and thus provoke Napoleon to take 
precipitous action against Prussia. Most improbably, Bismarck argued that 
Napoleon might look with favor upon a Hohenzollern on the Spanish throne 
since this would be preferable to an Orleanist or the installation of a republic.99    
Wilhelm’s comments that appear in the margin of the letter cast doubt on 
all of Bismarck’s arguments. In summary, “the hypotheses are possible, but 
equally possible in their nonoccurrence.”100 Moreover, it was not clear to him 
that accepting the throne in Spain would necessarily enhance the Hohenzollern 
name in Europe; failure was equally likely. But, although the king refused to 
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command Leopold to take the offer, neither would he obstruct the latter should 
he desire to accept it. Thus, the king allowed Bismarck to make his case by 
hosting a dinner in which Wilhelm, Anton, Leopold, Roon, Moltke, and Thile 
(secretary of state), were among the guests. This was in fact a thinly disguised 
crown council meeting. Leopold refused to accept the Spanish throne without 
Wilhelm’s assent to which the latter declined to give.101 No mention was made of 
a possible bellicose French response to the candidature, which would have made 
Wilhelm dead set against it. But out of earshot of the king, Moltke was famously 
asked, “but if Napoleon takes it ill, are we ready?” In response to which the 
general nodded in a manner that gave evidence of his complete confidence in a 
Prussian military victory.102  
In that same month, Benedetti reported evidence of the project to 
Napoleon and the ambassador was instructed to ask for Prussia’s assurance that 
it would not support something so objectionable to France.103 Thile falsely 
professed no knowledge of the candidature. By late June, Clarendon was 
informed that Napoleon would be compelled to oppose the candidature.104 
Bismarck was in close contact with Prim, and Anton, after wavering now seemed 
ready to agree to the offer.  
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The continued problem with Rome was the pretext for Daru’s 
resignation105, and Gramont assumed the role of French foreign minister. This 
was not good news in Berlin and London. Clarendon stated that “Gramont will 
be a very bad for. min. and one can only say that he is preferable to the detested 
rogue la Guéronnière who was the other candidate.”106 Bloomfield, British 
ambassador to Vienna, opined, “Gramont is favourable to the English alliance 
but he is violently anti-Prussian and Russian, and he certainly would not be 
sorry to stir up a feeling against the N. German confed. and stand out against 
any Prussian advance south of the Main.”107 Nigra, the Italian ambassador to 
Paris who knew the new French foreign minister well, had the strongest opinion: 
“There is no other way of saying it; the nomination of Gramont is a prelude to 
war, nothing could be clearer.”108 Earlier, Lyons summed up the situation nicely: 
“Prussia holds that it is not conquest or aggression to annex any German state. 
France considers that the annexation of any of the states south of the Main wd. be 
as much conquest or aggression on the part of Prussia, as it wd. be, on the part of 
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France to annex them herself. Prussia will never declare that she will not 
complete the unity of Germany. France will never declare that she will not 
interfere to prevent this.”109  
Bismarck needed to create a challenge so as to discredit the new hawkish 
turn in French foreign policy and the Spanish candidature presented a better 
pretext for this than did the kaiser project. Bismarck was changing his reference 
point in response to the French challenge. Previously, Loftus was confident that 
Bismarck was in no hurry to unify Germany and that the accession of the lesser 
German states into the North German Confederation was “reserved for a distant 
future.”110 Nevertheless, as Kennedy argues, “while often carrying out a forward 
policy in other parts of the world, the French position over the German question 
was essentially defensive; Bismarck’s, by contrast, was offensive and a freezing 
of the status quo would be for him an absolute defeat.”111 Thus, although the 
project should have been dead with Anton and Leopold’s letter of refusal to the 
Spanish government on April 20, Bismarck went behind his sovereign’s back and 
dispatched Bucher, his trusted aide, and Versen, a Prussian officer named by 
Moltke, on a secret mission to Madrid to further negotiate the candidature.  
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It is not too difficult to determine Bismarck’s motives here. Bucher was 
instructed to treat his mission as purely a dynastic quasi-private matter in which 
the Prussian state was to have no knowledge. In turn, Madrid was to deal only 
with the Sigmaringen family. Then, Bismarck could plausibly claim that he had 
no involvement in the affair.112 As indicated earlier, Prussian innocence would 
then discredit Napoleon’s right-wing extremist opponents and thus the 
chancellor could bolster the emperor’s conciliatory policy towards German 
unification. But Napoleon had already reversed preference by appointing 
Gramont as foreign minister; it was widely believed that he was appointed 
precisely to precipitate a diplomatic showdown or a war with Germany.113 Thus, 
how Bismarck could believe that this gambit would support Ollivier’s 
government is a mystery.  Bucher, who knew Bismarck professionally better than 
anyone because he was his closest collaborator in the foreign office for two 
decades, and who was the one to whom the Prussian dictated his reminiscences, 
is a better guide to the latter’s motives. According to Eyck, Bucher “knew better 
than anybody else how completely Bismarck distorted the truth, and in 
conversation with his friend Busch he called the Hohenzollern candidature 
frankly ‘a trap which Bismarck set for Napoleon’, and he added that neither the 
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king nor the crown prince had the least idea of this feature of Bismarck’s 
manœuvre.”114          
   Bucher and Versen tirelessly engaged in shuttle diplomacy between 
Madrid and Sigmaringen. Anton, who dominated his son’s thinking, was 
vainglorious and unduly attracted by the trappings of power. It was not too 
difficult to appeal to his sense of patriotism in order to change his mind 
regarding acceptance of the offer. Nevertheless, he wanted guarantees that 
Prussia would provide full support for his son’s candidacy. That is why he 
wanted Wilhelm to command his son to take the offer. Wilhelm stated he would 
never do this. On June 19, Frederick Wilhelm, the crown prince, let slip to the 
king that he had become a convert to the candidature plan, that Bucher was in 
Spain, that Versen was away from his Posen diplomatic post, and that Salazar, a 
Spanish diplomat, was enroute to Germany. Wilhelm was highly annoyed that 
unauthorized diplomatic activities were taking place when he thought that the 
issue had been put to rest. Bismarck was informed that Wilhelm wanted to be 
apprised of all the negotiations, henceforth. In the margin of the message the 
chancellor is quite explicit regarding his plan: “That beats everything!… So his 
majesty wants the affair treated with royal official interference?!…The affair is 
possible only if it remains the limited concern of the Hohenzollern princes, it 
must not turn into a Prussian concern, the king must be able to say without lying: 
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I know nothing about it.”115 Dynastic law required the king’s approval, which 
Wilhelm, on June 21, 1870 “with a heavy, very heavy heart” finally gave when 
apprised by Versen that Leopold finally wanted the throne.116 This was good 
enough for Anton and he informed Madrid of Leopold’s acceptance of the 
Spanish throne. 
 Bismarck intended to present France and the rest of Europe with a 
Hohenzollern on the Spanish throne as a fait accompli. He clearly hewed to the 
certainty principle here, believing that Napoleon would either receive the news 
with a good grace and stay at peace or he would be enraged and go to war with 
Germany. A June 25, 1870 ‘letter of instructions’, as it has come to be known, 
written either by Bucher or Bismarck, gives some insight into Bismarck’s belief as 
to what might happen. It was written to calm Spanish nerves over the nearly two 
year delay of the candidature from Prussia’s end. The author writes, “it is 
possible that we may see a passing fermentation in France, and, without doubt, it 
is necessary to avoid anything that might provoke or increase it.”117 Wetzel 
agrees with Becker that “it cannot be seriously maintained that Bismarck failed to 
anticipate the reaction of the French; to do so would, as Pflanze writes, ‘place 
him behind an amateur like Karl Anton, who from the outset predicted a wild 
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reaction in anti-Prussian Europe.’”118 But Wetzel rejects Becker’s contention that 
Bismarck advocated preventive war, here citing the chancellor’s well-known 
aversion to it as akin to committing suicide because one was afraid to die.119 We 
should remember Gall’s observation that Bismarck preferred to stand on the 
defensive in order to force his opponent to first commit himself.120 Thus, 
Bismarck stated that “if the trumpets of war were to sound, France would have 
to sound them” but that he was confident, up until the middle of July, that 
Napoleon would not give the command.121 Thus, Wetzel argues that Bismarck’s 
fostering of the Hohenzollern candidature was as to parry the new French 
aggressiveness with the appointment of Gramont.122 Seignobos argues that 
Bismarck intended to surprise France much as he did Austria and Russia with 
the successful installation of Charles on the Romanian throne in 1866.123 This 
might have been Bismarck’s thinking, but he certainly could not have rated peace 
any higher than war in this instance. This is because Napoleon had warned him 
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as early as 1869 that France would not suffer a Hohenzollern on the Spanish 
throne. It is not clear whether Bismarck intended this affair to lead to war, but he 
had to know that he was certainly bringing war within sight.124 Thus, it is well to 
bear in mind Hanotaux’s invocation of Montesquieu’s dictum that “the real 
author of a war is not the man who declares it, but he who makes it 
necessary.”125 
Bismarck’s plan went awry because the Cortes by law had to choose the 
new king, but it could not be kept in session much longer due to the oppressive 
summer heat. A cipher clerk’s blunder in decoding Salazar’s telegram to Madrid 
regarding Leopold’s acceptance set the election for “about the 9th [of August]” 
and not as “about the 26th [of July]” as intended.126 The Spanish legislature had 
been prorogued and to call it back for an emergency session aroused suspicions, 
particularly in Paris. On July 2, Prim informed Mercier, the French ambassador 
to Madrid, of Leopold’s acceptance of the Spanish throne. As Wetzel argues, this 
had been known for some time and Paris shouldn’t have pretended to have been 
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surprised.127 Gramont huddled with Napoleon at Saint Cloud and the former 
advised a strategy whereby France was to appear as the aggrieved party and that 
Prussia, and in particular Bismarck, was considered to be behind this affair. A 
four-step strategy was devised. First, the candidature should be attacked in 
Madrid and Berlin. Messages to Madrid in velvet-gloved terms indicated that 
Leopold’s presence would be an intolerable affront to France’s honor. A more 
brusque approach was taken in Berlin. Le Sourd, the French embassy chargé 
d’affaires, was to tell the Prussians, “we cannot, without some chagrin, see a 
Prussian prince sitting himself on the throne of Spain. We should, of course, 
prefer to learn that the cabinet of Berlin was not privy to this intrigue; if the 
contrary were the case, its conduct would suggest to us an attitude of too 
malevolent a nature to define in a telegram.”128 No one of importance save for 
Thile was around, and again, he disavowed any knowledge of Berlin’s 
complicity in the Spanish affair. This angered Gramont, since he had been 
apprised that Prim had corresponded directly with Bismarck on the subject.129 
Nonetheless, Gramont revealed his ineptness at handling the crisis and his 
motivated bias to contest Prussia, either through diplomatic humiliation or war. 
What else was Thile to do? To admit any complicity would have given the 
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French foreign minister license to engage in exaggeration in order to take 
precipitate action. As the Prussians disclaimed any knowledge of the affair, why 
would Gramont not then ask them to use their good offices to defuse the 
situation? This was an egregious diplomatic omission by a singularly inept 
statesman.    
 The French foreign minister’s second step was to alarm all of Europe 
through diplomatic messages to all of the capitals about the immediate peril that 
France was put in. Gladstone was asked by Napoleon through the Rothchilds to 
aid in getting the candidature withdrawn. But the British prime minister 
declined to interfere with Spain’s right to choose its own sovereign.130 An equally 
tepid response was met with in St. Petersburg. Crucially, the third step was to 
create the same sense of panic within France. Public opinion was rather inert at 
this point and it was precisely this press baiting that ended up creating an 
artificially wounded amour-propre. 
 The last step was to confer with Werther, the Prussian ambassador to 
Paris who was Francophile, to determine if a back channel to Wilhelm, who was 
vacationing at Bad Ems, might be found in order that the latter might intercede 
to forbid the candidature. But Gramont missed his best opportunity by failing to 
suggest that Napoleon and Wilhelm might personally meet in order to defuse the 
situation.131 Moreover, it was impossible for Werther to react in a timely fashion 
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because, on July 6, Gramont made an inflammatory statement in the corps 
législatif that “[France] will not tolerate a foreign power placing one of its princes 
on the throne of Charles V and thus disturbing the balance of power… [and that 
France] would know how to discharge…[its] duty without faltering or 
weakness.”132 Surprisingly, the liberal Ollivier had a hand in writing these 
inflammatory words. But unlike Gramont, Olliver had no motivated bias 
towards the Prussians; in fact, he was largely sympathetic toward them. The 
prime minister just thought that a hard line here would deter Prussia. 
Unfortunately, Ollivier never had control of his foreign minister. As will be 
demonstrated, just when France was given the requisite satisfaction needed to 
put an end to the crisis, Gramont took diplomatic actions that would ensure the 
outbreak of war.  
 Gramont’s incendiary speech in the corps législatif threatened 
Armageddon. Prussia was specifically accused of promoting the candidature. 
Moreover, diplomatic convention went by the boards as Prussia was insultingly 
referred to as a foreign power instead of as a neighboring people.133 The British 
government took some time to understand the seriousness of the situation 
although it did manage to aid in dissuading both the Spanish and the 
Sigmaringens from further promoting the candidature. According to Sorel, “in 
England, public opinion declared itself against the candidature of prince 
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Leopold. The Times formally condemned it. But in recognizing the legitimacy of 
the French grievances, the English wished above all to maintain peace.”134 At 
Granville’s request, one seconded by the king of Belgium, Victoria was able to 
petition a relative married into the Sigmaringen family to secure a withdrawal of 
the candidature.135 The prime minister was able to persuade Rances, the Spanish 
foreign minister, as to the likelihood of war should his government proceed with 
the project of putting Leopold on the throne.136 Nevertheless, London mostly 
pressed for moderation in Paris and in Madrid, but not in Berlin. Lyons, that 
prescient diplomat, clearly saw the kernel of the problem. Although he was able 
to obtain Gramont’s assurance that withdrawal of the candidature would put an 
end to the crisis, where if it was not, the France would declare war on Prussia,137 
the British ambassador scarcely believed it. To Granville he wrote, “if the 
Hohenzollern’s renunciation is announced in 24 or 48 hours, there will be peace 
for the moment!if not there will be an immediate declaration of war against 
Prussia…The French are getting rather more and more excited. They think they 
have got the start of Prussia this time in forwardship of preparation…If the 
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excitement goes on, the French may choose to pick a quarrel on the form of the 
renunciation or some other pretext, even if the prince retires.”138 To Layard, 
Lyons wrote, “notwithstanding the assurance of Gramont’s…I am not quite sure 
that even Hohenzollern’s renunciation wd. stop them. How Prim could suppose 
they wd. endure a secret plot between him and Prussia coming upon them as a 
surprise it is difficult to conceive.”139 
 This is precisely what happened. Gramont dispatched Benedetti to Bad 
Ems, not only to obtain a promise from Wilhelm to withdraw the candidature, 
but also to obtain a confession that he had been involved in the project from the 
start. On July 9, the forthright king admitted to the French diplomat the latter, 
but refused the former. Nevertheless, Wilhelm fully understood the seriousness 
of the situation and he did his level best to leave the Sigmaringen family full 
liberty to withdraw the candidacy considering the freighted situation, with the 
understanding that he would sanction this desired action. Leopold was hiking in 
the Alps and thus was difficult to reach. But Wilhelm went the extra mile by 
keeping Benedetti apprised of the proceedings, indicating that an answer would 
not be long in coming. Benedetti fully understood that the king was trying to 
manage the crisis in a manner favorable to the French. Thus, on July 10 he 
petitioned Gramont to relax the excited tensions in Paris. But Gramont wanted 
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his emissary to redouble his efforts and the latter was forced to impertinently 
state to the king that he was not doing enough and that preparations were being 
made in Madrid to welcome Leopold (which was not true). Gramont demanded 
that Wilhelm explicitly command Leopold to withdraw the candidacy, which the 
king, as from the start, refused to do. Gramont upbraided Benedetti by stating 
that time was running out even as the latter responded that “a delay of two or 
three days will not make things worse.”140 In part, Gramont had in mind excited 
demands from le Boeuf, the new war minister, that the French army needed to 
mobilize now in order to get the jump on the Prussians.141 Nevertheless, 
Gramont’s fractious attitude is a strong instance of defensive avoidance. He 
persisted in instructing Benedetti to exact from Wilhelm a promise that the latter 
repeatedly stated he would not give.   
 Gramont told Lyons that inflamed public opinion in France was 
justification for the government’s conduct. But this was quite wrong. Public 
opinion throughout France took Leopold’s acceptance of the Spanish throne in 
stride; it was not particularly perturbed until Gramont had whipped up opinion 
in the corps législatif and in the chauvinistic press that this was an affront to 
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French prestige.142 By making public, delicate private discussions that needed 
time to bear fruit, Gramont was responsible for creating a public propaganda 
beast that continually needed to be fed by fulminations from the rostrum that ran 
well ahead of actual events. The Moniteur, for instance, nonsensically demanded 
that Prussia, as a measure of goodwill, evacuate and abandon the great fortress 
of Mainz on the Rhine.143 It would be difficult to improve upon Craig’s 
assessment of this statesman: “Where reflection was needed, [Gramont] was 
impulsive; where deliberation of utterance was advisable, he was violent; and 
where a sense of measure might have crowned his career with a brilliant success, 
he overreached and tumbled his nation into disaster.”144   
      On July 12, Paris intercepted a telegram intended for Madrid in which 
Anton formally withdrew his son’s candidacy. Instead of waiting for further 
confirmation, Ollivier read the missive from Prim aloud in the corps législatif 
and aspersions were immediately cast upon it. Why had Anton, and not 
Leopold, written the message? Would Leopold just show up at Madrid in the 
dark of night as did Charles in Romania? Why was there no formal 
pronouncement from Berlin, much less from Wilhelm? Upon hearing the news of 
the renunciation, Wilhelm privately expressed to Augusta, queen of Prussia, that 
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“a stone had fallen from his heart...Take care to keep silent.”145 The king was 
being circumspect here; there was nothing to report to the French until he had 
Anton’s letter of renunciation in hand. But Lyons was quite correct that passions 
were so inflamed in Paris that any pretext would now be found either to publicly 
humiliate Prussia or to force it into war.  
Wilhelm was in difficulty here; Paris had formerly drawn sympathy from 
all of the major capitals for the predicament that Bismarck had put it in. All that 
Gramont had to do was to ask the German chancellor publicly to aid him in 
altering a matter that threatened the peace of Europe. France would then score a 
major diplomatic triumph because of Bismarck’s ridiculous fiction that he was 
not involved in the project. Support on the part of the lesser German states for 
Prussia was not axiomatic and certainly less so if the latter precipitated a war 
against France for its own aggrandizement. Thus, Gramont could easily have 
used the diplomatic victory in order to drive the German states south of the Main 
into the arms of the French or at least to put distance between them and Prussia. 
All he had to do was to remind them of how close they had come to war over 
Prussian dynastic motives and that it was French restraint that had prevented a 
catastrophe.146 But Gramont refused to take yes for an answer and instead, as 
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will be demonstrated, overplayed his hand by demanding guarantees from 
Prussia. 
As Wawro notes, Gramont played right into Bismarck’s hands. Each 
wanted war as much as the other. The only problem was that Prussia was 
prepared whereas France was not. Gramont blithely believed that Austria and 
Italy would join France in a war of revenge against Prussia. He never took time 
to consider that Austria would not look kindly upon the Italian army marching 
through its territory enroute to Prussia. Moreover, he never directed the requisite 
diplomacy that might have cemented alliances prior to the outbreak of hostilities. 
Contrary to Gramont’s belief, the Italians did not feel indebted to the French for 
their victories at Solferino and Magenta in 1859 and the presence of the Pope in 
Rome was intolerable to them.147 It has been argued that dysfunctional politics 
prevented the Austrian army from necessary reforms that would have made it a 
fit fighting French ally.148 This is beside the point for Austria did not forget 
French perfidy in failing to come to its aid during the Austro-Prussian War and it 
was largely determined to reciprocate the favor.    
Ollivier believed that Anton’s renunciation effectively closed the matter. 
Gramont was reminded by Lyons of the former’s promise to close the affair 
should the renunciation take place. Moreover, the foreign minister was warned 
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that if war occurred, “public opinion throughout the world would be against 
France.”149 Even Napoleon, at first, assumed a conciliatory stance when he wrote 
to Victor Emanuel, the king of Italy, that “it is peace…I know that some elements 
of public opinion in France would have preferred…war, but I see in the 
renunciation a satisfactory solution that deprives of any pretext for it.”150 
However, Napoleon then made a series of egregious mistakes. First, he did not 
close the affair but instead allowed himself to be influenced by the chauvinistic 
French press and the right wing extremists within his government who were not 
satisfied with the fiction that the Hohenzollern candidature was a private affair 
between the Spaniards and a dynastic family in which Prussia was not involved. 
Second, the emperor reverted to personal empire by directing Gramont to 
instruct Benedetti without first consulting his ministers, in particular Ollivier. 
Had Napoleon not bypassed his ministers, Ollivier would surely have headed off 
the new demands. The foreign minister instructed Benedetti to demand that  
Wilhelm publicly approve Leopold’s renunciation and say that Leopold’s 
candidature for the Spanish throne was never to be raised again.151 The king 
rebuffed Benedetti’s reluctant demand for a future guarantee, but he indicated 
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that he would give his unconditional approval to the resignation.152 Moreover, 
Wilhelm was courteous and told the diplomat that he had done as much as he 
could do. The king then authorized an account of the cordial meetings with 
Benedetti to be transmitted to Bismarck with the further instruction that the 
information be made public as the latter saw fit.153 The chancellor had 
deliberately stayed at his estate in Varzin away from Wilhelm’s side in order to 
continue the pretense that he was not involved. But Bismarck was morose at the 
prospect that Wilhelm would give way and consequently, either a public 
humiliation or a war would be averted. His mood brightened considerably when 
he hit upon the idea of editing the Ems telegram for publication in such manner 
that it took on a completely different tenor than the king intended. Bismarck cut 
out the conciliatory passages and concluded it with the explosive statement, “his 
majesty the king therefore decided not to receive the French ambassador and 
sent an aide-de-camp to tell him that his majesty had nothing further to 
communicate.”154 Upon reading Bismarck’s bit of chicanery, Moltke exclaimed 
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that, “what had sounded before like a parley, was now a flourish in answer to a 
challenge.”155 
Publication of the Ems telegram in both the French and German 
newspapers was not the catalyst for the French declaration of war. It merely gave 
justification for a decision that had already been made. Bismarck later boasted 
that he concocted the fabrication in order to drive France into war so as to unify 
Germany by drawing the lesser German states closer to Prussia: “The gulf 
between north and south Germany could not be more effectively bridged than by 
a common national war against the neighboring nation, our aggressor for 
centuries.”156 This gloss on history is quite false; it is safer to say that Bismarck 
was improvising and that his motivated bias to steal a march on France with the 
fait accompli of seating Leopold on the Spanish throne was backfiring when the 
French solved the chancellor’s problems by demanding humiliating guarantees 
of Prussia. Nevertheless, the Ems telegram had the effect of drawing support for 
Prussia from all of the German peoples including those south of the Main 
because of Benedetti’s alleged insult to Wilhelm.157  
It is likely that Bismarck decided that war with France was inevitable after 
Gramont’s incendiary speech in the corps législatif on July 6.158 Such was not so 
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with Napoleon and he procrastinated until the end. Two ministerial council 
meetings at St. Cloud took place before France declared war on Prussia. 
Ministers present at the first meeting, on the evening of July 14, were not privy to 
newspaper reports on the Ems telegram, even as the first accounts congratulated 
France on its diplomatic success. Upon hearing of the candidature, Gramont 
clearly hewed to the certainty principle by asserting that, in Ollivier’s 
remembrance, France was faced with “the naked choice between ‘war and 
abdication as a Great Power.’”159 This was not the case. Rather, Gramont’s 
rashness and incompetence produced the pseudo-certainty principle ahead of the 
certainty principle.160 A confluence of factors and missteps, notably the creation 
of the public propaganda machine that Gramont could no longer control and the 
military timetable to begin mobilizing two weeks prior to the Prussians 
demanded by le Boeuf in order to avoid the risk of disaster, made the ministers, 
even those predisposed to moderation, to assent to calling up the reserves. 
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Millman is quite wrong in believing that this action did not necessarily mean 
war.161 Wetzel is closer to the mark when he argues that “behind the scenes, the 
wheels of the two great military establishments, the French and the Prussian, had 
begun to gather speed!grinding along in the manner of such establishments, 
impervious to any hopeful political possibilities, accepting if only for the 
hypotheses of military planning, the inevitability of a war that was otherwise, 
even at this stage, not at all inevitable, and thereby creating a virtual inevitablity 
that, for their own efforts, would not necessarily have existed at all.”162 
The hopeful political possibility that Wetzel speaks of was a belated 
proposal by the British to call a congress to consider the dispute. Napoleon was 
intrigued by the idea; this was always his fallback option.163 Bismarck, however, 
did not recommend the idea to Wilhelm. Unfortunately, the congress proposal 
was dead when the war party, in particular Gramont, le Boeuf, and the empress 
Eugénie conjoined military timetable arguments with the now very real, but 
originally concocted, national feeling of wounded amour-propre to argue that 
war was inevitable. Thus, the French council voted unanimously for war on July 
15 and hostilities opened four days later. Although Britain had long before 
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decided not to intervene in the war, Bismarck’s release for publication in The 
Times of Benedetti’s handwritten draft treaty with Prussia of 1866 in which 
France was to acquire Belgium revulsed public opinion and thus gave the 
Gladstone government cover for its non-intervention. The most that Britain 
would do was to secure assurances from both antagonists to respect Belgian 
neutrality.  On September 2, the Prussians routed the French army at Sedan. The 
war then dragged on for a year and ended with the Prussian siege of Paris. 
Bismarck reasoned that an irremediably hostile France would never forgive 
Prussia for this ‘second Königgrätz’ and thus he annexed Alsace and Lorraine in 
order to acquire a security cordon.164 Once again, Bismarck managed to isolate a 
major power and then soundly defeat it in battle in order to complete the 
unification of Germany. 
Conclusion: The dynamics of asymmetric affective abandonment. 
German historians have been noticeably more partisan than their French and 
English counterparts in assessing Bismarck’s motives with regard to the crisis 
that produced the Franco-Prussian War. Gall, for instance, largely exculpates the 
chancellor by arguing that the flagging move for unification led him to engage in 
the Spanish throne gambit because no more promising target presented itself. 
The kaiser project was receiving significant opposition, particularly from Bavaria 
which had ideas of its own about becoming the counterpoint to Prussian 
hegemony within Germany. Thus, Gall argues that Bismarck believed that the 
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dangers and opportunities were from the Prussian standpoint precisely 
balanced.165 But this rational choice explanation clearly fails because it is difficult 
to believe both that Bismarck’s complicity in the Hohenzollern candidature 
would not be found out or that Napoleon would take kindly to the installation of 
a Prussian on the Spanish throne. Moreover, the chancellor deliberately thwarted 
his sovereign’s intention to remain at peace with France and circumvented him 
at every step in order to at least force a diplomatic humiliation on Napoleon in 
order to extricate himself from his overreaching.  
One might argue that Bismarck was proceeding with a rational choice 
calculus and that he simply miscalculated. It is true that he, just like Napoleon, 
preferred to achieve his objectives peaceably. The problem is that he could not 
because only a war would allow him to unify Germany from the top down, not 
democratically from the bottom up. A liberal, democratic Germany would have 
required concessions to the lesser German states that the chancellor was loathe to 
make. Thus, a patriotic war against a traditional foe to avenge an alleged 
diplomatic insult was the road that Bismarck chose in order to bring the lesser 
German states into the North German Confederation.166 
From a prospect perspective, the endowment effect should make actors 
less likely to engage in risk acceptance for gain. Yet in this case, Bismarck’s 
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attempt to place a Prussian-friendly government on France’s southern flank is a 
risk-acceptant taking. But as indicated earlier, it is likely that Bismarck was 
changing his reference point such that the failure to achieve a gain (measures to 
promote German unification) was seen as a loss. Thus, what France and Britain 
agreed was a secretive attempt to steal a march on the former, and thus risk 
acceptance for gain, was likely seen by the chancellor as risk acceptance for loss. 
It is difficult to find evidence that Bismarck tries to conciliate the French in 
order to lower the risk of war as the crisis reached its culmination. The certainty 
principle points to failing to invest in conciliatory resources that bring a higher 
probability of keeping the peace even at the cost of being less prepared to prevail 
if war does break out. Moreover, springing a fait accompli on the French by 
secretly installing Leopold on the Spanish throne hardly comports with using the 
insurance premium in other than a risky fashion. The pretense that the Prussians 
were not involved, although it was not believed by anybody, had it held up 
would have given the French little concrete evidence for complaint. In that sense, 
the peace would have been kept because France’s reason for prosecuting a war 
against Prussia would not have been obvious. Bismarck certainly showed less 
loyalty to Wilhelm than might have been expected and there is evidence that he 
was willing to let his sovereign take the blame for the Hohenzollern fiasco while 
intending to take credit for himself should it have succeeded. This, in itself, does 
not indicate a motivated bias to force a humiliation or war on France. What does 
is the mendacity associated with the edited Ems telegram. Had the doctored 
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telegram not drawn sufficient ire on both sides, the chancellor was ready to 
interpellate the North German legislature regarding war with France. Moreover, 
tendering his resignation was always Bismarck’s best argument should he not 
get his way and this was certainly on his mind.167 
From the French side the crisis that led to the war was indeed a trap 
sprung on it by Bismarck. Absent the actions of the war party, the chancellor  
believed until late in the crisis that Napoleon would peaceably give way. In this 
sense, he believed that France was self-deterred. But with the appointment of the 
bellicose and anti-Prussian Gramont as foreign minister, a preference reversal 
was made regarding French policy towards Prussia. In this regard, Napoleon 
was certainly using the insurance premium in a risky fashion. The endowment 
effect rightly points towards his determination to prevent the Hohenzollern 
prince from ascending the Spanish throne. But Anton’s renunciation of Leopold’s 
candidacy gave France everything that it needed for scoring a diplomatic victory 
over Prussia. Moreover, the move towards Prussian unification would have 
further been stalled because the lesser German states would gravitate towards 
France due to the latter’s exhibited restraint. But Gramont hijacked French 
foreign policy by overestimating the depth of his success and instead was 
determined to force a humiliation on Prussia. What was formerly a risky use of 
the insurance premium in order to avoid loss that had succeeded had now been 
transformed into a lottery ticket in order to take a long-shot gamble on an 
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unattainable gain. The French demand for future guarantees from Wilhelm was 
both inadmissible and pointless. This tactlessness was not unwelcome to 




Chapter 8:  A Partial Assessment of Prospective Balance Theory. 
 
Prospective Balance is an interactionist theory that asserts an improved 
explanation of interstate cooperation and conflict over neorealist theories that 
derive their explanatory power from distinctive distributions of power in the 
international system. At bottom, neorealism relies on expected utility 
calculations as the basis for state choice. Thus, states should be indifferent 
between gains and losses when making foreign policy choices. But neorealism 
has difficulty in explaining cases in which states do not engage in aggression 
when it appears to be profitable from a cost/benefit analysis and cases in which 
states engage in aggression that have little potential for profit.  
 Neoclassical realism has recently been proposed as an advance over 
neorealism’s paucity of explanatory power. In essence, neoclassical realism posits 
almost no explanatory power with respect to the influence of factors that reside 
at the international level. Jack Snyder, for example, finds that in none of the 
major power cases that he examines were international pressures necessary to 
explain a state’s overexpansion. Thus, he finds a domestic coalition explanation 
to be most persuasive.1 Schweller’s recent theory of underbalancing holds 
constant the level of threat in the international system. The structural 
characteristics in which society and government interact at the domestic level of 
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analysis provide the explanation as to whether states will balance or 
underbalance against an external threat.2 
 The neoclassical realist research program provides powerful insights into 
drivers of foreign policy choices, notably the deeper, more longer term, 
characteristics of both state and society. Still, neoclassical realism takes 
insufficient account of the degree to which the international system is a 
permissive (rather than a necessary) factor in the foreign policy choices that 
states make. This neglect is quite at odds with the European diplomatic history of 
the 19th century. The roughly fifty-year period that I examine demonstrates the 
crucial influence of interstate dynamics as being causal to the knife-edged 
decisions as to whether states will cooperate with one another to maintain the 
peace or whether they will largely go their own way and make foreign policy 
decisions based on affect, usually resulting from domestic politics. Boulding 
identified systemic dynamics in which interstate conflict was promoted either by 
real incompatibility or illusory incompatibility.3 In selecting from the four 
systemic dynamics identified by Prospective Balance in Chapter 1, I was 
interested in examining instances in which states were faced with dynamics of 
real compatibility on the one hand, and on the other hand, of illusory 
compatibility. Thus, the dynamics of widespread loss aversion and affective 
abandonment were examined in detail in this dissertation. 
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Widespread loss aversion suggests a restoration to a situation resembling 
the status quo after a foreign policy demand has been made even though hard 
bargaining and counter-threats may transpire. States are more likely to take 
account of the interests of others as they relax their attachment to endowments, 
invest in cooperative schemes that relax adherence to the certainty principle, and 
largely use the insurance premium in conservative fashion. Threats to revert to 
more risk acceptant actions for loss (notably increased attachment to the 
endowment effect, greater adherence to the certainty principle, and a more risky 
use of the insurance premium) are taken conditionally and thus are intended to 
bring recalcitrant states back into the cooperative fold. Moreover, these actions 
are largely telegraphed, should not take others by surprise, and are understood 
as necessary measures to ensure cooperation.  
In some contrast, affective abandonment of rational consistency is less 
straight-forward and the theoretical possibilities are more complex. Thus, conflict 
may eventually result when states fail to make clear to each other a 
determination to protect their respective interests from encroachment. Further 
characterized as mutual conciliatory affective abandonment, over-deterrence 
results and efforts to reinstate mutual deterrence can actually exacerbate conflict. 
Next, conflict may result when states are under-deterred because third parties 
fail to punish their aggression in timely fashion. I characterize this dynamic as 
mutual aggressive affective abandonment. Finally, a rising state might find itself 
under-deterred from aggression as a consequence of either over-deterrence, or 
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self-deterrence, or both, on the part of second and third parties. Thus, 
asymmetric affective abandonment results. Regarding these three theoretical 
possibilities, risk acceptant actions taken to avoid loss, noted above, will be quite 
sudden due to anticipated negative regret, will take others by surprise, and will 
not appear to serve a useful purpose. This is largely because such preference 
reversals take place despite the fact that the status quo has not materially 
changed. The impetus for such actions is likely to be domestic politics which can 
be quite opaque to other states. In extreme instances, states will convert the 
insurance premium into a lottery ticket in order to take a long-shot chance on 
making gains in the face of determined resistance. Thus, the majority of the case 
studies intensively examine these dynamics. 
Test results of the selected case studies.4 
The dynamics of widespread loss aversion were largely validated through the 
four case studies that were examined. From an expected utility perspective 
Russia might easily have made much more in the way of opportunistic gains as it 
put down Turkish oppression of Orthodox Christian Greeks in 1821. But Tsar 
Nicholas was happy to create an independent Greece to be mutually guaranteed 
by Russia, France, and Britain. The 1831-39 Eastern Question crises were partially 
validated by the dynamics of widespread loss aversion. Expected utility is 
plausible in two phases, first, as Russia took gains as a consequence of the Treaty 
of Unkiar Skelessi; second, as British interest in the Levant only became apparent 
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with the possibility of short routes to India due to the advent of steam 
technology. Nevertheless, Russian consideration of the interests of France and 
Britain in a geographical area of its presumed predominance is quite at odds 
with an expected utility perspective. Moreover, these are two hard cases for 
mutual resolution because they occurred outside the territorial purview 
governed by the Congress of Vienna of 1815.  
 The 1830 Belgian case gives some support to an expected utility 
perspective only because a minority scholarly view asserts that Britain benefited 
economically from the reduced power of the United Netherlands with the 
creation of a neutralized, independent Belgium. The predominant scholarly view 
is that Britain used the insurance premium in conservative fashion by securing 
Belgian independence in order to avoid system-wide war pitting the major 
European powers against a risk acceptant for gain France that covered its 
ambitions by coming to the aid of Belgium.  
 Interestingly, the 1848 Italian crisis supports widespread loss aversion 
with an unexpected, but salutary, finding. On the one hand, French public 
opinion required that Louis-Phillipe support Italian independence from hated 
Austria. But on the other hand, Italian possession of Savoy and Nice were the 
cruel symbols of French defeat as a consequence of the Vienna Treaties and thus 
were the very objects of French revanche. Palmerston wisely saw that Austria 
would do well to rid itself of ungovernable Italian provinces by giving them a 
measure of independence rather than to strictly adhere to the endowment effect. 
 495 
Thus, the British foreign minister reframed the situation by reminding Louis of 
the original idea of joining Lombardy to Piedmont, thus obviating French 
intervention and thus a system-wide war. Palmerston was also able to convince 
the Austrians to restore the status quo after the latter twice defeated the 
incompetent Italian army. Such an outcome is not expected by expected utility 
theory. 
 The dynamics of affective abandonment of rational consistency were 
largely validated by the five case studies examined. The eruption of the Crimean 
War in 1854 is perplexing from an expected utility perspective. The twenty-five 
year period prior to the war offered ample opportunities for Britain and Russia 
to object to the mutually increasing encroachment on each other’s territorial 
interests, largely in Central Asia. Additionally, Russia believed that its informal 
predominance over the Ottoman Empire attained the status of juridical respect 
by the other major European powers while both Britain and France saw inroads 
to be made through a consequent whittling away of Russian influence in the 
area. The Besika Bay and the Don Pacifico incidents, respectively, as well as the 
Leiningen mission, were canaries in the coal mine for both sides to reckon that 
there was a serious disjuncture between Britain and Russia regarding their 
common understanding of a shifting status quo. Moreover, aggressive and 
overextended positions had unilaterally been taken by both sides, but the lack of 
significant objection by the other gave each side reason to believe in the rectitude 
of its actions. Motivated biases, both to aggress as well as to offer little resistance 
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to such aggression, mutually reinforced the systemic structural imbalance. The 
French-instigated quarrel over the Holy Places drew Britain into conflict even as 
it believed that Russia was in the right for protesting. A preference reversal was 
taken for domestic reasons regarding Russia even as British decision-makers 
failed to perceive its implications. Despite the unfortunate destruction of the 
Turkish navy at Sinope, the tsar was largely begging the rest of Europe to 
intervene in order to restore the status quo. Thus, from an expected utility 
perspective, since neither Russia nor Britain wanted war with the other, this 
great power conflict should never have erupted. But Aberdeen failed to control a 
particularly russophobic foreign minister in Palmerston. Moreover, under the 
prime minister’s direction the cabinet cared more for unity of purpose than of 
debating significant policy differences that questioned the wisdom of being 
dragged into war by France against Russia. Aberdeen did so because he did not 
want France to steal a march on Britain in the Ottoman Empire and he did not 
have the courage to allow the possibility that his government would fall because 
of his preference for giving Russia a measure of satisfaction in the Ottoman 
Empire. 
 The Franco-Austrian War of 1859 resulting in the unification of Italy is an 
example of mutual aggressive affective abandonment, but it suffers from a 
representative bias because the case study is so anomalous. Austria was hated 
throughout Europe while Italian unity was somewhat championed. Moreover, 
the Russians and the British did not mind seeing the French and the Austrians 
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cut each other’s throats in order to reduce the latters’ pretensions and power. 
Nevertheless, instead of intervening to keep the revolutionary contagion on the 
Italian peninsula from spreading, third party major European powers preferred 
to raise the price that they would have to be paid in order to intervene on one 
side or the other. Thus, the weary antagonists largely quit the war leaving Italy 
as the default winner. Both Napoleon and Franz Joseph suffered from motivated 
biases to prosecute this war. Specifically, allowing Italy to become an 
independent, potentially antagonistic, major power was not really in France’s 
interest. Austria mistakenly believed that it could treat Italy as it wished, was in 
high dudgeon over major power interference within its recognized sphere of 
interest, but blithely believed that Britain and Prussia could be counted on for 
support and that France would restrain Sardinia. None of the latter occurred. 
Moreover, Russia would not break with France while Prussia would not side 
with Austria without each being properly compensated even as these watchful 
third parties deplored the revolutionary dynamics engulfing Italy and the 
consequent blatant disregard for dynastic privilege that eventually threatened 
their own interests. For these reasons affective abandonment wins out over an 
expected utility perspective. 
 The last three empirical case studies regarding Bismarck’s wars of 
unification are considered as a piece regarding the dynamics of asymmetric 
affective abandonment. It is impossible to understand the Franco-Prussian War 
(1870) without first considering the Franco-British fallout over the failures to 
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stem Russian and Prussian suppression of the Second Polish Uprising (1863) and 
the Prusso-Austrian annexation of the Elbe Duchies (1864). The high point of 
British non-intervention in Continental affairs was the Austro-Prussian War 
(1866). Thus, one could argue that the inclusion of the Franco-Prussian case  
study merely gilds the lily regarding testing the theoretical dynamics proposed 
by affective abandonment. Nevertheless, it was included because the diplomatic 
history is interesting in its own right, provides additional confirming evidence 
for the theoretical dynamics, and provides a logical conclusion to a period in 
European history in which Britain largely absented itself from Continental 
politics and allowed the balance of power there to significantly change with 
considerable implications for future interstate aggression. 
 It is usually believed that using the insurance premium in conservative 
fashion by making concessions to avoid war promotes peace and stability. But 
the devil is in the details; thus, the implications from the Second Polish Uprising 
and the Danish War over the Elbe Duchies point in different directions. The 
Alvensleben Convention was an overreach by Bismarck that codified Prusso-
Russian efforts to disarm Polish insurgents on a common frontier. Alexander did 
not need Prussian help and gratuitous Prussian interference aroused French ire. 
Unfortunately, Napoleon was spoiling for a fight with Prussia, and not with 
Russia, the real culprit in British estimation. French motivation to achieve a 
foreign policy success was demonstrated when the Alvensleben Convention was 
allowed to drop, thus giving Napoleon no reason to threaten Prussia. Since the 
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emperor wanted to maintain the good ties with Russia formed at the conclusion 
of the Crimean War in order to relieve his dependence on Britain, his preference 
reversal to threaten Alexander was illogical. A third preference reversal by 
Napoleon to threaten Austria made no sense even as Alexander attempted to 
give consideration to the Polish insurgents should they cease and desist. 
Unnecessary Polish blood was spilled largely due to British support for a cause 
that it knew it would not support with active intervention. The stakes were 
higher in Poland than they ever were in Italy; thus, Napoleon, and Palmerston, 
again as British prime minister, both had to know that the tsar would risk the 
possibility of system-wide war in order to put down the Polish insurrection. 
Some evidence for an expected utility perspective inheres in the obvious free 
hand that Russia had when it put down the insurrection as it saw fit without 
significant interference. But the Polish insurgents would not listen to their more 
moderate brethren and they maintained motivated biases to believe both that 
Russia was weak for conciliating them and that France and Britain would aid 
them with military support. Thus affective abandonment wins out due to the 
motivated biases on the parts of the Poles, British, and the French. 
 Prussia took the lead with Austria in dispossessing the Danes of Schleswig 
and Holstein, the Elbe Duchies, with almost no dissent from the other major 
Euorpean powers. Bismarck was keen to secure a naval port at Kiel as well. It is 
true that both Russia and Austria were against the annexation, but the latter 
merely went along with Prussia because it feared that the latter would steal a 
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march on it. Still, the non-interventionist British cabinet ultimately frittered away 
potential alliance options, thus leaving Palmerston to engage in loud blustering 
threats directed at Prussia that lacked any semblance of domestic support. 
Bismarck was unworried after he was able to secure the cooperation of Austria 
and he then bamboozled the rest of Europe into believing that he was merely 
upholding international law and thus the status quo by invading the Duchies. 
France refused to work with Britain as it punished the latter’s earlier refusal to 
aid it in defense of the Polish uprising. Military options were available to Britain 
both with or without French assistance. With the aid of the Danes and the 
Swedes, a small British army might be able to thwart the German Confederation 
advance in the narrow territory of Schleswig and the Jutland. Moreover, the 
British navy, still the most powerful in the world, would be an adequate 
deterrent against Confederation naval forces and possibly a sufficient deterrent 
in itself to stay Bismarck’s hand. A better option would have been to enlist the 
aid of France, but Palmerston mistrusted Napoleon because he feared that the 
latter wanted territorial revisions for Poland, Italy, and France as the price for his 
cooperation. Nevertheless, the prime minister failed to risk French adventurism 
on the Rhine and the chance that his government might fall if it allied with the 
latter against Prussia. In this sense, Britain used the insurance premium in risky 
fashion because its failure to act against unprovoked Prussian aggression 
sundered British influence in Continental affairs regarding the coming Austro- 
and Franco- Prussian Wars, respectively. Feeling further estranged from Britain, 
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Napoleon then unwisely reversed preference by offering benevolent neutrality to 
Prussia in the expectation of unspecified territorial favors to come. This too, was 
a risky use of the insurance premium because Bismarck merely pocketed this 
favor but gave nothing in return. 
 Prussia demanded the Duchies outright from Austria and the latter 
refused, thus providing the pretext for the casus belli that became the Austro-
Prussian War (1866). A rational choice explanation fails because the decision for 
war or peace did not turn on the possibility for economic compensation to be 
paid by Prussia to Austria, as Bueno de Mesquita and Lalman assert,5 but rather 
on Bismarck’s motivated bias to prosecute a war in order to achieve his 
kleindeutsch plan to unify Germany by expelling Austria. Both a conscientious 
monarch and a recalcitrant legislature opposed Bismarck’s contemplated 
aggression. But Britain wanted nothing to do with the Austro-Prussian imbroglio 
while France wanted to profit from the situation by offering benevolent 
neutrality to the antagonist that was the highest bidder. For its part, Austria had 
motivated biases to refuse to cede any of its endowments. In particular, giving 
way in Italy would have stayed Bismarck’s hand in Germany while giving way 
in Germany would have allowed Franz Joseph to maintain his possessions in 
Italy. But the insurance premium was converted into a risky lottery ticket and 
thus the Austrians were irrationally risk acceptant for loss to a degree 
unwarranted by the strategic situation.  
                                                            
5 Bruce Bueno de Mesquita and David Lalman, War and Reason: Domestic and 
International Imperatives (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1992), p. 228. 
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Britain used the insurance premium in risky fashion as well while France 
converted it into a risky lottery ticket. They would not work together, but singly 
they might have made a difference. Britain formally refused to endorse what it 
had earlier championed informally: the cession of Venetia to Italy in order to 
keep the Italians from allying with the Prussians against Austria. This was the 
high point of British non-intervention on the Continent and thus the later Franco-
Prussian War was merely a coda to the main piece. French support was worth 
more to Austria before than after the latter’s defeat at Sadowa, but Napoleon 
countermanded his own order to mobilize France against Prussia in defense of 
Austria. It quickly became clear to the French people that Sadowa was as much 
an Austrian, as a French, defeat. From a rational choice perspective, Napoleon 
should either have tolerated the Prussian victory, but made clear to the latter that 
he would tolerate no further unprovoked aggression, or backed Austria to the 
hilt. But he did neither and instead asked for compensations from Bismarck after 
the fact for his benevolent neutrality. Bismarck was later able to publicize this 
petitioning to the rest of Europe in order to demonstrate France’s insatiable 
greed. On the one hand, Russia objected to Prussian aggression, in particular the 
dispossession of dynastic privilege, but on the other hand, it remained grateful 
for Prussian support in suppressing the Poles. Britain was the only power that 
Russia would work with against Prussia, but it wanted the former to do all the 
work. Thus, from an expected utility perspective it can be argued bilateral 
alignments involving Russia, Britain, and France would have stayed Bismarck’s 
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hand. But none of these alignments obtained because all had motivated biases to 
refrain from taking up against the Prussian. Finally, all of the major European 
powers save for Austria mistakenly believed that a compact, unified Germany 
north of the River Main would keep the peace in Europe. 
The lead-up to the Franco-Prussian War (1870) began with a series of 
domestic and foreign policy misadventures that called into question Napoleon’s 
continued rule. The emperor felt betrayed by Bismarck over the latter’s late 
objection to his acquiring Luxembourg from the Dutch. The newly appointed 
German chancellor mistakenly believed that he could cede German-controlled 
territory to France without taking sufficient account that German public opinion 
would object to any cession of its endowments. (The dissolution of the German 
Confederation as a consequence of the Austro-Prussian War now presented 
Luxembourg as a possible acquisition for France. The Luxembourgers had no 
interest in joining the newly formed North German Confederation, but Prussia 
continued to maintain a military garrison in Luxembourg.) Napoleon threatened 
war with Prussia, but Britain defused the situation by chairing a congress that 
successfully neutralized Luxembourg as its military fortress was demolished.  
Bismarck mistakenly came to believe that Napoleon was becoming self-
deterred from war with Prussia as a consequence of the Luxembourg crisis. This 
belief was further fostered by a series of Napoleonic foreign policy failures, 
notably the proposal for a Triple Alliance with Italy and Austria directed against 
Prussia, and the Belgian Railways dispute. Thus, Napoleon’s appointment of the 
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conciliatory Daru as foreign minister as a cornerpiece of his new Liberal Empire, 
and the proposal for disarmament with Germany mediated by Britain, was seen 
by Bismarck as proof that Napoleon now accepted the fact of German 
unification. Nevertheless, the Prussian’s plan to make the king emperor of 
Germany, as well as a plan to finance a strategic railway through Switzerland, 
angered the French emperor and he reversed preference by installing the 
prussophobic Gramont as foreign minister.  
Bismarck took up the offer from Madrid to install a German royal on the 
Spanish throne. An expected utility perspective should have attuned Bismarck to 
the risk involved in seating German, or German-friendly, governments, on both 
of France’s borders. But he maneuvered to secure the Hohenzollern candidature 
on the Spanish throne even after Wilhelm forbade to command to Leopold and 
the royal family initially declined to accept it.  
Hard bargaining ensued between Prussia and France that ultimately 
resulted in the candidature being rescinded. Gramont scored an astounding 
diplomatic success and an expected utility perspective should predict that he 
would have been satisfied with his gains. A risky use of the insurance premium 
succeeded here. But the foreign minister had motivated biases either to further 
humiliate Bismarck diplomatically or to provoke war against Germany. Thus he 
converted the insurance premium into a risky lottery ticket. Demanding that 
Wilhelm promise never to raise the Hohenzollern candidature for the Spanish 
throne again was both impermissible as well as pointless. As Wilhelm refused, 
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France declared war on Germany and fought without any other major power 
allies. It was soundly defeated at Sedan and lost Alsace and Lorraine as territorial 
compensations to Germany.       
Gramont argued that public opinion forced him to take such a stance, but 
this is quite false as the French people initially took calmly to the news of the 
candidature. It was Gramont’s motivated bias to contest Prussia as evidenced by 
his whipping up populist anger through inflammatory speeches in the corps 
législatif as well as his collusion with both the chauvinistic French press as well 
as right-wing extremist elements. Military timetables for mobilization against 
Prussia combined with the now artificially wounded French amour-propre to 
produce the pseudo-certainty principle ahead of the certainty principle such that 
war became virtually inevitable,6 not inevitable, as Gramont claimed as the basis 
for his actions. 
None of the major European powers intervened to forbid the war. As in 
the Austro-Prussian case, they mistakenly underestimated Prussia’s chances and 
continued with the cognitive bias that both France and Russia, and not Prussia, 
were the prime disturbers of the peace on the Continent and would remain so 
into the future. But in the main, the motivated biases on the parts of the major 
European powers either to engage in the conflict or to refrain from intervening 
reinforced structural imbalance. Thus, asymmetric affective abandonment is a 
more plausible explanation than is an expected utility perspective. 
                                                            
6David Wetzel, A Duel of Giants: Bismarck, Napoleon III, and the Origins of the 
Franco-Prussian War (Madison: University of Wisconsin Press, 2001), p. 166.  
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Implications for theory. 
Historically, from the 19th through the 20th centuries, widespread loss aversion 
(Europe 1815-1853) transitioned to affective abandonment (Europe 1854~1880), to 
be followed more loosely by perceptual syndrome (pre-World War I and 
somewhat pre-World War II) and then intentional clarity (Cold War). This 
sequence of events may only be empirical and not necessarily theoretical. Long-
cycle theory of international relations might have something to offer here, but its 
theoretical underpinnings have been the subject of significant criticism.7 
Nevertheless, it is important to try to determine the signals that one systemic 
dynamic is changing to another if only, perhaps, to try to stem the degradation 
from peace to war. After examining the dynamics of widespread loss aversion 
and affective abandonment, three aspects deserve further consideration. First, 
unlike a number of constructivist accounts of the Concert of Europe,8 calls for a 
congress at times were not seen by the satisfied major powers as an opportunity 
                                                            
7 Joshua S. Goldstein, Long cycles: prosperity and war in the modern age (New 
Haven: Yale University Press, 1988); George Modelski, Long Cycles in World 
Politics (Seattle: University of Washington Press, 1985); Nathaniel Beck, “The 
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war: duration dependence in international conflict,” Conflict Management and 
Peace Science, vol. 12, no. 1 (1992), pp. 99-116; Richard Rosecrance, “Long cycle 
theory and international relations,” International Organization, vol. 41, no. 2 
(Spring 1987), pp. 283-301.  
8 See, for example, William H. Daugherty, “System Management and the 
Endurance of the Concert of Europe,” in Snyder and Robert Jervis, eds., Coping 
with Complexity in the International System (Boulder, CO: Westview Press, 
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to problem solve, but rather as an attempt by a revisionist power to upset the 
agreed upon status quo. Second, the reversion to isolationism on the part of a 
major power withdrew a safety net for the less secure powers and thus an 
important check against the flourishing of motivated biases based on affect as the 
bases for unilateral foreign policy actions. Finally, while ultimatums issued do 
not largely seem to have been heeded by target states, demands for compliance 
in perpetuity always failed in their purpose. One has to ask whether states would 
take such precipitate action in the absence of an understanding that third and 
fourth parties would provisionally back their legitimate interests, but put a check 
on illegitimate ones. If the answer is no, as I suspect that it is, then states that 
withdraw their support for defending the status quo have to expect that such 
dynamics are likely to flourish. I take up these issues in turn. 
The Vienna Treaties at the conclusion of the Napoleonic Wars were a 
grand bargain among the victorious major European powers. But Britain 
detested Austria’s repeated attempts to make Vienna the diplomatic center of the 
Concert. Thus, Castlereagh blocked Metternich’s effort to call a congress during 
the 1821 Greek crisis,9 while Palmerston refused an Austrian-inspired congress 
during the 1831 Eastern Question crisis.10 Nevertheless, eventually congresses 
successfully solved the Greek, Eastern Question, and Belgian, crises, respectively.  
                                                            
9 Schroeder, Metternich’s Diplomacy at its Zenith (New York: Greenwood Press, 
1969), pp. 251-66. 
10 Charles K. Webster, The Foreign Policy of Palmerston 1830-1841, vol. 1 (New 
York: Humanities Press, 1969), pp. 281-82. 
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France harbored revisionist ambitions, but nevertheless accepted 
responsibility for its previous aggression even as it continued to arouse some 
distrust throughout Europe.11 Foreign minister Russell’s rebuff of Napoleon III’s 
proposal in 1863 for a congress to consider the status of Poland as well as to 
review the 1815 settlement reveals displeasure at raising hopes and expectations 
that the status quo powers might be unable to gratify or suppress.12 An 1866 
proposal to call a congress was rebuffed because Britain considered it a French 
trap to commit London to the cession of Venetia by Austria to Italy.13 Since 
Austria agreed to the proposal provided that no territorial changes be allowed, 
France then lost interest in the project. More seriously, in 1859 Russia proposed 
that France call a congress to consider the disposition of Italy. It was proposed in 
order to mitigate German distrust of Napoleon. But the emperor acceded to the 
proposal, not to peaceably consider a revision of the Vienna Treaties, but to force 
Austria into war considering that the latter would be prevailed upon to make 
concessions. Moreover, Russia used the congress proposal as a means to keeping 
the war limited.14  
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An 1864 London conference was a sham proceeding in that Bismarck 
demanded and received a victor’s peace in annexing the Elbe Duchies. Moreover, 
he acceded to the conference in order to assuage the rest of Europe that he was 
upholding international law and the status quo even as he increased the intensity 
of his prosecution of war against Denmark.15 Still a congress was successfully 
called to conclude the Crimean War (Paris Treaty of 1856) and a conference 
defused the Luxembourg crisis (1867). Thus, the record of congresses and 
conferences in Europe from the period 1815-1870 is somewhat mixed; less 
successful after the advent of the Crimean War than before the war since a 
number of powers later developed motivated biases to promote their own 
interests rather than to solve problems in a manner congenial to the rest of the 
major powers, and perhaps even the minor powers as well. 
The change from widespread loss aversion to affective abandonment was 
marked by a series of events in which Britain, under various governments, 
isolated itself from Continental politics. This had the effect of removing a 
security guarantor and thus abetted the promotion of motivated biases on the  
part of France, Austria, and Prussia to seek security through unilateralism. 
During the early part of the Concert period, Britain under the direction of 
Palmerston in the foreign office, successfully aligned with France and thus 
restrained Louis-Phillipe from precipitate action to overturn the status quo. 
During the Belgian crisis, Palmerston gave the rest of Europe a security 
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guarantee against French aggression. Thus, the conservative powers refrained 
from contesting French and British military efforts to separate Belgium from the 
United Netherlands. Although this required a British threat of war should France 
not leave Belgium, the possibility of system-wide war was defused with Britain’s 
guarantee to the rest of Europe to restrain France. Again, in 1839 Palmerston 
threatened France if it did not desist in demanding better terms for its Egyptian 
renegade client Mehemet Ali, much to the relief of Russia. During the 1848 
revolutions, Palmerston was able to put an end to a plan for Prussian aggression 
against Russia over Poland with French military support and British neutrality. 
Moreover, he refused to allow Prussia to aid Schleswig and Holstein to revolt 
against Denmark. Finally, as noted above, he reframed the crisis in Austria over 
Italian revolt to give a measure of independence to Piedmont and Lombardy. 
This had the effect of allowing Napoleon III to remain both uninvolved and to 
retain popular support in France. 
The outcome of the Crimean War was the catalyst for separating the 
French from the British. Aberdeen failed to use Britain’s leverage in the Franco-
British relation to restrain Napoleon from prosecuting a disastrous war with 
Russia that none of the antagonists wanted to fight. Disillusionment with France 
led the British to withhold support for her attempt to aid the Poles against Russia 
and Prussia. In turn, France mistrusted Britain to the point that both refused to 
work together to deter Prussia and Austria from annexing the Elbe Duchies. This 
marks the point when Napoleon makes common cause with Bismarck as the 
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revisionist power on the Continent. Regarding the Austro-Prussian and Franco-
Prussian Wars, Britain adopts strict neutrality, thus allowing Prussia to 
aggressively unify Germany at the same time that Napoleon’s regime crumbles. 
Political observers in Britain saw that Napoleon was engaging in desperate and 
risky gambits to maintain himself in power, but there seemed to be no effort to 
connect Britain’s increasing isolation from Continental affairs to the emperor’s 
declining predicament. Moreover, Bismarck rightly came to believe that Britain 
need not count as an opponent in attempts to aggressively unify Germany.  
For its part, Britain was increasingly engaged in domestic problems, 
notably efforts at increasing the voting franchise. Moreover, foreign policy 
attention was more and more directed toward imperial ventures and problems 
within its empire. But thoughtful observers rightly saw that withdrawing from 
Continental affairs diminished Britain’s weight in having a voice internationally. 
Non-intervention was ultimately a losing game. Thus, from a self-interested 
perspective, continued intervention in Europe had much to recommend it. 
Palmerston was more clear-eyed than others. He wanted to see Germany 
organize in order to be an effective counterweight to the historically revisionist 
powers in Europe, France and Russia. But he was not taken in by arguments that 
Prussia would be a liberal bulwark against eastern authoritarianism. Both the 
influential diplomat Morier and Queen Victoria developed motivated biases to 
believe otherwise; the latter for familial dynastic reasons. But as it became 
obvious that Bismarck was co-opting liberalism in order to unify Germany from 
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above, arguments for continued non-intervention shifted from enthusiasm for 
the project to the belief that both Austria and France would prevail in any contest 
with Prussia. The lightning quick defeat of Austria by Prussia at Sadowa should 
have forced a reconsideration of Bismarck’s prospects by the British but it did 
not.  Thus, it was easy for Britain to continue to believe that its non-intervention 
was the correct policy choice even after evidence that it was spectacularly failing. 
In the two cases in which threats in the form of demands for future 
guarantees were issued, neither succeeded. Interestingly, both instances 
emanated, not from desperation, but from an overrating of the degree of leverage 
held by the issuer over its target audience. In the lead-up to the Crimean War, 
Nicholas appointed the arrogant and indiscreet Menshikov to intimidate the 
Sultan into revoking the decree (firman) granting new privileges to the French in 
the Holy Places. While this demand was legitimate because it asked for a return 
to the status quo, the tsar ratcheted up his demands. Menshikov thus demanded 
future compliance that no more disturbances would take place. Moreover, a 
convention (sened) was demanded in lieu of a mere firman. Orlov, the brilliant 
Russian diplomat, importuned his sovereign to satisfy himself with a return to 
the status quo. But Nicholas wanted the Sultan to cede control of twelve million 
Christians within the latter’s territorial purview. The tsar was thus demanding 
Turkish subservience to Russia in perpetuity, failing to understand that such a 
demand would never be acceded to by any major European power. Turkey had 
options and it thus refused Russia and petitioned for help from France and 
 513 
Britain, thus provoking the Crimean War.16 Nicholas suffered from defensive 
avoidance here, but in a somewhat weak form since he claimed to be cognizant 
of the need to back off from his demands should he encounter significant 
resistance. But the resistance that he had in mind was from the western powers 
and not from Turkey whom he gave little thought to.  
As noted above, the Franco-Prussian War was touched off when Gramont 
instructed ambassador Benedetti to demand of Wilhelm that not only would the 
latter publicly approve Leopold’s renunciation but also publicly promise that 
Leopold’s candidature for the Spanish throne never be raised again.17 Wilhelm 
earlier conceded to the first demand, but the latter demand for the future was 
impermissible because it encroached on his sovereign right to rule. Benedetti 
offered sage advice to Gramont to satisfy himself with this return to the status 
quo. But instead of being satisfied with scoring an astounding diplomatic success 
in exposing Bismarck’s machinations, the foreign minister overinterpreted the 
degree of leverage that he had in the situation, overreached, and then tumbled 
his nation into a disastrous war with Prussia. Gramont’s attitude here is a strong 
instance of defensive avoidance. 
In both instances cited, precipitate action was warned against by seasoned 
diplomats within both the tsar’s, and emperor’s, circle of advisors, respectively,  
but was rebuffed. Yet, in both instances, Russia and France were largely isolated. 
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Russia developed a motivated bias to believe that Britain would not object to its 
heavy-handed action, while France received warnings from the British, but no 
diplomatic support. Considering that two major power wars that should never 
have been fought erupted over these overreaches, the lack of third party checks 
to deter states from illegitimate demands was certainly costly in the final 
analysis. 
Relevance for current policy. 
The current world economic crisis, and in particular, the potential unraveling of 
the Eurozone, suffers from a number of dynamics similar to the shift from 
widespread loss aversion to affective abandonment examined here. Events are 
moving so fast that little confidence can be placed in any policy prescription. But 
the stakes are exceedingly high and thus elucidation of the similarities seems 
warranted.  
In an interconnected world economy, the United States would surely see 
any domestic recovery imperiled by an unraveling of the Eurozone, but it seems 
to be standing on the sideline due to fractiousness within the Congress to commit 
the U.S. to any significant problem-solving, both domestically and abroad. China 
seems to be the suitor of choice for any European bailout money since the U.S. 
seems to have absented itself. Still, one sees similarities in the diplomatic 
dynamics over the disposition of the Ottoman Empire prior to the Crimean War 
and the dynamics of the present crisis. Germany is as Britain was and France is 
as Russia was. The infelicitously dubbed PIIGS (Portugal, Ireland, Italy, Greece, 
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and Spain) seem akin to the declining Turkish Empire. As the most influential 
state in the Eurozone, Germany has steadfastly supported bailouts in trade for 
austerity measures taken in Greece. Italy is the third-largest, while France is the 
second-largest, economy, respectively, in the Eurozone. Italy is following the 
decline of Greece and now there are whispers that France may be next. Dubbed 
as the politics of ‘Merkozy,’ there is the presumption that German chancellor 
Merkel and French president Sarkozy have a common understanding of the 
status quo. This may not be so; Sarkozy’s recent comment that it was a mistake to 
allow Greece to join the Eurozone in 200118 merely throws gas on the fire. It is 
unclear why Sarkozy made the comment. Was he pandering to domestic 
displeasure? Or was he signaling to Germany that it might be better to 
precipitate the demise of the Eurozone, just as Russia did to Britain in the 1850s 
regarding the disposition of the Ottoman Empire? Or was Sarkozy directing his 
unfortunate comment to domestic and international audiences? Without a firmer 
understanding between France and Germany of the limits that both will go in 
order to keep the Eurozone together, unintended conflict between the two may 
occur. If France intends to precipitate the breakup of the Eurozone while 
Germany recognizes this as a distinct possibility, but will take determined steps 
to prevent it (analogously just as Russia and Britain conducted themselves 
regarding the Ottoman Empire), a chaotic transition may occur, thus certainly 
                                                            
18 “Nicolas Sarkozy: Greece should have been denied euro” 
bbc.co.uk/news/world-europe (October 28, 2011). 
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throwing the world economy back into recession and very possibly into 
depression. 
 While better communication between France and Germany is needed, the 
antidote of holding endless multilateral conferences may be counterproductive. 
In essence, talk has largely substituted for action such that many believe that 
Europe has been too dilatory in its response and thus may have run out of time 
to fix the problem. The lack of bold imaginative steps at the outset of the crisis 
has allowed the small technical steps of bailout money in trade for austerity 
measures to be outdated and insufficient as the problem begins to morph into 
possible wholesale default by major European economies. 
 It is doubtful that Germany could hold the Eurozone together by itself; it 
certainly would not have the domestic support to do so if put in that 
predicament. Thus, it is incumbent that the largest states with the most stake in 
the disposition of the Eurozone communicate frankly with each other and try to 
achieve a common understanding regarding the status quo that is quickly 
shifting beneath their collective feet. Otherwise, those states will largely go their 
own way and promote unilateral policy options based on affect in order to 
assuage domestic political opinion. Short-term risks will have been avoided only 
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Table 2:  Case Study Tests of Prospective Balance Theory. 
 
Br:  Britain F:  France R:  Russia A:  Austria Pr:  Prussia 
T:  Turkey S:  Sardinia P:  Poland  D:  Denmark I:  Italy      B: Belgium 
 
Systemic Dynamic: Widespread Loss Aversion 
 
Case Study Principal Phase  Endowment Certainty Insurance 
  State(s)   Effect  Principle Premium 
      Maintained? Followed? Character 
 
Greek Revolt   1 
(1821)      R    yes  not really conservative 
     Br/A      yes  yes  riskier 
      F    no  no  risky  
       2 
(1826)     R    not really no  riskier 
     F/Br   yes  yes  conservative 
 
Synopsis:  Russia defeats Turkey. An independent Greece is guaranteed by 
Russia, Britain, and France.    
 
Belgian Revolt (1830) 1    
   Br    no  no  ambiguous 
   F    no  no  riskier 
   R/Pr   yes  yes  conservative 
  2 
    Br    yes  yes  riskier 
    F    yes  yes  less risky  
    R/Pr   no  no  conservative 
 
Synopsis:  Holland attacks Belgium. Britain and France intervene and Holland is 
expelled from the newly independent Belgium.   
 
Turkish Revolts (1831) 1    
   R    yes  no  conservative 
   F    no  no  risky 
   Br/A   yes  yes  conservative 
 
(1839) 2 
   R    no  no  ambiguous 
   Br    no  no  ambiguous 
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   F    no→yes no→yes  risky→con 
 
Outcome:  Egypt attacks Turkey and is rebuffed by Russia. Turkey attacks Egypt, 
is defeated, but rescued by Russia. Egypt takes some gains.    
 
 
Italian Revolt (1848)  1 
  Br    no  no  conservative 
  A    yes→no yes→no risky→con 
  F    no→yes no→yes risky→con 
   2   
  Br    yes  yes  riskier→con 
  A    yes  no→yes risky→con 
  F    no  no  risky 
 
Synopsis:  Italy attacks Austria twice and is defeated both times. Britain 
convinces Austria to restore the status quo despite its victories. 
 
Systemic Dynamic: Affective Abandonment 
 
Case Study Principal Phase  Endowment Certainty Insurance 
  State(s)   Effect  Principle Premium 
      Maintained? Followed? (Lottery 
          Ticket) 
Character 
 
Don Pacifico Incident (1850) 
 Br  n/a  yes  no  risky 
  F    no  yes  conservative 
  R    no  yes  conservative 
 
Leiningen Mission (1851) 
A  n/a  no  no  risky  
  T    yes  no  risky 
 
Crimean War (1854)   1 
  F    no  no  risky 
  R    yes  yes  risky 
  Br    yes→no yes→no con→risky 






      2 
  F    no  yes  risky→con 
  R    no  yes  risky→con 
  Br    no  no  risky (LT) 
  T    yes  no  risky 
 
Synopsis:  Russia mistakenly believes that France and Britain cannot work 
together as a consequence of the Don Pacifico incident. Russia mistakenly 
believes that it can do what it pleases in the Ottoman Empire as a consequence of 
the Leiningen mission.  France humiliates Russia over the Holy Places dispute. 
Russia, in turn, humiliates Turkey with the Menshikov mission. France and 
Britain attack and barely defeat Russia in defense of Turkey. Turkey is admitted 
to the Concert of Europe. Russia loses the Romanian Principalities as well as the 
right to operate its navy on the Black Sea. 
 
Austro-Italian War (1859) 1 
  F    no  no  risky  
  S    no  no  risky 
  R    no  no  ambiguous 
  A    yes  yes  risky 
  Br    no  yes  riskier 
    2 
  F    no  no  risky (LT) 
  S    no  no  risky (LT) 
  R    no  ambiguous risky→con 
  A    yes  no  risky (LT) 
  Br    no  no  riskier→con 
 
Synopsis:  France and Sardinia contrive to attack Austria while Russia promises 
to ‘hold the ring’ for the aggressors. Austria refuses concessions and attacks 
Sardinia. Austria is defeated by Sardinia with French support. An independent 
Italy is declared with French and British diplomatic support. 
 
Bismarck’s Wars of Unification 
 
Second Polish Uprising 1 
(1863)    
  R    yes  no  conservative 
  P    no  yes  risky  
  Pr    no  no  risky 
  B    no  no  riskier  
  F    no  no  riskier 
  A    yes  yes  conservative 
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2 
  R    yes  no  riskier  
  P    no  no  risky  
  Pr    no  no  risky→con 
  B    yes  yes  riskier→con 
  F    no  yes  risky  
  A    yes  yes  conservative 
 
Synopsis:  Russia, in concert with Prussia, puts down a Polish revolt. Britain 
remonstrates Russia while France threatens Prussia. France then threatens Russia 
and finally, Austria. Britain refuses to support France and Russia successfully 
suppresses the Polish revolt. Russia is grateful to Prussia for its support. 
 
Danish War (1864)  1 
Pr    no  yes  risky  
A    no  yes  risky  
D    yes  no  risky  
Br    yes  no  conservative 
F    yes  no  conservative  
R    yes  yes  conservative 
2 
Pr    no  yes  risky  
  
A    no  yes  risky  
 D    yes  no  risky  
  Br    no  yes  con→risky 
  F     no  yes  con→risky 
  R     yes  yes  conservative 
 
Synopsis:  Denmark incorporates Schleswig. Prussia and Austria respond by 
occupying both Holstein and Schleswig. Britain, France, and Russia decline to 
intervene despite vocal support for the Danes from the former two states. France 
secretly asks for compensations from Prussia but is rebuffed. Prussia and Austria 
annex the two Elbe Duchies without dissent from the other major European 
powers. 
 
Austro-Prussian   1      
War (1866)   
Pr    no  yes  risky 
A    yes  yes  risky   
 R    no  yes  risky  
  Br     no  yes  risky  
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  F     no  yes  risky  
  I     no  yes  risky 
    2        
  Pr    no  yes  risky  
  A     yes  yes  risky (LT) 
  R     no  yes  risky  
  Br     no  yes  risky 
  F     no  yes  risky (LT) 
I    no  yes  risky 
 
Synopsis:  Austria mobilizes against Prussia due to the latter’s demand to annex 
the Elbe Duchies outright. Prussia dissolves the German Confederation and 
declares war on Austria. Austria defeats Italy at Custozza but is routed by 
Prussia at Sadowa. France asks for compensations from Prussia but is rebuffed. 
Prussia takes the Elbe Duchies and ejects Austria from Germany. 
 
Luxembourg   1 
Dispute (1867) 
  Pr    no  no  conservative 
  F     no  no  conservative 
  Br     no  no  conservative 
    2        
  Pr     yes  yes  riskier  
  F     no  no  risky  
  Br     no  no  conservative 
 
Belgian Railways  1 
Dispute (1868) 
  F    no  no  conservative 
  B     no  yes  conservative 
Br    no  no  conservative 
 Pr     yes  no  conservative 
   2        
 F     no  ambiguous con→risky 
 B     yes  yes  con→risky 
 Br     no  no  conservative 
 Pr     yes  no  conservative 
 
Synopsis:  France attempts to buy Luxembourg from Holland. Initially Prussia 
does not object but then publicly does so. France threatens war but is restrained 
by Britain. The issue is peaceably resolved when Luxembourg becomes a neutral 
power and Prussia removes the garrison there. France then petitions to buy two 
railways from Belgium in a purely commercial transaction. The Belgian 
government becomes alarmed and hostilities are threatened between the former 
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and France. Belgium finally retains the railways but pays an indemnity to France. 
Britain becomes increasingly estranged from France while Prussia believes that 
France is becoming self-deterred due to Prussian military power. 
 
Kaiser Project  n/a 
(1870)  Pr    yes  no  risky  
  F     yes  yes  risky 
 
Switzerland Railway n/a 
Project (1870) 
  Pr    no  yes  risky  
  F     yes  yes  risky 
 
Synopsis:  Prussia attempts to make its king the emperor of Germany. France 
threatens war. Additionally, Prussia angers France by financing a railway 
through Switzerland. Again, France is angered but backs down from war with 
Prussia. Prussia mistakenly believes that France is self-deterred. 
 
Franco-Prussian  1 
War (1870) 
  F    yes  yes  risky  
  Pr     no  yes  risky  
  Br     yes  yes  conservative 
  A     no  no  conservative 
  R     no  no  conservative 
  I     no  no  conservative 
    2        
  F     yes  yes  risky (LT) 
  Pr     yes  yes  ambiguous 
  Br     yes  yes  conservative 
  A     no  no  conservative 
  R     no  no  conservative 
  I     no  no  conservative 
 
Synopsis:  Prussia attempts to install a German ruler on the Spanish throne. 
France objects and Prussia rescinds the offer. France wants a guarantee that the 
candidature will never be raised again to which Prussia refuses. France declares 
war on Prussia but is routed at Sedan. Prussia annexes Alsace and Lorraine as 
compensation, thus estranging France from Prussia. 
